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E quelli a me: “Qui son li eresïarche
con lor seguaci, d’ogne setta, e molto
piú che non credi son le tombe carche.”
—Dante, The Inferno
“These are the arch-heretics of all cults,
with all their followers,” he replied. “Far more
than you would think lie stuffed into these vaults.”
—Translated by John Ciardi
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What follows is an intellectual history of the origins of British modern-
ism. The nature of modernism constantly shifts, within its own purview, and 
within criticism, and this interdisciplinary study embraces such dynamic 
elusiveness. Aesthetic complexities abound, history is continuous and rup-
tured at once, and religious concerns, in their very nature, tend to mystify 
certainty. At the same time, this book is an attempt at a synthesis of the 
discursive history of modernism, and as such it addresses the modernists 
in the terms of their own ambitions. For in the late Victorian, Edwardian, 
and High Modernist times, intellectuals faced the dying belief in a totalizing 
synthesis of the world. Many fought against a plunge into incoherence and 
fragmentation in their attempts at universalizing theories or in their inven-
tion of substitute aesthetic devices. From the 1880s through the 1920s, the 
discursive exchange among artists, philosophers, and religious thinkers that 
initially sought to synthesize worldviews culminated in the pragmatic con-
struction of modernist artificial or “synthetic” wholes. This is a story of the 
British modernists and a study of their work, and, even at a cursory glance, 
it raises the following questions: What do Virginia Woolf ’s notion of char-
acter and Walter Pater’s curious interest in the Mona Lisa share? What does 
a cadre of renegade priests have in common with the control of language in 
George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four? What sort of thread weaves together 
Joan of Arc, The Golden Bough, and the advent of New Criticism? What link, 
beyond a mere study of statistics, connects compulsory chapel attendance at 
Cambridge with Keynesian economic theory? The answer to each of these 
queries is, in a word, heresy. The claim may seem bold and tenuous at first, 
but this common denominator underpins a forgotten dimension of the ori-
gins of modernism, one deeply entrenched in Victorian blasphemy and the 
Preface
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crisis in faith, and one pointing to the censorship of modernist literature and 
some of the first doctrines of literary criticism.
 In April 1933, Hitler promulgated the policies of National Socialism, FDR 
was in the midst of the first hundred days of the New Deal, and T. S. Eliot 
traveled to the University of Virginia to deliver a series of lectures denounc-
ing the modernist trend to insert the “diabolical” into literature. Though 
paltry in comparison to these worldly affairs, Eliot’s lectures, which would 
be published as After Strange Gods: A Primer of Modern Heresy (1934), are 
not as disparate as they may seem. Each platform positioned itself as a cor-
rective to unwanted turns in twentieth-century history. Eliot’s self-righteous 
primer sought to teach readers how to discern whether an author wrote with 
a “proper” moral sense, and in such matters, he declared that “a spirit of 
excessive tolerance” was “to be deprecated” (20). April that year indeed was 
the cruelest month. For Eliot, orthodoxy could and should modernize tradi-
tion, which he claimed “implies a unity of religious background” and “makes 
any large-number of free-thinking Jews undesirable” (20). The next winter 
fed a little life to tolerance when the U.S. Congress repealed Prohibition, and 
Judge John Woolsey overturned the censorship, on obscenity charges, of 
James Joyce’s Ulysses (1922).
 Critics have handily debunked the intolerance, myopia, and anti-Semi-
tism of Eliot’s claims, and Eliot himself later disavowed many of the senti-
ments expressed in After Strange Gods. Nevertheless, the question remains: 
why would a major critic of the time frame modernist literature in terms 
of heresy? In answer, I find myself in accord with Eliot on three premises: 
religion is recurrently an important subject; heresy treats it as such; and 
scholars are responsible for confronting literary engagements with religion. 
At the same time, criticism handicaps itself if it assumes the rectitude of any 
orthodoxy and simply dismisses the opposition as wrong, or, as Eliot did, 
offers a sketchy and polemical moralization. In 1933, though, authoritarian 
answers won the day, and many modernists found themselves at the pulpit of 
prophecy, largely because for fifty years heretical discourses had confounded 
traditional accounts of the world. Part of Eliot’s frustration with modernism 
arises from this and from the fact that he could only define heresy as “wrong” 
and a characteristic result of “an exceptionally acute perception, or profound 
insight, of some part of the truth” (26).
 For purposes of this study, heresy should be understood, to quote the 
OED, both as “religious opinion or doctrine maintained in opposition . . . to 
that of any church, creed, or religious system, considered as orthodox,” and 
“by extension, opinion or doctrine in philosophy, politics, art, etc., at vari-
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ance with those generally accepted as authoritative.” Since the modernists 
accentuated the use of religious images, concepts, and festivals in their art, 
heresy, for them, shuttled with ease between religion and aesthetics. Religion 
and philosophy, conversely, never can escape the poetics of language. Heresy 
from 1883 to 1924, therefore, should be understood liberally, in that it was 
both a common interdisciplinary discursive mode and a rallying cry for the 
general critique of establishmentarian positions. Etymologically, “heresy” 
means a “choice one makes” or a “school of thought,” and a guiding principle 
for my investigations is to ask what happens when conflicting value systems 
or scholarly disciplines are placed in dialogue with each other.
 While heresy usually arises over differing interpretations of scripture 
or doctrine, often the interdicted discourse eventually becomes tolerated 
or even made orthodox. From 1883 to 1924 (a utilitarian demarcation 
explained in the introductory chapter), the prominent modernist heresy 
involved an attempt to syncretize contradictory schools of thought in resolu-
tions which would theoretically dissolve the distinction between orthodoxies 
and their contestation. Such a paradox saw synthesis itself become almost 
the de rigueur mode of transgression. Theory and criticism evolve through 
synthesis, and this study hopes to offer its own progressive dialectic of vary-
ing “schools of thought.” By linking rigorous textual analysis with reception 
theory and the examination of interwoven cultural discourses, particularly 
those of the Cambridge Heretics Society, 1909–32, I argue that the litera-
ture and culture treated here reveal a modernist sensibility influenced by 
theological concerns yet committed to the liberation of the body, women’s 
rights, and the concerns of “this world.” Such a pluralistic view of the world 
is antithetical to the intransigence of orthodoxy. From 1883 to 1924, though, 
heretical discursive modes were still able to underwrite significant religious 
debates and literary dramatizations of religious questions. The heretical dis-
courses discussed in what follows still teach us about the need and reward 
for encouraging and defending dissent, tolerance, and diversity.
 My narrative of the Cambridge Heretics Society intersects with virtually 
all strands of modernist thought. Founded by C. K. Ogden at Cambridge 
University in 1909, the Heretics witnessed, until the Society’s dissolution in 
1932, an impressive and diverse set of lectures by scores of influential mod-
ernists. There are the philosophers, Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore, James 
McTaggart, Ludwig Wittgenstein. John Maynard Keynes stood at the fore-
front of the Economics Section. Bernard Shaw was perhaps the most famous 
literary figure. Jane Harrison brought cultural anthropology into the fold. 
But if you were to name any famous modernist figure from W. B. Yeats to 
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E. M. Forster to F. T. Marinetti to Marie Stopes, it is remarkable how many 
were members of the Heretics or in dialogue with this group. This fascinating 
slice in time has been overlooked by criticism this far, and my discourse his-
tory of this discussion society draws connections between heresy and these 
major modernist figures, especially those associated with the Bloomsbury 
group. In particular, I examine how Lytton Strachey, Clive Bell, and Virginia 
Woolf used Moore’s influential Principia Ethica (1903) to steer modernist 
thinkers toward aesthetics and away from social and political concerns. The 
history of the Heretics has been an untold story, and recuperating the work 
of the many famous modernist personalities involved in the group leads to a 
new genealogy of modernism and its champion, New Criticism. In fact, I. A. 
Richards and William Empson were Heretics, and this influence can be seen 
in their early works Principles of Literary Criticism (1925) and Seven Types of 
Ambiguity (1930). These were modernist primers of critical heresy, and Eliot 
had to respond with his treatise.
 In illustrating the discursive continuities between 1883 and 1924 through 
my analysis of heresy, I am positioning Modernist Heresies against stratifying 
and reductive periodization of Victorianism and modernism by tracing the 
dialectic of heresy and orthodoxy, and the pragmatic shifting of both hetero-
dox and authoritative discourses. From Captain Cuttle’s refrain in Dickens’ 
Dombey and Son (1848) “overhaul the catechism” (182ff.) to the self-reflexive 
dictum in Joyce’s Finnegans Wake (1939) “Renove that bible” (579.10), proto-
modernists and modernists made extensive renovations to religious thought 
without removing tradition. The many cultural and literary instances of her-
esy and synthesis establish continuities between Victorian blasphemy and 
modernist obscenity, and I show that the mode of heresy shifts over the 
course of this time from one of syncretism to one based on discretionary 
“choices.” As Althusser and Jameson suggest, current literary history should 
strive to produce the “concept” of its object.
 While I trace the same historical trajectory of heretical discourses in 
the two parts of Modernist Heresies, Part I focuses on cultural phenomena, 
and Part II on literary manifestations. The introduction foregrounds the 
construction and reading of heresy in modernist literature, the “synthetic” 
approach of the Edwardians, and the modernist development of works of 
art which were putatively self-contained “wholes.” As an illustrative context 
for this study, a brief examination of the “modernist” crisis in the Catholic 
Church introduces the debates under consideration here and generates a 
suggestive set of implications for the literature of the period. The “modern-
ist” clergymen had tried to reconcile Church doctrine with the results of 
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nineteenth-century German higher criticism, the array of historical “Life of 
Jesus” studies, and evolutionary thought. To date, modernism has been the 
last heresy condemned by the Vatican, and in 1907 Pope Pius X in fact used 
a phrase emblematic of the historical context in denouncing modernism as 
“a synthesis of all heresies.”
 Part I considers the Cambridge Heretics Society as a cultural phenome-
non, and examines the birth of the Heretics, the administrative work of C. K. 
Ogden, and several addresses given to the Society. Through an examination 
of the papers of major figures in the Society and of other archival material, 
I seek to provide a thorough account of the Heretics, and demonstrate that 
these artists, academics, and philosophers central to defining the intellec-
tual climate of the time found in heresy an intellectual frame for their own 
activity. According to its regulations, the objective of the Heretics was “to 
promote discussion on problems of religion, philosophy, and art,” and the 
members rejected “traditional a priori methods of approaching religious 
questions.” As a history of the Heretics Society, my account moves from its 
humble epistolary inception after what was known as the “Prove All Things” 
controversy, to Woolf ’s dismissal of the Edwardians in her address “Mr. Ben-
nett and Mrs. Brown,” to Empson’s presidency of the Heretics in 1928–29, 
when he began writing Seven Types of Ambiguity with what Christopher 
Norris describes as a “‘heretic’ outlook” (Philosophy 4). Originating in the 
Edwardian period, the discussions of the Heretics Society illustrate how 
the discourse surrounding heresy continued through the 1920s, the time of 
“High” Modernism in literature.
 Beginning Part II, the fourth chapter discusses the historical reception 
of heresy while considering the debate between Shaw and G. K. Chester-
ton at the Heretics Society, Shaw’s play Saint Joan (1924), and the figure of 
Giordano Bruno. In his play, Shaw draws on his address before the Heretics 
and recasts heresy as a positive value and claims that religion must even-
tually respond to an evolving world since he believes “the law of God is a 
law of change” (38). Shaw sees “the law of change” as underwritten by the 
gradual reception of heretics and other people he considers forward-minded 
thinkers and doers. The figure of Joan of Arc presents a unique composite 
illustrative of historical revaluation, for Joan is successively perceived as a 
hero, a heretic, and finally a saint. The hegemony of orthodoxy comes to the 
foreground in my discussion of the processes of canonization, rehabilitation, 
and accommodation used by the Catholic Church in its treatment of her. 
Additionally, in this chapter, I discuss Bruno’s recuperation from 1883 to 
1924 by scholars, writers, and Italian nationalists who saw him as a martyred 
Franke_final.indb   15 1/28/2008   4:39:45 PM
xvi P R E FAC E
prophet of the synthetic agenda; the literary use of his pantheism as a means 
to explore paganism; and the aesthetic development of his leading modernist 
disciple, James Joyce.
 Chapter 5 explores the prevalence of the heresy of syncretism in the 
portrayal of paganism in late Victorian and Edwardian literature. As a com-
mon ideological structuring element, paganism arises in literature due to the 
prominent historical sense cultivated by the modernist clergy, evolutionists, 
and cultural anthropologists. The historical study of religion uncovered the 
buried pagan past in much of Christianity, and literature by Walter Pater 
and Thomas Hardy exploited this connection. Syncretic heresies require 
paganism as a supplement and use it as a primary structuring device. As if 
not wanting to be left out of the discussion, literary paganism undermines 
orthodox interpretations and foregrounds competing visions of the world. 
Chapter 6 begins with an examination of the place of religion in the devel-
opment of English as a discipline. After a discussion of the appropriation of 
I. A. Richards’ heterodox ideas by New Criticism, I analyze D. H. Lawrence’s 
use of synthesis, simile, and the sublime to construct a heresy of the doctrine 
of transfiguration in The Rainbow (1915). The chapter ends with a coda for 
this literary history by sketching T. S. Eliot’s and E. M. Forster’s polarized 
play with etymology in The Waste Land (1922) and A Passage to India (1924). 
Linguistic roots become the site at which religious discourses are included or 
excluded.
 In the Afterword, I return to Ogden, the founder of the Heretics Society, 
with a discussion of his development of Basic English, a universal language 
he later espoused as a product of “orthology.” After analyzing his translation 
of an excerpt from Finnegans Wake into Basic, I relate Ogden’s preoccupation 
with eliminating ambiguity in language to its reflection in George Orwell’s 
Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949). Basic English and Orwell’s Newspeak share 
many similarities, and I read Orwell’s dystopic novel and the  “compendium 
of all the heresies” within the book as a response to Ogden’s orthodox turn 
and as a statement on the continued need for heresy. What gradually comes 
clear in this literary history is that the displacement of heresy into political 
and linguistic realms also reflects the relative decline of heresy as a religious 
issue.
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Sections of Chapter 5 have been previously published in somewhat differ-
ent form. “The ‘Curious’ Pagan Spirit of Pater’s The Renaissance” appears in 
Nineteenth-Century Prose 31.1 (Spring 2004): 170–90; reprinted by permis-
sion of Barry Tharaud, Editor and Publisher. “Hardy’s Ur-Priestess and the 
Phases of a Novel” appears in Studies in the Novel, v. 39, no. 2, Summer 2007, 
copyright © 2007 by the University of North Texas; reprinted by permission 
of the publisher.
 Virginia Woolf ’s letter of 22 August 1929 to Julian Trevelyan is repro-
duced with permission of the Society of Authors as the Literary Representa-
tive of the Estate of Virginia Woolf. Extracts from the Chawner papers are 
made with the permission of the Master and Fellows of Emmanuel College 
Cambridge. For permission to quote from other material, I thank the Mas-
ter and Fellows of Trinity College Cambridge; the Syndics of Cambridge 
University Library, the Department of Special Collections; Young Library, 
University of California, Los Angeles; and the William Ready Division of 
Archives and Research Collections, McMaster University. The archivists at 
these libraries have been invaluable, and I am very grateful for their gracious 
assistance. Special thanks are due to Kathleen Garay and Carl Spadoni of 
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the archives of the Heretics Society.
 I am also in debt to the T. Anne Cleary, Frederick F. Seely, and Seashore 
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archives. This book would never have been written without the encourage-
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John Bishop has been an inspiration in both his teaching and his collegiality. 
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In Thomas Hardy’s last novel, Jude the Obscure (1895), when Jude Fawley 
first acknowledges the complete frustration of his desire to matriculate at 
university and become an Anglican minister, he recognizes himself to have 
been a foolish dreamer, draws comparison to some poetic lines of Heinrich 
Heine, and begins to see Christminster in a new light. He acutely feels the lit-
eral blindness of his first night there when, impassioned by the fruition of his 
long-sought arrival, he caressed the contours of the buildings in the dark, as 
if the city were his newfound Jerusalem. However, Jude’s gradual disillusion-
ment with his career prospects actually confirms his initial perception of the 
university town in which it “seemed impossible that modern thought could 
house itself in such decrepit and superseded chambers” (64). With the heavy 
touch of Hardy’s use of fate and fatalism, Jude also finds his cousin Sue in 
Christminster, who consoles him by dismissively noting that the “intellect at 
Christminster is new wine in old bottles” (120). As she uses the phrase from 
Matthew to admonish academia “to put new wine into fresh skins” (9:17), 
Sue at once condemns the university and indirectly reflects Hardy’s narrative 
desire to synthesize traditional and modern thought, the flesh and the spirit, 
form and content.
 Jude touched a nerve deeply rooted in the late Victorian consciousness, 
and the issues the novel raised challenged orthodoxy on several levels and 
elicited a general and vague fear of change. William E. Buckler points out 
the influence of Matthew Arnold’s thought on the novel, and he suggests that 
Sue’s biblical allusion recalls Arnold’s essay on Heine, which had included the 
Introduction
•
The Heretical Vintage 
of Modernism
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same reference in a description of “the awakening of the modern spirit” and 
its revolt against archaic dogmas and customs:
The want of correspondence between the forms of modern Europe and its 
spirit, between the new wine of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and 
the old bottles of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, or even of the sixteenth 
and seventeenth, almost every one now perceives; it is no longer dangerous to 
affirm that this want of correspondence exists; people are even beginning to 
be shy of denying it. To remove this want of correspondence is beginning to be 
the settled endeavour of most persons of good sense (109).1
This attempt to harmonize form and content dominated the “modern spirit” 
from 1883 to 1924 and explicitly challenged orthodox tradition and custom. 
In a strategy similar to the writing praxis T. S. Eliot commends in “Tradition 
and the Individual Talent,” a new religious discourse often will draw subver-
sively on extant traditions and the resultant heresy will function as old wine 
in new bottles. Arguing that heresy is a configuration repeated in various 
fictions of modernism, Modernist Heresies illustrates that this interdicted 
discourse is a critical part of the modernist gestalt, preoccupying its thought 
and underwriting its forms. Modernism owes much of its legacy to the liter-
ary, religious, and academic heretics discussed herein.
 Hardy’s and Arnold’s use of the enological metaphor speaks to the fer-
mentation during these years of a ubiquitous methodological approach used 
by these self-styled heretics in developing a coherent historical sense of aes-
thetics and metaphysics. While confronting the developments in natural sci-
ence, linguistics, and cultural anthropology, artists, clerics, and philosophers 
sought to advance humanitarian concerns without having to forsake the past. 
Sniffing to nose out what was age-worthy, the modernists opened everything 
they could find in the cellar of history. The questioning of the nature of tradi-
tion and orthodoxy (what exactly was the old cultural “wine”?) engendered 
the rise of various heresies as alternative options and led to large-scale reper-
cussions in the modernist reinvention of tradition.
 As the biblical passage suggests, the new cannot be funneled wholesale 
into the old, e.g., the “good news” of New Testament spirituality needed 
accommodating new ritual forms. Anglicanism perhaps is the grandest 
example of a religion changing its fundamental tenets while retaining old 
ritual forms. In the eyes of Roman Catholicism, Anglicanism is therefore a 
revolutionary heresy. Sue’s diagnosis of Christminster reflects this result of 
the Reformation and parallels Cardinal Newman’s implication during the 
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Oxford Movement that Anglicanism is an untenable form of new wine in 
old bottles. Amid the “spectres” of the Oxford Movement haunting the uni-
versity, Sue recoils from the persistent stultifying effects of the Church of 
England. In making a variant recension of the New Testament, Sue manifests 
the religious preoccupation of the time by packaging an old spirituality in a 
new form. As she tells Jude of her “new New Testament,” she made it “by cut-
ting up all the Epistles and Gospels into separate brochures, and re-arranging 
them in chronological order as written.” Sue maintains that “people have no 
right to falsify the Bible,” and that reading her truer new version “afterwards 
made it twice as interesting as before, and twice as understandable” (121).
 Similarly Jude the Obscure as a whole achieves a heresy that pushes sub-
sequent literary experiments to attempt further syntheses that avoid both 
orthodoxy and a nihilistic avant-garde. In the novel, Hardy had discovered 
that collocating the dual Bildungsromans of Jude and Sue, with their oppo-
sitional trajectories, presented a formal suspension of the problem of time 
by using two mutually obliterating storylines to show how religious values 
change throughout history. Sue’s conversion and Jude’s fall emblematize two 
heretical and historical threads—the rise of Christianity out of pagan antiq-
uity and the advent of modern secularization. The narrative tension between 
the two is like the “intellect in Christminster,” one religious impulse “pushing 
one way,” one “the other; and so they stand stock-still, like two rams butting 
each other” (120). However, the ressentiment fermenting in this “stock-still” 
narrative creates unstable readerly effects felt in the explosive reaction to the 
novel. Hardy could hold these inverse storylines in balance as two versions 
of historical teleology of different but equal merit, interest, and problematic 
effect; the readers of Jude could not abide the heretical implications.
 New ways to synthesize oppositional modes of thought abound in lit-
erature of this period, but major critical works also employed a similar and 
more direct method. Balance is the keynote of Nietzsche’s The Birth of Trag-
edy (1872) and its English counterpart, Arnold’s “Hellenism and Hebraism” 
(1869). James Frazer’s The Golden Bough (1890–1915), William James’ The 
Varieties of Religious Experience (1902), and Emile Durkheim’s The Elemen-
tary Forms of the Religious Life (1915) all sought to reconcile religious dif-
ference with a universalizing theory. T. S. Eliot’s essays, “Tradition and the 
Individual Talent” (1919) and “Ulysses, Order and Myth” (1923) advocated 
a mode of writing that synthesized past and present by affirming tradition. 
Georg Lukacs’ The Theory of the Novel (1915–16) points to Dostoevsky’s fic-
tion as a resolution of the oppositional and incomplete forms, abstract ideal-
ism and the romanticism of disillusionment, which plagued the genre since 
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its progenitor, the epic, no longer corresponded to an integrated civilization. 
As Michael Levenson states in A Genealogy of Modernism (1984), “[o]ne of 
the most notable features of the period was the continuity between genres 
and between disciplines, the self-conscious attempt to construct a unified 
theory of modernity” (viii).
 In varying significance, synthesis as an ideal became vital to various 
influential modernist schools of painting, economics, philosophy, drama, 
and literary criticism. As a reaction to the pointillism or divisionism of 
Seurat and his circle, Paul Gauguin, along with Emile Bernard, launched 
a school of “Synthesism” in art, before moving to Tahiti to paint primitiv-
ist themes often with Christian titles. In the preface to the catalog for the 
famous 1910–11 Post-Impressionist exhibit in London, Desmond MacCar-
thy explained that the “primitive art” of Cezanne, Gauguin, and Van Gogh 
seeks a pure self-expression in relating to the subject, one which can be hin-
dered by devotion to representation. Therefore, these “Synthesists,” a term 
which expresses “a quality underlying their diversity,” “simplify the drawing 
and painting” and aim “at synthesis in design” (101). MacCarthy argues that 
this approach means that the artist “is prepared to subordinate consciously 
his power of representing the parts of his picture as plausibly as possible, to 
the expressiveness of the whole design” (101).
 John Maynard Keynes, MacCarthy’s fellow traveler in the Bloomsbury 
Group, founded his inductive approach to economic theory on synthetic a 
priori truths, synthetic in that substantive truths attach a predication beyond 
their simple expression. G. E. Moore’s influential study of ideal “goods,” Prin-
cipia Ethica (1903), a Bloomsbury bible, championed a synthesis in human 
relations and the appreciation of art. In 1915, F. T. Marinetti called for a 
Futurist Synthetic Theater that would “compress into a few minutes, into 
a few words and gestures, innumerable situations, sensibilities, ideas, sen-
sations, facts, and symbols” (124). As the action unfolds on a fixed and 
constant stage, a chaotic simultaneity putatively could convey the pulse of 
“life.” During the 1920s, I. A. Richards developed a critical methodology for 
unpacking analogous complex relations within poetry that creates an “equi-
librium of opposed impulses.” For Richards, to organize reading literature 
by “synthesis” and “inclusion” widens the possibilities of experience, and 
“the experience of great poetry” can beget “moments of completed being.” 
The heterogeneity of a synthetic, inclusive poem exposes “more facets of the 
mind” and lends itself to “ironic contemplation, “a characteristic of poetry 
of the “highest order” (Principles 249–52). The synthetic, heretical vintage 
of modernism in the years from 1883–1924 suggests the last gasp of a wide-
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spread belief in a unified world.
 To speak of heresy in the modern world may initially have the ring of 
anachronism, conjuring up images of the Inquisition or the auto-da-fé. The 
decided religious associations of heresy seem to have had their import out-
moded by the advance of the scientific method and the exponential growth 
of academic disciplines. Such intellectual perspectives nevertheless ignore 
the struggles of those who fought against the oppression of orthodoxy. More-
over, during the key transitional period in Britain from 1883 to 1924, religion 
still held popular sway in determining the values and customs implicit in 
social interaction and personal responsibility. The significance and cultural 
context of religion in the late Victorian and Edwardian periods need to be 
recognized in order to understand the strategy and philosophy by which 
heterodox literature challenged orthodoxy while still including religious tra-
dition in its discourses.
 As a study of heresy and paganism in Britain during this period, Modern-
ist Heresies employs a genealogical mode of discourse analysis to explore the 
material history of religion and the literary experiments that accompany the 
changes of modern thought. As such, this work addresses the ideological 
questions of literary and cultural texts by discussing how people thought of 
religion and morality in the later part of the nineteenth century and the begin-
ning of the twentieth, and how and why those conceptions have changed. 
While heresy and heterodox uses of paganism are of central import here, 
these discourses function not to negate the value of religious experience, 
but rather to ponder competing visions of the world and social relations. 
In general adversity to conventional opinion and orthodox doctrine, heresy 
defines the British cultural climate from 1883–1924 and commonly appears 
in literature as a discursive trope. In its desire to work within extant systems 
and blend traditional and modern thought, heresy through its synthesis and 
syncretism functions as a discourse in the logic of modernism. Two cultural 
movements reinforce the literary analyses discussed herein: the modern-
ist crisis within the Catholic Church, and the Cambridge Heretics Society 
(1909–32). Since several highly influential figures of the modernist literati 
were members of the Heretics or in dialogue with the group, heresy also 
becomes crucial to an understanding of modernist aesthetics and ethics.
 In considering the loaded term “heresy” and the cultural play it enjoyed 
during this period, it is obviously useful to scan reactions within organized 
religion itself. The late Victorian and Edwardian attempt at synthesis was 
also part of the “modernist” movement in the Catholic Church, which Pope 
Pius X (1835–1914) nonetheless vehemently defined as heretical in 1907. In 
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the “modernist crisis,” the Vatican fought its last major battle over heretical 
doctrine. The attempt to harmonize religious dilemmas and oppositions is 
certainly not a new one, dating at least from those banned and burnt heretics 
Pico della Mirandola (1463–94) and Giordano Bruno (1548–1600). How-
ever, an examination of the modernist crisis accentuates the central debates 
under consideration here and generates a suggestive set of implications for 
the literature of the period.
 The modernist clergymen tried to reconcile Church doctrine with the 
results of nineteenth-century German higher criticism, the array of histori-
cal “Life of Jesus” studies, and evolutionary thought. What each of these 
modes of thought had done was to expose contradictions within scripture, 
between scripture and tradition, or between Genesis and geology. For exam-
ple, Ernest Renan’s La Vie de Jésus (1863) questions the sanctity of the Gos-
pels by claiming that the life of Jesus was only exemplary in its humanity. In 
Catholic orthodox eyes, modernism was a heresy since it questioned the bib-
lical canon and the validity of the Gospels as the Word of God. Modernists 
such as the French cleric Alfred Loisy challenged the historicity of Christ and 
the immutable nature of the canon, and in Britain, George Tyrrell and Baron 
Freidrich von Hügel embraced history and appealed to the Catholic Church’s 
amenability to change over time. In 1907, for instance, Tyrrell published his 
treatise Through Scylla and Charybdis, which sought to steer Christianity 
between the rock of Catholic tradition and the whirlpool of modern thought 
by presenting the human mind as a synthetic site capable of paradoxically 
accommodating these two separate spheres of thought.
 With the rise of scientific and historical methods in scholarship, some 
members of the Church felt that the representation of the life of Christ 
needed to be reevaluated since the disciples were subject to the same pitfalls 
as all historians. Moreover, these modernists believed that the Christian 
faith could be reinvigorated if doctrine was revised to conform to modern 
scholarship. In effect, the modernists deployed evolutionary theory and the 
idea of an ever-becoming world for their own pious purposes. The Church 
could evolve over time too. In response, however, the Vatican authorized an 
organization of spies, the Sodalitium Pianium, to out “modernists”; even-
tually excommunicated several of the “modernist” clergymen; and placed 
their works on the Index of Prohibited Books. During the late Victorian 
and Edwardian periods in England, an analogous attempt at synthesis pre-
occupied the work of religious scholars who sincerely engaged Darwinian 
thought and the developments in biblical hermeneutics. From the controver-
sial bestseller Essays and Criticism (1860) to Edmund Gosse’s Father and Son 
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(1907), liberal Protestantism in England grew to share the same concerns 
with the progressive Catholic modernists. When the Vatican labeled this 
thought “heresy” in 1907, the Cambridge Heretics Society quickly assembled 
a wide variety of avant-garde thinkers who proudly chose the interdiction as 
a sobriquet.
 As a result of the modernist use of “scientific criticism,” the clergy had 
to scramble to counter the perceived threat to the immutability of Christian 
dogma. Initially, the Vatican’s response to these contradictions chiefly came 
in the form of the declaration of papal infallibility at the Vatican Coun-
cil in 1870, and in the promotion of a Thomistic scholasticism defined by 
its opposition to modernist thought. In 1893, Pope Leo XIII moved away 
from both his encouragement of intellectual pursuits within the Church 
and his conciliatory measures toward the modernists. He further cham-
pioned Thomistic scholasticism, and his Providentissimus Deus reminded 
clerics to revere scripture and avoid “the fallacies of science” (Kurtz 43). The 
modernist clerics continued to pursue their rigorous biblical hermeneutics, 
albeit more cautiously. Then on December 17, 1903, Pius X initiated what 
his more liberal predecessor had not been willing to do; he brought to the 
foreground the heresy of “modernism” within the Church by authorizing a 
decree of The Holy Office placing five works of Loisy on the Index of For-
bidden Books. Appealing to the working class, Pius called for a return to 
traditions and a reaction against scientific advances. Finally, in the summer 
of 1907, he issued two encyclicals which sealed the fate of the Catholic mod-
ernists. First, in July, the Lamentabili Sane Exitu condemned sixty-five mod-
ernist propositions which pointed out specific inconsistencies in the Bible 
and challenged Church authority and infallibility. Many of the propositions 
reflected the common modernist thread of emphasizing the evolving nature 
of the Church, humanity, and the canon. Finally, in September, Pius X issued 
the encyclical, Pascendi Dominici Gregis, which condemned “modernism” 
as a “synthesis of all heresies” (89). The Pascendi asserted the Vatican’s duty 
bestowed by Christ onto it through apostolic succession to guard against 
“enemies,” even those “in her very bosom,” with “the greatest vigilance the 
deposit of the faith” (Carlen 89; 71).
 In condemning the modernist school of thought as the “synthesis of all 
heresies,” the Pascendi built on the associative labeling of the Lamentabili and 
made the modernist school of thought more coherent than it actually was. 
In this ironic slice of rhetoric, the encyclical used a synthesis of its own to 
proscribe the synthetic turn of the century climate. In fact, the decree further 
suggested that modernist doctrines only appeared self-contradictory, “with-
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out order and systematic arrangement,” when in fact these were the result 
of a deliberate plan to effect “the mutual separation of science and faith” 
(Carlen 72; 78). The unilateral homogenization of the work of highly diver-
gent modernist clerics enabled the Church to denounce them all in one bold 
paraphrastic stroke. As George Orwell illustrates with the “compendium of 
all the heresies” in Nineteen Eighty-Four (15), one effective method used by 
orthodoxy to contain heresies is to lump them together in one denuncia-
tion. Umberto Eco’s The Name of the Rose (1980) suggests that this has been 
a long-held stratagem of orthodoxy because “[t]o present to the eyes of the 
people a single heresy . . . shows the heretic as one jumble of diabolical con-
tradictions which offend common sense” (200). In the Pascendi, Rome had 
misleadingly fashioned modernism into a grand conspiracy that defined 
Catholic orthodoxy simply by opposition. In particular, Pius X opposed both 
the modernists’ use of reason solely for analyzing natural phenomena, and of 
their notion of a “vital immanence,” which manifests a need for divinity and 
creates a “special sentiment” that possesses “the reality of the divine” (Carlen 
73). As William James’ The Varieties of Religious Experience had posited a few 
years earlier, the modernists emphasized the roles of lived experience and the 
psyche or conscience in creating and confirming faith.
 In addition to an influential dialogue with advances in psychology, what 
modernism in the Catholic Church and literary modernism shared was the 
basic philosophical tenet that individuals can judge truth and the good based 
on their own experiences without deference to custom and orthodoxy. One 
of the definitive laws of the Heretics Society captures this mindset; members 
had to “reject traditional a priori methods of approaching religious ques-
tions” (see table 1 in chapter 1). Drawing on the Church’s recent ostracism of 
“modernism,” James Joyce’s broadside, “The Holy Office” (1904), satirized the 
function of the Vatican institution as the purifying force behind orthodoxy 
by applying its methods to the Dublin literary scene. Joyce proclaims that 
he too will perform the “office of Katharsis” (<Gk. kathairein, “to purge”). 
Abhorring superficiality and deception, the poetic voice, rather than “by 
proxy,” directly “[h]azards extremes of heterodoxy” (150–51). As I discuss in 
subsequent chapters, the Catholic modernist movement also directly influ-
enced the Cambridge Heretics Society, Shaw’s Saint Joan, and the attempts to 
recuperate Giordano Bruno.
 The same month and year that modernism was declared a “synthesis 
of all heresies,” Edmund Gosse published Father and Son (1907), an Erzie- 
hungsroman narrating his relationship with his father, Philip Gosse, who had 
been both a fundamentalist Christian and an eminent zoologist. The figure 
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of Philip Gosse embodies the conflicting issues embedded in the modernist 
crisis, since he was a fundamentalist who nevertheless thought he could rec-
oncile the implications of geology and zoology with the Bible. More impor-
tantly, since the Gosses were of the Plymouth Brethren faith, Father and Son 
underscores the fact that the religious modernists posed questions applicable 
not only to Catholicism but to many varieties of Christianity. Walter Pater, 
Jane Harrison, Thomas Hardy, and Bernard Shaw also show how modernist 
issues could be addressed in a variety of ways by non-Catholics, and similar 
issues surface in heretical responses to Anglican and dissenting orthodoxies 
of the period.
 Writing at a time when the modernist crisis erupted, Edmund Gosse 
offers his book as a factual “document” that delivers a “diagnosis of a dying 
Puritanism” (33). Father and Son should be read in the light of the modernist 
crisis not solely because of its shared concerns and proximate date of compo-
sition, but because the “Son” delineates in his scrupulously honest and gener-
ally self-effacing manner how someone can reject the attempt to synthesize 
Christianity and science and “let sleeping dogmas lie” (185). He describes his 
book as a “record of a struggle between two temperaments, two consciences 
and almost two epochs” (35), by which “two” he means, in part, Father and 
Son. On another level, “two temperaments” and “two consciences” reflect the 
conflict between Edmund Gosse’s desire for a modernist brand of exactitude 
and the residue of deference to Victorian propriety. The “two consciences” 
also inhabit the figure of the Father alone. Indeed, Philip Gosse also lives 
across “two epochs,” for his career as zoologist began in the relative calm and 
wonder before the monumental publication of Origin of Species (1859). In 
the aftermath, the elder Gosse rejects the theory of natural selection and puts 
forth his own attempt to synthesize Genesis and geology. His theory, referred 
to as “Omphalos,” posited that, “when the catastrophic act of creation took 
place, the world presented, instantly, the structural appearance of a planet 
on which life had long existed” (104). Philip Gosse did not have to face the 
Holy Office for his exposition, but the cold and mocking reviews served just 
as well.
 As a literary history of the transitional period from 1883 to 1924, Mod-
ernist Heresies is designed partly to bridge recent studies of the history of 
interdicted discourses. Joss Marsh’s Word Crimes (1998), centering on a 
landmark 1883 trial, analyzes the function of blasphemy in English law and 
literature during the Victorian period. In what amounts to a bookend to 
Marsh’s work, several studies, including Adam Parkes’s Modernism and the 
Theater of Censorship (1996) and Allison Pease’s Modernism, Mass Culture, 
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and the Aesthetics of Obscenity (2000), examine the obscenity trials from 
1915–28. Between these periods highlighted by legal sanctions taken against 
texts on the grounds of blasphemy and obscenity, heresy was an important 
concept for both religious and literary writers from 1883–1924. In their 
varied forms, heretical discourses from literature and culture of the fin-de-
siècle and the Edwardian period provide a cognitive map illustrating the 
continuities between Victorian blasphemy and modernist obscenity. Initially 
prompted by a general crisis in Victorian faith and the modernist movement 
in the Catholic Church, a concern with heresy becomes prominent in litera-
ture of the period because there were shared concerns among the religious 
and literary-minded.
 Marsh’s study uses a detailed history of nineteenth-century blasphemy 
not only to reread Victorian ideology, but also to understand the continu-
ing legacy of interdicted discourses. Drawing on her reconstructed account 
“from the close of the Napoleonic Wars to the Freethinker case and its after-
math,” Marsh argues that understanding the production and punishment of 
blasphemy reveals “a unique key to what made Victorian fiction tick” (7–12). 
In particular, she brilliantly revisits the “celebrated” case of G. W. Foote, the 
editor of the Freethinker. At Foote’s 1883 trial, Marsh believes that the fol-
lowing “historic ruling” of John Duke, Lord Coleridge, “insured blasphemy’s 
survival into the twentieth century”: “I now lay it down as law, that if the 
decencies of controversy are observed, even the fundamentals of religion 
may be attacked without a person being guilty of blasphemous libel” (28). 
Marsh then shows how this emphasis on decency functioned as a class-based 
interdiction that sought to muffle a plain-spoken working class whose words 
manifested a perceived absence of decorum and respectability. While the 
sanctions criminalized vulgarity, they also allowed for intellectual and liter-
ary forms of heresy which questioned the principles of religion.
 Since heresy is strictly speaking a religious offense, this crucial distinc-
tion enables an understanding of why heresy was so prevalent in the period 
from 1883 to 1924. In contrast to “an awareness of offensiveness,” to use 
Marsh’s words, that heightens the crime of blasphemy (277), heresy treats 
religion more subtly and seriously. Through a dialectic with orthodoxy, the 
heresies in literature from Hardy to Joyce reflect a newfound stratagem for 
simultaneously critiquing religious tradition and subverting the censor. Blas-
phemy and obscenity were secular offenses punishable in a court of law. 
Literature, at least in theory, could be heretical with relative impunity. For 
example, as Marsh well notes, novelists could develop the practice of “insert-
ing edgewise . . . their unorthodoxy in what we might call the heretic trope 
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of the Book-within-the-book” (181–88). Unlike blasphemy and obscenity, 
the fact that the heresies of the time did not have a dramatic day in a late 
Victorian or modern court also partially accounts for their critical neglect. 
However, the forms of literature, the cults surrounding historical heretics, 
and the cultural and religious movements during this period all consistently 
put orthodoxy on trial with ennobled heretical discourses as their chief wit-
nesses.
 While Marsh discusses some contemporary instances of blasphemy and 
its punishment, her account primarily ends in 1895 with an analysis of how 
Jude the Obscure summarily demonstrates the importance of blasphemy to 
nineteenth-century literature and culture. Jude, then, functions as “proof ” 
that “those restraints on freedom, which a society will always impose upon 
its ‘most influential’ medium fell, in Victorian times on the novel” (11–12). 
In particular, Marsh acutely shows the “direct imbrication” by Jude’s “class 
tragedy of thwarted aspiration” in the 1857 trial of Thomas Pooley, who, in a 
response similar to Jude’s, scrawled blasphemous graffiti on a rector’s gate in 
Cornwall (296). For each case, Marsh explains how institutional forces could 
not abide the implications of these “crimes” and relegated the poor laborers 
to further “obscurity.” In early 1890, Hardy wrote “Candour in English Fic-
tion” to critique the institutional forces which stifled sincere literary discus-
sion of theology and sexual relations, and claimed that “the position of man 
and woman in nature, and the position of belief in the minds of man and 
woman—things which everybody is thinking but nobody is saying—might 
be taken up and treated frankly” (133). After twenty years of using euphe-
mism in his literary battle with orthodoxy, Hardy decided to be candid. In a 
sense, for his last novel, Hardy let the refined heresies in such novels as Tess 
of the d’Urbervilles speak with a vulgar and relentless tongue.
 In contrast to the explicitness of blasphemy, heresy needs to be detected 
by close interpretation, as in the case of Mr. Tate, the English master, who 
finds heresy in the particular word choice of young Stephen Dedalus’s essay. 
Even as late as 1933, T. S. Eliot sought to continue the interpretive practice 
of heresy hunting. In After Strange Gods: A Primer of Modern Heresy, Eliot 
tried to rescue the reading public from the loss of tradition and orthodoxy. 
By having these distinct forces cooperate, he believed modern thought and 
feeling could be reconciled.2 This teaching text concludes with an appendix 
comprised of four “modern” passages designed to help students practice rec-
ognizing heresy for themselves. In one section, Eliot examines the work of 
Hardy and D. H. Lawrence to denounce the rise of personality in the novel, 
a symptom of the fact that morals are no longer associated with tradition 
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and orthodoxy. Eliot finds that both authors insinuate the “diabolic” into 
literature and illustrate that “modern blasphemy is merely a department of 
bad form” (55). Modern heresy, however, appears more subversively in the 
department of content and need not deploy the blatant forms of blasphemy 
or obscenity to work its effects.
 Whatever the degree of change from reticence to candor in Hardy’s writ-
ings, this shift certainly does not preclude the centrality of heretical discourse 
to an interpretation of Jude. In addition to the instance of Sue reordering 
the New Testament, Hardy’s last novel as a whole reflects one last heretical 
attempt on his part to synthesize “wine” and “bottles.” As Carla Peterson 
states, “Jude and Sue fail in their quest for intellectual and spiritual comple-
mentarity, and their failure marks the complete breakdown of ” the belief in 
the reconciliation of “pagan and Christian cultures” (85). In those twin soul-
mates, Sue and Jude, who are “just the same” (13) and “such an obscure pair” 
(243), the novel briefly achieves a synthesis in the unconventional marriage 
of these misfits. However, these brief unnarrated years, during which they 
were “almost the two parts of a single whole” (229), cannot be told because 
their very obscurity enables the happiness of the couple. Their blasphemous 
past, though, rears up to finish the story. As I show in Chapter 5, Hardy’s 
candid method used at once to avoid and create obscurity in Jude only helps 
to illuminate the heresies in Tess.
 Where Marsh leaves off in 1895, Adam Parkes begins to trace the origins 
of the censorship of modernist literature in the trials of Oscar Wilde, which 
saw his “crime” as intrinsically linked to literary “obscurity.” Since the “press 
accounts sheltered their readers by using references to literary obscenity 
to censor the unspeakable crimes for which Wilde was convicted,” Parkes 
considers the trials “obscenity trials” which blurred the boundaries between 
art and life, the appearance of indecency and indecency itself (11). Noting 
that the origin of the case sprang from the Marquess of Queensberry’s post-
card to Wilde accusing him of “Posing as a Somdomite [sic],” Parkes states: 
“Dorian Gray did not divulge specific acts, but it posed as if it did. Obscurity 
implied obscenity, a suspicion revived by the appearance in November 1895 
of Thomas Hardy’s novel Jude the Obscure, or ‘Jude the Obscene,’ as it was 
called in the Pall Mall Gazette” (8–9). Further arguing that literary modern-
ism from 1914–30 needs to be read in the light of a “theater of censorship,” 
Parkes states that, “especially in their responses to contemporary sexual dis-
course, such novelists as Lawrence, Joyce, and Woolf anticipated and sub-
verted the moral, political, and aesthetic premises on which the culture of 
censorship was operating” (viii).
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 In the trials that censored The Rainbow, Ulysses, and Radclyffe Hall’s The 
Well of Loneliness on grounds of obscenity, the “judges and lawyers often 
invoked the so-called Hicklin rule, established in Britain in 1868, which 
defined as obscene works tending ‘to deprave and corrupt those whose 
minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publi-
cation of this sort may fall.’” Finally, in 1928 after the defense for Radclyffe 
Hall’s novel sought to call artists as witnesses to the stand and explain its 
merits, the judge, Sir Chartres Biron, declared the irrelevance of such testi-
mony since a “book may be a fine piece of literature and yet obscene” (qtd. in 
Parkes 4). Great literature could have sex and sexuality in it, but it would be 
censored. As Parkes shows, concomitant with the rise of modernism, a new 
form of “indecency” often played a central role in the literary dramatization 
of religious controversies. Joyce and Lawrence, in particular, accentuated the 
dialogic exchange between religious and sexual discourses, and this preva-
lent development owes much to the return of paganism and the heresy of 
syncretism in the intellectual desire to synthesize Hellenism and Hebraism.
 By indirectly authorizing a reserved debate between paganism and Chris-
tianity, blasphemy law had curtailed making the sacred profane on a linguis-
tic level, yet allowed for subject matter that drew on ancient cultures and 
proclaimed the sexual divine. For example, in his play Salome (1891), Wilde 
positions the audience in Herod’s perspective, foregrounding the incestuous 
desire of the biblical passage, and forces it to reconcile the divine word with 
the beheading of John the Baptist and Salome’s erotic dance of the seven veils. 
Or, in an example of Marsh’s idea of the “heretic trope of the book,” there is 
the influence of the decadent, synthesizing book in Wilde’s The Picture of 
Dorian Gray (1891), the book of which one “hardly knew at times whether 
one was reading the spiritual ecstasies of some mediæval saint or the mor-
bid confessions of a modern sinner” (110). In cases similar to these, Parkes 
invokes Hans Robert Jauss’s point that “a new aesthetic form . . . can have the 
greatest conceivable impact on a moral question” (Jauss, Toward 42). Argu-
ing that Wilde’s art “was experimental, yet his innovations were intelligible 
only in relation to traditional notions of form and style,” Parkes then suggests 
that the critical reception of Wilde often recognized a “calculated deceit” on 
his part, that through his puns and epigrammatic style he was simultaneously 
working within and against culture (6; 14; 17). In a parallel argument, Rita 
Kranidis’s Subversive Discourse uncovers shared counterhegemonic strate-
gies in feminist novels of the 1890s. In order to escape the censorious effect 
of authoritative discourses, feminist writers, Kranidis illustrates, developed 
literary forms that critiqued traditional notions of femininity and patriarchal 
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exclusivity.3 Other types of experiments with literary forms can also achieve 
these ends, and heresy exemplifies this ability to work within and against 
culture, because, in its relation to orthodoxy, heretical thought can often 
mask itself beneath traditional forms. Between the legal statutes condemning 
blasphemy and obscenity, heresy took the subtle, subversive road connecting 
the two. Striking at the very doctrine and ideology of religious institutions, 
heterodox writers could affect their readers less overtly but more fundamen-
tally.
 The prurient subject matter that brought the reactionary censor down on 
Lawrence, Joyce, and Hall grew out of a liberating heretical approach toward 
the body, an approach that owes much not only to psychology but to the 
rediscovery and gradual literary experimentation with paganism. As a com-
mon structuring element in British literature from 1883–1924, paganism, a 
specific heretical discourse of chief interest here, arises from the prominent 
historical sense cultivated by the modernist clergy, evolutionists, and cultural 
anthropologists. The analysis of the synthetic philosophies during this time 
helps to reveal the methods by which literary writers collocated paganism 
and Christianity. For purposes here “paganism” refers to religions appearing 
prior to the advent of Christianity such as those of the Celtic, Roman, Greek, 
and Egyptian peoples. The high time for this aesthetic experimentation was 
1890–1914, but the modernist elision of their antecedents has helped to 
occult the pervasive influence of the Edwardian heretic position. By neglect-
ing or distancing themselves from their predecessors, leading modernist 
critics defined a lasting vision of a self-contained art or claimed a radical 
newness in the spirit of the times. To counter this disservice to an under-
standing of the fluid processes of history, we can now perceive heresy as a 
discourse that allows us to theorize and historicize the literature and culture 
across this transitional moment in history.
 In particular, the cultural contexts of the Cambridge Heretics Society and 
the Catholic modernist movement provide transhistorical links between the 
ideology of such texts as Hardy’s Tess of the d’Urbervilles (1891) and Shaw’s 
Saint Joan (1924). A movement branded heretical in 1907 and a society 
defiantly donning the brand, these two slices of history let us reconceive 
the literary period under question. By placing this historical 1907 moment 
in dialogue with the founding of the Heretics Society in 1909, we can begin 
to see how modern religious, literary, and philosophical thinkers clustered 
around the discursive function and positioning of heterodoxy.
 Heresy held such sway in the 1890s that, in the year before Jude appeared, 
a ninety-year-old William Gladstone returned to his study and sought to 
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remedy one last theological difficulty. In his contribution to Nineteenth Cen-
tury, “The Place of Heresy and Schism in the Modern Christian Church” 
(1894), the former Liberal prime minister applied to these divisions within 
Christianity the notion that historical change enables one to disregard cer-
tain “laws of religion,” such as the proscription of idolatry and usury, that 
“have been modified by circumstance” (158–59). Gladstone, the writer of 
such previous works as The Impregnable Rock of Holy Scripture (1891) and 
Homeric Synchronism (1876), an attempt to harmonize Homer with the Gos-
pels, subsequently felt that all the modern heresies, the “Babel of claimants 
for the honour of orthodoxy and catholicity” (172), should unite in defense 
of Christian belief. Therefore, he recommends a “readjustment of ideas, and 
not a surrender . . . of established laws and practices” (173, emphasis mine). 
For Gladstone, a united Christian apologetics is imperative because of the 
“signs of the times” which tell “the champions of religion” that “their duty 
[is] to equip themselves with knowledge, and use it as an effective weapon 
in regard to the ancient history of our planet and of man” (174). Evolution 
and the “historical method” were in the air, and he agrees with the Catholic 
“modernists” that scripture can defend Genesis from geology by synthesizing 
knowledges.
 In effect, Gladstone acknowledges that the history of Christianity is a 
history of sectarianism, and he calls for an ecumenical tolerance between 
“orthodoxy” and all the sundry heresies that have endured. Not only does the 
Grand Old Man note that the “evidence which condemns heresy and schism 
has been . . . greatly weakened” (159), but he also extols the virtues of non-
conformity in perpetuating faith while also advancing humanitarian causes. 
In Gladstone’s high Anglican mind, the place of heresy in the modern world 
is a secure and salutary one. However, in affirming this view, he redefined 
“heresy” as a “changeable and short-lived” phenomenon divested of doctri-
nal controversies (172). Gladstone states: “If and so far as the heresy involves 
in itself perversion of the Christian dogma, they are the sufferers. But here 
we are dealing with error, not heresy” (164). In such a context, heresy is no 
longer possible. By eliminating the “unorthodox meanings” from “heresy,” 
Gladstone’s insertion into the religious debates functions like a principle of 
Orwell’s Newspeak, in which changing the meanings of words can make “a 
heretical thought . . . literally unthinkable” (Nineteen Eighty-Four 246). Of 
course, Gladstone would have recoiled from such totalitarianism, and in fact 
did not want the state to control religion, but the effect of his argument is 
nevertheless an attempt to subsume and antiquate heresy. His essay, however, 
testifies to the currency of a heretical spirit in the late Victorian period.
Franke_final.indb   15 1/28/2008   4:39:48 PM
 I N T RODU C T ION
 In defining “heresy,” the esteemed Eleventh Edition of the Encyclopedia 
Britannica (1910) offers a representative survey of what an Edwardian expert 
in the field considered important about the subject. In his discussion of the 
modern use of the term “heresy,” Reverend Alfred Ernest Garvie notes that 
churches are “less anxious about the danger” of heterodox thought because 
“to-day a spirit of diffidence in regard to one’s own beliefs, and of tolerance 
towards the beliefs of others, is abroad” (360b). However, Garvie neglects 
mentioning the recent condemnation of “modernism” as a heresy (1907) or 
the advent of the Heretics Society (1909), and therefore the persistent import 
of the term is missing from the entry. While these historical events were 
probably too recent for an encyclopedic perspective, the entry’s classifica-
tion of the three types of heresy in the history of Christianity still delivers 
a parallel analysis of the forms of heretical thought that appear in British 
literature and culture from 1883 to 1924. There are “syncretic,” “evolution-
ary,” and “revolutionary” heresies. In “syncretic” heresies, such as Gnosticism 
or Manichaeism, the heterodoxy tries to create “a fusion of Jewish or pagan 
with Christian elements” (359b). If a doctrine is in the process of formation, 
“undue emphasis may be put on one aspect, and thus so partial a statement 
of truth may result in error” (359b). The contested history of beliefs about the 
nature of the Trinity exemplifies this type of “evolutionary” heresy. In cases 
such as the Reformation itself, a “revolutionary” heresy opposes “the church, 
its theory and its practice” (360a).
 From 1883 to 1924, all three forms of heresy appear in Britain. The Brit-
ish Catholic “modernists,” George Tyrrell and Baron von Hügel, were central 
parts of the clerical movement which tried to revolutionize Catholicism. 
Several writers led by Shaw proposed the idea that heresy itself reflects the 
fact that religion is always an evolving process. Through its extremely diverse 
set of debates and addresses, the Heretics Society witnessed all three forms 
of heresy in various manifestations. By far though, the most prevalent form 
of heresy during the Edwardian period was the syncretic, the attempt to find 
a new way to put a blend of wines in bottles. The following chapters discuss 
this concept extensively, but a few examples here illustrate the modernist 
preoccupation with syncretism. The narrative of Walter Pater’s Marius the 
Epicurean (1885) develops a dialectic of ethics and aesthetics that culmi-
nates in a synthesis of Christian and pagan values. In W. H. Hudson’s Green 
Mansions (1904), the natives of Guyana set fire to the tree in which they had 
trapped Rima the Bird Girl. She suffers this emblematic burning at the stake 
because the natives cannot abide her syncretic spirituality. James Joyce’s “The 
Dead” (1914) invokes the shared Dionysian and Christian elements in the 
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history of Epiphany in its search for a grander inclusivity than orthodoxy 
offers.
 In one of the fullest treatments of the Edwardian period, The Edwardian 
Temperament (1986), Jonathan Rose compiles extensive evidential cases of 
the period’s predominant synthesizing or unifying mode of thought. Amid 
the wealth of his material, Rose declares that the “period produced a remark-
able crop of omnibus philosophies harmonizing different points of view” and 
specifically “responded to the decline of religion by reconciling faith and 
reason, merging the two in a higher and broader synthesis” (2–3). While this 
last particular exercise was the basis of the Catholic modernist movement, 
Rose overlooks the Cambridge Heretics and the fact that heresy is the defini-
tive discourse of this type of synthesis (synthesis <Gk. suntithenai, “to put 
together”). Rose presents an array of fascinating, recondite material, includ-
ing a brief account of the formation of the Synthetic Society which “under-
took the ‘construction’ of a new foundation for religious faith” (6), and of the 
origin of the Fabian Society in the Fellowship of the New Life, whose mentor, 
Thomas Davidson, in 1883 “preached a pantheistic monism postulating a 
single immanent deity uniting the entire material universe” (22). Among his 
more canonical examples, Rose foregrounds the appearance of the Hibbert 
Journal, a theological quarterly launched by its editor in 1902 with the claim 
that “The Goal of thought is one” (9), the scientific advances that suggested 
universal coherence through electromagnetism, radio waves, and the special 
theory of relativity (6–8), and the influence of Madame Blavatsky’s Theoso-
phy, “a new cult that promised to effect a ‘synthesis of science, religion, and 
philosophy’” (11).
 Noting similar historical developments in “The Two Faces of Edward” 
(1959), Richard Ellmann had already adduced the results of Rose’s survey 
in stating that the “amount of unity which the Edwardians instilled in their 
work is one of their extraordinary accomplishments” (205). To perpetuate a 
phrase, Rose suggests that Forster’s epigraph to Howards End (1910), “Only 
connect . . .” captures a large part of this synthesizing temperament. By dis-
missing the Edwardians, though, as merely gathering convergent ideas and 
“conceiving all things as one” (3), Rose reaffirms the modernist dismissal of 
their predecessors. However, the various techniques and philosophies sur-
rounding the notion of “synthesis” from 1883 to 1924 are much more pro-
found, diverse, and lasting than Rose allows them to be.
 Let us take, for example, the most famous claim for the revolutionary 
newness of modernism in Virginia Woolf ’s “Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown” 
(1924). Woolf ’s words, “On or about December 1910 human character 
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changed,” now appear in nearly every critical commentary on the Edwardian 
and modernist periods as evidence of how the modernists saw themselves 
as breaking from their ancestors. What is neglected in criticism is the fact 
that she delivered a substantive version of this essay, “Character in Fiction,” 
before the Heretics Society in 1924. In Chapter 3, I analyze the manuscript 
changes in this famous modernist manifesto in order to show how the audi-
ence of Heretics informed her discussion of periodization, obscenity, and 
character. In ranging the “Edwardians and the Georgians [modernists] into 
two camps,” Woolf inserted “December 1910” as her chosen date of rupture 
after addressing the Heretics (CF2 421). Many studies perpetuate this false 
presumption of a radical epistemic break by ascribing it to a number of 
historical events: the death of a king, the outbreak of sundry manifestoes 
on the “isms,” the exhibition of one of those in London in 1910, and the 
shock of the declaration of war.4 Recent criticism has begun to argue against 
Woolf ’s claim, and heretical discourses provide a new historical perspective 
for understanding the particular continuities and discontinuities of late Vic-
torian and modernist literature and culture.
 In their 1996 revisionist history of the relations between the Edward-
ians and the modernists, Seeing Double, Carola Kaplan and Anne Simpson 
militate against the modernists’ influential and homogenizing assessment of 
their predecessors as “socially conscious” but “simple-minded” “hacks” (viii). 
Through the lens of reception theory, Kaplan and Simpson illustrate how 
the Edwardian period typifies the shifting of critical interpretations, and in 
particular they oppose Rose’s study whose poststructuralist influences lead 
to a denigration of the synthetic character of Edwardian thought. In contrast 
to the “intellectual honesty” and “healthy development” of the fragmented 
modern self, Rose finds that the Edwardians did not face “up to hard philo-
sophical choices” and only “achieved an inner wholeness by affirming unity 
everywhere” (210–12). Since the Edwardians, in Rose’s mind, “presumed the 
reconcilability of everyone and everything” (72), this “synthesizing impulse, 
carried to its final conclusion, would dissolve all intellectual distinctions into 
metaphysical slush” (210). However, the Edwardian impulse was just that, a 
search and a desire, not an a priori assumption.
 In fact, the Edwardians discovered validity in the idea of an organic soci-
ety, and this philosophical approach prompted some advances in the welfare 
state based on the “synthetic” belief that people exist in their relationship 
to others. Rose, though, will not credit Hardy’s observation that the ethical 
implication of the origin of species calls for the Golden Rule to all (64), or 
the general idea that “people shared a common ‘social citizenship’ and were 
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therefore entitled to common social services” (58). Noting that the First 
World War reversed these reconciling trends and that a new divisiveness 
appeared in postwar aesthetic forms, Rose even claims that the Edwardian 
“tragic flaw” consisted of not anticipating “the holocaust that would explode 
their cherished ideal” (72). Yet surely the Edwardians cannot be blamed for 
not foreseeing the future, and the shock, horror, and repercussions of war do 
not retroactively discount an entire preceding body of intellectual thought.
 Recognizing the deleterious effects of some of the choices made by the 
modernists, this work builds on Kaplan and Simpson’s admiration for the 
social advances and synthetic character of the Edwardians, a character which 
owes much to contemporary developments in physical science, linguistics, 
comparative mythology, and cultural anthropology. As they state, the “abil-
ity to hold in tension competing philosophical positions on contemporary 
culture” is “one of the most fascinating aspects of Edwardian literature, and 
one of its most pressing aesthetic claims” (x). A literary instance of this 
desire occurs during the debate over Shakespeare’s life and work in Ulysses 
(1922), set in 1904, in which Thomas Lyster, the Quaker librarian, tolerantly 
observes, “All sides of life should be represented.” However, the modernist 
tenor of Joyce’s novel does not refrain from poking at this inclusive diversity, 
and the next line mocks Lyster’s appeal: “He smiled on all sides equally” 
(162–63). The Edwardian syncretists brought issues into play with each other 
that the modernists tended to sort out in their aesthetic “choices” (heresy 
<Gk. hairesis, “choice”). Each type of response is a form of heresy, one unitar-
ian, the other sectarian.
 Kaplan and Simpson point out that, whereas the Edwardians engaged 
history and attempted to come to terms thematically with the perception of 
change and instability in the world, the modernists deified art, claiming that 
it must be more discrete and assume precedence over politics or philosophy. 
They undercut this modernist dismissal of the Edwardians by arguing that 
the chief difference between these groups consists not in artistic quality but 
in their views of history. The prominent current critique of modernist ideol-
ogy, as Marjorie Perloff illustrates, uncovers fascist tendencies in its aesthetic 
sensibility, which construct a totality out of spatial metaphors or the idea of 
tradition. In retrospect, we can better see the myopia of the constructed total-
ities. Perloff further reminds us that the emphasis on form central to ahistori-
cal views of literature is born out of a “self-destroying” view of modernity, to 
quote Paul de Man, that “exists in the form of a desire to wipe out whatever 
came earlier in the hope of reaching at last a point that could be called a true 
present, a point of origin that marks a new departure” (162).
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 In D. H. Lawrence’s essay “Surgery for the Novel—or a Bomb” (1923), he 
declares that the modern novel should lay waste present modes of thought 
by finding “a new impulse for new things in mankind” and by presenting “us 
with new, really new feelings, a whole line of new emotion, which will get us 
out of the emotional rut” (520). Chiefly, he attributes the “senile-precocious,” 
“sloppy” style and “self-consciousness” of modern novels to the “split” of 
“philosophy and fiction” which “used to be one, right from the days of myth” 
(518–20). By synthesizing the two, having them “come together again,” Law-
rence believes that readers will be estranged, but “a new world outside” will 
open to them (520). In different strains of this attempt to make things “new,” 
Pound’s Vorticism, Eliot’s Individual Talent, Lewis’ bold straight line, and 
fascism’s national borders all professed themselves to be corrective measures 
to the fragmented modern world.5 Michael Levenson sums ups “the Eng-
lish modernists” as “inclined to definitive opinions expressed in vehement 
tones” (viii). A common method used to promote the modernist manifes-
toes involved isolating themselves from competing systems of thought and 
idealizing a remote past—or blasting the past away. As a result of this self-
righteous violence done to the continuities of history, an orthodox backlash 
based on a “right-mindedness” pervaded the period.
 The Cambridge Heretics Society was not immune from such a critique. 
After his address before the group in 1911, G. K. Chesterton, the conserva-
tive watchdog of heresy in such books as Heretics (1905) and Orthodoxy 
(1908), wrote a letter to the president of the Society explaining his antagonis-
tic interest in the group: “[F]irst and last, I should like to ask them why they 
are so weak-minded (if you will forgive the phrase) as to admit that they are 
Heretics. You never really think your own opinion right until you can call it 
Orthodox” (MCMA 113.36). What Chesterton failed to realize was that in 
the Edwardian age heresy foremost implied synthesis, and the desire not so 
much to remain opposed to orthodoxy but to subsume it. Reconciliation and 
synthesis were the predominant modes of transgression of the age. Never-
theless, Chesterton’s rhetorical point prophetically anticipated the modernist 
turn in which heresy slowly declined as an important philosophical position, 
and the didactic modernist manifestoes abound with self-satisfaction and 
decree. In many respects, the dialectic of heresy and orthodoxy is akin to 
Jameson’s conception of the dialectic of utopia and ideology. As in the uto-
pian impulse, syncretic heresy in our transitional period of concern strives 
for a larger unity of collectivity than orthodoxy allows, while the latter devel-
ops strategies to appropriate the appeals toward synthesis and inclusivity.
 One of the difficulties in discussing periodization, even negatively, is 
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that there is still an initial need to create order through arbitrary but func-
tional dates. Criticism has delimited the Edwardian period, in particular, in 
a highly fluctuating manner. Kaplan and Simpson consider the years 1895–
1920 for their study; Rose’s The Edwardian Temperament uncovers mate-
rial from 1895–1919; Ellmann’s essay and Samuel Hynes’ numerous studies 
each employ the parameters of Edward VII’s reign (1901–10); and Harold 
Bloom offers the most inclusive span in his critical collection Edwardian 
and Georgian Fiction, 1880–1914. In choosing the years 1883 and 1924 as 
bookends to this literary history, Modernist Heresies incorporates the tradi-
tional anni mirabili of the decadent Nineties (1891) and of High Modernism 
(1922), but the most important aspect of the selections derives from their 
temporal demarcations well into the Victorian and modernist periods. Like 
Wittgenstein’s ladder, the dates are to be discarded after achieving a new 
knowledge of the origins of literary modernism. Heresy certainly exists both 
before and after these dates of Kafka’s birth and death, but during these forty 
years the intellectual climate and the discursive control which first put Foote 
behind bars and then banned Ulysses foregrounded heresy as an appealing 
and viable alternative discourse.
 Foote’s blasphemy trial initiates the context of my study, and several 
changes took place in 1924 which suggest a turning away from heresy. First 
and foremost, C. K. Ogden, the force behind the Heretics Society, resigned 
his thirteen-year presidency of the group in order to devote himself to his 
ideas of language reform. Two texts that I discuss later, Shaw’s Saint Joan 
and Forster’s A Passage to India, first appeared in England in 1924 and pre-
sented solutions to heretical problems. In that same year, Woolf delivered her 
address to the Heretics, which attempted to steer modernist art away from 
Edwardian synthetic heresies and toward stricter aesthetic “choices.” In the 
first “Manifesto of Surrealism” (1924), André Breton declared his belief in 
the “future resolution” of “dream and reality” into “a surreality” (14), which 
by his definition of the movement, would be “exempt from any aesthetic or 
moral concern” (26). Courting the desire for this synthesis, surrealism how-
ever would distance itself from heresy, which was vulnerable to orthodox 
appropriation, by asserting its “complete nonconformism clearly enough so 
that there can be no question of translating it, at the trial of the real world, as 
evidence for the defense” (47).
 On this note, Richard Ellmann offers a final, crucial insight needed for 
any critical reassessment of the Edwardian period. As Breton had warned, 
Ellmann notes the examples of Yeats and Joyce who “are sometimes suspected 
nowadays of having been reverted Christians or at least demi-Christians.” 
Franke_final.indb   21 1/28/2008   4:39:48 PM
 I N T RODU C T ION
He states that this fallacious critical turn happens because Edwardian writ-
ers who had actually “rejected Christianity” “no longer made a fuss about 
being infidels” and “felt free to use it [religion], for while they did not need 
religion they did need religious metaphors.” By using the lexicon they knew 
best, Edwardian writers often fashioned a climax out of a secular miracle 
or created unifying centers out of a “religious” event or symbol. As Hardy’s 
enological figuration indicates, the prevalence of religious metaphors dur-
ing this time also informs, in Ellmann’s words, “the Catholic modernists, 
with their emphasis upon the metaphorical rather than the literal truth of 
Catholic doctrines.” While Ellmann’s reminders certainly do not hold for all 
writers during this period, they serve to highlight the difficulties of interpret-
ing synthetic literature and the importance of reception in determining its 
orthodox or heretical valence. Nevertheless, when a writer such as Forster 
“is not for Christ or Pan, but with profoundly Edwardian zeal, for the deities 
reconciled” (Ellmann, “Edward” 192; 195), on paper at least this is strictly 
a syncretic heresy, and the writer’s particular religious inclination is of less 
importance than the textually manifest influence of the cultural context. The 
desire for synthesis flavors British literature from 1883 to 1924 with heretical 
and religious metaphors bottled as a new vintage blend.
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•
The Academy of Modern Heretics
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Chapter 1
•
A Society of Heretics
On December 8, 1909, during her lecture inaugurating the Cambridge 
Heretics Society, Jane Harrison (1850–1928), the classical scholar and 
anthropologist, rejoiced that the “word ‘heretic’ has still about it an emo-
tional thrill” and that “[t]o be a heretic to-day is almost a human obliga-
tion” (“Heresy” 27–28). Historical progress, in Harrison’s mind, had made 
the Edwardian period conducive to a relentless dialectic between maverick 
heretics and the orthodox herd. Fresh in her mind was the condemnation 
of modernist religious thought as a “synthesis of all heresies.” For Harrison, 
the dialectical relationship between heresy and orthodoxy would subsume 
orthodoxy in a broader synthesis and propel human intellectual endeavor. 
The dialectic would produce new syntheses from which society could choose 
a more enlightened course for subsequent thought and action. Harrison 
found that the inauguration of the Heretics Society was a welcome first step 
on this path. The previous critical neglect in acknowledging the vital and 
formative influence the Heretics had on modernist thought may be one of 
the more glaring omissions in our understanding of twentieth-century intel-
lectual history, for the Heretics effectively dominated the intellectual climate 
in Britain from the end of the Edwardian period through the height of the 
modernist era.
 The critical oversight is all the more surprising when one considers the 
impressive and diverse lists of people who were either members of the Her-
etics or addressed the conversation society under the rubric of heresy. The 
active and wide-ranging Honorary Members included Harrison, the dra-
matist Bernard Shaw, the historian G. M. Trevelyan, the economist J. M. 
Keynes, the mathematician G. H. Hardy, the political scientist G. L. Dick-
inson, the literary critic I. A. Richards, the classicists F. M. Cornford and 
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Arthur Verrall, and the philosophers G. E. Moore, John McTaggart, Bertrand 
Russell, and George Santayana. While most of these persons had established 
themselves as reputable national figures by the 1909 inception of the Her-
etics, several, including Keynes, Trevelyan, and Richards, rose to intellectual 
prominence while participating in the Society until its dismantling in 1932. 
Two Cambridge undergraduates, C(harles) K(ay) Ogden (1889–1957) and 
William Empson (1906–84), would begin their long and opposing studies of 
language while serving as presidents of the Heretics. Even more command-
ing a claim for the centrality of the Heretics during this time perhaps is the 
composite of artists and intellectuals outside academia who, while not all 
becoming Heretics, came to Cambridge to address the group. Most of the 
pre-eminent figures of the Bloomsbury Group exchanged ideas with the 
Heretics; Roger Fry, Clive Bell, Lytton Strachey, Edith Sitwell, Leonard and 
Virginia Woolf all sojourned by the Cam to dab a little in heresy. Even E. M. 
Forster, as I illustrate in chapter 2, engaged the Heretics in his novel, Arctic 
Summer, which he abandoned unfinished at the outbreak of the First World 
War. Other noteworthy guest speakers included Rupert Brooke, Vernon Lee, 
Rebecca West, Walter de la Mare, F. T. Marinetti, Bonamy Dobree, Marie 
Stopes, Wyndham Lewis, Arthur Machen, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. (See the 
Appendix for a list of the meetings and addresses of the Heretics Society.)
 This impressive roster not only establishes the fact that a proper his-
tory of the Heretics has long been warranted, but it also indirectly suggests 
that the particular subjects of heresy and religion have been received with a 
peculiar form of silence by academia.1 Until recently, religious heterodoxy 
has been virtually a taboo subject in criticism, particularly in discussions of 
the modernist period. Our immediate intellectual precursors often openly 
defended or denounced religion until people of varying pious and secu-
lar inclinations no longer wanted to offend each other’s sensibilities. As a 
result, in the postmodern age, religious issues have been muted because they 
are still controversial topics. However, several recent studies have begun to 
illustrate that the subject is indeed important, even if not to hold religious 
debates once again, then to understand our intellectual history.2
 In the previous cursory accounts of the Heretics, a memoirist or historian 
briefly mentions the existence of the Heretics and possibly records an anec-
dote about their meetings. Sometimes the reports make erroneous claims, 
such as naming Cornford the founder or calling the group the “Heretics 
Club.” The most significant yet innocent negligence lies in not identifying 
the Heretics at all. Over the course of the Society’s twenty-three years, sev-
eral landmark essays and nearly every tangent of modernist thought were 
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initially promulgated in this freethinking atmosphere. The Heretics Society 
brought forth such a diverse and expanding set of topics and allowed for such 
a variety of perspectives that a complete account of the Heretics is impracti-
cal for purposes here. However, the following discourse history highlights 
the origins and first five years of the Heretics before the First World War in 
order to demonstrate that heresy was not only fundamental to Edwardian 
Britain, but that the Heretics themselves embodied and enacted the ability 
and desire to coordinate conflicting schools of thought. In the historical 
moment from 1909–14, the umbrella platform of the Heretics Society was 
able to balance competing tensions and oppositional views. Isolating this 
coalition of heresy in the “Georgian” period enables us to draw historical 
continuities from the Edwardian to the modernist periods. In contrast, an 
account of another five-year period, 1919–24, illustrates the prevalent shift 
at the Heretics from a desire for synthesis to a more divisive form of heresy 
in which modernists defended the “correctness” of their positions.
 When previous general histories, memoirs, or literary studies do men-
tion the Heretics Society, they tend to deflect the impetus for the radical 
group onto C. K. Ogden. Those who remember him fondly for his admin-
istration of the Heretics, his editorships of The Cambridge Magazine and 
Psyche, or his invention of Basic English often use the word “polymath” to 
describe him. Those inclined to dismiss the Heretics invariably label him 
“eccentric.” For instance, in his multi-volume A History of the University of 
Cambridge, Christopher Brooke mentions, only once, “the formation of the 
society of Heretics,” and attributes this achievement to the “plotting” of “that 
celebrated eccentric C. K. Ogden” (126). On the other hand, in the one sub-
stantive account of the Heretics, a memoir essay, P. Sargant Florence, Ogden’s 
right-hand man at the Heretics from 1909–24, attacks the “superficial tag” 
placed on Ogden that he was “a mere eccentric who happened to have tossed 
off the The Meaning of Meaning and Basic English.” Instead, Florence chooses 
to underscore additionally his “importance as a heretic and a creator of her-
etics, among at least six generations of Cambridge men and women” (CH 
227). Similarly, in the most thorough account of Ogden’s work, W. Terrence 
Gordon also seeks to recoup Ogden’s heretical influence on modern thought, 
stating that by 1932 “an incalculable effect of intellectual ferment had been 
exerted on a whole generation of future writers and thinkers, many of whom 
would transform heretical views into received wisdom” (7–8).
 During his second year at Magdalene College, Ogden and several other 
Cambridge undergraduates formed the Heretics in the Michaelmas term 
of 1909. Though he was a keen recruiter of heretics and the paragon of a 
Franke_final.indb   27 1/28/2008   4:39:49 PM
 PA RT  I :  T H E  AC A DE M Y  OF  MODE R N  H E R E T IC S
marketing publicist, Ogden could not have helped solidify the birth of the 
Heretics without the widespread encouragement of the faculty. Considering 
the difficulties that an undergraduate-based organization faces in recuperat-
ing lost membership each year, the Society would not have maintained itself 
for twenty-three years without having touched a nerve in the culture of the 
times. To attribute the Heretics solely to Ogden credits his influence, but also 
does a disservice to the cultural contexts of the Edwardian and modernist 
periods.
 Ascribing the creation of the Heretics to a single person is a facile expla-
nation for a much more complex and widespread phenomenon. Edwardian 
Cambridge in 1909 already teemed with heterodox ideas and affiliations 
influencing college life. Perhaps most flamboyantly, Rupert Brooke and his 
circle of Neo-pagans romanticized love, nature, drama, and the possibilities 
for social transformation. For several years on campus, a group of academ-
ics known as the Cambridge Ritualists had been cultivating a new approach 
to the study of classical pagan literature and culture. These “Ritualists,” Jane 
Harrison, Francis Cornford, Gilbert Murray, and Arthur Cook, all were 
developing methodologies for confirming the primacy of ritual over myth 
in ancient cultures. Harrison and Cornford would become Heretics; Mur-
ray and Brooke each would later deliver a paper before the Society. In this 
context, it is no wonder that Jacob Flanders in Woolf ’s Jacob’s Room goes up 
to Cambridge in 1906 and finds the study of Greek, science, and philosophy 
to be the “light” that “burns above Cambridge” (39). However, the narrative 
voice soon adds the clarification: “if you talk of a light, of Cambridge burn-
ing, it’s not languages only. It’s Julian the Apostate” (49).
 The list of Heretics and their associates also illustrates that these same 
people were often also members of the more widely received Cambridge 
Apostles and travelers in the famed Bloomsbury Group. Underscoring the 
fundamental connections between the latter two groups, Quentin Bell claims 
that Bloomsbury was born at Cambridge in the autumn of 1899 when Leon-
ard Woolf, Lytton Strachey, and Clive Bell first became friends sympathetic 
to each other’s intellect, and he adds that of these “young men who formed 
the nucleus of Bloomsbury, all save Clive Bell and Thoby Stephen were 
members of that semi-secret Cambridge society The Apostles” (Bloomsbury 
23; 37). In her exemplary study of the epistemological discursive exchange 
between Russell, Fry, and Virginia Woolf, Ann Banfield intricately eluci-
dates the “Cambridge Apostolic” influence on the “Bloomsbury family tree,” 
which has “yet to be explored in all its ramifications” (x). One of these 
ramifications, still neglected, is the role of the Heretics in facilitating this 
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dialogue and widening the sphere of mutual influence between the Apostles 
and Bloomsbury.
 The historical reception of the figures in question highlights these more 
acceptable groups and effectively distances them from their engagement with 
heresy. Often in their own memoirs, the former Heretics are complicit in this 
elision by muting their past associations with the Society. While the agnostic 
or atheistic Apostles never refrained from admitting their religious doubts, 
in Bloomsbury the discursive agenda was already replete with their topical 
concerns—literature, economics, painting, publishing. In their relationship 
with the Heretics, the Bloomsbury Group would bring these issues to the 
foreground and concede explicit religious questions to the other Heretics. 
Nevertheless, this shared dialogue illustrates that Bloomsbury found heresy 
an important issue and the Heretics a crucial audience. Through a tolerance 
implicit in the acceptance of heresy, Bell, Strachey, Virginia Woolf, and oth-
ers could steer the direction of British intellectualism through the avenue of 
heresy.
 Intellectual histories and period studies of modernist literature have 
accounted well enough for the roles of the Cambridge Apostles and the 
Bloomsbury Group in directing aesthetic and philosophic thought in Britain 
during the first few decades of the twentieth century. As Richard Deacon 
stresses in his history of the Apostles, “the influence of its members has been 
considerable on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean and in all spheres of life 
from administration to the arts, from philosophy to politics, from science to 
medicine” (vii). With its inception in 1820 as the Cambridge Conversazione 
Society, the Apostles began refining its exclusive membership for prominent 
roles in British society. Tennyson would commemorate his experience at the 
Apostles with an apotheosized Arthur Hallam in section 87 of In Memoriam 
(1850). It is particularly fascinating to look at the impressive list of the fifty or 
so members chosen between Dickinson and Fry in the 1880s and Brooke and 
Wittgenstein in the early 1900s and wonder at the selection processes at work 
in so accurately discerning the potential of its members. Nearly half of the 
fifty Apostles chosen in those thirty years became major figures in the intel-
lectual climate of England. Among those, Dickinson, Hardy, Keynes, McTag-
gart, Moore, and Russell were also eager Heretics. Through others such as 
Forster, Fry, Strachey, and Leonard Woolf, who addressed or responded to 
the Heretics, the Apostles helped to cultivate a triangular and often over-
lapping dialogue between themselves, the Heretics, and Bloomsbury. The 
eclectic nature of these various affiliations made possible a dialogue at once 
heteroglot, negotiable, and identity-based. Similar to the effect of the wide-
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ranging topics and perspectives of the Heretics, the Bloomsbury Group, as 
S. P. Rosenbaum believes, “displays a unique complex resemblance that can-
not be reduced to a platform or creed” (Group ii).
 In his study of the Apostles, W. C. Lubenow also finds that the secret 
society, while “caught up in a struggle for wholeness” that could relate the self 
and the world, was, however, eclectic and professed “no single ideology.” The 
Apostles brought together members from diverse religious backgrounds, yet 
Lubenow hazards one conclusion unifying their intellectual endeavors—that 
“from beginning to end [the Apostles] were bound together in a common 
sceptical tradition which enabled them to both engage in self-definition and 
forge a sense of duty” (WCL 411). In seeing their history as “inseparable 
from the history of religion in the time between Waterloo and the Great 
War,” Lubenow argues that they contributed “to reform when they were of 
the church and [remained] sympathetic to religious impulses when they 
were not” (WCL 407). Throughout the late nineteenth century, the Apostles 
aggressively pursued abolishing religious tests at university and several other 
significant agnostic and secularizing causes. By 1902, Lytton Strachey reports 
that they “discussed whether it should crusade against Christianity,” and 
he was among the majority who “seemed to think [they] should” (WCL 
400). Lubenow ends his study of this “crucible of heterodoxy,” as he calls 
the Apostles, at the time of the advent of the Heretics when, in a sense, the 
Apostles’ “crusade” became manifest (WCL 400). Lubenow’s account loses 
some of its acuity in erroneously asserting that Moore, Hardy, and Russell 
“went missing from Ogden’s scrutiny” and did not join the Heretics (WCL 
405). Knowing them as such, the legacy of the Apostles’ skepticism becomes 
even more clearly bequeathed to the Heretics.
 In his biography of Dickinson, Forster remembers the nature of the Apos-
tles’ meetings: “The characteristics of such societies vary but little. The mem-
bers are drawn from the older undergraduates and the younger dons, they 
meet of an evening in one another’s rooms, a paper is read, . . . and finally the 
reader responds to his critics” (34–35). While the Heretics did share similar 
practices with this other discussion society, Forster is trying to play down the 
cache of secrecy surrounding the exclusive Apostles. Therein lies a key differ-
ence between the Heretics and the more star-chamberesque atmosphere at 
the Apostles and Bloomsbury. The discursive exchange amongst (and shared 
“membership” in) this triumvirate of conversation societies mandates a rec-
ognition that the Heretics not only held equivalent import and sway, but 
did so in a more open, egalitarian, and diffuse fashion. To speak of the 
Apostles and Bloomsbury is to speak of an elitism characterized by secrecy 
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on one hand and highbrow culture on the other, but the Heretics, while still 
functioning as a member-based society, often opened their meetings to the 
public, and published addresses as examples of heretical thought. In a sense, 
the Heretics provided a forum for making public whatever ideas individuals 
from the other groups had worked out behind closed doors.
 By most accounts, the most exciting and influential school of thought 
that blossomed at turn-of-the-century Cambridge was the ethics of the 
Apostle and eventual Heretic, G. E. Moore. For instance, in his account 
of Bloomsbury, Quentin Bell states, in an echo of Woolf ’s famous declara-
tion, that by 1900 there was a need “for a new honesty and a new charity in 
personal relations,” and the Group found in Moore’s philosophy a liberating 
approach to life (28–37). Bell believes Bloomsbury was born with Moore’s 
ethos. In his landmark Principia Ethica (1903), a thirty-year-old Moore pur-
sued the meaning of “goodness,” finding it inevitably indefinable, yet he was 
still able to outline contemplative states of mind reflective of and conducive 
to “goodness.” Though intrinsic “goodness” cannot be defined without refer-
ence to a posited natural or transcendental property, Moore argues that some 
fundamental principles of ethics, various goods, are self-evident and can 
be illuminated by the conceptualization of “organic unities.” These “organic 
unities” or “wholes” may have intrinsic value, but in Moore’s words, “such a 
whole bears no regular proportion to the sum of the values of its parts” (27). 
Therefore, in this form of holism, reducing a “whole” to its component parts 
does not lead to a definition of the “good.” Only through an analysis of the 
general and immediate causal relations within a “whole” do “goodness” and 
“right action” become verifiable. In this vein, Principia Ethica further exem-
plifies the prevalence of synthetic agendas during the Edwardian period.
 On the other hand, Moore also laid the seeds of the various modern-
isms, essentially founded on the belief in the “rightness” of their methodolo-
gies, when he affirmed the argument that one could “declare” a proposition 
“untrue, because its untruth is evident” to him or her. While intuition does 
not validate the “rightness” of an ethical choice, Moore believes, as in the case 
of denying that pleasure is the only good, that his intuitive supposition, if per-
suasive enough, “justifies us in holding that we are so” (144–45). By bearing 
in mind how actions will affect the organic whole, that is, whether they will 
generally make the world a better place, Moore believes that his disciples will 
be able to determine an immediate course of action. He emphasizes that the 
“idea of abstract ‘rightness’” constitutes “conscience,” and a “‘conscientious’ 
man [is] one who, when he deliberates, always has this idea in his mind, and 
does not act until he believes that his action is right” (178–79). Above all, a 
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“common sense” should be used in making the decisions. Moore’s own care-
ful deliberations culminated in the famous last chapter in which he defines 
“The Ideal” in terms of qualities attainable in “this world.” In the legendary 
platitude, Moore declares that the most decidedly “valuable things, which 
we know or can imagine, are certain states of consciousness, which may be 
roughly described as the pleasures of human intercourse and the enjoyment 
of beautiful objects.” These “highly complex organic unities” link the object 
of enjoyment with a perceived consciousness of the object, and this appre-
ciation brings together spiritual and material goods and makes them more 
valuable than the sum of their parts (188–89).
 No doubt this conception of human ideals is what led to the dramatic influ-
ence of Principia Ethica. Keynes claimed that the influence was “the beginning 
of a renaissance, the opening of a new heaven on a new earth,” and he added 
that the “New Testament is a handbook for politicians compared with the 
unworldliness of Moore’s chapter on ‘The Ideal’” (10: 435; 444).3 Another fel-
low Apostle, Strachey wrote a “confession of faith” to Moore, and in reference 
to Principia Ethica he exclaimed to Leonard Woolf, “glory alleluiah!” (qtd. in 
Levy 235; 239). Moore’s book elicited these enthusiastic responses laden with 
religiosity because it not only offered a new ideal of “this world,” but he also 
explicitly questioned the legitimacy of God and heaven. For instance, Moore 
states: “though God may be admitted to be a more perfect object than any 
actual human being, the love of God may yet be inferior to human love, if 
God does not exist” (200). As Nietzsche had done twenty years earlier, Moore 
presented a revolutionary revaluation of traditional morality and wisdom. 
However, the degree to which Cambridge and Bloomsbury put Moore’s theo-
ries into practice became a pointed source of debate in the memoirs of figures 
such as Keynes, Russell, and Leonard Woolf.
 In “My Early Beliefs,” Keynes reports that the effect of Principia Ethica on 
Moore’s coterie of friends “dominated, and perhaps still dominate everything 
else.” On the other hand, he also claimed that they ignored the chapter on 
ethical conduct and only “accepted Moore’s religion” (10: 435–36). Similarly, 
in his autobiography, Russell states that “those who considered themselves 
his disciples ignored [the idea of organic unities] and degraded his ethics 
into advocacy of a stuffy girls’-school sentimentalizing” (71). Leonard Woolf 
disagrees wholeheartedly and finds Keynes’ memoir a “distorted picture of 
Moore’s beliefs.” Instead, Woolf argues that in fact when he, Keynes, Strachey, 
and others became Moore’s followers in 1903 they used Principia Ethica as 
a practical guide to ethical conduct, one that used “the more divine voice of 
common-sense” (161–62). R. B. Braithwaite offers the peaceful solution that 
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Keynes found Moore’s treatise on ethical conduct old hat compared to the 
exhilaration produced by the new ideal (244). To further clarify this little 
rift, David Holdcroft presents a diplomatic perspective: “if the Principia and 
its author was not the major influence on Bloomsbury, it was undoubtedly a 
major influence” (133).
 Although Bloomsbury had Moore’s sanctification of the “enjoyment of 
beautiful objects,” he refrained from the “task” of “Aesthetics” and thereby 
enabled the Group to determine what constitutes the beautiful. Though he 
admitted that a false evaluation could lead to “an error of taste,” he also 
believed that a proper analysis of art could “satisfy” the observer that his or 
her taste was “correct” (192–95). He suggested that others could sufficiently 
avoid the arbitrariness of taste by using a “consensus of opinion” in their 
value judgments (200). Instead of the analysis of beauty, Moore later con-
cerned himself with refining and elucidating his ethical system, and from 
1914–25, he used the meetings of the Heretics as his forum. His addresses to 
the Society included discussions of “Intrinsic Value” in January 1916 and “A 
Defence of Common Sense” in January 1925. During the same time period, 
Bloomsbury gradually congealed and also began using the Heretics Soci-
ety as a forum to advocate their tastes. Clive Bell in particular deployed 
Moore’s philosophy in his mandarin aesthetic judgments. In Moore’s words, 
the Group came to believe their “judgment” was “right,” and this discursive 
development, as shown later, directly leads to the decline of the centrality of 
heresy and the Heretics Society.4
 While Bloomsbury and the Apostles may have begun practicing a secular 
religion during the Edwardian period, traditional faith and the vision of uni-
versity life as a place of religion persisted with an equal vigor at Cambridge. 
Despite confronting an increasingly secular society and the gradual accep-
tance of evolutionary thought, orthodoxy had held its own during the late 
Victorian age, especially at universities. Calling the phenomenon of religion 
at Oxford and Cambridge in the last half of the nineteenth century “one of 
the deepest paradoxes” (105), Brooke notes how the centrality of religion 
at university actually strengthened in the face of legislation that facilitated 
a secular education. After 1856, no pledge of adherence to the thirty-nine 
articles or other declaration of faith was mandatory for a degree, except 
in divinity. For the next fifteen years, membership in the governing body 
of dons, the Senate, entailed affiliation with the Church of England, but 
the 1871 Religious Test Acts abolished even this holdover requirement. The 
Second Reform Bill had enabled Gladstone to acknowledge the growth of 
nonconformists and push this further emancipation through Parliament. 
Franke_final.indb   33 1/28/2008   4:39:50 PM
 PA RT  I :  T H E  AC A DE M Y  OF  MODE R N  H E R E T IC S
Nevertheless, as Brooke states, “many vestiges of sectarian privilege still 
clung to the colleges and chapels and divinity professors” (102). Cambridge 
was founded as a religious institution, and in 1877 the university commis-
sioner reaffirmed in statute that the colleges were intended to be in part a 
place of worship and theology. The Theological Tripos had appeared in 1874 
in the wake of the abolition of the tests, and the educational system was now 
in place to spawn several key theological studies over the course of the rest of 
the century.5 Additionally, fellows and patrons sought to continue the legacy 
and import of religion at university by investing in the building and restora-
tion of college chapels. In the last half of the nineteenth century, St. John’s 
and Queens’ saw new chapels adorn their campuses. King’s College Chapel 
continued, as it still does, to tower majestically over the town.
 Filling the pews was not a difficult task on paper since the most salient 
religious component of university life came in the form of mandatory cha-
pel attendance.6 Peter Cunich finds that “[r]eligious orthodoxy remained 
a central feature of the university, with compulsory chapel as its symbol” 
(204). The dons saw themselves as functioning in loco parentis, and they felt 
that only good could come of forced attendance at services where the gospel 
might be heard by students disillusioned with punting and pub life. The 
number of compulsory services attended per week varied by college, but until 
the time of the Heretics resident undergraduates across the university were 
officially required to attend several per week and two on Sundays. Enforcing 
the obligatory attendance was a different matter. The agnostic dons were dis-
inclined to do so, especially if they were skipping out on services themselves. 
Already in 1838, some Trinity men had formed The Society for the Preven-
tion of Cruelty to Undergraduates, which circulated the attendance records 
of the master and fellows in response to The Society for the Propagation of 
Christianity among the dons. At King’s since the 1870s, the young men could 
“sign a book rather than attend” (Brooke 112–15). When the undergraduates 
did attend, their “rowdy behaviour” and “giggling” undermined the desired 
instillment of discipline (Brooke 116; Cunich 226). By the end of the century, 
the administration realized that the problems associated with compulsory 
chapel required that the system be overhauled, but no adequate forms of 
maintaining chapel attendance could be seen.
 Then in the early 1900s, Francis Cornford, a future Heretic, published 
a critique, Compulsory Chapel (1904), and a classic satire of university life, 
Microcosmographia Academica (1908). In the latter scathing little treatise 
that promotes itself as a guide for the young academic politician, Corn-
ford attacks the do-nothing bureaucratic policies of the administration that 
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prevent thought and just action. Only “when the Church is in danger” will 
it act, and that is only to impose “some rules” (9–10). Compulsory cha-
pel repeatedly bears the brunt of Cornford’s satire in the following passage 
exemplifying the handbook’s style: “They [young academics] must never be 
troubled with having to think whether this or that ought to be done or not; 
it should be settled by rules. The most valuable rules are those which ordain 
attendance at lectures and at religious worship. If these were not enforced, 
young men would begin too early to take learning and religion seriously; and 
that is well known to be bad form. Plainly, the more rules you can invent, the 
less need there will be to waste time over fruitless puzzling about right and 
wrong” (10). In exposing the cult of stupidity and the mindlessness of rules 
that can repress thought, Cornford still reveals his own concern for religious 
questions.
 The next year his colleague William Chawner brought a more staid ear-
nestness to the issue of compulsory chapel, and his address, “Prove All Things,” 
would lead directly to the birth of the Heretics. Compulsory chapel failed to 
survive the First World War in any college except Magdalene. By 1924, the 
“ordinary congregation” had “of late years sadly diminished” (Green 338). 
Though Ogden’s college, ironically enough, was the last holdout, the advent 
and rapidly growing influence of the Heretics suggests the possibility that 
their presence nailed the coffin on the statute. With heresy becoming more 
and more intellectually legitimate, the dons could no longer justify enforc-
ing the rule by penalty.7 In 1921 the rule was changed, even at Magdalene, 
so as not to require a certain number of attendances or impose sanctions, 
and instead it simply read: “attendance at College Chapel is expected of all 
undergraduates” (Cunich 236).8 In 1909, though, the climate at Cambridge 
was decidedly less tolerant.
The “Prove All Things” Controversy
Toward the end of Ogden’s first year at Cambridge, William Chawner (1848–
1911), Master at Emmanuel, publicly expressed his lingering private doubts 
about Christianity, and his disavowal of orthodoxy initiated a scandal known 
as the “Prove All Things” controversy, or alternatively, the “Chawner Affair.” 
More interested in teaching than scholarship, Chawner in nearly forty years 
had only published a letter on university examinations in Greek since his 
prize-winning dissertation of 1872, The Influence of Christianity upon the 
Legislation of Constantine the Great. During his time at Cambridge from 
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1867–1911, Chawner had helped turn Emmanuel into a teaching college, 
and the general esteem in which he was held eventually led to his appoint-
ment as Master in 1895. Behind his face of authority, though, the master had 
been trying for some years to justify institutional Christian orthodoxy, and at 
length he concluded that it could not be maintained. At the inaugural lecture 
of the Emmanuel College Religious Discussion Society, Chawner shared his 
loss of faith.
 On this May evening of 1909, Chawner’s argument for the need to “Prove 
All Things” advocated the transgression of orthodoxy in the pursuit of the 
“truth” about the origins and destiny of humanity. Chawner felt promise in 
the return of a scholarly voice to religious debates, and his emphasis on the 
alienation of intellectuals from orthodoxy suggests that he held “approxi-
mately a Unitarian position” (TCA 7). Privately publishing the pamphlet 
in the same month, Chawner disseminated copies to all who asked. As the 
newly appointed dean, Charles Raven (1885–1964) remembers arriving at 
Emmanuel in January of 1910 amid this controversy and being asked to 
remedy a situation that “came as a thunderbolt among the faithful” (173). 
A bastion of orthodoxy, Emmanuel had been built on the former site of a 
Dominican monastery. Its founder, Sir Walter Mildmay, had tried to con-
tinue the spirit of the mendicant order by establishing a college in 1584 that 
would manifest Puritan leanings while remaining deferential to the crown. 
In 1909 Emmanuel still had close ties with Anglican and evangelical parson-
ages, and many ordinands were affiliated with the college. The master had 
originally pleased them sufficiently enough to gain his position. However, 
the orthodox administration could not have realized that Chawner was of 
that rare breed that grows radical with age. Raven likens him to “a man who 
had caught late in life the scepticism that infects most of us at eighteen; and 
like measles at his age it was a bad attack” (173). The shock of having such an 
overt heretic among the faculty grew worse once the Cambridge administra-
tion witnessed the widespread support Chawner received.
 In the opening remarks of his lecture, Chawner tries to evoke a question-
ing mood by quoting passages from Proverbs, Thucydides, Wordsworth, 
and Arnold, which refer to the uncertainty of human existence. Immedi-
ately, Chawner acknowledges that he does not accept the received authority 
of the “precise and definite answer” Christianity offers to such questions 
(3). A single, fixed conception of Creation and Providence is intolerable to 
Chawner in a pluralistic world. Noting the presence of many world religions 
and even the divisive sects within Christianity, Chawner declares: “for beings 
finite and relative, as we are, there is no absolute truth, no ultimate body of 
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doctrine, no rounded logical complete system, that can be comprehended in 
thought or set forth in words” (4). Such dismissal of logocentrism was not 
by any means original in 1909; the striking newness was hearing such words 
from the master of a college in a public forum.
 Amid the relativism of belief, Chawner finds no surprise that in a post-
Darwinian world there has been a “growing indifference and hostility shown 
towards Christianity by men of culture and learning and intelligence.” Chawn-
er’s use of specific gender here seems intentional, for in his view Protestant 
“churches are half empty and the congregations consist of women only” (5). 
He further observes an indifference to Christianity in Germany, hostility in 
France, and a combination of the two in England. Chawner then turns his 
eyes on Cambridge itself, where he diagnoses a general decline in the value 
that the student body places upon worship and Holy Orders. An experiment 
in voluntary chapel attendance tried during the previous “Long Vacation” 
had failed miserably, leaving the chapel virtually vacant. The clerical pro-
fession attracts few, Chawner claims, not because the monetary reward for 
taking orders had decreased over the previous decades, but because there is 
“no message to deliver.” Among “first class men,” Chawner observes a more 
conspicuous lack of desire for what “ought to be the most coveted of offices” 
(8). In his mind, the relative ease of winning promotions and honors in the 
holy profession means nothing to those ambitious for intellectual stimula-
tion. In describing the university climate at the inception of the Heretics 
Society, P. Sargant Florence reminds his readers: “It must be realised that in 
1909 Jude the Obscure conditions still prevailed. A child of relatively poor 
parents, however clever, was virtually debarred from Oxford or Cambridge 
by reason of poverty” (CA 14). As Sue states in that novel, poor students who 
have a great “passion for learning” like Jude “were elbowed off the pavement 
by the millionaires’ sons” (120). While economic factors might still have 
prevented Jude from matriculation, Chawner’s paper suggests that, were he 
able to attend college, the poor naive boy’s clerical aspirations soon would 
have been redirected. In 1909 Cambridge, Chawner, or maybe Ogden, would 
have been Jude’s Sue.
 While the students have turned away from Christianity, Chawner finds 
that the faculty respond to the crisis in faith by maintaining a placid veneer 
that keeps up appearances. Chawner wants to expose what he calls “a conspir-
acy of silence” (10), a phrase he might have borrowed from an indictment by 
Cambridge’s own Samuel Butler in The Way of All Flesh (1903). After Ernest 
Pontifex’s loss of belief, Overton critiques the self-righteous and prosper-
ous “teachers of truth” who benefit through “a conspiracy of silence” about 
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religious questions (299). In Chawner’s Cambridge some of the professors, 
fellows, and lecturers are “in open opposition” to Christianity, but the general 
attitude remains one of “benevolent neutrality.” Others accept the practical 
ethics taught by Christ while quietly rejecting the dogmatic underpinnings. 
The Master of Emmanuel wants a forum “to represent the other side” of the 
arguments students hear in chapel from its “official defenders.” In the public 
schools, Chawner senses a similar control of religious questions “by artificial 
means” (9–10). Clerical influence still determines educational policy, and 
orthodox headmasters rule their intellectual superiors. For Chawner, reason 
and the intellectual life could not be reconciled with orthodoxy.
 At this point in his paper, Chawner clarifies his thesis:
If you have followed the thread of my argument, you will have seen that my 
purpose has been to show, that in the three leading nations of Western Europe 
there is something like a general revolt among men of intelligence against old 
fashioned orthodoxy, that there is a feeling of unrest and uncertainty in the 
religious world, that these symptoms have shown themselves as conspicuously 
here as elsewhere, and that there is urgent need of such a society as you are 
founding to-day. (10)
Faced with this cultural context, the pedant in the master wants his student 
audience above all to attempt to cultivate a coherent view of the world, the 
hallmark of Edwardian thought. For the “men” who are “the salt of the earth” 
historically have provided life to Christianity through the desire “to coordi-
nate and harmonise” beliefs (11). To achieve such a synthesis of thought, a 
religious discussion society should use reason as its chief tool and, to validate 
and refine the reasoning, debate. For a proper debate, Chawner offers some 
structural and methodological advice for approaching the explosive subject 
of religion. There should be no delicacies of discussion though. The discus-
sion society should employ “impartial criticism” and “frankness,” “secure 
representatives of every variety of opinion,” and “invite distinguished per-
sons from outside to read papers” (11). Almost to the word, the Heretics 
Society adopted his advice and incorporated its details into its laws and orga-
nization. The Heretics would also denounce the orthodox mode of a priori 
reasoning that ignores the contradictions embedded in doctrine and tradi-
tion. Protesting against this method of “the Church,” Chawner mandates an 
acknowledgment of evolutionary thought and comparative anthropology. 
His vision of the history of religion suggests that heterodox positions serve 
as refining agents in the development of civilization.
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 The orthodox voices should still be heard, however, and Chawner notes 
additionally that agnostics and atheists need not make an open disavowal of 
faith in order to avoid discomfort for friends or family. Amid all the various 
philosophical or religious positions, Chawner still affirms the persistence of 
the “moral sense,” and he concluded his speech advocating doing “good” out 
of “sympathy” for others. By the “moral sense,” he meant “the sense of duty, 
conscience, the categorical imperative whose right to command we admit 
even when we refuse our obedience” (15–16).
 As would be expected, the orthodox contingent at Cambridge moved 
quickly to respond. Ostracizing reviews immediately appeared in both 
Christian and lay newspapers and journals.9 Chawner, though, was more 
interested in the responses he might have elicited in those outside of the 
mainstream. On May 15, Chawner sent a copy of “Prove All Things” upon 
request to the repository at the University Library. He included a handwrit-
ten note on the first page welcoming a heated exchange with the Christian 
establishment: “I have great pleasure in enclosing a copy of my pamphlet. I 
did not send it to you for the same reason that I did not send it to some of my 
most intimate friends—for fear of hurting their susceptibilities. I hope that 
my unorthodox views will not give offence. I am told that I have already been 
denounced in one College chapel. This pleases me” (CUL cam.c.909.7).
 Over the course of the ensuing five months, Chawner received scores of 
requests for a copy of the pamphlet. In addition to neutral correspondence or 
acknowledgments of receipt, some seventy letters survive expressing either 
commendation or disapprobation of his paper, or in some cases, approval 
of his motives but condemnation of his tactics. The letters came from such 
a wide variety of people and signaled such a strangely mixed audience that 
Chawner decided to publish all of them anonymously as a supplement to 
his pamphlet. Only three people denied permission to print their letters.10 
In November the Cambridge University Press printed thirty-seven letters 
in the order Chawner received them, with a prefatory note dated October 
15. In this, he regrets that he must publish the letters anonymously, espe-
cially because twenty-three letters are from professors, fellows, and others at 
Cambridge “whose position would give weight to their opinion” (2). Some 
of these are from women teachers at Girton and Newnham. A separate sec-
tion includes thirteen letters from nonresidents of Cambridge selected for 
diversity of perspective, which variously report the thoughts of a surgeon, a 
barrister, a scientist, several headmasters, and both Anglican and noncon-
formist clergymen. A letter added to the residents’ section we know now to 
be signed collectively by, among others, C. K. Ogden and C(yril) M(oses) 
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Picciotto, the two key founders of the Heretics Society.
 Nearly all of the letters express their interest in the subject matter and 
thank him for having sent a copy of the pamphlet so readily. The fact that 
many have read borrowed copies testifies to the interest in the rumor mill 
and uproar surrounding the Chawner Affair. Some want the further dis-
semination of “Prove All Things” to more remote communities and wish 
that Chawner would make more copies available for purchase. Indeed, the 
first letter writer questions Chawner’s gender-specific appeal and suggests 
that women too should be equally confronted with “the truth” (4). The pre-
dominant tenor of the correspondence as a whole supports Chawner, appre-
ciates his frankness and sincere tone, and particularly admires the courage 
of someone in such an influential and scrutinized position who is willing to 
proclaim such views.
 A few letter writers predictably feared for the souls of young impression-
able minds. One member of Cambridge suggests that, if there is “no standard 
of orthodoxy,” the best undergraduate minds would not receive the stimula-
tion of a consistent discussion, and the remainder would not be able to make 
sense of “fragments of disconnected philosophies.” People would end up 
adopting the “dogma that there is no answer” (8). Aside from the intellectual 
arrogance of this perspective, the writer reveals a prevalent belief that heresy 
inevitably leads to the loss of faith. Several letters wonder what new moral-
ity could arise if the old creed is lost. One correspondent feels that a new, 
humanist ethical code is not enough and still wants a metaphysical unity 
for humanity, even if it is an “abstract God.” One self-proclaimed indepen-
dent thinker still doubts “whether it is wise to offer this meat to babes,” and 
another worries about “what happens to a youngster when he goes out into 
the world with his religious principles gone” (19–21). Certainly, forecasts 
about the future of tradition and the effects of open debate both are dubious 
at best, and literature of this period decidedly illustrates that the etiology of 
changing values is moot. (Does the questioning young scholar fall into the 
abyss with Kurtz? Does he grow full of melancholy or troubled by the “ache 
of modernism” like Stephen Dedalus or Angel Clare? Or does one discover a 
way to cultivate a “moral sense” akin to that of Dorothea Brooke, Lord Jim, 
or the Schlegel sisters?) Several of the letters acknowledge doubt and the 
implications of modernist thought, yet some writers remain content in their 
faith. One cleric appreciates being kept abreast of the currents in lay interests, 
and another remains orthodox despite “many disquieting thoughts” (22). 
The pious need not defend what they believe since, for example, faith may be 
“of the nature of a conflict—not of a conflict with truth but with obstacles to 
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truth which for a time appear to be true” (16). One of the faculty correspon-
dents echoes this sentiment in believing Christianity to be “a progressive 
revelation,” so it can only benefit from “the fullest possible discussion” (5).
 Above all, the most striking condemnation concerns Chawner’s posi-
tion as master. The writer who denied Chawner’s perception of the preva-
lence of agnosticism also thinks “Prove All Things” is “a distinct abuse” of 
Chawner’s “position” and states that he has “no moral right to upset a boy’s 
religious beliefs unless [he has] a higher religion to offer” (21). Responding 
to a suggestion in this letter, Ogden later joked with Chawner: “I hope the 
idea of leaving youngsters till they are 35 will not make much headway” 
(ECA 2.3.6). The credibility of the writer is further tempered by his convic-
tion that drunken debauchery has grown in Germany ever since the people 
“abandoned their religion” (21). The responsibilities of masterdom remain 
in debate today. In his account of the Chawner affair, Brooke can admire the 
“basic purpose—to foster candour and openness in religious discussion,” but 
he questions the wisdom of condemning compulsory chapel and of distrib-
uting “pamphlets attacking the orthodox from the master’s lodge” (124).
 While Chawner reports that his motive in publishing the letters was to 
offer the interested readers of “Prove All Things” more information on the 
state of religion, publishing the correspondence suggested to the adminis-
tration that the furor might not die down and that the master’s lodge now 
housed a loose cannon. During the Heretics’ formative academic year of 
1909–10, the Chawner crisis brewed at Emma. Two factors, though, checked 
any further plans for reform Chawner might have had in mind, his ill health 
and the stealing of his thunder by the Heretics.
 One of the letters in the residents’ section is a brief statement of interest 
and deference signed by twelve undergraduates from across the university 
on May 23, 1909. Of the new disciples of “Chawner’s heresy,” five were from 
Trinity, three from Sidney, two from Magdalene, and one each from Queens’ 
and Caius (see figure 1). This intercollegiate student group wrote to Chawner: 
“We have been much interested in your pamphlet ‘Prove All Things,’ and 
should be glad to know if copies may be anywhere obtained: we feel sure that 
many undergraduates would be glad if it were made accessible” (ECA 2.3.6). 
Like the Apostles nearly a century earlier, these twelve young men had just 
sown the seeds of an intellectual society that would participate in determin-
ing from a privileged position the British stance on philosophical, religious, 
and aesthetic questions. The society would not be secret in nature, though, 
and the discussion forum would be open. These new “apostles” were so sure 
of the sentiment of the student body that at least four of them, including 
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Picciotto and Ogden, used the summer to plan the birth of their prospective 
“Heretics Society.” In the fall, Ogden began a fascinating correspondence 
with Chawner, soliciting his advice on how to canvass sympathetic members 
of the faculty and convince them to join the Heretics.
The Cambridge Heretics Society
In his account of the beginnings of the Heretics, Sargant Florence remembers 
that in the Michaelmas term of 1909, as a freshman, he went to “a mysterious 
gathering over the Pepysian Library at Magdalene . . . intent on forming a 
constitution and finding a name for a society to oppose compulsory college 
chapel and to discuss religion freely” (CA 13). Though Ogden had attended 
Rossall prep school in Fleetwood, Lancashire, Picciotto was from St. Paul’s 
in London, and Florence labels the rest of the attendees of the meeting “Pau-
Figure 1. The founders of the Cambridge Heretics Society, 1909–10. C. K. Ogden is seated second 
from the right. (Source: C. K. Ogden fonds, McMaster University Library, MCMA 114.28)
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lines” as well. He also describes Ogden as the “moving spirit” of the meeting 
in steering its course of action (CA 3; 13). The meeting profoundly influ-
enced Florence, who immediately would become central to the workings of 
the Heretics and continue so for fifteen years.
 At the same time that Chawner was preparing the supplemental letters 
for publication, Ogden and Picciotto had already discussed their plans with 
him and begun fishing for potential Heretics. By the time the collected letters 
appeared, the Heretics had already met several times, formed a constitu-
tion, and swayed several professors to join their cause. In the months from 
October to December of 1909, Ogden and Chawner conducted a remarkable 
correspondence. Ogden’s alternately sophomoric and sophisticated voice in 
the letters illustrates the mixed exhilaration and frustration involved in start-
ing a movement or organizing a society. He writes to Chawner as a son to 
father, seeking advice, courting approval. In an October 6 letter, Ogden told 
Chawner that the Heretics had already attracted such Honorary Members as 
Harrison and John McTaggart (1866–1925), two scholars who in December 
would deliver the pair of inaugural lectures of the Heretics Society. Ogden 
lists the honorary members after parenthetically stating “besides yourself.” 
On November 1, Ogden again writes: “It was unanimously decided that 
the Master of Emmanuel be elected an Honorary Member” (ECA 2.3.7). 
Such tactical presumption did work, for “The Master of Emmanuel” soon 
headed the list of honorary members. Ogden was refining the memorable 
solicitation and marketing skills that would define and mobilize the rest of 
his career. Florence notes: “Somehow or other he seemed to find the right 
approach to the dons we enlisted, as well as to the distinguished speakers we 
secured” (CA 15). Despite Ogden’s artful diplomacy, becoming a Heretic at 
this point could not have been a wise choice for Chawner, who was already 
caught in the imbroglio of his own design. He was also already sick, for in the 
same letter Ogden expressed hope for Chawner’s recovery from an unstated 
“illness” (ECA 2.3.7). Chawner’s condition would not abate until at least 
mid-December.
 By the beginning of the Michaelmas term, the Heretics had elected Pic-
ciotto as acting chairman and Ogden as secretary, and on October 3 they 
met to discuss Monsignor Moyes’ lecture on “How do we know there is a 
God?” (ECA 2.3.7). In coordination with this clerical perspective on the 
subject, the Heretics raised issues from a lecture McTaggart gave on “Agnos-
ticism.” Ogden’s October 6 letter also described the careful yet singularly self-
directed deliberations surrounding the rules for the Society. Despite their 
deference to faculty opinion, these undergraduates were also self-possessed 
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and assured of their own position. The defiance of their terse manifesto 
is striking. Perhaps the boldest, and very modernist, assertion required of 
members initially confronted some dissent, i.e., the proposed rule that mem-
bers “reject traditional a priori methods of approaching religious questions.” 
Ogden told Chawner that while “to most people this is plain enough, and 
denotes what we require in an inoffensive manner, philosophers demur.” 
Here Ogden means McTaggart. Though he was readily willing to become 
a member, McTaggart “objected that he spent ‘most of his life approaching 
religious matters’ thus” (ECA 2.3.7). He would suggest an alternative, and on 
November 15 Ogden sent Chawner the revised set of rules (see table 1).
 The new version of laws included McTaggart’s amendment to Law 4 
regarding types of membership, which Ogden found “quite unobjectionable, 
neither too vague nor too definite” (ECA 2.3.6). McTaggart’s added clause 
opened up another dimension to the Heretics, Associate status, which would 
enable the manifold increase in the number of Heretics. Though people may 
not be “entirely free to be Members,” those “in sympathy” could join the 
Society as Associates. The emphasis on the word “free” may also suggest that 
the Associate status was, in part, designed to allow for the membership of 
those simultaneously affiliated with the Free Thought Association, another 
Cambridge discussion group of which the Heretics’ officers disapproved.
 At first, Ogden and the others sought to exclude unilaterally all members 
of this rival group of freethinkers. Without acknowledging the contradic-
tion in philosophical tolerance, Ogden informed Chawner that he regretted 
this only because the Master of Emmanuel had recommended a member 
of the F.T.A., one Mr. Lavington.11 While the Heretics wanted him to join, 
they would not withdraw their demands for exclusivity, in part because 
they wanted to distance themselves remotely from Aleister Crowley. Ogden 
explained to Chawner that when the Heretics “set out we were to endeavor 
as far as possible to contradict the impression produced by Mr. Crowley’s 
introduction to Cambridge at an early stage of that Society’s existence” 
(ECA 2.3.7). Crowley had become acquainted with the occult while an 
undergraduate at Cambridge during the “magic revival” of the 1890s, and 
by 1909, he had established his own society, the Silver Star, and published 
semi-pornographic manuals for traineeship in magic. If the Free Thought 
Association could produce “The Beast,” as Crowley was known, then the 
Heretics wanted no dialogue with such a tainted conversation society.
 In December, however, the Heretics had reached an agreement with the 
F.T.A. The Heretics saw promising changes on the latter’s executive commit-
tee, and Ogden explained to Chawner that the group had expressed the desire 
“both officially and otherwise to be no more than their name would properly 
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I.
OF THE NATURE OF THE SOCIETY.
1.  That the name of the Society be “The Heretics.”
2.  That the object of the Society be to promote discussion on problems of religion, phi-
losophy, and art.
II.
OF MEMBERSHIP AND ASSOCIATION.
3.  That the Society consist of Members, Associates, and Honorary Members, who shall be 
elected by the members.
4.  That the Members consist of those who reject traditional a priori methods of approach-
ing religious questions; that Associates consist of those who, while in sympathy with 
the general principle of open discussion, are not entirely free to be Members.
5.  That Members and Associates be elected from members of the University of Cambridge 
below the degree of M.A. and from students of Newnham and Girton Colleges; that 
Honorary Members be elected from those not eligible for Membership or Association, 
owing either to their being above the degree of B.A. or to their not being Members of the 
University.
III.
OF SUBSCRIPTION.
6.  That Members pay 2s. 6d., Associates 1s. 6d. subscription per term.
IV.
OF OFFICERS.
7.  That a Chairman, a Treasurer, and a Secretary, be elected at the end of each Term, and 
that these Officers form a Committee which shall decide all arrangements for meet-
ings.
V.
OF MEETINGS.
8.  That meetings be held not less than four times a Term, at any place deemed suitable; and 
that at all meetings Members, Associates, and Honorary Members may introduce visi-
tors.
9.  That if any Member challenge the ruling of the Chairman he may appeal to the mem-
bers present, a majority of whom shall decide the point.
VI.
OF PRIVATE BUSINESS
10.  That all matters of private business be in the hands of Members only.
11.  That any change in the laws may only be effected by the vote of two-thirds of all Mem-
bers of the Society.
12.  That any Law, except Law 11, may be suspended for any meeting by a majority of 
members present at any meeting.
Source: MCMA 114.1
table 1. The Laws of the Cambridge Heretics Society, October 1909
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imply.” Hence, while full members of the Heretics “remain distinct” and have 
“sole authority,” members of the F.T.A. could participate through Associate 
status. Ogden added that the Heretics’ election of Francis Cornford, who was 
affiliated with the F.T.A., to Honorary Membership “formed a natural link in 
the conclusion of this friendly agreement.” More importantly, the Heretics 
wanted to create a united front of freethinking, since “it is undesirable that 
the outside world should rejoice at any misunderstanding between us” (ECA 
2.3.7). Through this process of appropriation, the Heretics began to form 
an umbrella coalition of dissent and heterodoxy at Cambridge. The alliance 
would become insignificant as the Heretics grew and came to overshadow 
the other dissenters. The F.T.A. would lose some of the spotlight as Ogden’s 
managerial skills quickly drew such figures as Shaw, Chesterton, and Rus-
sell to the Heretics. Additionally, after several joint meetings between the 
Heretics and the Emmanuel College Religious Discussion Society, the latter 
became supernumerary and faded away.
 During its formative stage, the Heretics also struggled over some logisti-
cal and functional aspects of the laws. When its numbers were so small that 
the location of the meeting did not matter, the Heretics held their informal 
meetings in a member’s rooms or a pub or coffee shop. Mostly the meetings 
were held in Ogden’s rooms, which at first were in the attic over the Pepysian 
Library at Magdalene. Since these rooms could only host thirty people, the 
Heretics initially thought of limiting undergraduate membership to fifteen. 
Later when Ogden moved in the fall of 1911 to an office over MacFisheries 
in Petty Cury, the meetings went with him, a fortunate change which pre-
cluded the necessity of limiting membership. The flat above this fish business 
on Trumpington Street, what everyone knew as “Top Hole,” would also be 
Ogden’s headquarters for the Cambridge Magazine. G. F. Fox of Newnham 
playfully remembers the effect that the proximity of the fish house had on 
her: “For long after, the smell of fish recalled the Heretics” (88). In her mem-
oir, Dora Russell recalls that for the meetings “one waded or sat on” Ogden’s 
filing system, which consisted of “a great many books which lay in piles” 
next to “piles and piles of papers and letters” (43). The Heretics might have 
been mistaken for sardines in these moments. Every Sunday night amid 
this atmosphere a member or guest would present a paper on any aspect of 
religion, art, or philosophy, and then open up the floor to discussion. These 
lively informal meetings were the forum for introducing visitors for poten-
tial membership, since the four or five plenary addresses held each term in 
lecture halls were not conducive to rapport-building conversation.
 The laws of the Heretics Society were slightly modified over its lifespan. 
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One change allowed nonmembers to hold the Chair at the plenary meet-
ings, and in 1921 an Economic Section of the Heretics was inaugurated. By 
November of 1909, though, the laws were finalized enough to let the young 
radicals turn to soliciting further Honorary Members. The faculty then knew 
exactly what commitment they were making. The Apostles G. M. Trevelyan, 
Lowes Dickinson, and G. H. Hardy were among the first of their star recruits, 
while J. M. Keynes replied to Ogden by the 15th that he “would rather not 
be” an Honorary Member (ECA 2.3.6). Within three weeks Keynes had inex-
plicably changed his mind, and he was on Ogden’s list of fifteen Honorary 
Members presented at the inaugural lectures of December 8 (ECA 2.3.7) (see 
figure 2). When the Heretics first issued their green-printed triptych schedule 
of meetings in the Lent term of 1910, Keynes name is on the right leaf listed 
among the nineteen original Honorary Members.12 In early December, these 
nearly outnumbered the twenty-three undergraduate Heretics. The appetite 
for heresy was stronger initially amongst the older generation at Cambridge. 
They had been craving it longer. However, so that their number “may not 
Figure 2. Triptych program of the Cambridge Heretics Society, Michaelmas term 1911. 
(Source: C. K. Ogden fonds, McMaster University Library, MCMA 114.7)
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appear out of proportion,” the Heretics decided to limit the Honorary Mem-
bers to twenty until there were at least fifty regular members and associates. 
McTaggart’s and Harrison’s inaugural lectures doubled their size as hoped, 
and Ogden shared with Chawner his optimism for the growth of the Society 
since they were “only just beginning to be heard of ” (ECA 2.3.7).
 The Associate status also enabled the women of Girton to attend meet-
ings, since the College administration forbade them to join the Heretics 
outright (Fox 88). Chaperon rules also curtailed attendance until Ogden 
found a way to circumvent the tradition. Dora Black of Girton, who later 
gave a joint presentation before the Heretics with her future husband, Ber-
trand Russell, delighted in the glee of escaping holy retreats or College 
chapel on Sundays with an “exeat permit” she would use to attend Heretics’ 
meetings. The administration could only frown. Black would “bicycle off 
there . . . with a most agreeable feeling of defiance and liberation” (42). She 
noted how Ogden would “bolster the self-confidence of the more obscure,” 
and felt that she was “one of those who would not have put pen to paper 
but for his encouragement” (MCMA 65). She would later be secretary of 
the Heretics in 1918–19. Looking back and wondering “how women ever 
managed to free themselves from their corsets . . . and the iron straitjacket 
imposed on them by religion, morality and social sanctions,” Russell, née 
Black, ascribes part of their success to the Heretics’ protest “against author-
ity.” She highlights the particular role of the Heretics after stating: “I believe 
that the metaphysical discussions that went on in Cambridge from 1900 
onwards had very great political and social repercussions, not the least of 
these the emancipation of women” (Tamarisk 41–42). P. Sargant Florence 
reports that Alix, his sister who later translated Freud’s papers with her hus-
band, James Strachey, told him that she found meetings of the Heretics “one 
of the few occasions of real University coeducation” (CA 17). The philo-
sophical ideas heard therein and “the knowledge that heresy is contagious” 
were the chief weapons in Dora Russell’s vision of the war against authority 
(Tamarisk 43).
 As a result of Jane Harrison’s presence on the faculty, a presence Virginia 
Woolf calls “formidable yet humble” (Room 18), Newnham women could join 
from the outset. Chaperons were also required there, though. As G. F. Fox 
of Newnham remembers, the protective elderly mandated that the nubile 
women be “shepherded by a don” to “such a dangerous debating society” 
(88). Undergraduate women of both Girton and Newnham held committee 
posts and contributed important papers at the informal meetings.13 From 
inception, the Heretics had sought to include women’s voices in the religious 
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debates, as one of Chawner’s correspondents had suggested, and by 1911, the 
Heretics changed the laws in order to ensure representation on the executive 
committee of at least one student from Girton or Newnham. For the 1919–20 
academic year, three of the seven committee members were women, includ-
ing the secretary, a prestigious post.
 When Florence’s aunt, Ethel Sargant, “took charge” as an Honorary Fel-
low at Girton, the college had their counterpart to Harrison, and Girton 
women could then attend the Heretics unrestricted. The hundredth meeting 
of the Society took place on January 28, 1913, at Sargant’s house, the Old 
Rectory at Girton. This meeting was actually a dinner party celebrating the 
occasion with a six-course meal flamboyantly punctuated by arched tongue 
and fillets of sole à la Cardinal (MCMA 114.5).
The Inaugural Lectures
Despite the maturity of Ogden’s correspondence with Chawner, the neo-
phyte heretic still displayed brief moments of tentativeness and insecurity. A 
few members of the Heretics had expressed reservations about the notori-
ous name by which people would know them. However, when the Heretics 
Society went public in the lecture rooms of Trinity College on the night of 
Wednesday, December 8, the members had resolved their nominal qualms. 
Moreover, Jane Harrison, in her usual stately ebullience, gave the Heretics 
cause for pride in their choice of name when she “characterised this as ‘most 
inspiring.’” Harrison and McTaggart also eliminated any residual fears the 
Heretics might have had about their acceptance when “in spite of pressing 
engagements [they] very kindly promised speeches for about 20 minutes 
each” (ECA 2.3.7). Then, in their opening remarks, Harrison suggested that 
the Heretics embodied the spirit of the times, and that at present humans 
were morally obliged to become heretics, and McTaggart dared his audience 
to pursue to the furthest extent the implications that “truth” might have 
on religious questions. Together the inaugural speeches illustrated the two 
chief strains of thought that would characterize the Heretics before the war. 
McTaggart brought to metaphysical and ethical questions a rational utilitari-
anism, infused with notions of love and happiness. In her address, “Heresy 
and Humanity,” Harrison checked any rigidity in McTaggart’s colder calcula-
tions by claiming that heresy, as “the child of Science,” can lead to a new way 
of life and vision of the world through the use of cultural abstractions and 
the recognition of “an organic spiritual union” (35–39).
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 Amid the panoply of academic anthropologists researching pagan cul-
tures at the turn of the century, Harrison stood alone in professing markedly 
feminist and heretical positions. Criticism of late has only begun to recuper-
ate her interesting life and avant-garde ideas. She was among the first genera-
tion of women to receive a college education in Britain, and over the course 
of her fellowship at Newnham, she became known as a true performer at 
the podium, fondly remembered for her evocative gestures. In spanning the 
period from 1883 to 1924, Harrison’s academic career roughly embodies the 
historical trajectory of the intellectual, political, and cultural ideas addressed 
in this study. The historical reception of Harrison’s ideas also exemplifies the 
gradual acceptance over time of heresy and heretics that history sometimes 
allows, and her development of Nietzsche’s idealized sense of pre-Olympian 
cults illustrates the anthropological and historical relations between pagan-
ism and Christianity of particular interest to Pater, Hardy, and Joyce.
 Opening her address to the Heretics with an etymological account of the 
word “heresy,” Harrison claims that a “zealous pursuit,” forever embedded in 
the word, continues to radiate from the courage of heretics “who were burnt 
at the stake for love of an idea” (27). The pejoration of the word only arises 
from “an enemy’s mouth” since the value of personal “choice” is also rooted 
in the history of the word. In pursuing her driving question as to why heresy 
becomes “desirable,” Harrison returns to a speculative time when societies 
first formed their initial bonds. When “sympathy” and “uniformity” draw 
people together, the collective struggle for life cannot abide the heretic. The 
modern day “good soldier” is an avatar of the archetypal orthodox person. 
The danger of rejecting tradition had previously been akin to abandoning the 
safety of the “herd,” but Harrison suggests that as a result of the progress of 
civilization a self-defining membership in the Heretics is not only obligatory 
but desirable. To paraphrase Harrison’s perspective, the toleration and viabil-
ity of the modern heretic derives from the humanist growth of civilization. 
In the past, custom enslaved its peoples and wielded a tyranny so powerful 
that individual thought was unheard of in a culture mechanically chugging 
through time without recognizing a need for improvement. The past, Har-
rison provocatively states, is embodied by “an oligarchy of old men,” “and in 
such a society, personal choice, heresy, is impossible” (28–29).
 In Harrison’s view, this oligarchy perpetuates orthodoxy and blind faith 
out of the force of “herd suggestion” that causes traditional views to have 
the feel of instinct. These collective suggestions seem ineluctable because as 
she states, “they are what Mr. William James would call a priori syntheses of 
the most perfect sort.” Here Harrison appeals to her audience’s vowed rejec-
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tion of all “traditional a priori methods of approaching religious questions.” 
When discussing this topic, Harrison feels that a pious perspective is inher-
ently intense and irrational, so she calls on the Heretics not to “reason with 
our opponents,” but rather try “to get this immense force of herd-suggestion 
on to the side we believe to be right” (31–32). While evincing a desire for 
a new synthesis, Harrison not only seems to forget the better intentions of 
the Heretics in courting open debate, but she also anticipates Bloomsbury’s 
self-assured consensus building and G. K. Chesterton’s criticism of heresy. As 
noted before, in his dealings with the Heretics, he implied that heresy ends 
when it begins to think itself “right.” It is one of the compelling aspects of the 
Heretics that they provided a forum so tolerant that internal dissent never 
allowed for a foothold strong enough to begin promulgating its own ortho-
doxy. While the individual Heretics, and Ogden especially, would begin to 
defend the correctness of their own personal schools of thought, for over 
twenty years the Heretics enabled the possibility of being oppositional out of 
principle.
 On many levels, Harrison’s address draws on the methodology and per-
spective of Nietzsche’s works. She put forth a vision of humanity that evolves 
across time by reconciling contradictory elements and moving beyond the 
past. Reason is a useful tool for her, but equally important is the ability to 
acknowledge the irrational in life. While Harrison declares an “impasse” in 
the nineteenth-century struggle between orthodoxy and science, tradition 
and individual freedom, she claims that in the Edwardian period “life” began 
to feel “its way blindly to a solution, to what was literally a harmony.” In this 
way, Harrison characterizes the Edwardian period in a manner similar to 
Nietzsche’s description of the nature of Greek tragedy in the time of Aeschy-
lus. In The Birth of Tragedy (1872), he argues that the plays of Aeschylus 
represent an aesthetic reconciliation of the old world collectivity of Dio-
nysus and the new world individuating processes of Apollo and the other 
Olympian gods. Similarly, Harrison inspires her fellow Edwardians with 
thoughts that they have also managed a remarkable synthesis of worldviews. 
By progressively liberating the individual within the ties of civilization, the 
Edwardians embody a “disparate organism.” The modern miraculous har-
mony lies in the fact that a “Society” can be composed of “Heretics.” How-
ever, Harrison implies that the future of heresy may see its assimilation by 
society: “We live now at the transition moment; we have broken with the 
old, we have not quite adjusted ourselves to the new” (35–36). In a sense, 
she affirms Arnold’s diagnosis of “the want of correspondence” between 
“old bottles” and “new wine.” Through the cooperation implicit in society, 
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though, Harrison believes that the Edwardians “at once differentiate and 
organically unite” and that this “new gospel” saves people “not by science, 
not by abstraction, but by a new mode of life” (37).
 Though Harrison may recast many of Nietzsche’s views, her critique of 
the “oligarchy of old men” and her privileging of the pre-Olympian matri-
archal Greek cults distinguish her from his repeated denigration of women. 
Such sharp feminist perspectives had earlier hindered Harrison’s academic 
career, but by 1909 she was firmly entrenched in her fellowship at Newnham 
and had already written her influential Prolegomena to the Study of Greek 
Religion (1903). She could then join Chawner in growing more radical with 
age, and her general reputation and self-confidence helped to defuse the 
charge of Cambridge’s own oligarchy of old men. In fact, when Harrison 
turned to publishing her address, she told her fellow Cambridge Ritualist, 
Gilbert Murray, that she wanted to send copies “to lots of young girls who 
are full of sweetness by nature but who for conscience sake are Militants” 
(J. Stewart 119). Her militancy was strictly pacifist in its desire for a radical 
liberation of the human spirit, and she concludes her address with her own 
view that only “in a civilised anarchy . . . can the individual come to his full 
right and function” (40).
 In his 1962 preface to her later work, Epilegomena to the Study of Greek 
Religion, and Themis, John Wilson suggests that “many of her colleagues 
were utterly bewildered and angered by her” because she was a “militant 
agnostic” who “gave no comfort” to the Christian society in which she lived 
(x). Wilson therefore points to the conservative political and religious lean-
ings of her contemporary publishers as the reason her books went out of 
print. Shelley Arlen observes that “Harrison’s feminism, pacifism, and athe-
ism made her a particular target for the outrage of conservative male col-
leagues” (165). In addition to these radical ideas, her attack on the primacy of 
reason in studying the Greeks aligned her too much with Nietzsche for some 
of her contemporaries. While antagonizing some of her lay peers, Harrison’s 
address also elicited a hostile response from Edward Selwyn, an Anglican 
priest and fellow at Corpus Christi College. In Tradition and Reason: being a 
reply to Miss Harrison’s ‘Heresy and Humanity’ (1911), Selwyn tried to defame 
her work as “emotional,” “provincial,” and an “amazing position,” arrived at, 
not surprisingly “by the irregular tendency of her own logic” (13). However, 
Selwyn does not address Harrison herself, but those students “who have not 
yet quite decided that they will ‘not reason with their opponents’” (5). In 
other words, he overemphasizes her one point of questionable rhetoric. In 
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distorting Harrison’s desire for free thought and open debate, Selwyn tries 
to appeal to those Cambridge undergraduates who will have only read his 
paper. Underscoring her definition of heresy as “personal choice,” he wants 
people to choose to be traditional.
 For the title of his inaugural address, “Dare To Be Wise,” McTaggart 
anglicized the motto of the University of New Zealand, and asserted that the 
Heretics have the “duty” to follow the “injunction”—“Sapere Aude” (3). In 
discussions of religion and philosophy, McTaggart agreed with James’ The 
Varieties of Religious Experience (1902) in recognizing the undeniable lived 
experience of many people whose happiness fundamentally depends upon 
a belief in God.14 However, the “search for truth” about religious questions 
calls for a unique brand of courage so that the seeker is willing to confront 
painful and bleak conclusions drawn from independent reasoning. Echo-
ing his formative influence on the laws of the Heretics, McTaggart declares 
that each potential philosophical or religious question must be approached 
without any a priori assumptions. Though philosophical investigation may 
destroy happiness, this possible effect cannot legitimately lead to a denial of 
an undesired conclusion.
 The bulk of McTaggart’s quickfire address served as a pointed corrective 
to both the religious and philosophical communities. Through his dialecti-
cal methodology, McTaggart exposed the errors of both sides in order to 
let the Heretics begin their philosophical quests on a proper footing. In 
his mind, doomsday prophets mistakenly assert that “if certain views on 
religious matters were true, all morality would lose its validity” (4). To this 
perennial perception of the decline of morality, McTaggart retorts that, aside 
from precluding the need for holy observances, disbelieving in religion does 
not affect everyday life and its perpetual moral choices. The second error of 
defenders of the faith is to assume that agnosticism or heresy “would destroy 
the value, for those who accepted the beliefs, of many of those parts of 
experience which would otherwise have the highest value” (5). Here McTag-
gart disagrees with Tennyson’s claim in In Memoriam that love would suffer 
without a belief in immortality; instead, the unconditional goodness of love 
should be valued regardless of duration. Asserting “the practical importance 
of the problems of religion,” McTaggart argues that all moral and metaphysi-
cal questions “must be answered one way or the other according to the solu-
tion we adopt of religious problems” (4–7). As a metaphysician, McTaggart 
shares with religious-minded people an interest in what he considers to be 
the most central concerns of humanity. Religion must be debated.
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 The chief difference between religion and philosophy, as McTaggart 
reminds the Heretics, is that the latter does not accept a proposition without 
sufficient evidence. In turning to philosophical questions, McTaggart dem-
onstrates for his audience the proper methodology to use in following the 
fourth law of the Heretics, the rejection of “traditional a priori methods of 
approaching religious questions.” Therefore, “test everything,” and however 
painful it may be, dismiss what does not fit, and endure the consequences 
since there is no certainty beforehand that religion will not be challenged 
by the implications of the findings. At work here is the Edwardian synthetic 
agenda, trying to harmonize beliefs, beginning to show signs of the modern-
ist proclivity for exclusion.
 In miniature, McTaggart’s address replicates many of the arguments from 
his Some Dogmas of Religion (1906). By revisiting his personal idealist posi-
tions there, it is easier to understand his incomplete responses to the reli-
gious questions he cursorily raises. For in discussing immortality, the exis-
tence of God, the general goodness or evilness of the universe, and whether 
it is progressing or devolving, McTaggart only offers some guidelines for 
the investigations. In his earlier work, he had suggested the possibility of 
immortality, and thereby escaped Dante’s circle of hell for heretics, while 
arguing against the belief in a personal God. The questions about the uni-
verse affect potential happiness, and this factor taints the objectivity of the 
pursuit and influences both benevolent and maleficent views of the world. 
To the Heretics, McTaggart declared that on this matter there “is no intrinsic 
à priori connection between existence and goodness.” Further, he indirectly 
commands them to reject Kant’s idea of a categorical imperative since they 
should not believe an action to be “truthful” simply because it unilaterally 
leads to good. Though he would like to prove the world good, it may in fact 
“be very bad.” Assuming that the universe is benign blindly begs the ques-
tion of “the nature of existence” which McTaggart claims “is the one we are 
setting out to determine” (12). Interestingly in his major work, The Nature 
of Existence (1921), McTaggart later concluded that time will end and that, 
in this stage of existence, beings will exult in a pure state of love. Along the 
path to such potentially wondrous conclusions, he promises nothing else to 
the Heretics but the glory of the search itself. Quoting some anaphoric lines 
from William Morris’ “Love is Enough,” he suggests that, though the search 
for wisdom may endure repeated suffering, the reward comes from seeking 
truth for its own sake.
 As would be the practice at future meetings, the chairperson, in this case 
Francis Cornford, opened the floor to questions. Often the ensuing discus-
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sion would last two or three hours before the Heretics would close the meet-
ing near midnight. After this first meeting, Harrison prophetically wrote to 
Ogden over the Christmas vacation: “I thought the discussion that followed 
McTaggart’s paper promised well for the future” (MCMA 107.8). In Novem-
ber, McTaggart had written a letter to Chawner too late to be included in 
the “Prove All Things” supplement. After his inaugural address, McTaggart 
might have felt that his prophetic words applied equally to himself: “I am 
convinced that in twenty years those who remember 1909 will realise how 
much your action has done to promote in Cambridge not only true learning, 
but also true religion” (WCL 402–3).
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After the inaugural lectures at the end of 1909, the Heretics Society 
indeed enjoyed tremendous growth and notoriety until the First World War 
drained Cambridge of its men. By 1913, over 200 undergraduates had joined 
the Heretics, representing between fi ve and ten percent of the student popu-
lation (CH 226).1 Th is period from 1910 to 1914 was one of the two most 
active and infl uential times of the Society, the other being 1920–24 when 
“normalcy” returned to campus aft er the war and the infl uenza epidemic, 
and Ogden fi nally would fi nish his twelve-year presidency of the Heretics. 
In the “Georgian” period, though, a sense of discovery and a remarkable 
diversity of perspective tempered the Heretics’ meetings with a tolerance and 
joy of religious debate noticeably diminished aft er the war. For one thing, the 
voice of orthodoxy, or at least liberal Christianity, maintained a consistent 
presence in the early years with addresses by the Reverends P. N. Waggett, 
E. W. Lummis, and R .J. Campbell, a popular Fabian cleric who preached the 
gospel of social reform at the City Temple.2 Additionally, the two most reso-
nant debates at the Heretics saw Christians G. K. Chesterton and H .G. Wood 
respond to the “heresies” of Bernard Shaw and J. M. Robertson, M.P., respec-
tively. In the 1920s, the topics of the meetings became nearly altogether secu-
lar, though the speakers still oft en identifi ed their works as heretical.3
 By then, Ogden had established himself as a major editor who controlled 
Th e Cambridge Magazine, Psyche, and the Today and Tomorrow Series. He 
also had co-written Th e Meaning of Meaning (1923) with I. A. Richards 
and translated into English Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 
(1922). Ogden’s interest in language and specifi cally Benthamite principles 
of linguistic reform had earlier carried over into the Heretics Society and, 
according to Florence, “set the tone of Heretics discussion” (CH 232). From 
Chapter 2
orn
The Early Years of the 
Cambridge Heretics, 1910–14
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all accounts, Ogden’s presence in the social gatherings of the Society was 
strategically understated, and he oft en dissembled his personal feelings on 
matters. Terrence Gordon emphasizes Ogden’s fascination with the use of 
African and other assorted masks in speaking to people and claims that he 
was “[n]ever satisfi ed with any vantage point but the panoptic” (3–9).4 Simi-
larly, Florence explains that Ogden remained out of the spotlight because he 
“seemed rather to fancy the role of an éminence grise acting in secret” (CA 
15). Dora Russell reports that he presided with “his usual impish provocation 
of argument” (Tamarisk 43). Perhaps most revealing is Ogden’s own descrip-
tion of his interaction with the Heretics. Th ough the following comment was 
written in 1929 as part of a grant proposal for language study, it neverthe-
less suggests that he distanced himself from the Heretics’ meetings with a 
calculating objective in mind: “In 1909 with a view to studying the handling 
of words in practical discussion I founded a society called ‘Th e Heretics,’ 
which for the next 12 years played a considerable part in University life and 
thought . . . I was thus able to stage and direct some 300 experiments of three 
hours each, to study the defects of verbal exposition and argument, under the 
most favourable conditions” (MCMA 128.10). At the time of the application, 
Ogden had just started his Orthological Institute (1928–56), and he defi nes 
“orthology” as “the term which has been used to cover the new researches 
into the possibilities of developing the instrument of language (from the 
Greek orthos ‘correct’ and logos ‘word’)” (MCMA 128.10). In a sense, “her-
esy” trained Ogden to develop his own orthodoxy of language. In the con-
clusion, the fi ner details of his creation of Basic English at the Orthological 
Institute and the implications of this transformative shift  become apparent 
in discussions of Finnegans Wake and Nineteen Eighty-Four.
 Th ough Ogden’s personal engagement with the Heretics raises many 
important questions about his motivations and infl uence, before the war he 
was still a tyro in his scholastics, and the older intellectuals still championed 
or confronted the workings of religious heresy. While Ogden was remaining 
a relatively silent observer, however, two events occurred that would solidify 
his eventual prominence in the Heretics. In the academic year of 1910–11, 
the president, C. M. Picciotto, left  the Society, and the Emmanuel College 
governing body silenced Chawner, the Heretics’ inspiring voice, shortly 
before his death. Th e leadership of the Heretics then clearly fell to Ogden 
and his detached persona. He would use Th e Cambridge Magazine to make 
his voice heard and to publish extracts and reports of the Heretics’ meetings. 
In the journal, he oft en referred to the Heretics as “the ungodly.”
 Before Chawner died, the Heretics shared the forum for Cambridge free 
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thought with the Emmanuel College Religious Discussion Society. Oft en 
the two organizations held joint meetings, including the pair of inaugu-
ral lectures for the Heretics. On March 10, 1910, Chawner presided over 
one of these meetings in which the Apostle L. H. G. Greenwood discussed 
“Agnosticism and Conduct”; two months later Chawner’s continued dissemi-
nation of pamphlets fi nally precipitated a response from the administra-
tion at Emmanuel. On May 18, he circulated an address by the president 
emeritus of Harvard University, Charles Eliot, entitled “Th e Religion of the 
Future.” Chawner attached a cover letter in which he stated his hope that 
the pamphlet would help undergraduates “to discard the ill-founded and 
superstitious elements which still survive in popular Christianity” (TCA 10). 
A cartoon in the college paper, Th e Lion, captures the eff ect of Chawner’s 
renewed readiness to spread free thought (see fi gure 3). Th e senior tutor,      F. 
W. Head, here recoils in horror from the sight of another corrupted under-
graduate mind, and less than two weeks later he signed the fi rst public oppo-
sition to Chawner at Cambridge. Aft er Charles Raven received a letter from 
a headmaster asking “whether Emmanuel was a fi t place for a candidate for 
Figure 3. “Let there be truth, may the heavens fall”: cartoon lampooning “The 
Chawner Affair” at Cambridge. William Chawner, Master of Emmanuel College, 
hands out pamphlets on freethinking, while the Senior Tutor F. W. Head turns 
away in horror. (Source: The Lion, May 1910)
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holy orders” (178), he, Head, and fi ve other fellows sent Chawner the fol-
lowing protest: “Fellows of the College whose signatures appear below wish 
to represent to the Master their conviction that his recent practice of issuing 
to the undergraduates pamphlets and circulars dealing with questions of 
religious controversy is detrimental to the general interests of the College 
and specifi cally and gravely embarrassing to other offi  cers of the College 
in the discharge of their statutory duties” (TCA 7).5 While Chawner had an 
equivalent number of supporters on the governing body, he nevertheless 
sought consul which opined that he had not broken any college statutes, but 
had “committed a breach of duty as Master.” Caustic and unrepentant, he 
only admitted an error in publishing a denunciation of compulsory chapel 
and promised to be silent thereaft er about that issue (TCA 8–9).
 Eighteen months aft er “Prove All Th ings,” however, Chawner’s candid 
voice echoed through the halls of Emmanuel once more. In his address to the 
E.C.R.D.S., “Truthfulness in Religion,” Chawner wanted “to put into practice 
the principles [he] advocated” (2). Stridently against those who believe it is 
better not “to say what we think” (5), he labeled miracles an embarrassment, 
atonement unjust, and openly denied the divinity of Christ. For the most 
part, though, Chawner concerned himself here with defending heterodoxy, 
calling for a secular educational system, and stressing the idea that religion 
evolves. In fact, he mentions the signifi cant work of the Heretics Society in 
manifesting this notion, and states that “[p]rogress has been the work of 
the dissenter, the non-conformist, the heretic” (19; 9). Chawner would not 
see much more of the “progress” made by the Heretics. While on holiday 
the next spring, he died in Switzerland on March 19, 1911. According to D. 
B. Welbourn, there “were those who alleged he had committed suicide, but 
probably he died of a brain tumour” (TCP 19).
 Th e passing of the master, though, was not an irreparable loss to the Her-
etics since the host of Honorary Members were already in place to assume 
mentoring roles. In particular, two fellows of Trinity College, Francis Corn-
ford (1874–1943) and G(eorge) M(acaulay) Trevelyan (1876–1962), took 
up Chawner’s lead in condemning compulsory chapel. By the time of the 
Heretics’ arrival on campus, Cornford had already satirized chapel atten-
dance in Microcosmographia Academica, and his Th ucydides Mythistoricus 
(1907) established him as one of the Cambridge Ritualists. In that unortho-
dox work, Cornford had argued for the myth and ritual origins submerged 
beneath Th ucydides’ history. In October of 1911, Cornford addressed the 
Heretics on “Religion in the University” and off ered a close analysis of Angli-
canism on campus in its component parts: Th eology, Ritual, and Faith. In 
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this short speech which Ogden transcribed for publication, Cornford affi  rms 
that, though the diversity and ubiquity of religion makes it one of the most 
important studies, campus life should be free from religious bias which cor-
rupts the intellectual atmosphere. Religious tests for all teaching posts should 
be rigorously abolished because he suspects that possibly “sometimes tests 
are secretly applied in making College appointments.” More importantly 
for Cornford, compulsory chapel should be eradicated since its oppressive 
nature abuses the power of ritual to infl uence impressionable minds, and 
those forced to attend will compromise the morale of those who do want 
to worship. Since it is “not the business” of a university “to maintain one 
form of creed,” Cornford suggests that it should “have a mosque, a Hindu 
temple, a Baptist chapel and so on” if they have an Anglican chapel (3). To 
some degree this policy is in eff ect today on university campuses, though 
Cornford saw a diff erent future for ritual faith, which he felt was dependent 
on theology. Explaining his defi nition of a Heretic “as one who thinks that 
theology can be remodelled,” he promises the ambivalent hope to his audi-
ence of Heretics that if “they are successful, their heresy [will become] the 
orthodoxy of the next generation.” He foresees the development of heresy as 
one that will make the Incarnation and the Resurrection dubious and leave 
only the theology of Christ, who was “the arch-heretic and rebel of his time.” 
However, Cornford suggests that by then “students of comparative religion” 
will have traced “the continuous history of the representation of the divine 
back from its present forms to its primitive origin” (5–6). Here Cornford is 
laying the groundwork for his From Religion to Philosophy (1912) and sens-
ing the modernist impulse toward a historical method applied to the life of 
Jesus. Cornford, though, sides with the paganizers who see Christ as another 
in a line of “dying” gods.
 In October 1913, Trevelyan further questioned the ethics of religious 
conformity in his address, “De Haeretico Comburendo.” Trevelyan, a fellow 
of Trinity who would become the most widely read historian of his genera-
tion, had recently completed a trilogy on Garibaldi, highlighting the Italian 
patriot’s anticlericalism. Trevelyan also was a militant agnostic with a partic-
ular anti-Papist strain. His History of England elicited the defensive reaction 
of Hilaire Belloc, who wrote his own Catholic-infl ected history of the nation. 
However, tolerance is the keynote of Trevelyan’s address, and he insists that 
heretics, with whom he identifi es himself, must stand up for their beliefs 
yet still feel the orthodox are approachable for discussion. Th e title of his 
address, “De Haeretico Comburendo,” refers to the act of Henry IV, which, 
according to the Eleventh Edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica, “enabled 
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the diocesan alone, without the co-operation of a synod, to pronounce the 
sentence of heresy, and required the sheriff  to execute it by burning the 
off ender, without waiting for the consent of the crown” (Garvie 362). As 
Trevelyan explains, his paper examines “the general conception that under-
lay that old statute, namely the assumption that every one is morally bound 
to believe the doctrines of the society in which he lives, and that if he does 
not really believe them he ought at least to conceal his thoughts” (1). Since 
he fi nds this conception to be the prevalent tenor of the Edwardian period, 
Trevelyan implores his audience, for the humanitarian good, to resist the 
demands of social convention while refraining from an equivalent reaction-
ary intolerance. Insincere conformity, including chapel attendance, whether 
for altruistic or conventional reasons, “is disastrous to human progress,” and 
the hypocrisy results in a “decay in moral character” (7). Above all, tolerance 
is necessary because “an ever increasing variety of religious experience and 
belief is the rule of the modern world” (2). For Trevelyan, society should 
mirror the platform of the Heretics in not privileging any religion, thereby 
eroding intolerant divisions and facilitating the vision of all peoples as “one 
body” (22). He points out that the Edwardians are already on the road to 
this universal equality by reaching “the last stages of legal persecution, in the 
application of the Blasphemy Laws in cases only where the ‘Christian doc-
trines are attacked by poor and more or less uneducated persons in language 
which may be described as coarse and off ensive’” (3). Affi  rming Marsh’s 
argument that blasphemy laws were a particularly class-based interdiction, 
Trevelyan did not foresee the turn toward censorship a few years later that 
such propriety would engender.
 Along with the death of their mentor less than two years aft er their incep-
tion, the Heretics endured another fundamental change to their organiza-
tional dynamics when Picciotto resigned his presidency and membership. 
Florence refers to this change as the “disconcerting conversion of Pittiotto [sic] 
to mysticism” (CA 14). Gordon also reports Ogden’s succession to the presi-
dency when Picciotto “converted unaccountably to mysticism” (6). However, 
Picciotto in fact had tried to account for his experience when he addressed 
the Heretics for the one and only time on October 23, 1910. His epistolary 
conceit, “Via Mystica,” elaborates on the diffi  culties and rewards of mysticism 
by addressing the unreported questions of a friendly correspondent, “Dick.” 
Since he believes “mysticism to be in its essence undefi nable and, to all but 
the sympathetic, meaningless” (ix), Picciotto stresses the conception that the 
mystical mind is of a diff erent “kind” and not degree. Th erefore, those who 
deny the intuitive and spiritual dimensions of knowledge cannot glimpse the 
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fundamental unity of an intangible world withdrawn from rational thought. 
Picciotto fi nds himself in a diffi  cult position, not only because there are 
unsympathetic gainsayers of mysticism, but he is obliged to account for 
himself despite the inadequacies of language to communicate such profound 
experiences. Language is of the rational world, but the joy, sorrow, and pri-
mal unity seen when the veil of Maia lift s propels one to struggle against the 
walls of ineff ability. Th e nature of mystical experience makes it, however, 
dramatically convincing to Picciotto, in that as William James describes the 
consciousness of the mystic, “something in you absolutely knows” that the 
result of intuition and meditation “must be truer than any logic-chopping 
rationalistic talk” because “articulate reasons are cogent for us only when 
our inarticulate feelings of reality have already been impressed in favor of the 
same conclusion” (84–85).
 During the period in which Picciotto underwent a spiritual transforma-
tion, Ogden began a correspondence with Lady Victoria Welby (1837–1912) 
and then became the leading proponent of her forays into “Signifi cs,” a study 
of language as signs of meaning.6 Picciotto’s address refl ects the divergent 
paths of the two leading undergraduate Heretics. His newfound mysticism 
was “disconcerting” to Florence because he, like Ogden, was a rationalist. 
In the opening remarks of his fi rst address to the Heretics on February 9, 
1911, Ogden might have had Picciotto’s diffi  culties with expression most 
clearly in mind: “Since reaching what may better perhaps be called years of 
indiscretion every successive discussion to which it has been my fortune to 
listen has left  me more convinced of the incalculable confusion produced by 
our neglect of the clear conceptions of the functions of language” (CUL Add.
Ms.8309). Th is address would become the basis of the historical section of 
Ogden and Richards’ Th e Meaning of Meaning. Picciotto would later enter 
the bar and become a member of both the Council of the Jewish Historical 
Society and the Knights of Columbus, an international benevolent orga-
nization of Roman Catholic men. In fact, “Via Mystica” already defended 
Catholicism as the most important religion on the grounds that it perpetu-
ates mysteries and “carries ecstasies into daily life” (18). For Picciotto, the 
Heretics were enemies of mystical reverence, since in his mind “one is either 
a born mystic or a born rationalist, and the two can have nothing to say to 
each other” (34). Finding that empirical minds “are best left  alone” (x), he left  
the Heretics, apparently taking to heart the concluding words of Harrison’s 
inaugural lecture. She ended her talk with an admonition against egotism, 
and suggested that when it “snarls within us, we should resign our member-
ship of the Society of Heretics, and go back for a season of the ‘godly disci-
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pline’ of the herd” (41). Among Picciotto’s few subsequent publications is a 
history of his London Day School, St. Paul’s, in which he extolled its virtue 
in letting “all things . . . be openly and freely discussed, by word of mouth or 
in print, and that nothing need ever be regarded as prohibited save the blas-
phemous or the obscene” (140). Between the interdictions against blasphemy 
and obscenity discussed earlier, heresy came forth as the means by which 
Picciotto discovered mysticism. St. Paul’s had tolerated heresy, and spawned 
a host of heretics, but the Heretics Society Picciotto had helped found under 
the same principles no longer met his needs.
 Picciotto’s decision to resign from the Heretics did not refl ect the tenor 
of the Society as a whole. He was not as dominant a personality behind the 
scenes as Ogden, and he felt his voice was being muffl  ed. Th e public face of the 
Society, though, allowed room for both the rationalist and the mystic. Indeed, 
the Society and its journalistic organ, Th e Cambridge Magazine, had commit-
ted themselves to “welcome every point of view” (CA 18). By encouraging an 
embodied form of heteroglossia, the Heretics produced a unique composite 
of oppositional thought that further attracted a set of earnest intellectuals 
from across Europe who needed such a forum to expound their ideas. 
 In his address to the Society, “Mysticism and Logic,” shortly before the 
war, Bertrand Russell encapsulated the confl ict of concern to Picciotto and 
found that these varying perspectives produced the best form of philosophy 
when put in dialogue with each other. His opening remarks state that, though 
metaphysics has been developed “by the union and confl ict of two very diff er-
ent human impulses,” the “greatest” philosophers “have felt the need both of 
science and of mysticism,” and “the attempt to harmonize the two was what 
made their life” (BR 8:30).7 It made Russell’s too. In this last-minute addition 
to the Heretics’ schedule in March 1914, Russell explained a key transition in 
his own philosophy in which he denied the mystical position on metaphysical 
questions, but commended its spirit of reverence. A similar brand of rever-
ence facilitates the ethical neutrality of “true” objective science because that 
is how “the world is to be understood” (BR 8:49). On the other hand, mysti-
cism “oft en holds that all Reality is good” (BR 8:45), whereas Russell believes 
in a subjectivity that can only eff ectively and legitimately realize good in the 
individual. Th ough he was beginning his “religion of science” period, Rus-
sell, in miniature, emblematized the Heretics’ desire and recognition of the 
importance of entertaining all sides of a debate.
 In fact, the distinguishing characteristic of the Heretics Society before 
the war rested in a series of debates that secured its respect and notoriety. 
Th e brainchild of the two heads, Ogden and Picciotto, did justice to the 
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remarkable if short-lived cooperation of two fundamentally opposed minds. 
Had Picciotto remained another year he would have witnessed Chesterton, 
his fellow “Pauline” and future Catholic, respond in dramatic fashion to 
Bernard Shaw’s address, “The Religion of the Future.” This extended debate 
of 1911 is the signature mark of the Heretics in bringing together two of the 
most famous people in England at the time. Shaw’s address is central to the 
theory of heresy underwriting Saint Joan, which is discussed along with the 
Shaw/Chesterton debate in full in chapter 4. These early years of the Heretics 
would also, incidentally, see discussions of the same authors whose “pagan” 
discourses are examined in chapter 5. For example, A. C. Benson, fellow at 
Magdalene, surveyed the religious and artistic temperaments of Walter Pater, 
his academic area of specialization,8 and A. L. Bacharach addressed the Soci-
ety on “Thomas Hardy, the Poet of Heresy.” Classical and “savage” paganism 
were common enough topics for the Heretics, but paganism and the heresy 
of syncretism came to a head in the debate over the “Christ-Myth” between 
H. G. Wood (1879–1963) and J. M. Robertson, MP (1856–1933).
 During the Michaelmas term of 1911, Wood initiated the debate by argu-
ing for the historicity of Jesus and against Robertson’s theory that Christ was 
another in a series of solar myths. A few weeks later Robertson defended 
his position. In drawing the Liberal member of Parliament, the Heretics 
heightened their notoriety in a term that had just seen the conclusion of 
the Shaw/Chesterton debate. Scottish and self-educated, Robertson was not 
only a governmental figure, but also an established Shakespearean scholar 
and one of the most militant freethinkers of the day. He had worked for the 
National Reformer with Charles Bradlaugh in the 1880s and 90s, and his 
Modern Humanists (1891) had championed the radical, rational defense of 
liberty and emphasis on morality in human affairs in the work of Carlyle, 
Ruskin, Mill, and Arnold, among others. During the late 1890s, Robertson 
went on a well-received lecture tour of the United States before publishing 
his two-volume A Short History of Freethought (1899), tracing heterodoxy 
from ancient to modern times. Of concern to Wood, though, was Robert-
son’s subsequent companion works, Christianity and Mythology (1900) and 
Pagan Christs (1903). Robertson’s views had recently gained notoriety and 
affirmation with the translation into English of Arthur Drews’ work of 1910, 
The Christ-Myth. In opposing the mythical view of Christianity, the young, 
unknown Wood could only offer his sincere faith and a personal study of 
histories of Jesus’ life.
 On November 12, Wood addressed the Heretics on “The Christ-Myth” 
(a criticism),” and his argument chiefly tries to debunk the claims of Pagan 
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Christs. He believes that Robertson’s work “contains some good criticism 
and much good material,” but, as “a contribution to the historical problem 
of Christian origin, it is unscientific in method and irrelevant” (Wood and 
Robertson 14). Robertson had posited the idea that the Gospel account of 
Jesus’ life from the Last Supper to the Crucifixion was actually just a mystery 
play based on a sublimated ancient rite. Disputing the claims for a “Pales-
tinian” origin of the Gospels, Wood shortens Robertson’s “history” to his 
claim that “something happened to recall to the mind of some Jews not only 
the general idea of human sacrifice, but also an old and elaborate ritual of 
human sacrifice connected with an early and entirely forgotten Jesus-cult” 
(8). Later, he explained to Ogden that “a hypothesis like Robertson’s is out 
of court from the start,” and that “[w]hatever Christianity was, it did not 
arise from Jews in touch with Hellenism” (MCMA 112). He believed that his 
opponent was an acute anthropologist, but that Christianity is more than a 
question of folklore. Three weeks later, with Wood in the audience ready to 
begin an actual debate, Robertson bluntly replied that he professed merely a 
“theory,” not a “history,” based on “things remembered,” not forgotten (18). 
Moreover, he pointed out that his theory traces the origin of such rites to the 
“Joshua-myth” and even earlier primitive rites surrounding human sacrifice, 
not simply Jewish culture of the first century b.c. In an approach similar to 
the Cambridge “Ritualists,” Robertson suggests that the Gospels are myths, 
or “stories,” accounting for ancient rites. He concludes his response by noting 
Wood’s dismissal of all that is outside “orthodox tradition” (16), in contrast 
to his own rejection of the a priori acceptance of orthodoxy. Wood, neverthe-
less, enjoyed the spirited debate, and wrote to Ogden: “let me congratulate 
you on the temper of your Society. So long as it is interested in truly scientific 
questions it is bound to be useful, and I should count myself happy if I were 
to see more of you” (MCMA 112). He did speak to the Heretics again in 
October of 1913, and in the 1920s his literal approach to Christianity led him 
to join the Society of Friends. Robertson continued his literary scholarship, 
and became the parliamentary secretary to the Board of Trade from 1911 to 
1915.
 Other provocative issues rousing debates at the Heretics included coed-
ucation, Bergson’s theories of consciousness, and the general function of 
churches in the modern world. Education, along with economics and other 
social sciences, fit under the rubric of the Society because there were room 
and scope enough for what Florence calls “practical human heresy” (CH 
238). In November of 1913, Mr. C. Reddie, while addressing the Heretics on 
“Sex in Education and Education in Sex,” denounced coeducation for caus-
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ing an “electric leak” in men. He later stated “the pith” of his lecture to be: 
“if the British Empire is not to perish, we must fill it up with Britishers. This 
is women’s work. If they cannot marry in England, let them go to the colo-
nies” (CH 238). Responding to Reddie the following February, J. H. Badley 
of Bedales School defended coeducation and received much support from 
several Heretics as the debate played out through letters in The Cambridge 
Magazine.
 After 1912, when Ogden began functioning dually as president of the 
Heretics and editor of the magazine, he used his journal to further the dis-
cussions of the Heretics and called on his new connections in the publishing 
world to reproduce the debates. One such instance of this is the pamphlet 
encapsulating Bertrand Russell’s synopsis of the philosophy of Henri Berg-
son, a reply by H. Wildon Carr, and finally a rejoinder by Russell. Before his 
discussion of “Mysticism and Logic,” Russell had addressed the Heretics on 
Bergson in March of 1912, and this lecture, which would be reduced slightly 
for Russell’s famous A History of Western Philosophy (1945), was, according 
to Alan Wood, of great significance to Russell in “helping to re-establish him 
as one of the leading figures in Cambridge” since “it was his first big success 
as a public speaker” (89). As Russell described his anticipation of the event to 
Lady Ottoline Morrell, “the whole world seems to be coming tonight.” After-
ward, he told her: “It had a great success last night—the place was packed 
and they seemed to enjoy it. Not a soul rose to defend Bergson at the end, 
so there was no discussion. McTaggart spoke a few graceful words and we 
all went away” (BR 6:316). No doubt the reason the audience was speechless 
arose from Russell’s intricate and idiosyncratic attack on Bergson’s dynamic 
view of the world. Moreover, he had extensively quoted several of Bergson’s 
works without sufficient explication, and the whole of Russell’s synopsis can 
be seen as the work of a logician making a travesty of an anti-intellectual 
philosophy. In his biography of Russell, Wood adds that “the reader must 
imagine it delivered in Russell’s dry, precise and ironic voice, and punctuated 
by laughter and applause which greeted his sallies” (89). The satire, obliquity, 
and intricacy of Russell’s dismissal of Bergson’s reasoning stunned the audi-
ence into silence. Only when Ogden solicited Carr for a defense of Bergson 
before the Heretics and a further rebuttal in the Cambridge Magazine did 
Russell hear a challenge to his views. To be fair and provocative, Ogden 
allowed Russell to respond in a later issue of the journal, and eventually in 
1914 the Heretics printed all three sorties as a pamphlet.
 To begin his lecture, Russell supposes that Bergson writes out of a “love 
of action” since his singularly distinct philosophy precludes classification by 
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methods or results. Russell commits this intentional fallacy in order to catego-
rize Bergson and avoid having to address the overall effect of seeing the world 
as constantly in flux. The British empiricist cannot abide a “becoming” view 
of the world which thwarts the static positings of discrete logic. Instead, Rus-
sell focuses on defending the intellect versus instinct and space versus time. 
Along similar grounds, Wyndham Lewis would attack Bergson and Joyce in 
Time and Western Man (1927). While Lewis reflects the modernist desire 
to impose order on the world through a “right-minded” exclusivity, Russell 
would later allow a place for instinct in the world in “Mysticism and Logic.” 
The difficulties he had had with Bergson’s thought suggest that he felt com-
pelled to revisit the role of instinct and mysticism in his subsequent address 
to the Heretics. For instance, in trying to defend contemplation against action 
and Bergson’s idea of duration, “the time which is of the essence of life,” Rus-
sell admitted: “I do not fully understand it myself ” (BR 6:323).
 As few as nine days before his address to the Society, Russell had not 
started writing, and in working out Bergson’s philosophy for himself and 
the Heretics, he utilizes familiar concepts to ground his understanding. He 
describes Bergson’s ideas “as synthetic rather than analytic” (BR 6:326), and 
his opening image likens Bergson’s philosophy to the Manichean heresy. 
Russell believed that the Heretics will recognize dismissively the similarity 
of the conception of the “whole universe” as “the clash and conflict of two 
opposite emotions” to the Manichean dualistic battle between spirit and mat-
ter (BR 6:320). Furthering this sardonic portrayal, Russell turns Bergson’s 
associations between matter, space, and the intellect into the evil forces at 
work in the world. In a crucial move, he makes Bergson’s philosophical con-
demnation of the certainties of the intellect hinge on his use of space, and 
the English logician could not have disagreed more with the idea that “the 
whole of the intellect depends upon a supposed habit of picturing things 
side by side” (BR 6:330). (Virginia Woolf would seem to have been aware of 
this debate in her caricature of Mr. Ramsey when he ponders what comes 
next in his “alphabetic” philosophy: “If Q then is Q—R—”.9) Since the intel-
lect separates matter in Bergson’s view, only instinct and memory adhere to 
the workings of duration, the closest intimation we have of the spirit world. 
Poetic visions such as these charmed Russell, and he realized that Bergson 
might best be judged on aesthetic grounds. To conclude, however, that “there 
is no reason to think it [Bergson’s philosophy] true” (BR 6:337) suggests that 
he had missed the point that there may be an intuition to feel it true.
 In June 1912, Wildon Carr defended Bergson in his address to the Her-
etics entitled “Life and Logic.” As the secretary of the Aristotelian Society in 
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London, Carr had hosted a dinner party in October of 1911 when Russell 
first met Bergson. Bernard Shaw was also present, and Russell reported that 
the playwright “made an amusing speech explaining how glad he was that 
Bergson had adopted his (Shaw’s) views” (BR 6:318). Shaw was jokingly 
claiming that Bergson’s “creative evolution” affirmed Shaw’s “original” idea of 
a “Life-Force” that he had extolled in Man and Superman (1903) and in his 
speech to the Heretics the previous May. (Certainly, Shaw well understood 
his and Bergson’s mutual debt to Nietzsche’s concept of the Will to Power.) 
As a host and admirer of Bergson, Carr then felt compelled to defend his 
former guest when Ogden asked for a rebuttal to Russell. Carr’s simple and 
careful reply qualifies Russell’s perspective in two important ways. He points 
out that Russell focuses on details while ignoring the luminous clarity of the 
whole idea of duration, and he states: “Mr. Russell is perfectly entitled to 
question or deny that we can have knowledge by intuition, but if there is such 
knowledge it is characterised by just this fact that it is consciousness of life in 
living” (BR 6:459). Indeed, in Russell’s rejoinder, he had to “admit that there 
is an element of question begging in all refutations of Bergson” (BR 6:346). 
Not only did he recognize that he could not use intellect against instinct, but 
Russell further acknowledged that, though he still finds Bergson’s reasoning 
to be wrong, his philosophy is not necessarily false. Russell’s desire to become 
more “synthetic” and later incorporate mysticism into a philosophical sys-
tem testifies to the provocative influence and atmosphere of the Heretics 
Society during these early years. By its very existence, the Society promoted 
the possibilities of alternative yet totalizing worldviews.
 Finally, perhaps the most emotionally charged debate at the Society 
occurred in February 1914. This unrecorded formal debate between the 
Heretics and the X Club of Oxford found the Heretics arguing in favor of a 
motion proposed by Hubert Henderson, “That in the opinion of this House 
the Churches today are doing more harm than good.” Though this debate is 
now mostly lost to history, Florence believes that the motion carried “by a 
small majority” (CH 230).
 The “victory” over the X Club must have been bittersweet to the Heretics 
who had watched the Oxford branch of their Society fail to sustain itself in 
1911. During the same academic year that Ogden took control of the Her-
etics, the new president sojourned in Oxford with R. F. Rattray of Manches-
ter who later reminded Ogden of how he “helped us to start the Heretics” 
(MCMA 113.37). By May of 1911, Rattray and the Oxford Heretics had orga-
nized sufficiently to have a full schedule of meetings for the Easter and Trin-
ity terms. They adopted wholesale the laws of the Cambridge Heretics and 
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admitted thirty-five members and five Honorary Members including Russell 
and F. C. Conybeare. McTaggart also came to give a talk on “Optimism,” and 
E. S. P. Haynes’ address, “Religion and Modern Morality,” was published in 
association with the Cambridge branch. However, the ensuing fall found 
the Oxford Heretics dissatisfied with their progress, and in December, the 
secretary, H. H. Bellot, put forth the motion that “this Society has failed in 
its object, and that it be herewith dissolved.” The motion carried, although 
it included B. H. Wilsdon’s suggestion that they possibly be reconstituted 
“at some future date” (MCMA 114.7). Heresy was more decidedly a “Cam-
bridge Movement.” Despite the permanent hiatus of their brothers in heresy, 
the Cambridge Heretics still advertised the existence of the Oxford branch 
in their 1912–13 prospectus and noted that “efforts [were] being made to 
found similar Societies at other universities” (MCMA 114.4). The printing 
of three thousand copies of this prospectus registered their confidence, and 
Harrison’s quotation, “To be a heretic to-day is almost a human obligation,” 
served as an epigraph to the document. The First World War certainly must 
have dampened the efforts to establish other Societies of Heretics. Yet in 
September of 1918, Jean Foley, the president of The Women’s Art Society 
of Montreal, wrote to Harrison seeking information about the nature and 
object of the Heretics. Foley explained that a “few adventurous spirits of our 
city would like to found a ‘Heretic Club’” (MCMA 107.8).
 The growth and proliferation of the Cambridge Heretics, on the other 
hand, does indeed owe much to the tremendous skill in solicitation and 
recruitment of Ogden. Doubtless, the elder dons at Cambridge had been 
especially receptive to heresy due to the cultural contexts discussed earlier, 
but Ogden’s persistence in his pursuits enabled the Cambridge Heretics to 
avoid the sophomore jinx that befell the Oxford branch. He was relent-
less in feeling out potential members amongst the faculty and student body 
through casual conversation. Ogden would then follow up on these first 
encounters by sending out gracious letters requesting someone’s member-
ship. As a result, in the first few years of the Society, he had systematically 
enlisted those undergraduates and dons at least friendly to heresy. H(erbert) 
A(llen) Giles (1845–1935), professor of Chinese, typified the encouragement 
Ogden would receive in his response that “it will give me much pleasure to 
become an Hon. Member of ‘The Heretics’” (MCMA 113.36). In Giles, the 
Heretics added the English authority on Chinese language and culture, who 
also fanatically took sides on other intellectual issues. With the passing of 
each academic year, Ogden would recuperate lost membership by approach-
ing the new arrivals on campus. For instance, George Santayana became a 
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member while spending the First World War in Cambridge. To facilitate 
signing up members, the Heretics printed cards which stated that the bearer 
had been selected as a potential Heretic. The new recruit only had to fill in 
the date, his or her name and college, and then pay dues.
 Perhaps the most significant addition to the Heretics after the immediate 
rush of Honorary Members came after Ogden sent the following letter to 
G. E. Moore upon his return to Cambridge in October of 1910:
Dear Sir,   October 17th, 1910
 I am writing on behalf of the above Society to express the hope that you 
will permit us to include your name in our list of Hon. members. This does 
not necessarily imply liability to read papers or otherwise actively support the 
Society.
 Hoping that we shall have your approval.
   I am yours truly
   C. K. Ogden
   (CUL Add.Ms.8330 80/1/1)
With Moore’s prompt acceptance, the Heretics further solidified their dis-
cursive exchange with Bloomsbury and the Apostles. His “ethical religion” 
became one of their multifarious heresies, and it informs Bell’s Art (1913), 
Woolf ’s The Voyage Out (1915), and Strachey’s address to the Heretics, “Art 
and Indecency” (1920). Even though Ogden assured Moore that he need not 
undertake additional obligation, Moore grew to be the Heretics’ most prolific 
speaker as he addressed the Society no less than five times between 1914 and 
1925, including one talk on “The Value of Religion.” Six months after Moore 
joined, the Heretics extended their influence most flamboyantly outside the 
pale of Cambridge when Shaw accepted an invitation to become an Honor-
ary Member after his irreverent, progressive speech on “The Religion of 
the Future.” The striking nature of Shaw’s vision compelled Chesterton to 
respond, and Forster would also take issue with Shaw’s apotheosis of “work” 
in Arctic Summer.
 To entertain their distinguished guests from outside the university, the 
Heretics would depend upon the good graces of their members who might 
happen to know the visiting lecturer. Usually, an Honorary Member would 
provide lodging and hospitality to the invited speaker so that the Heretics 
did not incur further costs, for the budget of the Society functioned solely 
on dues and the occasional sale of tickets for major lectures. In most aca-
demic years, the Heretics collected between £40 and £50 of income, and most 
Franke_final.indb   70 1/28/2008   4:39:59 PM
C HA P T E R  2 :  T H E  E A R LY  Y E A R S  OF  C A M B R I D G E  H E R E T IC S
of these funds went toward operational costs. Tickets sold for Chesterton’s 
response to Shaw suggest that this debate was the economic as well as popu-
lar highpoint of the Society. Receipts from Chesterton’s meeting brought in 
nearly £35 and put the Heretics income over £100 for the academic year. 
With their surplus, the Heretics could afford to pay some expenses of the 
lecturers. Mostly, such expenses were one pound or less, but Chesterton and 
Georg Brandes did receive speaker’s fees of five to ten pounds.10 The limita-
tions of the Heretics’ budget occasionally hindered their goals. Indeed, amid 
all Ogden’s solicitory successes, there were some grand failures.
 In the immediate aftermath of Chesterton’s popular triumph, Ogden 
wrote to Chesterton’s cohort in defending Catholicism, Hilaire Belloc (1870–
1953). However, this other member of the twin-headed orthodoxy Shaw 
characterized as “Chesterbelloc” would not stoop to refute heresy without 
sufficient financial payment. Belloc wrote to Ogden on November 23, 1911: 
“You do not say whether I should receive a fee from the receipts of such a 
Meeting or not. I certainly should not be prepared to address a Meeting at 
less than my usual fee of ten guineas, and if, as I presume, this is not what 
you had in mind, I fear my engagements are far too numerous to leave me 
time for the discussion of Agnostic, Protestant, Judaic, and other religions” 
(MCMA 113.36). Whether or not the Heretics could meet his price, Belloc’s 
tone suggests that he had little interest in participating in open debate with a 
potentially hostile audience. In fact, he never addressed the Heretics, but his 
view of the agnostic rationalists in the Society can be seen in his polemical 
discussion of “The Modern Attack” in The Great Heresies (1938).11
 In addition to Belloc, Ogden, despite his best efforts, also failed to secure 
the affiliation or appearance of W. B. Yeats and Thomas Hardy. When Ogden 
wrote to Yeats in January of 1913, the poet had recently decided to publi-
cize his fear about the potential dangers of anti-Protestant bigotry if Ireland 
were granted Home Rule, and Ogden tried to appeal to Yeats’ thoughts on 
Catholic intolerance. However, Yeats was also busy championing Rabindra-
nath Tagore and campaigning for a Dublin Modern Art Gallery. Yeats had 
recently met with Ezra Pound, and together they extolled the virtues of noble 
patronage of the arts in Renaissance Italy. Amid this influence, one of Yeats’ 
contributions to the Irish Home Rule movement at the time was to write a 
poem noting Guidobaldo’s patronage and suggesting that public demand 
should not determine funding for the arts. The day before Yeats replied to 
Ogden on January 9, 1913, he had written to Lady Gregory about his satisfac-
tion with the poem and the brewing thoughts he had for new ones concern-
ing Aubrey Beardsley’s dying sister, Mabel. With so many preoccupations, 
Franke_final.indb   71 1/28/2008   4:39:59 PM
 PA RT  I :  T H E  AC A DE M Y  OF  MODE R N  H E R E T IC S
it is easy to understand Yeats’ polite refusal of Ogden’s offer to address the 
Heretics. Yeats explained that “at any other time” he “would have accepted 
with pleasure but at the moment” he was “so deep in a new book of verse” 
that he could not “turn aside to prepare a lecture” (MCMA 113.37).
 In November of 1913, Ogden set his sights on Thomas Hardy, “The Poet 
of Heresy.” The timing would seem to have been perfect, except for the fact 
that Hardy had begun to think about how posterity would receive him. 
In June, Hardy had been granted an honorary Litterarum Doctor degree 
from Cambridge, and earlier in November Magdalene College, with A. E. 
Housman among other guests, had made Hardy an Honorary Fellow dur-
ing a formal ceremony in chapel. Ogden asked the newfound affiliate of his 
own college to become a member of the Heretics. Little would Ogden have 
expected the following unpublished letter of November 20:
      Max Gate
 Dear Sir:    Dorchester
 My thanks for the pamphlets of ‘The Heretics,’ and for your interesting 
note, to which I cannot reply adequately offhand. I have of late been withdraw-
ing from societies, etc., that I formerly belonged to, and I fear that instead of 
joining the Heretics even as an Honorary Member I must stand and be merely 
a sympathetic spectator of their doings in the cause of truth. I will read the 
papers with great pleasure.
 Believe me.
 Yours truly
 Thomas Hardy
 (MCMA 113.36)
Indeed, Hardy would be an especially sympathetic supporter when Ogden 
began receiving abuse during the war for printing articles from the foreign 
press in the Cambridge Magazine. Heresy was a different matter. In 1913, 
Hardy’s health began to falter, he often wrote to churchmen about church 
architecture, and he had started to think of an “autobiography” after the 
death of his first wife. A month before his polite refusal of Ogden’s request, 
Hardy had published one of his last returns to prose, the suggestively entitled 
short story “A Changed Man.” In the strange autobiography, The Life and 
Work of Thomas Hardy, written in the third person with the collaboration 
of his second wife, the narrative voice explains the bestowal of the fellow-
ship at Magdalene in rather pious terms. Even though early in life he had 
decided he could not enter the church conscientiously, it states “Hardy had 
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read the lessons in church in his young-manhood, besides having had much 
to do with churches in other ways, and the experience may have recalled the 
old ecclesiastical times” (391). In projecting himself for future generations, 
the narrative also notes a sketch-painting of Hardy to be hung in the hall of 
Magdalene. After the scornful reviews of Tess, Hardy had identified himself 
with heretics being beaten by the “hammers” of the Inquisition, and he did 
not want that to continue. Ogden might have asked himself, as Jude did of 
Sue after her turn to piety, if this could be the same person “who brought the 
Pagan deities into this most Christian city,” who “quoted Gibbon, and Shel-
ley, and Mill” (276).
 Hardy and Yeats were not Cambridge figures; however, E. M. Forster 
was not only a Cambridge Apostle and member of the Bloomsbury Group, 
but after the publication of Howards End (1910) his string of eloquent and 
successful novels also had made him one of the most respected artists in 
England. He initially presents a conspicuous absence from the Heretics Soci-
ety. From 1909 to 1911, he had been mostly out of the country, ruminating 
over what to do after his recent masterpiece. The Heretics would seem to 
have been far from his mind and of little relevance to his own aesthetic 
experiments and philosophizing about the ways of the world—that is, until 
he began to pursue a new variant of his stylized narrative “antithesis” upon 
returning to Cambridge in November 1911, the month that can be consid-
ered the high watermark of the Society. The Oxford Heretics were still active, 
Robertson and Wood were in the midst of their debate, Cornford addressed 
the Society, and Chesterton delivered his rebuttal to the “dogmas” of Shaw. 
While Forster sojourned at Rupert Brooke’s lodgings in Cambridge, a new 
idea for a novel blossomed. He would explore the dynamic between a heroic 
man and Brooke figure, Cyril Marsh, and Martin Whitby, a Quaker aesthete 
and fellow at Cambridge, using Roger Fry as a model. Through this antitheti-
cal complement, Forster sought a synthetic reconciliation of two “outdated” 
types of men—Marsh needs reeducation, Whitby revitalization.
 In addition to the dichotomy between the chivalric and the civilized man, 
Forster also poses Brooke’s and Fry’s recent discussions of art against each 
other in an attempt to see if they can “connect.” As Forster wrote on Novem-
ber 24 to Brooke, “I have this moment decided to put all I can remember of 
your paper on art into a novel—and as I remember it. You have not to mind. 
‘It will never get written unless’” (Letters 1:126). While here he is referring 
to Brooke’s “Democracy and the Arts,” a paper delivered to the Fabians in 
December 1910 calling for state subsidies for literature, Brooke’s later address 
to the Heretics in February 1913 better illustrates the chivalric code Forster 
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found in Brooke. In this defense of August Strindberg’s passionate realism, 
Brooke identifies with the Swedish playwright’s disgust toward feminism 
and wants “to declare that men are men and women women” (Hassall 378). 
In contrast, Forster wrote in his “Locked” diary, the same day as his letter 
to Brooke, about how he was inspired by Fry’s desire “to clear Art of remi-
niscences,” such as an idealized chivalric past, and to “paint the position of 
things in space” (AS xviii).12
 Amid this tension, the debate between Shaw and Chesterton filters 
into the first draft of Arctic Summer known as the Tripoli Fragment. The 
title comes from the theater of the Italo-Turkish War in September 1911, 
and Marsh plans to go to Tripoli because supporting the Turks is a “clear 
issue” on behalf of which he can demonstrate his chivalric code (AS 193). 
In championing war, Marsh represents the type of man Shaw hopes will 
fight for the “religion of the future,” “men with some belief in the purpose 
of the universe, with determination to identify themselves with it and the 
courage that comes from that” (RF 5). As Forster also notes in his diary, 
he had also been in Cambridge in May at the time of Shaw’s address, and 
he was either in the audience for Chesterton’s reply on November 17 or 
heard of it from his mentor and great friend “Goldie” Dickinson, who had 
questioned Chesterton about reason and liberty in relation to Christianity. 
The defender of orthodoxy responded that only the nonrational mystic can 
confuse the terms, forget about free will, and believe that “God could at the 
same time keep men bound and prevent their going wrong” (18). While this 
phrasing also is important to Forster’s novel, Chesterton’s critique of the 
belief in creative evolution underwriting Shaw’s “religion of the future” more 
explicitly informs Forster’s discussion of ethics and progress. Chesterton 
attacks the mystic, as Shaw identified himself, who does not hold a neces-
sary “fixed ideal” and instead believes in something which is only “trying to 
exist” (10–11). Shaw’s heresy postulated that God works through humanity, 
and “it is ours to work for something better, to talk less about the religion 
of love (love is an improper subject) and more about the religion of life, and 
of work.” Heretics must apply the driving Life-Force and “work towards that 
ideal” of making God until they “get to be supermen” (RF 6–7). In Forster’s 
novel, Whitby distances himself from such ideals and “what ‘being right’ 
means today,” working for social justice for the underprivileged in a progress 
“lumbering slowly forward.” He laments the passing of the Crusades whose 
“reward of fighting” was “pleasure” rather than “comfort,” and he defends the 
use of the “spiritual life” against “Work the religion of the future” (AS 194–95, 
emphasis mine).
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 In this emotion, Whitby has been infected by Marsh, who feels “saved by 
the war” and describes the chance circumstances that prevented him from 
“going wrong” as “conversion” and “a sort of miracle” (AS 192–93). In war, he 
can avoid the fate of his brother, Robin, who had planned to take holy orders 
at Cambridge before he went “wrong.” In its vagueness, the novel constructs 
this taboo misdeed as either heresy or homosexuality, perhaps united in the 
euphemism “sexual heretic.” Marsh, rather, wants to be “worthy” of women 
“or the whole thing goes.” Whitby, who is attracted to Marsh in another 
fragment of the novel, tries to console him by noting: “we must be worthy 
of them in the way they wish, not in the way we wish. That is the new chiv-
alry” (AS 193). Here Forster openly begins to question the gentlemanly code 
which he had previously defended in a paper read before both the Apostles 
and the Bloomsbury Friday Club, “The Feminine Note in Literature” (1910). 
Reflecting on Arctic Summer in 1951, Forster felt he had “got my antithesis 
all right”; however, he could not finish the novel because he “had not settled 
what was going to happen.” He added that the two men could never be rec-
onciled except as “companions in defeat,” but “such an ending doesn’t interest 
me” (AS 162). Perhaps in leaving for India in October 1912, he discovered 
the exile that could grant triumph to the male lovers in Maurice.
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The First World War and 
the Bloomsbury Heresies
The blunder we know as the First World War eventually brought a drastic 
decrease in enrollment at university. By 1916, male enrollment had dropped 
well over 80 percent.1	Ogden stayed in Cambridge after receiving a medi-
cal exemption from service. The lack of a significant student body makes it 
remarkable that he was able not only to keep the Heretics functioning, but 
also to help them thrive. Increased dependence on elderly dons, female stu-
dents, and refugee scholars enabled the Society to continue their meetings 
without abatement. Major events subsided, but Harrison, Moore, George 
Santayana, Vernon Lee, Rebecca West and others ensured that flair and cut-
ting-edge thought still shone in the city of learning. G. H. Hardy continued 
to assist mentoring the Heretics, spoke on “The Value of Knowledge,” and 
persuaded the self-taught phenomenal mathematician Srinivasa Ramanujan 
(1887–1920) to loosen his Brahmin orthodoxy and accept an exhibition 
from Trinity for the duration of the war. The illustrious Cambridge Magazine 
disseminated the ideas of the Heretics beyond the university town. The his-
tory of the serial is fascinating and beyond the pale of concern here, but it 
did maintain its practice of publishing and discussing parts of addresses to 
the Society. Of more lasting effect, the magazine brought Ogden fame, noto-
riety, and respect. For out of all the British press, the Cambridge Magazine 
was the only one to print foreign news coverage of the war. As copy man, 
marketing agent, and editor, Ogden had no external accountability, and he 
received enough faculty support to prevent being threatened or shut down. 
Chapter 3
•
Aesthetics 
and the Modern Heretics
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Bertrand Russell, Thomas Hardy, and Arnold Bennett were among the more 
vocal supporters of his practice that allowed people to read a more objective 
account of the war.	With such a controversial publishing policy, though, the 
Cambridge Magazine became as notorious as the Heretics, all to Ogden’s 
glee.
 From his position of power, Ogden turned directly to practical concerns, 
secure in both an economic base and an outlet for his ideas. His interests in 
pacifism, syndicalism, worker’s rights, and universal and women’s suffrage 
provide a more complete and mainstream progressive portrait of him than 
his more idiosyncratic adventures in linguistics. Among his more provoca-
tive intellectual output during the war, Militarism versus Feminism (1915) 
and Fecundity versus Civilisation (1917) synthesized his interests in pacifism 
and feminism. Each of these was first published serially in the Cambridge 
Magazine under the pseudonym Adelyne More. In fact, many of the mag-
azine’s editorials and columns were written under this nom-de-plume, or 
others Ogden donned such as T. L. for “The Limit,” or C. M. for the Cam-
bridge Magazine. While Militarism versus Feminism developed the idea that a 
military state necessarily implied the subjection of women, Fecundity versus 
Civilisation argued that over-population was “the cause of war and the chief 
obstacle to the emancipation of women” (1). Bennett wrote the introduction 
to the latter when it was published in book form, in which he dismisses the 
hygienic, religious, political, and economic arguments against birth control 
as wrong, elitist, or warmongering. Since he finds that intelligent people no 
longer find these arguments valid, he points to a “false shame” that keeps the 
topic of birth control hushed (5). When Marie Stopes addressed the Heretics 
after the war on the topic and her practice, some of the more fastidious mem-
bers of the Society wished to keep their ears shut and quietly resigned their 
membership.
	 Despite Ogden’s resourceful maintenance of the Heretics Society during 
the First World War, Dora Black (Russell), the secretary from 1917–19, had 
fundamental doubts about the future legitimacy and function of the Her-
etics. Ogden’s growing association with Bloomsbury furthered her opinion 
that the important issues for a post-war Britain concerned either politics or 
art. A few weeks after the Armistice, Black addressed the Society on “How to 
be Happy” by valorizing eighteenth-century hedonism over medieval ascet-
ism, but her feelings over the viability of the Society were better captured by 
J. C. Squire’s discussion of “The Limitations of Heresy” the following May.	In 
the summer of 1919, she wrote to Ogden expressing her doubts: “As to Her-
etics I am really rather worried about the whole business, because I cannot 
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see any basis for going on with the Society. When I look around for people to 
give papers I only see political people and purely literary people. . . . It seems 
impossible to keep free of politics without being ineffective. It is like the lat-
ter period before the French revolution, when the religious battle had been 
fought, they all went into politics.” The Russian Revolution had inspired her 
with hope for a socialist future, and the Heretics did not seem to her to be 
working effectively toward that end. However, the birth control controversy 
surrounding Marie Stopes later caused Black to think she had been “quite 
wrong about the need for anti-religion.” Still, she facilitated the aesthetic 
turn of the Heretics by suggesting that they solicit Lytton Strachey, Clive Bell, 
and Virginia Woolf to address the Society. All of these figures would travel 
to Cambridge in the next few years and address the Heretics before Ogden 
moved to London. Prior to committing to this reorientation, Black went to 
Paris in the fall of 1919 to study while the Heretics took a “sabbatical” term to 
regroup.2	As the influenza epidemic plagued Europe that fall, Ogden, Black 
suggests, thought of “temporarily dropping the Society” (“Friend” 89–90). 
The new face of peace forced Ogden on several levels to redraw his battle 
lines.
	 On Armistice Day, Ogden’s publication of foreign press during the war 
came back to haunt him as rioters, celebrating the peace, ransacked his 
Cambridge Magazine Book Shop and Art Gallery, smashing the establish-
ment and throwing paintings by Duncan Grant, Vanessa Bell, and Roger Fry 
into the street. The reactionary rabble, reportedly medical students, were 
angry at Ogden’s pacifism and publication of varying viewpoints on the war. 
As a witness to this tumult, I. A. Richards reports a mythologizing account 
of meeting Ogden across the street trying to identify the culprits before 
embarking on a philosophical discussion that would eventually lead to their 
collaboration in The Meaning of Meaning. According to Richards, the treatise 
exemplified Ogden’s interest in ridding language of “word-magic,” sought 
to improve communication, and discouraged “received and approved prac-
tice in the conduct of the word meaning” (“Co-Author” 101). Basic English 
would follow this same agenda. A week after the riot, F. C. Bartlett’s address 
to the Heretics, “In Praise of Intolerance,” must have reverberated in Ogden’s 
ears. In effect, as Florence states, the riot “did in fact uproot him from Cam-
bridge” (CA 41). Though his Cambridge establishments rebounded with 
great financial success, Ogden became more and more centered in Blooms-
bury over the next few years where he came to live in Gordon Square next 
door to J. Maynard Keynes and near James and Alix Strachey. In London, 
after transforming the Cambridge Magazine into a quarterly, he launched 
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Psyche, the Soho-based journal which would become his vehicle for an early 
form of psycholinguistics and later his Orthological Institute.
 In this immediate post-war period, Ogden began gradually to use the 
Heretics as a staging ground for explorations into aesthetics and linguistics. 
In April of 1920, Ogden and Richards spoke to the Society on “The New Sym-
bolist Movement” and shared some of their forays into verbal signification. 
While the Heretics lost some of their visibility as the Cambridge Magazine no 
longer reported their weekly meetings, Ogden started the Today and Tomor-
row Series in 1924 and provided a public outlet for many addresses to the 
Heretics by publishing over a hundred volumes of unconventional thought 
over the course of the next ten years.3	Perhaps Ogden’s most lasting work, his 
translation of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, further echoed the interest in seman-
tics growing in the discursive exchange between Cambridge and Blooms-
bury. As Florence states, one of the more remarkable facts about Ogden was 
the “topicality in the application of his thinking, turning from international 
affairs to the peace-time discussions that were exercising Bloomsbury at that 
time on art and philosophy” (CA 49).
	 During the academic year 1920–21, Bloomsbury began to exert an even 
greater influence on the Heretics when Lytton Strachey addressed the Soci-
ety on “Art and Indecency.” On the tails of his widely acclaimed Eminent 
Victorians (1918), he delivered what S. P. Rosenbaum calls his “best paper 
on literary theory,” a critical approach which “bears directly on his verse and 
other writings” (Edwardian 308). His essay also reflects the culture of censor-
ship beginning to grow around the obscenity trials of Lawrence and Joyce. 
Strachey’s discussion of the relationship between ethics and aesthetics bears 
the direct imprint of the evaluative method outlined in Moore’s Principia 
Ethica. Since Strachey believes that works of art are examples of Moore’s 
complex “wholes,” he stresses the importance of observation and reception 
within the “organic unity.” However, in a defense of “art for art’s sake,” he 
admits that art has ethical elements and produces ethical effects, but he does 
not relinquish belief in the idea that “the aesthetic whole must be judged by 
purely aesthetic standards” (84). As a result of these conclusions, art, in his 
view, can possess indecent qualities and still be beautiful, depending on taste. 
In an inversion of Judge Biron’s later statement during The Well of Loneliness 
trial, Strachey declares that a “work of art which is indecent may be of the 
highest merit” (89). Like Moore, Strachey leaves others to decide the ethical 
effects produced by an “aesthetic whole.” The underlying assumption of his 
argument suggests that the “right” aesthetic relations can be determined, and 
further implies that a coterie of critics such as the Bloomsbury Group will 
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decide them. Though his address therefore has utility for censoring literature 
(i.e., indecent art can have deleterious effects), Strachey principally defends 
art potentially seen as obscene, because as a whole the overall greatness of a 
work of art can withstand the effects of indecent elements. In a paraphrased 
application of Moore’s theory, he states that “the values of these wholes can-
not be determined merely by a sum of the values of the parts, but depends on 
their combination” (89).
 In the same masterful style that characterizes his unique study of Victo-
riana, Strachey blends a sardonic irreverence with vivid illustration to show 
the possible ludicrous results of confusing ethics and aesthetics. For example, 
he jokes that “the Kaiser’s delinquencies have really nothing to do with his 
moustaches,” and that “many clergymen who have read Catullus with impu-
nity, have been, it is reported, completely demoralized by Mrs. Humphry 
Ward” (83–84). To pursue the topic of the relations between the artistic 
and the indecent, Strachey offers three categories of people whose views are 
“pronounced and completely incompatible” (84). In each case, the Prudes, 
the Naturalists, and the Bawdy do not account for the “whole” complexity 
of art in Strachey’s mind. The Prudes, “who seem never to have recovered 
from the loss which they sustained on the death of Victoria,” abandoned 
bowdlerization and compromised to allow some indecencies such as those 
in Shakespeare (85). Similarly, blasphemy law allowed for irreverent religious 
discussion and produced a horde of heresies that eventually broached the 
realm of modernism. Once on this slope, Strachey argues, the Prudes lost the 
strength of their foothold on moral propriety—rigidity. Consequently, moral 
principles may vary “according to individual taste” and illustrate that “there 
is no criterion for deciding which are the orthodox” (85).
 Even though Strachey’s method functions under the same principles of 
difference, he wants to impose an aesthetic criterion. One of his premises 
implies an aesthetic orthodoxy will decide taste. For instance, the Naturalists, 
Strachey’s second category, react against prudery and instead promote the 
liberation of the body. Since “acts of reproduction, of excretion, and so forth” 
are “indistinguishable from other bodily acts,” the Naturalists believe that 
the “very notion of ‘indecency’ was a fallacious one” (86–87). Strachey finds 
in favor of the advanced Naturalist position over the Prudish one, but noted 
that the basis of the Bawdy perspective, which places value on the indecent, 
exposes the flaw in the Naturalist argument. The works of Aristophanes, 
Rabelais, and Voltaire rely upon the existence of indecency.4 If, as Strachey 
feels, indecency is a state of mind resulting from feelings and not a state of 
body coded by acts, then his conclusion fails in calling for an altogether dif-
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ferent perspective that sees art as complex wholes. Feelings or, in Moore’s 
word, “contemplation” are parts of the luminous “whole” and the reception of 
the work of art. Though Strachey’s conclusion might explain the “conflicting 
views that obtain on the subject” and defend the place of indecency in art, 
it does not admit the importance of readers’ changing ethical and aesthetic 
values over time, a salient point implicit in its own rhetoric.
 Several months later in November of 1921, Clive Bell arrived in Cam-
bridge to further Strachey’s point that people of good judgment (read 
Bloomsbury again) would agree upon the nature of aesthetic qualities. In 
this particular case before the Heretics, jazz is the victim of Bell’s authorita-
tive taste. Addressing only the full members of the Society on “Jazz Art,” Bell 
declares that “Jazz is dead” and that he, “someone who likes to fancy himself 
wider awake than his fellows,” will “write its obituary notice.” Such elitism 
informs his rambling, racist account from his disparagement of the shallow, 
trendy “bonne compagnie” who support jazz, to its influence on “riff-raff ” 
such as Italian Futurists, to its origins in a “troupe of niggers” who “can be 
admired artists without any gifts more singular than high spirits.” Jazz itself, 
no less, consists only of an “impudence” full of a “determination to surprise” 
and “to make fun.” By denigrating even the techniques of jazz syncopation 
and brevity, Bell grants no quarter to music, “the art that is always behind the 
times” (“Jazz” 214–17). Indirectly, his discussion of jazz becomes a tribute to 
the glories of modern painting.
 For Bell, painting such as the work of Cezanne reflects a deliberate thought 
process on the part of its practitioners, whereas jazz opposes “the products of 
the cultivated intellect” and is merely “a ripple” on “the wave” of modernism. 
He finds that post-Impressionist painters “firmly settled on their own lines 
of development,” as if artists do not evolve and instead foresee the full scope 
and trajectory of their careers (214–16). In this rhetorical move, Bell both 
imposes a strategic perspective on the part of his subjects and reveals himself 
as a critic who is trying to do the very same thing and steer the direction of 
aesthetic taste. His perspective considers the egalitarianism of jazz repugnant 
since “it encourages thousands of the stupid and vulgar to fancy that they can 
understand art, and hundreds of the conceited to imagine that they can create 
it” (227). In Bell’s view, one must be discriminating in order to appreciate art, 
and the populace is not trained enough. As the thrust of his argument in Art 
(1913) put it, the critic’s role is to guide an audience’s interpretation of art and 
create the aesthetic experience of it. Here Bell’s critic functions like a tube to 
Pound’s artist who is the “antennae of the race” (58). One elite group will be 
attuned to the world, and another will interpret their message clearly.
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 In Art, Bell had first posited the existence of a common aesthetic emo-
tion that manifested itself internally when appreciating “good” art, and he 
suggested that a powerful literati could decide what defined “good” and 
hence impose that view on the masses. Such a dogmatic view is ubiquitous 
in incipient modernism as seen in Pound’s Vorticism and H. D.’s Notes on 
Thought and Vision (1919).5	 For purposes of the Bloomsbury/Cambridge 
nexus, Bell’s view of the ministry of culture reflects the direct application 
to aesthetics of the theories of Moore’s Principia Ethica. Both Moore’s ethics 
and Bell’s aesthetics stress the importance of envisioning the whole and pre-
determining a course of action or creation, and hold that the philosopher or 
critic can declare something to be good or beautiful and convince others that 
it was not an arbitrary decision. In particular, Bell’s idea of “significant form” 
depends, like Moore’s belief in the “good,” on the illumination of the entirety 
of a set of relations in art or in conduct. In Art, Bell pursued the “central 
problem of aesthetics,” the cause of the aesthetic emotion, which all “sensible 
people agree is a peculiar emotion provoked by works of art.” He adduces this 
cause to the essential quality of “significant form,” and finds that “lines and 
colours combined in a certain particular way, certain forms and relations of 
forms, stir our aesthetic emotions” (16–17). While this reductive theory of 
art has been handily debunked, it nevertheless exerted considerable influ-
ence in drawing attention to form over subject matter, and represents one of 
the first ahistorical modernist turns in art.
 Ogden himself was one of the first, along with I. A. Richards and James 
Woods, to critique the essentialism of Bell’s theory. In the self-mockingly 
entitled The Foundations of Aesthetics (1922), these writers collaborated in 
exposing the fallacious “meaningless” of significant form by asking “logi-
cally ‘significant of what?’” (n61). Richards adds that the book “has pages 
of undermining fun at the expense of the Bloomsbury aestheticians” (CA 
47). Later, in a letter to Thomas Bodkin regarding his book The Approach to 
Painting (1927), Ogden not only continued to attack the idea of significant 
form, but also speaks of the theory as heresy. Writing under the guise of a 
“housewife,” Ogden states that “she” just wants to offer an opinion before 
returning to “her cooking and parenting” (UCLA 1/2). Under another in 
his long line of assumed identities, Ogden expressed “surprise” in reading 
Bodkin’s book “to find no reference to the standard refutation of Clive Bell’s 
heresy, ‘significant form’ which is based on a purely verbal confusion, as 
documented in [Ogden’s] article on Aesthetics . . . in the 13th Edition of the 
Encyclopedia Britannica.” Ogden also questions Bodkin’s implication that he 
“accepted Clive Bell’s other heresy,” the existence of an aesthetic emotion, and 
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inserts “her” view that “standard analyses” render “otiose” Bell’s “assumption 
that there is an aesthetic emotion (unknown to modern psychology), as dis-
tinguished from an aesthetic experience or state (which though in part ‘emo-
tional,’ is surely not one of the ‘emotions’)” (UCLA 1/2). Though Bell’s idea of 
“significant form” had become the basis of an established aesthetic school, it 
is a heresy to Ogden because the standard of Benthamite linguistic analysis, 
“verbal fictions,” deconstructs its validity. While courting Bloomsbury aes-
thetes and living among them, Ogden did not relent in his general critique 
of received interpretations. By the late 1920s, though, Ogden had deployed 
Bentham’s ideas in his creation of Basic English. As many of the modernists 
did in refining a school of thought, he eventually created his own orthodoxy 
and tried to control the “fictions” inherent in the psychological dimension of 
language.
 Bell’s own discriminating orthodoxy centered on the belief that painting 
is the avant-garde form of art, one that was beyond the influence of others 
such as jazz. On the other hand, though “so shallow a current,” jazz could still 
claim musicians such as Stravinsky and writers such as Eliot whose forms 
broke the rules. Jazz can appear in literature in versions of its chief formal 
element, syncopation, and this fact suggests that while Bell denigrated the 
jazz movement as a whole, he can respect individual manifestations of its 
form. For example, he notes how syncopation informs Virginia Woolf ’s style 
as she “developed a taste for playing tricks with traditional constructions” 
and “‘leaves out’ with the boldest of them.” However, he carefully qualifies 
his view in stating that his sister-in-law does not “properly” belong to the 
jazz movement, and does not “jeer at accepted ideas of what prose and verse 
should be and what they should be about.” More importantly, she discrimi-
nates and strikes “no note of protest against the notion that one idea or emo-
tion can be more important or significant than another” (“Jazz” 224). When 
Woolf spoke to the Heretics on the nature of character in modern fiction, 
her own view of the proper response of modernity to tradition, shuttling 
between intolerance and egalitarianism, would alternately problematize and 
affirm his account.
Virginia Woolf among the Heretics
For the next few years, the Bloomsbury Group continued to take the train 
up to Cambridge with increasing regularity. Edith Sitwell spoke in the same 
term as Bell on “Modern Criticism”; the Russells together indicted “Industri-
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alism and Religion” in March, 1922; then during the Lent term of 1923 Mar-
gery Fry discussed reforming “Prisons and Punishment” before her brother, 
Roger, shared his ideas on “Composition.” Leonard Woolf spoke of “Hunting 
the Highbrow” in 1926. Undoubtedly, though, one of the most resonant 
historical moments of the Heretics Society occurred on May 18, 1924, when 
Virginia Woolf developed her treatise on modernist aesthetics, “Character in 
Fiction.” Woolf spoke while, as legend would have it, the British track team 
trained for the Paris Olympics by racing the stroke of bells around the Great 
Court at Trinity. The role of the Heretics in the evolution of her famous essay, 
better known as “Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown,” remains overlooked.6 Before 
and after addressing the Heretics, Woolf substantially changed the tenor, 
economy, and charge of her essay. Of further literary import, within days of 
her address, Woolf wrote in her diary, “my mind is full of The Hours,” the 
working title for the novel that would become Mrs. Dalloway (301).
 The centrality of “Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown” to British modernism 
need not be reaffirmed extensively here. It is a touchstone of modernist aes-
thetics. Serving several critical purposes, biographers, aestheticians, and lit-
erary historians have used the essay to explain the modernist or “Georgian,” 
in Woolf ’s terminology, epistemic break from their Edwardian predecessors, 
the testy episode over character development between Woolf and Arnold 
Bennett, and the indirect dialogue between Woolf and Joyce, Mrs. Dalloway 
and Ulysses. The essay has become a modernist aesthetic manifesto appropri-
ated by formalists and feminists alike. Prior to this final, canonized version, 
Woolf had expanded her initial “Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown” from the 
previous fall for presentation to the Heretics. In Cambridge, Woolf chiefly 
took issue with Bennett’s claim that she and the modernist generation could 
not create “real; true; and convincing” characters.7 To discredit his point and 
demonstrate the beginnings of character formation, Woolf inserts herself in 
the scene of a railway carriage. One Mrs. Brown and a Mr. Smith converse, 
stiffly trying to keep up respectable appearances, when Mrs. Brown suddenly 
starts crying. Mr. Smith’s gruff British-male response and quick abandon-
ment of her causes Woolf to want “to realise her character” and to note 
that here was a common inspiration to write fiction (CF1 508–9). To rebuff 
Bennett’s perspective, she claims that no “generation since the world began 
has known quite so much about character as our generation” (CF1 504) and 
that the Georgians/modernists such as Strachey, Forster, and she herself had 
to create characters anew because their predecessors provided no appropri-
ate example of how to package content into form.
 In the lecture version alone, Woolf explained to the Heretics that, if 
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“you read Freud,” you will understand the “scientific reasons” why modernist 
writers “dive deeper in to the real emotions and motives of their fellow crea-
tures” (CF1 504). In contrast, the Edwardians were too focused on a super-
ficial materialism of objects rather than the self and its psychology. When 
Woolf revised “Character in Fiction” for T. S. Eliot’s Criterion, she added the 
epoch-making lines explaining that “on or about December 1910 human 
character changed” and “when human relations change there is at the same 
time a change in religion, conduct, politics, and literature” (CF2 420–22). 
An extensive amount of criticism has discussed the reasoning behind the 
periodization, but the fact remains that she inserted the date after, in her 
words, a “good hard headed argument” with the Heretics who underwent 
severe turmoil during that month in 1910 and who were founded on reject-
ing the a priori perpetuation of the conclusions of tradition (Letters 115). The 
history of the Heretics, with whom she had just become familiar, perhaps 
instantiated further the historical transition she had in mind for many other 
significant reasons.
 Beth Daugherty has discussed the importance of the audience to an 
understanding of Woolf ’s lecture in causing the “foremost effect on her 
mind, the primary impetus for reworking the essay, and the major influence 
over the essay’s final shape” (278). However, Daugherty unfortunately hinges 
her argument that “Bennett’s sexism and Woolf ’s feminism lie at the bottom 
of their public wrangling” (269) on erroneous statements common to glosses 
on the Heretics Society. Since Daugherty reports that Woolf spoke solely to 
an “audience of women” at the “Heretics Club, a group in Girton College,” 
she concludes that “the sex of the audience” encouraged Woolf “to confront 
Bennett” and persuaded her “to incorporate her feminism within the essay 
and was thus the decisive factor in Woolf ’s development of the essay” and 
“her career” (279).8 On the contrary, a mixed-gender hall of heretics became 
the crucial lever Woolf used to launch her principles on the proper, self-
contained function of literature. The Heretics served both as an arena in 
which Bloomsbury could build an aesthetic consensus and as a straw man 
in Woolf ’s argument that fiction should not drive you “to join a society,” but 
rather to read the book again. She would invert her belief that “everything 
[could be] inside the book, nothing outside” (CF2 427–28), in her famous 
statement from “A Sketch of the Past” that “the whole world is a work of art; 
that we are parts of the work of art” (72).
 Woolf ’s theory of aesthetic “wholes” owes much to the philosophy of the 
Heretic who in all likelihood was a member of her audience, G. E. Moore. 
Gabriel Franks contends that “the student of Principia Ethica will find its 
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ideas echoed again and again in her work and her convictions” (230). The 
philosophical echoes resound throughout Woolf ’s first novel, The Voyage 
Out (1915), a novel preoccupied with the idea that human society is an 
organic whole plagued by the inefficacy of communication. As Woolf strug-
gles to find her fey, distinct narrative voice still caught in the inheritance 
of Edwardian forms, Richard Dalloway appears as a rakish gentleman who 
had his best thoughts at Trinity College where he concluded that his ideal 
was “Unity” (64). When he seduces young Rachel Vinrace and kisses her 
“passionately” telling her she has “beauty,” it is as if Moore’s two highest 
ideals consummate in this enjoyment of a beautiful object and pleasure of 
human intercourse (76). Dalloway has just read the dictum from Principia 
Ethica, “Good, then, is indefinable,” and draws the same conclusion that, in 
discussing ethics, “it’s the arguing that counts” (74). St. John Hirst, another 
Cambridge man, echoes Moore’s belief that persuasion alone enables ethical 
propositions to be held true: “He said that he thought one could make a great 
deal of difference by one’s point of view, books and so on, and added that few 
things at the present time mattered more than the enlightenment of women” 
(164). The polemics of the novel anticipate Woolf ’s later sustained critique 
of the objectification of women, while still deliberating the social function of 
art. Evelyn M. embodies this tension. She is a member of a “Saturday Club” 
designed “to talk about art,” but she wants to be more politically active and 
“form ourselves into a society” to fight for causes that constitute “[b]eing 
real” (248–49). In one of her last appearances in the novel, Evelyn explains 
that “she was going to found a club . . . in Bloomsbury preferably, where they 
could meet once a week.” She feels certain that “if once twenty people—no, 
ten would be enough if they were keen—set about doing things instead of 
talking about them, they could abolish every evil that exists” (321). A pursuit 
of this idea of the “real world” behind the visible world pervades the novel, 
which sometimes suggests it is a mystical conception of love.9
 In these instances from The Voyage Out, Woolf introduces four themes 
that preoccupied her throughout her literary career. Her address to the Her-
etics bears directly on these issues: philosophical mysticism, the influence 
of a coterie of intellectuals, the value of art versus political engagement, 
and the tension between aesthetic “wholes” and “leaving things out.” The 
paradoxical tenet that an oblique, fragmented aesthetic work can still point 
toward an organic unity derives in part from her self-described mysticism. 
Andrew McNeillie refers to the epiphany in “A Sketch of the Past” of the 
flower’s relation to the earth, “That is the whole,” as the “clearest critical 
expression” of her “hybrid, emphatically secular, yet also mystical” view of 
“transcendental reality” (17–18). Mrs. Brown is an early personification of 
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this flower. Through such microcosmic character expositions as Mrs. Brown 
on the train, Woolf believes that novelists can provide “us at the same time a 
complete view of human life.” In reading great novels such as Jane Eyre, War 
and Peace, and Jude the Obscure, she explains that “you do at once think of 
some character who has seemed so real that it has the power not merely to 
make you think of it in itself,” but also “of religion, of landscape, of love, of 
the immortality of the soul” (CF1 509).10 To achieve such aesthetic wholes, 
Woolf ’s repeated intimations imply the necessity of a synthetic view.
 Throughout her oeuvre, Woolf worked to develop a narrative technique 
both rich in perspective and mystically suggestive. Ann Banfield’s The Phan-
tom Table (2000) considers her fiction, in part, a metaphysics of unseen 
spaces: “The universe of Virginia Woolf ’s novels is a monadology whose plu-
rality of possible worlds includes private points of space and time unobserved, 
unoccupied by any subject. Its principle of unity is not a pre-established 
harmony conferred ahead of time by authorial intention. It is constructed 
ex post facto via a style and an art” (1). Psychology and philosophy provided 
fiction not only with a new understanding of character motivation, but also 
access to a spatial dimension shared with religion and literature, what Woolf 
called “moments of being.” Since people subsequently look closer at reality, 
in Woolf ’s view, modernist “literature must be different” (CF1 504). If art 
could achieve a flickering sense of unity through a formal construct, then the 
artist had not only the liberty but the duty to “leave things out.”
 Woolf ’s formal principles, then, operate under a different conception of 
synthesis. McNeillie suggests that her “synthesis of forms and genres” owes 
something to the Bloomsbury fascination with the post-Impressionists, of 
whom Fry’s famous 1910–11 exhibit marks one of the main reasons for 
Woolf declaring the opening year the dawning of a new age (19). Another 
Bloomsbury figure, Desmond MacCarthy, as noted earlier, characterized the 
painters as “Synthesists” who “find completer self-expression” in their work 
“than is possible to those who have committed themselves to represent-
ing objects more literally” (97). MacCarthy, who spoke to the Heretics on 
“Heroic Poetry” in 1915, further claims that the artist tries “to unload, to 
simplify the drawing and painting, by which natural objects are evoked, 
in order to recover the lost expressiveness and life.” Aiming “at synthesis in 
design,” the artist prepares “to subordinate consciously his power of repre-
senting the parts of his picture as plausibly as possible, to the expressiveness 
of his whole design” (101). Rather than a coherent text woven of disparate 
discourses, synthesis here means artifice. Woolf ’s fictions reflect the change 
in currency of the term “heresy” from 1883–1924, from Edwardian syncre-
tism to discrete “choices.” Synthesis becomes synthetic.
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 In the published version of “Character in Fiction,” Woolf states that 
various aesthetic artifices make a novel such as Tristram Shandy or Pride 
and Prejudice “complete in itself ” and “self-contained,” leaving “one with no 
desire to do anything, except indeed to read the book again, and to under-
stand it better.” In this fetishization of the text, she believes that readers will 
concomitantly be able to understand the world better, and inserts the previ-
ously mentioned contrast that in order “to complete” Edwardian novels “it 
seems necessary to do something—to join a society, or, more desperately, to 
write a cheque” (CF2 427). While the premise of Three Guineas implies that 
Woolf revisited the importance of subsidizing social justice, the revisions 
added to the published “Character in Fiction” also suggest that the address 
to the Heretics, who would solicit her to join, caused her to rethink the role 
of audience and public readership in relation to the principles of her treatise. 
To the Heretics, she described Edwardian novels as leaving her with a “strong 
feeling of disappointment” (CF1 510). In changing this to a “strange feeling 
of incompleteness and dissatisfaction,” Woolf emphasizes the importance of 
an aesthetic “whole” (CF2 427). However, as if she remembers the readerly 
component in Moore’s ideal of the contemplation of beautiful objects, Woolf 
accentuates the role of public readership in the published essay. Clearly she 
is against didacticism in art, but not in determining how the public should 
appreciate it. She wants to overcome the “division between reader and writer,” 
and believes that books “should be the healthy offspring of a close and equal 
alliance between [them].” As part of this agreement, readers must “insist 
that writers shall come down off their plinths and pedestals, and describe 
beautifully if possible, truthfully at any rate, our Mrs Brown.” Mrs. Brown 
can become one of those substitute artifices tapped into unity; once manifest, 
she will be “life itself ” (CF2 436).
 Before the manifestation of the emblematic Mrs. Brown can signal “one 
of the great ages of English literature,” Woolf believes that the need to break 
from the Edwardian legacy causes fragmentary forms and the “prevailing 
sound of the Georgian age”—“crashing and destruction.” Though she con-
fesses that she too cries out “for the old decorums,” she admonishes the 
readerly public to be patient and “[t]olerate the spasmodic, the obscure, the 
fragmentary, the failure” (CF2 434–36). In making choices of omission in 
narrative, the writer must convince the reader of their validity. In directing 
the public on principles of literary taste, again “it’s the arguing that counts.” 
Bloomsbury was in place not only to help determine rhetorically how art 
should be received, but also to make its associates find the Heretics Society 
superfluous.
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 Toward the end of both versions of “Character in Fiction,” Woolf ’s 
famous dismissal of Joyce’s Ulysses on grounds of indecency illustrates the 
creation of Bloomsbury taste at work. She uses the same aesthetic prin-
ciples as those in Strachey’s address on “Art and Indecency.” Joyce’s unnamed 
“indecencies” reflect her idea that the “Georgians” have not yet discovered 
their technique, yet such works can still be judged on their overall merit. 
Indecency is not one of the literary experiments to be tolerated if it is delete-
rious to the aesthetic whole. Woolf states: “Mr Joyce’s indecency in Ulysses 
seems to me the conscious and calculated indecency of a desperate man who 
feels that in order to breathe he must break the windows. At moments, when 
the window is broken, he is magnificent. But what a waste of energy! And, 
after all, how dull indecency is, when it is not the overflowing of a super-
abundant energy or savagery, but the determined and public-spirited act of a 
man who needs fresh air!” (CF2 434). Joyce’s overexertion makes “[m]uch of 
the book . . . very poor stuff in consequence” (CF1 516), and, since the inde-
cency is “not the overflowing of a superabundant energy,” Strachey’s thesis 
that the “whole” can abide indecent asides does not apply. Bloomsbury’s 
decorous taste refrained from supporting the sexuality of Lawrence’s and 
Joyce’s work, possibly out of class bias, and this unintentionally facilitated 
the conventional wisdom of the censorious legislation declaring that a “book 
may be a fine piece of literature and yet obscene.”
 Examined with more than a formalist lens, “Character in Fiction” may 
appear naive. To Woolf ’s grand credit, though, both her literary style and 
vision of the political dimension of art evolved. She would write two formal 
masterpieces, Mrs. Dalloway and To the Lighthouse, fight against the censor-
ship of literature, and even more actively work for feminist and other radical 
causes. In this light, Moore’s work fails to account for her complex ideas 
regarding ethical and social order. Banfield points to the “dominant role of 
Russell’s thought for [her] reading of Woolf ” (40), and McNeillie nods to 
the influence of Harrison in reminding us not to lock Woolf ’s “intellectual 
seriousness” in the “wooden embrace of G. E. Moore” (13). Several studies of 
Between the Acts argue that Woolf ’s novel uses Harrison’s theories on Greek 
ritual to structure her narrative.11 When Woolf took the podium before the 
Heretics, she certainly felt the presence of the “famous scholar” “J—H—,” as 
she refers to Harrison in A Room of One’s Own (18). Woolf recently had read 
Harrison’s Epilegomena to the Study of Greek Religion (1921), whose third 
section, “The Religion of To-Day,” derives from her February 1921 address 
to the Heretics.
 In this capstone to her scholarly career, Harrison diagnoses and recom-
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mends several changes in contemporary views of religion which also illus-
trate a historical current informing the ideology of modernist aesthetics. 
From 1890 to 1920, she grew to believe that religion needs to be seen in con-
text, that god is an important but not essential by-product of pagan rites, and 
that religion promotes life, though this can be “hindered by the idea of a god” 
(xxii). Revised over the course of her thirty years of research, these points 
are Harrison’s final conclusions in her brief Epilegomena, in which she also 
stresses the point that “it is possible to have a living and vigorous religion 
without a theology” (xliii). In her studies of the origins of Greek religion, 
she welcomes the emendations she had to make over time in order to reflect 
the implications of new thought, primarily that of Durkheim and Freud. To 
paraphrase, God is a social construct created out of our desires. Her meth-
odology is consistent with her central point that religion evolves in accord 
with culture, but, as Shaw suggests in his preface to Saint Joan, thought that 
is ahead of its time generally is decried as heresy. And Harrison sees her own 
work in such a light. In the preface to the second edition of Themis (1912), 
she expresses her “joy that most of my own old heresies that had seemed to 
my contemporaries so ‘rash’ were accepted by the new school, almost as pos-
tulates” (539). Central among these postulates are the ideas that pre-Hellenic 
society was matriarchal and that dance and daimon were primordial rituals 
corrupted by the construction of the Olympian gods.
 In “The Religion of To-Day,” Harrison argues that the First World War 
had made asceticism the core of modern religion. Gabriel Murray wrote to 
her soon after the publication of Epilegomena; he found that the third chap-
ter “explains and justifies asceticism, which is almost the most important 
piece of teaching that the world needs nowadays” (J. Stewart 182). Though 
Harrison believes that the impetus of all religion seeks “the conservation and 
promotion of life” (xvii), she feels that the Catholic modernist doctrine of 
vital immanence affirms her idea that modern religion “aims at the bettering 
of life, by the exercise of the function of choice and the practice of asceticism” 
(lii, emphasis added). What Pius X had decried as the heretical essence of 
modernism, Harrison gladly embraces, and she adds the stipulation that 
God can only be found in the human “self ” where people decide values. 
After associating value in general with religious questions, Harrison told 
the Heretics that asceticism looks toward higher values because “you and I 
are good but . . . we can and need to be better” (liv). For example, she claims 
that the flesh is shameful because the spirit is better. Her interest in the 
psyche explains both points crucial to her argument, i.e., that human beings 
rank values based on their desires and that the doctrine of vital immanence 
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implies that the “best in you, is one with God, is God, your work is the divine 
activity” (liv). This internal, experiential view of the Kingdom of God, how-
ever, does not solely make asceticism a function of negation. Art and science 
better society and “rank as of the highest religious value” (lv). Asceticism, 
or the function of choice, attunes the aesthetic “instrument” and provides 
the “discipline that is necessary for eminence in art” (lv). Art and science 
uplift the human soul and make the question of God’s objective existence 
irrelevant.
 When Harrison ends her Epilegomena with the epigram “Via Crucis, Via 
Lucis” (lvi), it would appear that she has had a seachange in her religious 
thought. Mute is the Dionysian revelry, muffled the cry to separate from the 
herd. However, the function of heresy (“choice”) rings clear in providing 
what she had earlier asked the Heretics to find, the “new mode of life” in 
the “transition moment” of Edwardian syncretism. The tension of synthetic 
heresies facilitated the making of hard “choices” by bringing forth a variety 
of ways of thinking. Often modernism would make hierarchies of them 
in closed, determinate forms. The trajectory of Harrison’s discursive career 
emblematizes this shift, and her emphasis on the value of asceticism may 
inform Woolf ’s critique of indecency. The change in Harrison’s interests from 
pre-Olympian cults to asceticism parallels the turn from orgiastic collectivity 
to rational propriety that Nietzsche finds in the literary history of Greek trag-
edy. Similarly, the rich, flowering, productive character of modernism from 
1890 to 1940 owes much to the fluctuation between the bounty of uncertain 
discovery and the brilliance of formal conceptions. Synthesis in tension with 
discriminatory thought indeed makes modernism, like Classical Greece and 
the Renaissance, in Woolf ’s words, “one of the great ages of literature.”
The Dissolution of the Heretics
Several factors, including the passing of a generation of elderly dons and the 
growth of substitute humanist societies, led to the dissolution of the Heretics 
Society. None, however, was quite so important as Ogden’s permanent relo-
cation to Bloomsbury. On January 3, 1925, Harrison wrote to Ogden: “I am 
sorry that you have left Cambridge for Cambridge needed you. Well—thru 
the Heretics you put up a good fight just when most needed” (MCMA 107). 
Two weeks later McTaggart died. The Executive Committee of the Heretics 
quickly tried to recoup their losses. On a postcard crucial to the enduring 
preeminence of the Heretics, the Society disseminated the announcement of 
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G. E. Moore’s influential address, “A Defence of Common Sense,” above the 
following list of proposed new Honorary Members: E. M. Forster, Roger Fry, 
Virginia Woolf, Lytton Strachey, C. K. Ogden, I. A. Richards, and J. B. S. Hal-
dane (MCMA 114 env.6). Though Ogden would be an Honorary Member 
until 1927, the four members of the Bloomsbury Group refrained from join-
ing the Society. From 1924 to 1932, the cache of the Heretics slowly petered 
out, punctuated on occasion by a dramatic episode. In dissolving into a 
vague humanism, though, the principles of the Heretics diffused into other 
disciplines and eventually transmuted into orthodoxies of economics, phi-
losophy, liberal humanism, and literary criticism. Spawned out of the pool 
of heresy, various schools of thought of continuing influence tried to offer a 
humanistic vision of the world which excluded the religious, but remained 
implicitly heretical. For instance, there is Keynesian economics.
 While Bloomsbury was not brought into the heretic fold in one fell 
swoop, the rogue economist already was an Honorary Member. The outcry 
surrounding his Economic Consequences of the Peace (1919), highly critical 
of the Treaty of Versailles, the heavy reparations imposed on Germany, and 
the overall negative impact on free markets, inspired the Heretics to found an 
Economics Section of the Society. Sargant Florence states that the section was 
“heretical in criticizing theory based entirely on the assumption of a rational 
economic man” (CH 237). They would meet in Florence’s house until 1927 
when it merged, in another instance of the Heretics’ gradual loss of currency, 
with the newly formed Marshall Society. Though Keynes was not as active as 
other Honorary Members, he identifies himself as a heretic and consistently 
refers to his economic theories in his writings as “heretical” and opposed to 
the “orthodox” economies of Marxism and laissez-faire capitalism.12 He con-
sidered himself a “free-thinking heretic,”13 and professed his belief in 1930 
that the “heretic money reformers” have “flourished in undiminished vigor 
for two hundred years,” and that this proves that “the orthodox arguments 
cannot be entirely satisfactory” (6: 190–93). Keynes believed in the power 
of intuition in economic planning, denounced the importance of the Gold 
Standard, and stressed the idea that banks only imposed costs for profit and 
instead could supply all the production and trade necessary without anyone 
incurring any “real costs.” As he worked toward his highly influential, now 
unread General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936), he sought 
as a “heretic” who is an “honest intellectualist” to “reconcile heretics and 
bankers in a common understanding” (6: 194).14 The General Theory has 
become a standard economic principle of the G8, and in it Keynes believed 
that he discovered the “fatal flaw” in the “orthodox reasoning” of economics 
to be that there was no “satisfactory theory of the rate of interest” (13: 489). 
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In order to even out the drastic market cycles between boon and slump, 
Keynes proposed to change the rate of interest accordingly in order to stimu-
late consumption or investment. Now when Wall Street muzzles itself to hear 
the Federal Reserve Board make a decree, it hears Keynes’ distant, heretical 
voice determining its trade.
 As Keynes grew in national prominence, his presence in Cambridge 
concomitantly diminished. He emblematizes a trend throughout the 1920s, 
which saw the first generation of Honorary Members of the Heretics gradu-
ally fade away. Harrison and McTaggart died; several others retired; Moore 
lost some of his cutting-edge appeal. By 1929, Florence had taken a post in 
Birmingham and Ogden had withdrawn his Honorary Membership since he 
found it no longer necessary to maintain contacts at university. In pursuit of 
funding for Basic English, however, he highlighted the possibility and impor-
tance of reestablishing his Cambridge connections in the same successful 
application to the Rockefeller Foundation in which he touted the Heretics as 
teaching him about the “verbal defects” of language.15 To stress the urgency 
of an endowment for Basic English in 1929, Ogden claimed that now at hand 
was a “great opportunity which may not occur again” because “[n]ot only is 
the older generation, the leaders of 19th Century thought, by whose advice 
and experience we should like to profit, rapidly passing away, but for some 
years we have kept in view certain brilliant young students at Cambridge and 
elsewhere whose services should be secured without delay” (MCMA 128.10). 
For the next fifteen years, Ogden would call on many of these dormant and 
burgeoning connections to drum up support for Basic English.
 Ogden certainly had William Empson in mind as an example of one of 
these “brilliant young students.” The flamboyant, precocious scholar was 
working under the tutelage of the Heretic I. A. Richards in 1929, and the 
influence of his thesis, Seven Types of Ambiguity (1930), needs little elu-
cidation here. Empson’s career at Cambridge from 1925 to 1929 was, in 
short, stellar. He excelled in math during his first year, wrote a large body of 
poems, edited Granta, and, in debates, defended modern literature against 
the charge that it was degenerate and oversexed. He also joined the Heretics 
upon entering Magdalene College and became the president for his final 
year while writing a large section of Seven Types in a furious few weeks.16 
Christopher Norris believes this undergraduate past infuses Empson’s entire 
literary career with “the workings of a rationalised ‘heretic’ outlook” (Phi-
losophy 4). In this light, the influence of the Heretics not only informs the 
controversy surrounding Empson’s interpretation of Paradise Lost in Milton’s 
God (1961),17 but also suggests possible heretical implications veiled in his 
first critical book, which inspired New Criticism and close attention to the 
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verbal ambiguities enriching a text. In Milton’s God, Empson confesses that 
he thinks “the traditional God of Christianity very wicked” and that he had 
done so since he “was at school” (10). John Constable points out to neo-
Christian formalists who “dodge the implications of [Empson’s] linguistic 
theory for their theology” that “‘ambiguity’ destabilizes the word of God by 
suggesting it has human origin,” and that it is not “possible for a Christian to 
believe that God’s mind contains unresolved conflicts” (5). Such critiques of 
logos and apologistic interpretations of God’s paradoxical will became more 
manifest throughout Empson’s career, but they are also evident in Seven 
Types and his early poems. For instance, one of his best poems, “Camping 
Out,” published while President of the Heretics, uses the parentheses to com-
ment subversively on “(God’s grace)” as something subservient to nature and 
as a “glass of the divine (that will could break)” (Poems 29).
 From the viscera, Empson recoiled from Christian doctrines regarding 
sin and sacrifice that he believed constituted a brutal, primitive ideology. 
In Seven Types of Ambiguity, this barbarous conception of Christianity per-
meates his illustration of the last, most ambiguous type. The seventh type 
“occurs when the two meanings of the word, the two values of the ambiguity, 
are like two opposite meanings defined by the context, so that the total effect 
is to show a fundamental division in the writer’s mind” (192). Empson ends 
this chapter by explicating passages from Crashaw, Dryden, Hopkins, and 
Herbert which all reveal “[s]omething weird and lurid in this apprehension 
of the sacrificial system” (222). Here is an example of Empson’s critique of 
the primitive in Christianity drawn from the relationship between Christ 
and Mary in Crashaw’s “Blessed be the paps which Thou hast sucked” (1670): 
“a wide variety of sexual perversions can be included in the notion of suck-
ing a long bloody teat which is also a bloody wound. The sacrificial idea is 
aligned with incest, the infantile pleasures, and cannibalism; we contemplate 
the god with a sort of savage chuckle; he is made to flower, a monstrous 
hermaphrodite deity, in the glare of a short-circuiting of the human order” 
(221). To make grave this critical joviality a few pages later, Empson points 
to Jupiter’s “magnificent obscenity” in Pope’s Dunciad (1728) that “makes the 
indifference of God disgusting and the subservience of man unendurable” 
(223). Immediately, though, Empson returns to his sardonic irreverence in 
his riff on the moment in Crashaw’s translation of “Dies Irae” (1652) when 
“discharge” ambiguously relates to both “soft bowels” and God’s judgment. 
Empson stresses the capital importance of a poem that “defines God and 
dung as opposites,” and, in one of his sliest jibes, he states that “it is proper 
that they should have been brought into this chapter” (224). It is proper for 
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Empson and also insulting to God, because he had earlier stated that the 
ambiguous mind of seventeenth-century poets “draws its strength from a 
primitive system of ideas in which the unity of opposites . . . is of peculiar 
importance” (222–23). To conclude with “a more controlled and intelligible 
example,” Empson turns to George Herbert.
 Empson’s crowning analysis of Herbert’s “The Sacrifice” (1633) had ini-
tially been published in the May 1929 edition of Experiment during Empson’s 
presidency of the Heretics. He views Herbert as pious and the poem merely 
a “mouthpiece” for the “theological system” which it addresses, but Empson’s 
play with verbal ambiguities works to put the contradictions the poem holds 
in equilibrium, or synthesis,18 in a dissonant if “luminous juxtaposition” 
(224). That is, orthodox doctrine becomes profanely illuminated. Though 
Herbert may have had a reverent intent, and is able to balance perfectly the 
doctrine of Christ’s sacrifice, Empson exposes the doctrine itself as ambigu-
ously constructed and intolerably savage. To make his case, Empson focuses 
on the following lines in the poem attributed to Christ on the cross: “Only 
let others say, when I am dead, / Never was grief like mine” (31). One inter-
pretation may say Christ wants humanity never to have to suffer as he did, 
but Empson adds the view that “he may mean mine as a quotation from the 
others” (228). From this perspective, Christ asks for retribution and wants 
his persecutors to suffer eternal damnation. Though Empson questions the 
acceptance of this double meaning, he insists that readers will always think 
this interpretation is a possibility, and turns to doctrine as evidence of how 
this contradiction can be reconciled. Christ atoned for our sins, but we must 
still toil and have faith out of fear of hell. To conclude, Empson argues that it 
is not important whether Herbert was conscious of these implications, that 
the interpretation is not blasphemous but “merely orthodox,” for orthodoxy 
is savage in its desire to inflict pain and deny life (229).19
 This, then, is an example of a division in the writer’s mind, conscious or 
not, whose ambiguity is reconciled by a formal unity and a “false identity” 
provided by doctrine. However, the reconciliation is inevitably false in its 
construction, something religious New Critics tended to obscure in appro-
priating Empson’s methods. In 1930, Allen Tate, R. P. Blackmur, Kenneth 
Burke, and Yvor Winters all contributed to the symposium, The Critique of 
Humanism,20 and the battle lines were drawn between historical, humanist-
minded textual criticism and its conservative, veiled-religious counterpart. 
Toward the end of his career, Empson would accentuate historical context 
and biographical material to fight what he considered the Christianization 
of secular and skeptical authors.21 Empson’s own biography includes a noto-
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rious end to his affiliation with Cambridge. A month after the appearance 
of his heretical analysis of “The Sacrifice,” Empson won the Charles Kings-
ley Bye Fellowship at Magdalene for the following year. His zest for life 
made him careless and his fellowship short-lived when a college servant 
found condoms in his room. Empson lost the fellowship and had his name 
stripped from the college books. It is uncertain how his continuing presence 
in Cambridge might have affected the Heretics, but his influence on literary 
criticism during this time when English emerged as a discipline is not as 
ambiguous.
 Cleanth Brooks, one of the influential critics Empson believed inserted a 
neo-Christianity into literary analysis, appropriated Empson’s methodology 
for his own ends while denying all political, religious, and social implications 
of his interpretations. In The Well Wrought Urn (1947), Brooks outlines this 
view in the concluding chapter, “The Heresy of Paraphrase.” In this staple of 
New Criticism, he argues for the inseparability of form and content in any 
proper study of poetry, and his emphasis on the formal constructs of irony 
and paradox illustrate the inheritance that orthodox modernist aesthetics in 
the Eliotic school bequeathed to New Criticism. Questions of form predomi-
nate. The critical terminology, the heresy of paraphrase, represented a taboo 
for New Criticism in the vein of the Affective or Intentional Fallacies. For 
Brooks, any interpretation of verse that goes beyond formal close reading is 
“heretical,” and, in this denunciation, he implicitly indicts one of the most 
salient characteristics of Empson’s mode of analysis.
 Certainly, Empson’s common method is to paraphrase several interpre-
tations of a kernel of verse in order to illustrate the ambiguities created by 
poetic technique and language. Brooks declares that “most of our difficulties 
in criticism are rooted in the heresy of paraphrase” because, in splitting the 
“poem between its ‘form’ and its ‘content,’” the “paraphrastic heresy” brings 
“the statement to be conveyed into an unreal competition with science or 
philosophy or theology” (183–84). In Brooks’ mind, “most of the common 
heresies about poetry derive” from the belief that a “poem constitutes a 
‘statement’ of some sort” (179). For Brooks, paraphrase does a disservice 
to the complexities enriching a poem, and symptomatizes the “distempers 
of criticism,” which mostly derive, as Richards had argued, from making 
propositions “about the poem” (182). Instead, he works to establish a mode 
of analysis of poems in the “tradition” which share a “common goodness” in 
terms of “structure,” not “content” or “subject matter” (177). This approach 
is what initially attracted him to Empson, whose criticism he described in 
an earlier review as “an attempt to deal with what the poem ‘means’ in 
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terms of its structure as a poem.” However, Brooks also notes a common 
objection to Empson’s criticism which “forces upon the poem his own per-
sonal associations,” and often appears in interpretive paraphrase (“Empson’s” 
125; 128).22 By the time of The Well Wrought Urn, Brooks seems to have 
sensed Empson’s “heretic outlook,” for he indirectly summarizes Empson’s 
methodology in describing the “most subtle” manifestation of the heresy of 
paraphrase. This “error” of criticism is “most stubbornly rooted in the ambi-
guities of language,” begins with the “‘paraphrasable’ elements of the poem,” 
and subordinates the “other elements” (183). In effect, Empson’s interpretive 
riffs unpacked the synthetic “wholes” theorized by High Modernist aesthetic 
manifestoes, orthodoxies of the organic, closed craftwork. Brooks tried to 
stifle this critical “heresy” which might raise questions about theology in 
Herbert’s “The Sacrifice,” and his use of the term “heresy” reveals not only 
his own biases, but also its residual currency.
 Empson was the dynamic force in a cluster of bohemians at Cambridge 
who were engaged in avant-garde aesthetics and radical politics. They con-
tinued the use of the Heretics Society as a forum for cutting-edge thought, 
and they entertained Marxism. They dabbled in surrealism. They published 
in Granta, Venture, and Experiment, an extreme left-wing journal whose 
submissions emanated mostly from Magdalene College. The Woolfs’ Hog-
arth Press published the voices of several Heretics in the famous volume 
Cambridge Poetry, 1929. The poems of Heretics (Empson, Christopher “Kit” 
Saltmarshe, Hugh Sykes Davies, and Julian Bell) were gathered together with 
those of John Lehmann, Michael Redgrave, and Jacob Bronowski to express 
the voice of a new generation. Later the Woolfs sounded them off the Oxford 
contingent of Auden, Spender, and Day Lewis in another landmark collec-
tion, New Signatures (1932). A sense of promise was trying to mitigate the 
economic slump plaguing Britain at the time. In Empson’s inner circle, Julian 
Trevelyan and Kathleen Raine began their respective careers in painting and 
poesy as radical Heretics.23 Among this generation at Cambridge, Julian Bell 
and John Cornford exemplified the growing appeal of Marxism, and their 
commitment to social justice eventually led them to volunteer in the Span-
ish Civil War, where they died fighting for the Republic. Bell was the son of 
Clive and Vanessa Bell, nephew to the Woolfs, and Cornford’s father was the 
classical scholar and mentor of the Heretics. The Society was passing on its 
legacy within families. Bell became one of the last treasurers, and Trevelyan, 
the nephew of the Heretic historian, took over the secretarial duties for a year 
and a half after Empson’s dismissal.
 When Empson was sent down from Cambridge in 1929, the Heretics 
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still had a host of talented members, but they had lost their president and his 
magnetic presence. He realized the precarious situation of the Society and 
immediately set out to advise Trevelyan, his new recruit. In telling the story 
of his expulsion, Empson cautioned him: “What happened (since you ask) 
was the porters found a French letter in my rooms, and the bedmaker had 
also been very industrious at reading letters and so forth; let it be a warn-
ing to you, young man, I had no idea one was so officially spied on. It was 
high time I got away from the place; I shall do journalism now if I can.” He 
passed down Ogden’s standard recruiting technique: “The great thing is to 
get somebody who will do for the first or second Sunday, and get out some 
sort of card. Then you can pick up the locals” (Letters 10–11). Empson sug-
gested specific faculty to solicit, and he leveled with the sophomore secretary 
on the state of the Society’s affairs: “I’m afraid I’ve let you in for a difficult job 
rather; I have just been kicked out of Cambridge, so probably the President 
next year will be Professor Piccoli, a dear thing who doesn’t know a bit what 
the Heretics like, and wants watching about Croce. I have got a promise 
from Wittgenstein to speak next term but that is absolutely all” (Letters 
9). Piccoli too would be gone by the fall of 1931, leaving Cambridge amid 
vague hints of distress. Empson regretted handing over the reins to Piccoli, 
though everyone called him “the dear,” especially since the latter’s passivity 
would replace Empson and Trevelyan having their “year of feeding the lions 
together” (Letters 12). From Empson’s other notes, it is clear that the Heretics 
are the prideful beasts for him, so that the gladiatorial image is one of the 
Society donning the image of the Cambridge mascot to eat Christians.
 From the summer of 1929 through the fall of 1930, Julian Trevelyan and 
Elisabeth Wiskemann sent out a flurry of solicitous letters in a struggle for 
the survival of the Society. The Heretics had kept the correspondence with 
artists and intellectuals who had previously accepted, postponed, or declined 
invitations to address the discussion group, and now the Society came call-
ing again. The Heretics renewed these dormant acquaintances with some 
success, and Arthur Waley, Sturge Moore, and C. E. M. Joad all returned to 
address the Society. The family Sitwell was willing to speak again, but illness 
and travel kept them away. Foreshadowing his work in Milton’s God, Empson 
himself offered to “read a paper, or read from notes, about whether poems 
ought to be annotated, whether it is important, and why it is hard.” He sug-
gested the “bright caption,” evocative of ambiguity, “Sphinx, or the future of 
exegesis,” and said he “could give examples from the Bentley edition of Mil-
ton, and the answers to Bentley, which I have been very excited about” (Let-
ters 20). On the other hand, Richard Aldington and Leonard Woolf politely 
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declined, citing preoccupations with other affairs, while Aldous Huxley was 
more brusque in his refusal. In June of 1930, he responded to Trevelyan: 
“Your telegram was forwarded to me by post, after some delay. Thank you 
for asking me to read a paper to the Heretics on Sunday: but I’m afraid I can’t 
accept your invitation. I am returning you the virgin half of your telegram, 
which will be of more use to you than me” (TCL JOT 1/48). Though Empson 
told Trevelyan that “certainly Virginia Woolf had better come again” (Letters 
10), she wrote the following poignant response to Trevelyan’s invitation:
22nd, August 1929
Monks House
Dear Julian,
(If I may call you so)
 It is awfully nice of you to ask me to come and speak to the Heretics. I 
have the greatest respect for them, and if I could speak to anybody it would be 
to them.
 But I find thinking more and more impossible—it takes up so much 
time and I can’t ever say what I want—so that I brought my life as a speaker 
to an end last October, and shall never open my mouth in public again:—I 
hope.
 But many thanks to you and the Heretics for inviting me.
   Yours sincerely,
   Virginia Woolf
Please remember me to your mother and father.
(TCL JOT 1/63)
Woolf is referring to her delivery of sections of what became A Room of One’s 
Own to the Arts Society at Newnham and Odtaa at Girton. Amid the sadness 
of her inner struggles, she still found the grace to cast favor on the Heretics. 
Her newfound difficulties with public expression brought a significant loss 
to the Heretics, one more than recovered with her focus on fiction and social 
commentary in the 1930s.
 Perhaps news of debauchery and the growing debt of the Heretics even-
tually influenced others to distance themselves carefully from the Heretics. 
On October 29, 1929, Black Tuesday, Kit Saltmarshe complimented Trev-
elyan on the “full and excellent programme . . . produced for the fall term,” 
and cherished Julian’s letter which “came like a breath of heretical Cam-
bridge air.” At the same time, “horrified by the revelations of extravagance,” 
he ominously admonished his fellow Heretic: “if you only knew how Bill 
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and I denied ourselves . . . and now you are destroying the sound financial 
position we made for you, alack and woe. Let me tell you that we made it a 
rule to pay for ourselves except upon one occasion a term” (TCL JOT 2/16). 
In November 1930, Rex Warner regretted that his “paper did not provoke 
more discussion,” but suggested that, “possibly, the vodka is to blame” since 
“[m]ore sober,” he “should have been more argumentative” (TCL JOT 2/7). 
The following March, Saltmarshe informed Trevelyan of a bizarre “Sidney 
Sussex ‘accident.’” He claimed that “by all accounts [it] should have been 
treated as manslaughter,” and added “[s]uffice it to say that a book was 
found describing an Eskimo rite for getting to Heaven and entailing exactly 
the same tying-up as that of the deceased student” (TCL JOT 2/17). By the 
spring of 1931, Trevelyan had left Cambridge without a degree and ventured 
off to Paris to paint on the Seine with Max Ernst and others. As treasurer 
of the Heretics, Julian Bell wrote to him: “The Heretics have just avoided 
bankruptcy, so here’s your cheque. Thank goodness I’m free of the job” (TCL 
JOT 30/106). In the last few years of the Society, a general economic slump 
combined with a sudden profligate tendency on the part of the Executive 
Committee broke the economic stability the Heretics had secured for twenty 
years from Ogden to Empson.
 The major intellectual blast of the last four years of the Society came in 
the Michaelmas term of 1929 when Wittgenstein returned to Cambridge, 
fulfilled his promise to the Heretics, and delivered to them his famous lecture 
on “Ethics.” Wittgenstein’s discussion of ethics was his only popular lecture, 
and it marks the transition in his thinking from the study of logical proposi-
tions and the “picture theory” in Tractatus to the rejection of this approach 
in the posthumous Philosophical Investigations. He came to believe that lan-
guage performed many more functions than those that could be described 
in terms of truth or falsity, and, in order to show the limitations of language, 
his focus shifted toward the language of everyday life and the context sur-
rounding an utterance. The subject of ethics is an example of this latter set of 
expressions which consists of “meaningless” language, and, though he greatly 
respects ethical issues, he concludes his address by stating that “to write or 
talk Ethics or Religion [is] to run against the boundaries of language,” which 
is “perfectly, absolutely hopeless” (12). In all ethical or religious propositions, 
Wittgenstein discerns a characteristic use of similes or allegories. Though 
he claims it is impossible to drop metaphor and express the same statement 
without speaking nonsense, he believes that there are other ways of looking 
at the world than through a scientific lens because people do experience 
ineffable, pleasurable moments. For example, he points to the way people 
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explain miracles, for the first case, and wonder at the world’s existence, for 
the latter.
 Such a view nears mysticism, and Wittgenstein states at one point that 
“Ethics, if it is anything, is supernatural” (7). In fact, he acknowledges that 
one can always add “God” to declare absolute values of judgment, and, in his 
contemporaneous discussion with Friedrich Waismann, he noted that “[i]f 
any proposition expresses just what I mean, it is: Good is what God orders” 
(15). However, he has allowed that to invoke God is a case of using metaphor, 
and that such expressions are essentially nonsense. Wittgenstein’s hereti-
cal view allows for God while explaining that to speak of divine good is to 
babble. It is the paradoxical view that enables faith by radical theologians and 
other Christian intellectuals who sincerely engage modern thought. It also 
deconstructs logos. The implications of his address on ethics thus underwrite 
both religious humanism and the poststructuralist onslaught on humanist 
value-formation.
 Within a year of the dissolution of the Heretics, the collaborative “Human-
ist Manifesto” (1933) provided a theoretical platform that would be adopted, 
at least tacitly, by a growing number of liberal humanist societies. The sixth 
statute of the manifesto declares: “We are convinced that the time has passed 
for theism, deism, modernism, and the several varieties of ‘new thought’” 
(Wilson 36). Rather than the modernist attempt to synthesize sacred and 
secular impulses, humanism often sought to replace religion in name or 
principle, and take command of all aspects of social life. The manifesto itself 
is another example of the modernist production of manifestoes designed to 
decide what is right. In 1941 the American Humanist Association appeared, 
and Dora Russell probably mistook another Cambridge humanist organiza-
tion for a new branch of Heretics in a 1967 letter to Ogden’s brother, Frank. 
She writes: “There must have been some attempt to revive the Heretics at 
the end of the Second War, for I went to Cambridge to deliver a paper to 
them, 1946 or 47 or even later. Two of the former pupils of my own school 
Jeremy Pritchard and Donald Alcock were then at Cambridge as under-
graduates, and were at this meeting. The paper was called the ‘Fundamental 
Heresy of Women’ ie [sic] of women as the natural heretics to the Machine 
Age Religion” (MCMA 65). Probably the title of her talk led her to confuse 
the Heretics with another humanist society, though the history is unclear. 
During the 1960s, E. M. Forster was president of the Cambridge Humanist 
Society, founded in 1955, but in that year he initially asked G. E. Moore to 
take this helm. The aging don and former Heretic “declined because he did 
not think the name strong enough” and asked, ‘Is not the main point of it to 
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be anti-religious, i.e. to believe very confidently, as I do, that there is no God,’ 
or, at least ‘that it is extremely doubtful whether there is any?’” (WCL 406). 
Between heresy and humanity, Moore chose the one more striking.
 In 1963, Julian Huxley as president inaugurated the British Humanist 
Association during a dinner held in the House of Commons. Forster was on 
the advisory council during the 1960s. The BHA was designed as the unify-
ing heir apparent for such “humanist” groups as the Rationalist Press Asso-
ciation, the National Secular Society, the Heretics, and the Ethical Union. 
The BHA is still active and runs its own press, publishing a variety of human-
ist texts including Forster’s What I Believe and Other Essays. One of the 
first volumes off its press, The Humanist Outlook (1968) includes Florence’s 
memoir essay on the Heretics. At the end of the memoir, he states that the 
“moral of the story is that senior members of universities should take some 
responsibility for the stability of humanist societies from one fleeting genera-
tion of undergraduates to another” (CH 239). Another “moral” of the his-
tory of the Heretics Society is the neglected fact that heresy was a prevalent 
methodological approach and discursive trope of modernism. Now that this 
recuperative sketch of its influence is before us, the following chapters turn 
to analyses of textual instances and the reception of heresy, in part to explain 
this neglect, but largely to examine the heretical modernists’ subtle, synthetic 
vision.
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In Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World (1932), when Mustapha Mond 
explains to the Savage why people in their soma-induced stupor no longer 
need religious books such as William James’ The Varieties of Religious Experi-
ence, the benevolent megalomaniac states that the books on his secret shelf 
are “about God hundreds of years ago” and “[n]ot about God now.” Though 
the Savage objects that “God doesn’t change,” Mond ends the discussion with 
the sharp retort: “Men do, though” (157). As Gladstone’s discussion of heresy 
illustrates, authoritative discourses also will shift to account for the chang-
ing worldviews implicit in much of modern thought. Vatican II (1962–65) 
accepted many propositions of the clerical modernists in its ecumenical 
movement to renew the Catholic Church. More recently, Pope John Paul II 
apologized for the Inquisition in 1992, and he suggested thinking of hell as 
more of a state of mind than an actual place. Oftentimes heretics themselves 
have been the subject of revisionist histories, and this chapter examines 
how works by Shaw and Joyce engage the cultural movements from 1883 to 
1924 to rehabilitate the burnt heretics, Joan of Arc and Giordano Bruno. The 
biblical and literary canons undergo similar transformations, for example, in 
revisiting neglected works, the ideology of the Apocrypha, and the portrayal 
of religion in works by such authors as Boethius, Milton, and Joyce.
 The cry of heresy depends upon the estranged reception of readers, his-
torians, and inquisitors. But the same heresy often will also advance thought 
and social justice before being received as orthodoxy in subsequent gen-
erations. To achieve its subversive ends between 1883 and 1924, heterodox 
literature often subtly inserts a recusant voice amid its competing discourses, 
a voice that privileges being “other” out of “choice.” While a syncretic hereti-
cal gesture works to make contradictory ideologies cohere, disparate textual 
Chapter 4
•
Canonical Transformations
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elements may not be reconcilable and thereby will create a gaping chasm in 
the reader’s mind. The most suppressed type of heretical discourses in litera-
ture, and therefore the most susceptible to orthodox appropriation, occurs 
in the ideological construction embedded in a text’s linguistics, competing 
doctrines, or implied genealogy of religion. The ensuing analyses over the 
next three chapters examine these issues in the synthetic vision of heretical 
discourses in works by Shaw, Joyce, Pater, Hardy, and Lawrence. Hereti-
cal inclinations in literature often become interpreted for orthodox ends by 
focusing solely on the accepted religious elements. The subversive discourse 
of a text, however, can luminously come forth both within the constraints 
of an unfolding narrative and over the course of history with the widening 
horizons of its readership. The process of reading, in its very nature, pro-
duces an engagement with a constructed world dependent on evaluation, 
broadens the possibilities for living, and brings the capacity for changing cul-
tural values into the domain of the human will. Heretics and literature itself 
participate in the process of transforming the canon and making orthodoxy 
seem strange, and on this note Shaw’s address to the Heretics, “The Religion 
of the Future,” champions the function of heresy and reception in changing 
cultural values over time.
“The Religion of the Future”
As I mentioned in chapter 2, the “debate” between Shaw and Chesterton dur-
ing 1911 was the signature mark of the Heretics before the First World War. 
At no other time did the Society enjoy as much financial clout or as large a 
national audience. In fact, the prolonged battle of ideas between Shaw and 
Chesterton known as the “Great Debate,” officially began in Cambridge, and 
the friendly rivals quickly launched a series of debates in Memorial Hall, 
London, to follow on the heels of their successes at the Heretics. As was the 
case with most of the famous disputes initiated by the Society, their debate 
was not a debate in the traditional sense since Chesterton responded six 
months later and neither was in attendance for the other’s address. The so-
called debate nevertheless finally brought the two dynamic speakers in direct 
conflict and a widespread notoriety to the Heretics.
 The contrast between the six-foot-four, gray-bearded mystical drama-
tist and the rotund, beer-loving rational Christian dogmatist continued to 
have national public appeal until a final debate of 1927, “Do We Agree?”1 
As Alzina Stone Dale notes, after “most of their debates, as contemporaries 
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admit, the question of ‘who won’ depended upon the political or religious 
views of the onlooker” (153). Often Shaw and Chesterton would quibble 
over the definition of a word such as “miracle” or “heresy.” The victory would 
depend on reception, for instance, whether a person could be convinced 
either to embrace or repulse heresy. Before the Heretics, Shaw and Ches-
terton fought over the nature of what happens to heresy over time, while in 
effect they both agreed that the interdicted discourse, if properly defended 
and promulgated, becomes orthodoxy. However, while Shaw saw heresy 
as an aspect of the Life-Force consistently evolving and driving humanity 
toward progress, Chesterton wanted people to exercise their free will, defend 
their opinions and yet always consider them “orthodox.” In each perspective, 
received acceptance tolls the death knell of heresy—it becomes orthodoxy.
 Though Shaw’s and Chesterton’s separate addresses to the Heretics com-
prised their first critical engagement covered extensively by the national 
media and published in pamphlet form, for several years these men of let-
ters had been lampooning and critiquing each other in the press. In Heretics 
(1905), his denigration of Edwardian religious inclinations, Chesterton initi-
ated the battle of ideas by including Shaw among other “heretics” such as 
Wells, Kipling, and Goldie Dickinson. Shaw’s Man and Superman (1903) 
had clearly enough delineated the principles of the Life-Force, and its pro-
tagonist, John Tanner, declares in the addendum, “The Revolutionist’s Hand-
book,” that “[e]very genuine religious person is a heretic and therefore a 
revolutionist” (214). Indeed, the resonance of this play led Chesterton to say 
that he was “not concerned” with Shaw “as one of the most brilliant and one 
of the most honest men alive,” but “as a Heretic—that is to say, a man whose 
philosophy is quite solid, quite coherent, and quite wrong” (Heretics 15). 
The rhetorical appeals of this position would characterize all of Chesterton’s 
comments on Shaw and heresy. Chesterton would flatter his opponent, and 
he would note the coherence heresy holds while forever refraining that this 
is due to orthodoxy and simply a “wrong” interpretation.
 Chesterton could not abide the changes in modern thought that find 
people willingly identifying themselves in opposition to orthodoxy. Ignor-
ing the earlier etymological meanings of “heresy” such as “personal choice” 
or “school of thought,” he condemned the Edwardian world in which the 
following is permissible: “The word ‘heresy’ not only means no longer being 
wrong; it practically means being clear-headed and courageous,” and the 
“word ‘orthodoxy’ not only no longer means being right; it practically means 
being wrong.” Somehow this change in connotation only signifies for Ches-
terton “that people care less for whether they are philosophically right” 
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(Heretics 4). On the other hand, rather than illustrating a culture that has 
forsaken philosophy or the desire to be “right,” people, as the Heretics most 
flamboyantly displayed, had usurped the charged power of the word in order 
to confront orthodoxy head on.
 In the February 1908 issue of The New Age, Shaw responded to Ches-
terton’s intransigent dogma with the grotesque and lasting caricature, the 
“Chesterbelloc.” In this portrayal of two divided conservatives bumblingly 
trying to work together, Shaw satirizes the allure of “the Chesterton-Belloc 
chimera,” which “can produce the quadrupedal illusion” of a “pantomime 
beast” (77). At the front end, the rabid attack-dog of orthodoxy, Hilaire Bel-
loc, bites while the jovial and consoling Chesterton pulls up the rear to digest 
Belloc’s bilious critique for a popular audience. Later in the year within the 
same pages of The New Age, Shaw more seriously responded to Chesterton’s 
charge that he denied miracles. This was a controversial topic in the air since 
Pius X had recently condemned the modernist tendency to deny the verac-
ity of miracles. To be sure, Shaw affirms, he has always believed in miracles 
because the world is full of undeniable miraculous events such as birth, life, 
and consciousness. The person who denies miracles “is simply wrong in his 
definition of a miracle” in thinking it “something that he is not accustomed 
to and did not expect” (“Miracles” 43). The sine qua non nature of miracles 
for canonization by the Church later caused Shaw to revisit his theory of 
miracles for Saint Joan. In the play, the degree of credulity becomes of lesser 
importance than the personal or official reception of miracles, which he has 
a cleric define as the process that creates faith.
 Two years before the official “Great Debate” began in Cambridge, Ches-
terton offered a final preparatory sortie with his book-length literary and 
biographical study, George Bernard Shaw (1909). Labeling Shaw a “heathen 
mystic” (7), Chesterton finds that he has too many individual opinions and 
that a “man must be orthodox upon most things, or he will never even have 
time to preach his own heresy” (8). As a result, Chesterton argues that Shaw’s 
plays have become more philosophy than drama, and their successes fur-
ther promote a Shavian heresy. Nevertheless, Chesterton claims that Shaw’s 
attempt “to offer some key to all creation” by “rallying his synthetic power” 
will only preach a “vast and universal religion” of which “he is the only mem-
ber” (127).
 On May 25, 1911, Shaw and the Heretics said otherwise. Not only did the 
Irish playwright accept, upon finishing his address, an invitation to become 
an Honorary Member of the Society, but over a thousand people packed a 
Cambridge lecture hall and nearly two hundred others were turned away 
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from the door. Writing for the Gownsman in the year before the Cambridge 
Magazine appeared, Ogden rejoiced that the “enthusiastic audience which 
crowded to the Victoria Assembly Rooms on Monday is a striking example 
of the recent triumphs of heresy in Cambridge” (“Shaw” 669). Most Honor-
ary Members of the Heretics were in attendance, and for the event the Society 
initiated the practice of disseminating advertising broadsides for their more 
renowned public lectures (see figure 4). Proceeds from ticket sales amounted 
to eleven pounds nine shillings, and hiring the Victoria Assembly Rooms 
cost only two pounds five shillings (MCMA 113.38). This surplus combined 
with the fact that Shaw, as was his practice, did not request a speaker’s fee 
made the event the first major financial success for the Heretics.
Figure 4. Announcement of Bernard Shaw’s address to 
the Heretics Society. (Source: C. K. Ogden fonds, McMas-
ter University Library, MCMA 114.29)
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 For the addresses by both Shaw and Chesterton, Cornford took the chair, 
and Ogden copied down their words. Cornford, though, let his biases shine 
through and specifically introduced Shaw with enthusiasm “as a protagonist 
of the Heretical movement” (RF 1).2 When Shaw began his hour-long speech 
on a stifling Monday late afternoon, he immediately set forth a definition 
of the relationship between heresy and orthodoxy that would eventually 
undergird his theory of heresy in Saint Joan. In likening a heretic to “a man 
with a mechanical genius who began tinkering with a bicycle or a motor 
car and made it something different from what the manufacturer had made 
it,” Shaw considers that the heretic “was really a man with a home-made 
religion” (RF 1).3 Later in the speech, Shaw would echo this description of 
the heretic in stating that the “man of genius” must “amuse and frighten” 
the laity because they fail to understand him or the “vital truths of religion.” 
Such elitism, though, drew applause and laughter from the audience when he 
said, “with a smile,” “I know this . . . for I am by profession a man of genius” 
(RF 3–4). However, in a premise crucial to his conception of the Life-Force 
and its role in historical change, he deflects interest away from the heretical 
genius who molds religion “to suit himself,” and onto the “orthodox people,” 
the “people who really mattered.” Shaw grants his privileged audience the 
historical agency to propagate ideals amongst the masses by stating that 
what “the Heretics had to do was to prepare a ready-made religion for the 
next generation for the people who had to accept religion as it came” (RF 
1). Shaw’s speech founds itself on the élan vital of Bergson and the will to 
power of Nietzsche, and his view reflects this shared attempt to synthesize 
spirituality and evolution. To affirm his belief in progress, Shaw assumes that 
just and visionary heresy becomes the religion of the future as the changing 
horizon of readerly expectations reflects on history and changes its recep-
tion. The Life-Force below progressive heresy, however, consistently evolves 
and never satisfies itself with becoming a static set of tenets. As a member of 
the orthodoxy of posterity, the heretic thinks he or she is “right” as a heretic, 
but this “correctness” changes relatively over time.
 Confronting his audience with such an unstable cosmos, Shaw is acutely 
aware that he might alienate some of his listeners; consequently, he alludes to 
natural selection which had made “evolution” familiar, and he interchange-
ably uses the concepts of “God” and the “Life-Force.” In the question-and-
answer session, one unnamed Heretic objected that “Shaw ought to endeavor 
to avoid the unpleasant word God, with its unsatisfactory associations”; to 
which Shaw “admitted the word was somewhat fatuous, yet ‘Life-Force’ did 
not please people, and he could find nothing better” (Ogden, “Shaw” 670). 
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Shaw believes that people want a “God whom they could understand,” so 
he offers some guidelines stressing the need to rid religion of idolatry and 
borrowed, archaic legends. Additionally, he feels that natural selection cre-
ated “a horrible void” that left us in a world without “purpose or design.” 
To fill this chasm, the Life-Force presents the goal of the superman. If the 
Heretics used “what they called their will,” Shaw argues that society could 
return to “some belief in the purpose of the universe” by establishing “laws 
and morality which they supposed to be the will of God.” He underscores 
the point that this will is not God, while still finding that the idea of being 
possessed by God or the devil is a “conception of enormous value.” Not 
only does it illustrate the similarities between temptation and inspiration, 
but conceiving God as needing to work through human hands and brains 
in order to “struggle with a great, whirling mass of matter . . . meant our 
moulding this mass to our own purposes and will, and in doing that really 
moulding to the will of God” (RF 2–6). Such slippery spirituality begets the 
superman. This user-friendly theory of the Life-Force also accounts for the 
origin of evil because through trial and error humanity was “liable to make 
some mistakes.” Replete, however, with the majestic possibility characteristic 
of the Edwardian period, Shaw demands belief in the “Will to Good” and 
the idea that people are “all experiments in the direction of making God.” He 
even concludes with an optimistic Edwardian vision of synthesis: “when the 
different races of the earth had worked out their own conceptions of religion, 
those religions might meet and criticise each other, and end, perhaps, in 
only one religion.” The First World War had not yet made common what he 
finds impossible, “to regard man as willing his own destruction” (RF 6–8). 
As French soldiers in the trenches of the Western Front would pray to Joan 
of Arc for morale, Shaw in Saint Joan would call on her “vitalism” and recent 
canonization in order to counter the Thanatos drive.
 Joan’s trial and the war were examples of “error,” and overcoming them 
suggested to Shaw, as he had told the Heretics, that a sober, courageous 
humanity still could be “super-supermen” and “a world of organisms who 
had achieved and realised God” (RF 7). Willaim Furlong evocatively reports 
that, in communicating ideas such as the Life-Force or the superman, Shaw 
worked for crescendo effect, the “Shavian head was thrown back, his eyes 
seemed to pierce through and beyond his auditors, and his voice deepened 
into a more pronounced Irish accent as his tone became prophetic” (82). 
Shaw certainly did have his audience of Heretics enraptured, and even a 
review in The Christian Commonwealth described his performance as “glori-
ously irreverent, transparently sincere, divinely prophetic, and inspiring—
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the very thing for our older universities” (RF 12). Indeed, the mystic, as 
Shaw identified himself, immediately accepted the invitation to become an 
Honorary Member of the Heretics.
 Orthodoxy would have to wait six months before Chesterton arrived in 
Cambridge to respond to what The Academy called “A Detestable Outrage” 
in protest “against the dissemination of poisonous theories amongst young 
persons” (RF 13). The Heretics remembered a similar conservative reaction 
to Chawner and the “Prove All Things” controversy, and actually seemed to 
revel in it by printing this news clipping at the end of Shaw’s speech and as 
an introduction to Chesterton’s. Another excised quotation from The Fort-
nightly Review mandated that “it is surely time for a chivalrous revolt against 
this conventional unconventionality” (qtd. in Chesterton, “Future” 2). Ogden 
knew that outrage only brought more notoriety to the Heretics, and he even 
knew how to spin Chesterton’s fame and rebuttal to serve the needs of the 
Society. For instance, the Heretics’ prospectus for 1912–13 stated that “the 
most important outcome of the event [Shaw’s address] was the great meeting 
the following term, when Mr. G. K. Chesterton defended orthodoxy against 
the attack of Mr. Shaw” and resulted in “a remarkable accession of strength 
to the Heretics” (MCMA 114 env.4). Publicity of any sort brought timorous 
and blossoming heterodox thinkers into the fold.
 In facing the Heretics with all the hopes of orthodoxy behind him, Ches-
terton could have imagined himself in the role of Gabriel Syme, the protago-
nist in his most popular novel, The Man Who Was Thursday (1908). Syme 
had been recruited as a “philosophical policeman” who will fight “The Last 
Crusade” and wage the “battle of Armageddon” against the anarchy of the 
modern world created by “the most dangerous criminal now . . . the entirely 
lawless modern philosopher” (43–47). Easily disguised as an anarchist called 
“Thursday,” Syme is perfect for this mod squad and its “heresy hunt” since 
he is a poet at heart and can “discover from a book of sonnets that a crime 
will be committed” (43). Once accepted into the cell of elite anarchists in this 
chase novel, Thursday pursues every other modern rebel named after a day 
of the week until they each literally pull off masks and reveal themselves to 
be undercover thought police. Each philosophical policeman personifies an 
element of the creation of the world, and immense, mysterious Sunday rep-
resents “the peace of God” (178) and the “mystery of the world,” of which we 
know only “the back” (167–68). In its allegory of creation which emphasizes 
the need to defend the faith and learn from the power of anarchy, the novel 
clearly shows the influence of the recent condemnation of the Catholic mod-
ernists. At one point, Syme jokingly declares, “we are all Catholics now” (16), 
Franke_final.indb   112 1/28/2008   4:40:06 PM
C HA P T E R  4 :  C A NON IC A L  T R A N SF OR M AT ION S
and later he elucidates his position by stating: “The moderns say we must not 
punish heretics. My only doubt is whether we have a right to punish anybody 
else” (44). Punish he would not, but Chesterton saw the opportunity at Cam-
bridge as a chance to subdue the “modern” Heretics.
 After arriving fifteen minutes late to the Guildhall, the City Council 
building, where an audience of eight to nine hundred waited to hear him on a 
Friday night, Chesterton spoke for over an hour and answered questions for 
another one. A magnificent pipe organ rose behind him, and the room was 
strewn with heraldic emblems of English kings and paintings of mayors and 
Queen Victoria. Tradition was on his side. He received ovations at beginning 
and end, and he “dealt with hecklers in a prompt and ready manner.” His first 
heckler was Cornford who introduced him as “the only living man who had 
ever written two books, one entitled ‘Orthodoxy’ and the other ‘Heretics.’” 
Though he had read Heretics the previous day, Cornford refrained from 
Orthodoxy, “having, he supposed, been repelled by the title.” Upon rising to 
the platform, Chesterton first explained that his tardiness “was due to the 
fact that he came there in a Cambridge cab, and constantly encouraged the 
horse and driver to go slower and slower so that he might see the beauties 
of the town, and also begin to make up what he was going to say” (“Future” 
3–4). The trip from Petty Cury to Market Hill had inspired him. Later in 
January 1912, Ogden printed a sketch of Chesterton taking these notes in 
the first issue of The Cambridge Magazine. Chesterton inadvertently had 
launched the reciprocal relationship between the Heretics and Ogden’s first 
journal. He later wrote to Ogden: “My best notes were made, not just before 
the lecture, but just after it. . . . But these were also made in a cab; so that your 
picture will do quite as well for the baffled and remorseful lecturer as for the 
expectant and provocative one” (MCMA 113.36). Among Chesterton’s last- 
minute notes, which were written on the pamphlet of Shaw’s address Ogden 
had sent to him, Joseph Pearce reports that he outlined his main points and 
psychologically prepared himself with the declaration: “It has taken about 
1800 years to build up my religion. It will not take 18 minutes to destroy Mr. 
Shaw’s” (168).
 After noting the weight of history behind Christianity, Chesterton imme-
diately defended Shaw against the writer of the review in The Academy who 
was merely “an idiot” with “no belief in Christianity” (4). Chesterton claims 
there are two mistakes that have been made by both Shaw and orthodox 
reviewers; the first was “to suppose that the commonwealth was Christian” 
(a diagnosis which received applause), and the second was to believe “they 
were living in an age in which the Christian religion had been eclipsed” (6). 
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Because Christianity has always triumphed before, Chesterton has faith in 
its power to rise once again to the challenge of heresy and apostasy. From his 
Roman Catholic–friendly perspective, Chesterton defends Christianity in 
terms of a pragmatic battle in which England should be seen as a “heathen 
country to be conquered and redeemed” (6). In his mind, Christianity can 
and will be resurrected.
 In particular, Chesterton focuses on Shaw’s use of the word “God,” and 
claims that he had to choose the traditional signifier of divinity because 
“Christianity had been born again” after the onslaught of the French Revo-
lution and Nietzsche (7). When one Heretic in the audience objected that 
Chesterton “was making rather a caricature of Mr. Shaw,” the defender of 
orthodoxy ignored the point of order that in speaking of God, Shaw “had to 
speak in human terms to a human audience” (15–16). In his review for The 
Gownsman, Ogden also underscored the idea that Chesterton, while skillful 
at debate, did not “fully appreciate the position of Mr. Shaw” and misunder-
stood the proposition that people can advance the purpose of “God” or the 
“Life-Force” (196). Chesterton refused to consider Shaw blasphemous since 
he was “a very sincere religious man,” and “it was absurd to talk about blas-
phemy” in “a state profoundly divided about what is sacred” (8–9). Heresy, 
instead, was the discursive mode at work.
 Though he considers Shaw a “Pagan,” Chesterton tries to redirect his 
position by stating that “nobody as alert, alive and vigorous as Mr. Shaw 
could do without a God in the modern world” (7). What Shaw considers 
a divinity not yet mature, Chesterton redefines as a paganism blind to the 
imminent return of Christianity. He therefore turns to Shaw’s ideas of the 
Life-Force and questions “the good of a God which was gradually trying 
to exist” (11). Ignoring Nietzsche’s philosophy and other developments in 
modernist thought, Chesterton declares that “when men had talked about 
a God, they had meant a large number of ideas, but they certainly had not 
meant something produced by the people who were thinking about it” (10). 
Chesterton abhors change in the definition of theological dogma, which is a 
fundamental characteristic of many heresies. In making God an aim rather 
than a cause or principle, Shaw had presented a belief system that had no 
“good” because “a God which was gradually trying to exist” offered no fixed 
ideals “by which we regulated ourselves” (11). In stating that people must 
have preset ideals and “must be absolutely certain that that object was right 
and the thing to be attained,” Chesterton begs the question in assuming 
knowledge of value before it has been confirmed. His appeal fell on deaf 
ears, since the Heretics under law 4 rejected all traditional a priori modes of 
thought. They were more inclined to Shaw’s view, which avoids the logical 
Franke_final.indb   114 1/28/2008   4:40:06 PM
C HA P T E R  4 :  C A NON IC A L  T R A N SF OR M AT ION S
fallacy by not having fixed ideals and allowing for trial and error. To account 
for human foibles and provide an alternative to Shaw, Chesterton calls on the 
concept of free will from “the historic creed of Christianity,” which is based 
on “the ideas of Reason and Liberty” (13). Since God gave people the right 
to create and then be responsible for their actions, Chesterton believes this 
condition explains not only how the world changes, but also why God might 
want to make the world.
 In the question-and-answer session, Brimley Johnson argued that Ches-
terton’s view implied that Christianity evolved and that both he and Shaw 
were trying to adapt God to the modern world. Chesterton responded that 
he “regarded that as an answer to Mr. Shaw and not to him” (19). In general, 
the defender of orthodoxy avoided the implications of the questions and 
instead would steer his response toward the haven of dogma. For instance, 
an unnamed person asked his position on the recent excommunication of 
the modernist cleric George Tyrrell; to which Chesterton defended Pius X’s 
actions by invoking the beneficent past practice of Popes. Bradlaugh Bonner 
asked if Chesterton thought his grandfather, Charles Bradlaugh, “denied 
God”; to which Chesterton made a joke about the Greek root of “atheism.” 
Goldie Dickinson took issue with Chesterton’s comments on reason and 
liberty and wondered if he “believed that nothing else was essential” to 
Christianity (17). Chesterton simply referred to his original point. Even the 
Christian Commonwealth adduced this elusivity and chastised Chesterton 
for his “enigmatic” remarks and for not providing clear answers to meet 
“the difficulties of those who are looking for light in these matters” (Ches-
terton, “Future” 20–21). In his review, Ogden pointedly encapsulated the 
effects of the divergent speeches; he believed that Shaw’s position needs to be 
explained more and “urged,” while Chesterton’s “does not appear to call for 
further comment” (196).
The Reception of Heresy and Shaw’s Saint Joan
By 1913, Shaw himself “urged” his theory of heresy forward when he first 
began to ponder writing a play about Joan of Arc. In September of that 
year, Shaw wrote to Mrs. Patrick Campbell explaining that he would “do a 
Joan play some day, beginning with the sweeping of the cinders and orange 
peel after her martyrdom, and going on with Joan’s arrival in heaven.” He 
wanted to condemn the English for their part in her execution, but “save” 
English literature with his representation of the English soldier who gave her 
a makeshift crucifix as she was tied to the stake. For Shaw, the soldier is “the 
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only redeeming figure in the whole business.” Consequently, Shaw wanted 
to provide a British account of Joan that would correct the “puffing libel” of 
Shakespeare’s Henry VI. As part of his desire to emphasize the posthumous 
legacy of Joan’s power, Shaw joked that one of his “scenes will be Voltaire 
and Shakepear [sic] running down bye streets in heaven to avoid meeting 
Joan” (SJ 123). While this scene never made it into his drama, Saint Joan, 
his wish to conflate characters anachronistically points to the epilogue of the 
play in which the canonization of Joan simultaneously canonizes heresy. As 
an overt and didactic estrangement effect, the fantastic mise-en-scène dur-
ing the epilogue works to elicit responses that privilege progressive politics 
and produce a self-critical awareness of the possibility of modern cases of 
intolerance.
 In accord with Huxley’s presentation of the idea that the perceived nature 
of divinity shifts with the unfolding of history, Shaw also claims that religion 
must eventually respond to an evolving world since, as he says in the preface 
to Saint Joan, “the law of God is a law of change” (38). Whereas Huxley’s 
modernist view of a dystopic world has its values dictated for it by an elite 
few, Shaw’s chronicle play sees “the law of change” as underwritten by the 
gradual reception of forward-minded thinkers and doers. By characteriz-
ing Joan’s decided presumption as “miraculous” and “unbearable” (4), Shaw 
underscores two qualities of his definition of heresy that make it unaccept-
ably ahead of its time. Institutional forces may work to thwart the upstart 
heretic, but the energetic struggles of a martyr for a heretical cause eventually 
effect a mystical and “miraculous” change in the course of history.
 On several levels, Saint Joan is a play about reception. As Shaw states in 
the preface, compelling historical “theocrats” such as Joan, who claim to pro-
fess God’s will, “need never fear a lukewarm reception.” The marked stridency 
of their declarations mandates that they are received as either “messengers 
of God” or “blasphemous impostors” (44). Indeed, the figure of Joan of Arc 
further presents a unique composite illustrative of how values can change 
over time. Joan is a hero, then a heretic, then a saint. From 1429 when she 
captured Orleans, to 1431 when she was burnt at the stake, to 1920 when she 
was canonized, Joan demonstrates that an individual can participate in and 
affect historical processes and historiography. Nevertheless, Shaw stresses 
the idea that history usually drags behind the individual visionary, and the 
value of the avant-garde vision can only be recognized with hindsight and 
much delayed approbation.
 The plot of the drama excludes battle scenes and focuses on Joan’s rise to 
power and her subsequent trial and execution. Of more compelling critical 
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interest, the form of Saint Joan presents a metacommentary about reception, 
and the reviews of the play capture in one historical moment the way popular 
and critical success can be met with a reactionary backlash from an orthodox 
and established few. Joan’s canonization was “in the air” when Shaw’s play 
was produced first in New York in December of 1923 and then in London 
the following March. Saint Joan generally met with a captive audience for 
213 performances in the States and 244 in England; the success of the play 
suggests that the cultural context of the early twenties found something 
particularly fascinating about Joan. The appeals made to its audience are 
manifold: Joan is a medieval suffragette, a “super-flapper,” a forerunner of 
Protestantism, the perennial French national heroine, and, in a peculiar Sha-
vian twist, Brigid or the “poor old woman” who will save Ireland. In addition 
to her sainthood and rebellious, pious view of God, Joan also addresses the 
worldly concerns of feminism and nationalism. The women’s movements of 
the time of the staging certainly accentuated the reception of the play. Joan 
embodies a plurality of identities and offers a unique answer to the anxieties 
of the First World War and its aftermath. Here was a woman who believed in 
defending her nation in the name of God.
 However, Shaw, as usual, has his own overt didactic purposes to pro-
mote and deftly inserts them into the momentum launched by the popular 
and religious cult which had recently effected Joan’s full recuperation. In 
addition to his quirky endeavor to purify the English language and strike 
“Foul Mouthed Frank dead for swearing” (76), Shaw calls for a truce in 
the war within the Church over modernism and asks for the clergy not to 
see themselves in a struggle with science. Most importantly, Shaw usurps 
the occasion of Joan’s canonization to canonize heresy in principle and in 
deed. In fashioning Joan anew, he sees himself as Joan’s canon, the filter of 
all that has been said of her before and the “measuring rod” of what should 
be valued in and remembered about her. Often in the play, he puns on the 
word “canon” and points to the word’s etymological origins in the Greek for 
“rule,” reed,” or “measuring device.” The Church “canons, the doctors of law 
and theology,” will “mark” Joan’s character, while Joan herself “can make” her 
own “mark” (121; 140). Joan’s self-canonization also appears in her critique 
of official military strategy when explaining that only she knows “how to use 
your cannons” (114). As Joan’s trial comes to a close in Scene VI, the Inquisi-
tor delivers a diatribe against the contagion of heresy and orders his fellow 
judges to “Mark what I say.” Despite the Inquisitor’s slippery slope argument 
warning against the future effects of heresy that “at first seems innocent and 
even laudable” (128), the audience can still feel the influence of Shaw’s words 
Franke_final.indb   117 1/28/2008   4:40:07 PM
 PA RT  I I :  MODE R N I ST  L I T E R A RY  H E R E SI E S
from the preface in which he casts himself in the role of the new Inquisitor. 
There he says that we must privilege heresy “on the simple ground that all 
evolution in thought and conduct must at first appear as heresy and miscon-
duct” (38). To appear fair, Shaw repeatedly claims that his portrait of Joan is 
both the first to treat her realistically and the first not to vilify the Church. 
He congratulates himself on his historical accuracy and his careful perusal of 
the trial records.
 Certainly, T. Douglas Murray’s 1902 translation into English of Joan’s 
trial records and her subsequent canonization were both historical develop-
ments necessary for Shaw’s conception of The Maid. The trial records were 
first published by Quicherat in 1841, and for the next eighty years grew the 
cult of Joan, the movement for her canonization, and the literature surround-
ing her. In a section of the preface to his play, Shaw rhetorically summa-
rizes the representations of “The Maid in Literature” as either scurrilous or 
romanticized portraits. He will be the one to offer an objective account that 
also welcomes Joan’s mysticism. Discussing Shaw’s attraction to the figure of 
Joan, Louis Crompton finds that, through her, he could put forth a drama-
tized treatise on Creative Evolution and “combine the free critical spirit of a 
skeptical age with the coherent convictions and fervor of an age of ‘organic’ 
faith.” In the figure of Shaw’s Joan, readers acutely perceive this synthesis that 
indicts orthodoxy while embracing a knowledge beyond reason, because her 
dramatized reception illustrates a historical process that alternates between 
ages of doubt and faith (32).
 Both Shaw’s positioning of himself as respondent to all of the literature 
on Joan, and the multivalence of the expansive reviews of the play, make 
Saint Joan a valid and troublesome text to place vis-à-vis reception theory. 
In his seminal essay, “Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory” 
(1970), Hans Robert Jauss claims that literary history can synthesize Marxist 
and aesthetic approaches by discovering the “socially formative function” of 
literature (37), a function that “necessarily also includes the criticizing and 
even forgetting of tradition” (23). Still, Jauss is no nihilist; rather he wants 
to understand the mechanisms by which literature helps its readers escape 
or supersede tradition on an everyday level. Through both diachronic and 
synchronic analyses, readers will reconstruct their horizons of expectations 
in response to the aesthetic distance generated by a new work. Consequently, 
Jauss invests the reading public, as a Joan of their own, with “history-making 
energy” (8).
 The role of the readers in literary history draws on not only what has 
already been read but also what has been lived, and Jauss acknowledges the 
import of the idea that “the scholarly forming of theories [lies] in the pre-
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scholarly experience of life” (“Literary” 32). In this light and by remembering 
Shaw’s belief in an ethereal Life-Force driving the world, Saint Joan can be 
read as an anticipatory treatise on reception theory. Jauss’ work directs us 
toward a synchronic analysis of the reception of Shaw’s diachronic view of 
Joan. What results is a focus on a historical moment explosive with questions 
of power.
 The most obvious power-monger in relation to Saint Joan is Shaw, who 
claims that the play “contains all that need be known about her” (57). While 
he is here referring to the two-year part Joan played in history, Shaw also sees 
himself as supplanting four centuries of myth and literature erected around 
her. Shaw is now the expert in a literary subject that has been treated by such 
lesser writers as William Shakespeare, Voltaire, Friedrich von Schiller, Robert 
Southey, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Thomas De Quincey, Gioacchino Rossini, 
George Eliot, Margaret Oliphant, Mark Twain, Anatole France, and Arthur 
Conan Doyle. In summarizing the previous accounts of Joan, Shaw points 
out how the historical context informs their portrayal of her and illustrates 
“the too little considered truth that the fashion in which we think changes 
like the fashion of our clothes” (46). His diagnosis functions self-reflexively 
too. In staging a play, actors and directors will interpret the drama differently 
over time, and the effects of the performance as a whole will change. While a 
stage director in the 1920s, for instance, might have chosen to stage Joan in 
flapper dress, of more importance is the fact that the period in which Shaw 
wrote was rife with variant valorizations of heresy.
 Despite any reluctance we might have in acknowledging Shaw’s self- 
promotion of his own influence, his 1934 words are rather prophetic: “It is 
quite likely that sixty years hence, every great English and American actress 
will have a shot at ‘St. Joan,’ just as every great actor will have a shot at ‘Ham-
let’” (qtd. in Tyson 114). With the first performance in mind, though, Shaw 
had written the play for Sybil Thorndike, the British star of the stage. Thorn-
dike later recalled: “I simply lived in that part. I have never had anything in 
the theatre which has given me as much as Saint Joan did. Something more 
than just theatre. It confirmed my faith . . . all the things I had to say were 
things I wanted to say” (Gibbs, Interviews 310). The heresies within the play 
are what Thorndike could not quite explicitly state in another recollection of 
how the play appealed to her sense of Christianity: “One felt in Saint Joan 
that here was something Shaw wanted most passionately to say about the 
Christian who was a true Catholic and a true Protestant in one—two oppos-
ing qualities existent at the same time, which is the balance—the hard, but the 
true thing in Christianity.” In her wish for a Church tolerant of free thought, 
Thorndike refrains from using the term for the interdicted discourse, yet 
Franke_final.indb   119 1/28/2008   4:40:07 PM
0 PA RT  I I :  MODE R N I ST  L I T E R A RY  H E R E SI E S
still points to a synthetic heresy which would make her follow Joan “without 
question” if “she lived to-day” (Trewin 59–60). The list of actresses subse-
quently playing Shaw’s Joan runs from another prominent star of the 1920s, 
Winifred Lenihan, to Jean Seberg, Sarah Miles, Joan Plowright, Judi Dench, 
Jane Alexander, Lee Grant, and Lynn Redgrave.4
 Joan’s canonization can be read as a move on the part of the Catholic 
Church to assert its place in the world after the First World War and win 
hegemony by adapting to the times. There are several moments in the play 
when Shaw suggests this has been a long-held stratagem on the part of the 
Church. The Archbishop says “a miracle, my friend, is an event which creates 
faith” (79), and the Inquisitor anticipates changes in the future reception of 
Joan and believes that a “flaw in the procedure” of her trial “may be useful 
later on” (145). These statements are in accord with Shaw’s points that the 
Life-Force is subject to human error, and that, in the Church, “there is no 
wrong without a remedy” (32). He characterizes the Vatican as highly cog-
nizant of the processes of maintaining hegemony. The end, which is Church 
authority, justifies the means. Though Joan’s canonization resolves the ques-
tion of her relationship to the Church, Shaw’s play engenders a new defini-
tion of saintliness, one far from orthodox tenets.
 By defining a miracle as “an event which creates faith,” Shaw strips the 
act of its supernatural and inexplicable qualities. Though Monseigneur de 
la Trémouille finds such a definition “a bit fishy,” the Archbishop stresses 
the idea that an “event which creates faith does not deceive,” and that these 
miracles “are not frauds because they are often . . . very simple and innocent 
contrivances by which the priest fortifies the faith of his flock” (79–80). More 
importantly, faith is now built upon reception, not immanence, and the First 
World War did much to instill faith in soldiers and evoke prayers to Joan. In 
his 1919 biography of Joan, Denis Lynch, a Jesuit, reports that, in the imme-
diate aftermath of the war, people would praise and march in procession for 
Joan “as if victory even now were due to her” (344). Lynch also suggests a 
significant power lies in prayer and commends her direct canonization since 
“Joan has been much invoked during . . . these dark and fateful days” and 
“[e]xplain it how we may, the tide of invasion rolled no further than that 
battle line traced by Joan on the Meuse, Marne, and Oise” (344–45). Two 
years earlier, Cecil B. DeMille’s first historical epic, Joan the Woman (1917), 
had framed her biography within a story about heroism and martyrdom in 
the ongoing trench warfare. The preamble to the film declares: “Joan of Arc is 
not dead. She can never die—and in the war-torn land she loved so well, her 
Spirit fights today.” Joan then appears as a vision to the English soldier hold-
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ing Joan’s sword he had exhumed and deliberating whether to volunteer for 
a suicidal mission, and she tells him that the “time has come for thee to expi-
ate thy sin against me.” The English soldier assumes the debt of his nation, 
and the film further promotes the penitent air surrounding the movement 
for Joan’s canonization in having her condemners pray at the end, “God 
forgive us—we have burned a Saint” (Joan). In this context, we can venture 
an answer for Joan’s case to the following general question used, as Kenneth 
Woodward notes, in the formal procedure for making saints: “What particu-
lar message or example would canonization of the candidate bring to the 
church?” (78). While this question of timeliness incorporated into the Code 
of Canon Law in 1917 might elicit an acknowledgment of Joan’s popularity 
and the importance of prayer, canonizing Joan would also send a message 
that the Church was tolerant and able to admit mistakes.
 With these issues in mind, the Catholic Church could fortify its posi-
tion on the contemporary modernist movement within its own clergy. The 
Church was not unilaterally intolerant, and the acceptance of Joan’s miracles 
offered an appealing rebuke to the modernists’ desire to embrace science. 
Pope Pius X’s denunciation of the modernist trend to disbelieve in miracles 
became, in fact, a move acutely crucial to his own subsequent canoniza-
tion. Shaw’s play offers an alternative solution to the battle between religious 
modernism and the Church. He calls for a humble Church that allows free 
thought; otherwise, he claims it is “guilty of the heresy that theology and 
science are two different and opposite impulses.” On the contrary, he feels 
“[w]e must accept the tension” (36), and he even posits that a synthesis of 
science and religion is possible through a faith which some people create 
through miracles and others through “commonsense and simple fact” (30). 
While Shaw has a different view of the relationship between the Church and 
evolution, the canonization of Joan suggests that the Church designed its 
own strategy to create the impression that it could evolve too. Though Shaw 
would state that the desire for progress and the willful drive of a heretic 
cause this change in policy, Joan’s heresy and the modernist one can be read 
together to inform an understanding of Church politics. In a three-week 
period from 1903 to 1904, Pius X took the first steps both to declare modern-
ism a heresy and Joan a saint. He placed Alfred Loisy’s books on the Index of 
Forbidden Books, and declared Joan Venerable. From 1907 to 1908, further 
steps were taken: he officially condemned “modernism” to be a heresy, and 
beatified Joan. Eventually, in 1920, Pope Benedict XV canonized her. Wit-
nessing the Church turn to the medieval while ferreting out the modernist, a 
careful observer might begin to question the Church’s relation to modernist 
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heresies and the veiled politics behind canonization.
 Since 1234, the papacy alone has assumed the right to canonize, though 
the extant thousands of saints canonized under more informal procedures 
have been retained. In 1642, Pope Urban VIII drew on the work of the 1588 
Congregation of Rites and formalized the threefold process by which a per-
son becomes a saint, and his stipulations generally continue to underwrite 
the methodology for making saints today. Currently, the Congregation for 
the Causes of Saints is the Church office that most often invokes the doctrine 
of papal infallibility. Canonization declares with certainty that the person 
is in communion with God, and the pope declares this ex cathedra. Under 
current Church ideology, burning a heretic is a mistake; canonizing a saint 
never can be. Usually after a local following popularizes the holy qualities of a 
person, the pope confirms this movement and allows for the “introduction of 
the cause” for sainthood, thereby terming the person “Venerable.” In order to 
be beatified or declared “Blessed,” the Venerable person under examination 
must be proven to have established a reputation for sanctity, to have pos-
sessed a heroic nature to his or her virtues, and to have worked four miracles. 
After the ceremonial mass of beatification, canonization comes if two further 
miracles happen as a result of prayers to the Blessed to intercede on behalf of 
the indirect object of the prayers. Generally, the miracles involve the healing 
of the sick, and in Joan’s case that is exactly what they were. For her beatifica-
tion, Pius X authenticated three miraculous cures of diseases afflicting three 
separate French nuns. They had beseeched Joan, and the miracles were attrib-
uted to her. The pope can dispense with the fourth miracle if the person had 
founded a religious order, and Joan was allowed this dispensation because 
she had “saved” France. The miracles enabling her canonization also involved 
the healing of French women.
 In Saint Joan, Shaw instead emphasizes the “miraculous” nature of Joan’s 
engagement in secular affairs. As a result, her miracles become more of a 
series of actions that changed history, and they assume a less supernatural 
air since they all can be attributed to coincidence or her presumptuous will. 
The possibility of the supernatural persists, though, not only in the form of 
a mystical will to power, but, through reception, in that creating faith out of 
the perception of miracles confirms above all the belief in the supernatural. 
When Robert de Baudricourt concedes to Joan’s will and the hens immedi-
ately begin to lay eggs, it is seen as a miracle on her part (71); when Joan dis-
cerns a disguised Charles VII and “knows the blood royal,” the play inscribes 
this as a miracle and Charles knows he will have his “saint” too; Charles 
sees another miracle of hers when Foul Mouthed Frank is struck “dead for 
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swearing” (76); and Joan arrives and the wind changes just as Jean Dunois, 
the military commander, needed this “miracle” to enable the crossing of the 
Loire and the eventual “miraculous” victory at Orleans (78). In terms of the 
power Shaw grants the evolutionary heretic, perhaps the most important 
comment on the nature of miracles is Bertrand de Poulengey’s belief that 
“the girl herself is a bit of a miracle” (66). The remarkable feats of a teenage 
working-class woman confronting the medieval patriarchal church and state 
do indeed make her extraordinary, a “miracle” if you like.
 They also make her a heretic. In noting the two prevalent opinions of her, 
that she was “miraculous” and “unbearable” (4), Shaw combines these two 
views in his definition of a heretic as someone whose “headstrong presump-
tion” challenges, exceeds, and must suffer the suppression of the authorities 
of the time (118). Shaw, in fact, states that Joan was burnt for her “unwom-
anly and insufferable presumption” (3–4), and his repeated use of the word 
“presumption” to describe her heresy points to his idea of forward thinking. 
Etymologically, “presumption” means “something taken ahead of its time,” 
and its Indo-European root *em- (“to take”) inflects other such words as 
“prompt,” “example,” and “redeem.” For Shaw, then, Joan’s heresy was to dare 
to take liberties before they are granted by authorities, but in the process 
she anticipated future values. As Joan states, her presumptuous voices are 
“always right” (118).
 Throughout the play, Shaw’s address to the Heretics underwrites his por-
trayal of Joan’s supernatural and progressive qualities. While the play jumps 
on the bandwagon that had led to Joan’s canonization, this appropriation of 
her cause lets him be the first legitimately to write a literary work entitled 
Saint Joan, and then collapse the boundary between saintliness and hereti-
cal beliefs. Though Shaw again declares Joan a heretic, heresy has a positive 
valence for him. He plays with his definition of heresy as he fiddles with the 
doctrine of miracles. Joan’s desire for harmony with God and social progress 
is what Shaw calls in the preface “an appetite for evolution, and therefore a 
superpersonal need” (14). He finds Joan exceptional for the “intensity of her 
vital energy” (21), and the clerical and lay authorities in his dramatization 
find her “so positive” and “very hard to resist” (61–62). Here is Shaw’s belief 
in Creative Evolution and the will to power, which he mentions and capital-
izes in the play. Shaw even has Pierre Cauchon, bishop of Beauvais, say, “I 
know well that there is a Will to Power in the world” (106).
 In his address to the Heretics, Shaw had implied that God’s will works 
through the bodies of inspired people, and Joan indeed states that “it is the 
will of God that you are to do what He has put into my mind” (62). In the 
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preface to the play, Shaw reminds us of his belief that “there are forces at work 
which use individuals . . . in the pursuit of knowledge and of social read-
justments” (13). God’s will becomes inseparable from human will, except 
through reception. If a character such as de Baudricourt believes that the 
voices she hears come from her “imagination,” another may concur with 
Joan that that “is how the messages of God come to us” (68). In the preface, 
Shaw defends people who hear voices and see visions because they have an 
imagination “so vivid that when they have an idea it comes to them as an 
audible voice, sometimes uttered by a visual figure.” He adds that a “visionary 
method” of making a scientific discovery “would not be a whit more miracu-
lous than the normal method.” Results, reception, and in Shaw’s words, the 
“test of sanity” and the “reasonableness of the discovery” matter more than 
the method (11–12). The overwhelming successes of Joan enable Shaw to 
dismiss the question of the objective veracity of her voices.
 Though he does deride the voices as “illusory” since they often failed her, 
notably during her incarceration, he finds that she had a “reasonable” expec-
tation of rescue according to the logic of her own imagination (17).5 More 
importantly, he militates against suppositions that Joan was insane or sui-
cidal, and he defends her mindset by comparing it to modern scientific and 
psychological practices that are equally incredible or suspect. As he states, 
“modern science has convinced us that nothing that is obvious is true, and 
that everything that is magical, improbable, extraordinary, gigantic, micro-
scopic, heartless, or outrageous is scientific” (47). Shaw’s point that historical 
context influences reception, and that this changes, becomes clearer for his 
scientific analogy in comparing Joan’s history to the debt modern chemistry 
owes alchemy. Only in Joan’s case, the Church tried to determine the mod-
ernist context by canonizing her and changing her reception itself.
 As a form of the will to power, heresy brings newness into the world 
by modifying extant traditions, and Shaw calls on the Church to welcome 
freethinking. He even makes a disingenuous appeal that if freethinking were 
encouraged he might convert. Since Shaw claims that the “Churches must 
learn humility as well as teach it” (36), he finds nothing objectionable when 
Joan “acts as if she herself were the Church” (103). Through the inspiration 
of her voices, Joan believes that she has special access to God’s will, and Shaw 
claims that “her notion of a Catholic Church was one in which the Pope was 
Pope Joan” (30). In the phraseology of his speech to the Heretics, Joan is 
the perfect example of a heretic, that is, someone who has devised a “home-
made religion.” Additionally, she illustrates his point that God works through 
specific people, and that these “chosen people” perform God’s will. In refus-
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ing to deny her voices and accept the clergy as the sole arbiter of divine will, 
Joan becomes in Shaw’s eyes “one of the first Protestant martyrs” (3). After 
noting the “heresies” of John Wycliffe and Jan Huss, Cauchon compares 
Joan’s “arch heresy” of “Protestantism” to their way of thought, which “sets up 
the private judgment of the simple erring mortal against the considered wis-
dom and experience of the Church.” Indeed, many subsequent “Protestant” 
heresies founded their thought on a leader perceived as a “chosen one” or on 
the belief that the faithful can, in the Inquisitor’s description of the origins of 
heresy, promote “their own judgment against the Church,” and take “it upon 
themselves to be the interpreters of God’s will” (128–30).
 For these types of heresy, assuming the power of interpretation deter-
mines how God will be received, and this presumption has further repercus-
sions at the level of audience because it decides whether to sanctify or scan-
dalize the original interpretation. The interpretation of her voices, as with 
her miracles, is central in determining whether to consider Joan a heretic 
or a saint. The Inquisitor realizes the difficulties in persecuting heretics who 
“believe honestly and sincerely that their diabolical inspiration is divine” 
(129), but he will not relinquish the power of interpretation and the authority 
of the Church to cut off “an obstinate heretic as a dead branch from the tree 
of life” (101). When Joan later implies that the Church could be “contrary to 
God,” she commits “[f]lat heresy” and has said “enough to burn ten heretics” 
(135). However, in then handing Joan over to the English army, the Church 
enables itself to have a future “remedy” for her execution since it then could 
deny responsibility and blame these secular authorities for her punishment.
 By highlighting the putative possibility that the Church deliberately 
allowed for subsequent reevaluation of Joan’s heresies, Shaw foregrounds the 
“wilfulness” of heresy to affect future generations. In the logic of the play, the 
eventual acceptance of forms of nationalism, Protestantism, and feminism 
depends in part on Joan’s various subversions of orthodoxy, an acceptance 
which in turn causes a reconsideration of her values and social position. As 
a result, Shaw invests heresy with enormous power, and though Joan’s voices 
may only be “echoes” of her own “wilfulness,” they clearly have more lasting 
effect than the “voice of the Church Militant.” When she glories in the “right-
ness” of her course of action, Joan becomes perceived as tragically proud and 
one who will not recant her belief that “everyone else is wrong.” However, she 
dismisses the question of her pride, and reminds her prosecutors that her 
military strategy proved “true” and simple “commonsense”; moreover, she 
plays down the miraculous nature of her voices in stating: “even if they are 
only echoes of my own commonsense, are they not always right” (116–18). 
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Once again the received effect of an action is worth more than its intrinsic 
value.
 By working within tradition and allowing a role for the Church in the 
modern world, Shaw’s play evinced enough conservatism to please his main-
stream audience. Perhaps the established academy sought to validate this 
turn away from the more controversial and subversive subjects of his earlier 
plays. Shaw had his own form of canonization when he received the Nobel 
Prize in 1925 in response to Saint Joan. The play also became popular with 
audiences and met critical acclaim on both sides of the Atlantic, particularly 
in New York. An unsigned review in the Observer found the play “brilliant” 
for its weaving of tragedy and burlesque and the “strangest possible com-
pound of the modern and the medieval” (SJ 126–27). In The New Statesman, 
Desmond MacCarthy underscored the experience of religious emotion as a 
desideratum for an understanding of the play, yet still found that “[o]nly a 
languid mind could fail to find in it intellectual excitement, only a very care-
fully protected sensibility could escape being touched and disturbed” (Wein-
traub 31). Luigi Pirandello attended the New York premiere and became 
poignantly moved. He praised the range of “poetic emotion” displayed by 
Shaw, and hilariously compares the American audience with a hypothetical 
Italian one. Italian audiences would applaud the moments when Shaw would 
have them crying (Evans 279–84). In her review entitled “A Super-Flapper,” 
Jeanne Foster critiqued the same production, yet only found that Joan does 
not wear men’s clothing but “a rather modest Coney Island bathing suit.” The 
rest of her review draws an extended, unfavorable comparison of Shaw’s play 
to Chesterton’s orthodox treatment of St. Francis (Weintraub 29–30).
 In London, the reviews were even more mixed. Many of the regular 
drama critics found the play entertaining and intellectually stimulating; often 
the phrase “the greatest of Shaw’s plays” was used. Criticisms raised usually 
objected to the playfulness of dialogue, the anachronisms, and the didacti-
cism and staging of the epilogue. T. S. Eliot led the backlash. He objected 
to the reform-minded nature of Joan and calls Shaw’s portrayal the “great-
est sacrilege of all Joans” (SJ 145). In 1925 a former friend of Shaw’s, J. M. 
Robertson, the former M.P. and speaker to the Heretics, objected to the 
playwright’s reverent attitude toward Joan and wrote a whole book critiquing 
the lack of realism and historical veracity in the play. Robertson’s Mr. Shaw 
and “The Maid” calls for those curious about “truth” to disregard “Mr. Shaw’s 
assurance that Saint Joan tells him all he needs to know” about her and to 
study history on their own “in the spirit of science” (114–15). In a second 
review, Eliot championed Robertson’s book and claimed the play deludes the 
Franke_final.indb   126 1/28/2008   4:40:08 PM
C HA P T E R  4 :  C A NON IC A L  T R A N SF OR M AT ION S
minds of religious people. Though he would distance himself from Robert-
son’s pure rationalism, Eliot found the latter’s book “of equal value to people 
who approach the problem from an orthodox Christian standpoint.” Eliot 
feared that “the numberless crowd of sentimentally religious people who 
are incapable of following any argument to a conclusion” will be duped into 
believing in “the potent ju-ju of the Life Force,” Shaw’s Joan (SJ 146). On the 
other hand, Louis Crompton more recently argued that Shaw’s view of Joan 
as an agent in Creative Evolution “was calculated to provoke dissent from 
rationalists and orthodox Christians” (37). An unsigned review of the world 
premier in New York anticipates such a reaction due to Shaw’s evident criti-
cism of the Church. No doubt the “indignation” that the reviewer suggests 
will be felt “in some circles” (Evans 278) arises mostly from the epilogue 
when all the characters in the drama, including her condemners, come back 
on stage together to praise and then forsake Joan once more.
 In terms of both form and content, the epilogue estranges its audiences 
by collapsing historical progression and implying that Joan would still be 
burnt in modern times. Even reviews that generally praise the play often 
took exception to the epilogue. Because “that final scene says the same thing 
several times,” Alexander Woolcott believed that “Shaw will cut” the epilogue 
“when he sees the play” himself (Evans 276). Yet Woolcott still stressed the 
importance of an implicated audience that would condemn her now. Though 
G. H. Mair found that Saint Joan “remains a very great play,” he believed that 
the epilogue is better read, and he objects to the deliberate estrangement 
and compromise of the unities of time and place (SJ 135–36). James Agate, 
writing for The Sunday Times, dismissed the epilogue as “wholly unneces-
sary” since it “is implicit in all that has gone before” (Evans 289). In his 
review for The Times, A. B. Walkley declared the epilogue “an artistic failure” 
and “an incongruity” “to the eye,” and he finds it “a nuisance that [Shaw] is 
so obsessed with the present period as to drag it into every period” (Evans 
286). These critiques offer a pointed illustration of the “aesthetic distance” 
and “horizon change” that Jauss finds can be measured by the reviews of a 
new work that “confronts the expectations of its first readers” (“Literary” 
14–15).
 When Shaw champions heresy and forward thinking, he does this, in 
Jauss’ words, by predisposing “readers to a very definite type of reception 
by textual strategies” (“Literary” 12). In this way, Shaw practices what he 
preaches and tries to shift the horizon of values adventitiously. In the preface, 
he emphasizes above all the importance of historical perspective, and the fact 
that he did not want to stultify himself “by implying that Joan’s history in the 
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world ended unhappily with her execution, instead of beginning there.” Con-
sequently, his positivist nature finds that “the epilogue must stand” because 
it “was necessary by hook or crook to shew the canonized Joan as well as 
the incinerated one” (53). Pirandello did find the epilogue “noble poetry” 
which uses “irony and satire” to create a “second climax” after Joan’s burn-
ing and adds to this “first crisis of exquisite anguish another not less potent 
and overwhelming” (Evans 283). Similarly, in a review for The New Republic, 
Edmund Wilson defended the epilogue by arguing that it is necessary to 
understand that the play concerns “human history,” not “individual tragedy,” 
and shows Shaw’s growing, “longer view of human affairs.” In finding that 
the play condemns modern intolerance which would forsake Joan again, 
Wilson suggested that Saint Joan reflects a turn in Shaw’s plays away from 
those “before the war” in which “there were no insoluble problems” and 
they “almost invariably ended cheerfully enough with a precise indication of 
the solution” (Weintraub 39–42). In miniature, Wilson here diagnosed the 
change from an Edwardian positivist, synthetic agenda toward a modernism 
intolerant of divergent heresies.
 As a classic case of 1920s defamiliarization or estrangement effects, the 
formal properties of the epilogue work to expose the recurrent susceptibility 
of societies to intolerance. In the preface, Shaw states that “as far as tolera-
tion is concerned the trial and execution in Rouen in 1431 might have been 
an event of today” and that “we may charge our consciences accordingly” 
(29). In the epilogue, Shaw implicates his audience by placing a representa-
tive of modern times alongside Joan and her executioners. The mixing of 
historical periods functions as the interwoven narratives in D. W. Griffith’s 
Intolerance (1916) to show not only, as Shaw argues, “that society is founded 
on intolerance,” but also its ugly continuing legacy (40). The epilogue, then, 
exemplifies Viktor Shklovsky’s thesis in “Art as Technique” (1917) that the 
function of art is to invigorate quotidian existence by making “the familiar 
seem strange” (265). As he argues, the “technique of art is to make objects 
‘unfamiliar,’ to make forms difficult, and to increase the difficulty and length 
of perception because the process of perception is an aesthetic end in itself 
and must be prolonged” (264). When Shaw addresses critics in the preface 
to Saint Joan, he emphasizes the issue of relative value tied to this perspec-
tive in ridiculing the critics and “fashionable” people who believe that “the 
sooner it is over, the better,” and defends the length of his play by pointing to 
the “paying playgoer, from whose point of view the longer the play, the more 
entertainment he gets for his money” (54). Shaw believes that he is attuned 
to the popular spirit of the times, and the epilogue does reflect a modernist 
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experimentation with forms.
 Though the ingenuity of the epilogue by some standards may not be 
considered radical, it nevertheless acutely estranged its orthodox audience. 
Raymond Williams and Terry Eagleton seem to have overlooked both this 
documented effect of the play and the structure of the epilogue when they 
each critique Shaw for not departing far enough from traditional forms. Wil-
liams claims that Shaw’s “whole drama is certainly a case of ‘new wine in old 
bottles,’” since it only adds “the discussion” and accepts “almost all the devices 
of the old romantic drama” (272). Affirming Williams’ critique, Eagleton 
further suggests that Shaw’s traditional, “naturalistic” forms undermine the 
radicalness of the content. He contrasts the formal properties of Shaw’s plays 
with Bertolt Brecht’s use of estrangement effects, and believes that the Irish 
playwright’s work exemplifies the fact that the “discourse of the play may 
be urging change, criticism, rebellion; but the dramatic forms . . . inevitably 
force upon us a sense of the unalterable solidity of the social world” (187). 
While these critiques do have merit for the bulk of Shaw’s plays, Saint Joan 
represents a case in which the “old bottle” itself has been cast off with her 
canonization. As the first literary text to dramatize her life in the wake of 
sainthood, Shaw’s play portrays its subject matter in the light and form of a 
mystical, evolving Life-Force.
 The unusual aesthetic form of the epilogue is a series of dei ex machina 
in which all the dead and dreaming characters and even a modern priest 
sequentially and fantastically appear on stage. By conflating history for-
mally, the epilogue makes traditional meanings of heresy “seem strange.” 
The ideological construction of the epilogue collates irreconcilable historical 
moments and views of history, so that to condemn heresy is to condemn 
not only progress, but also something misunderstood. Drawing off the cli-
ché that one always condemns what is misunderstood, Saint Joan therefore 
implies that Joan’s radical and mysterious desire for progress always will suf-
fer persecution. Joan’s canonization suggests progress and optimism for the 
future, and her crowned king, Charles, believes that “Joan would not have 
fussed about it if it came all right in the end” (151). However, Shaw urges 
further progress and tries to shock his audience into the recognition that the 
fight for “progress” is an ongoing process, and he works against the Church’s 
attempt to end the debate over the issues at hand by canonizing Joan. Instead, 
he puts forth, in the vein of his address at Cambridge, the idea that heretics 
and heretical literature of the future consistently modify those of previous 
generations in an incremental, Fabian fashion. When the modern priest 
announces that Joan has finally been canonized, Shaw steals his thunder and 
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offers a new vision of heresy. Cauchon, the cleric in charge of her trial, states 
that “mortal eyes cannot distinguish the saint from the heretic” (163). In an 
argument akin to the conceit in Donne’s “The Canonization” that lovers are 
saints, Shaw formulates his own paradox: heretics are saints. By collapsing 
the opposition between heresy and saintliness, Shaw effects a tabula rasa on 
a stage now clear to redefine values. Avant-garde thinking, women’s rights, 
tolerance, and a medieval sense of public responsibility would certainly be 
valued in Shaw’s “Religion of the Future.”
The Recuperation of Bruno and 
the Canonization of “Clay”
In addition to the canonization of Joan of Arc, the period 1883–1924 wit-
nessed the diverse recuperation of another burnt heretic, the Italian philoso-
pher Giordano Bruno. A wide variety of thinkers had discovered inspiration 
in his metaphysics and martyrdom. In the preface to Saint Joan, Shaw nods 
to this cultural movement and compares the persecution of Bruno with that 
of Joan:
When the Church Militant behaves as if it were already the Church Triumphant, 
it makes these appalling blunders about Joan and Bruno and Galileo and the 
rest which make it so difficult for a Freethinker to join it; and a Church which 
has no place for Freethinkers: nay, which does not inculcate and encourage 
freethinking with a complete belief that thought, when really free, must by its 
own law take the path that leads to the Church’s bosom, not only has no future 
in modern culture, but obviously has no faith in the valid science of its own 
tenets, and is guilty of the heresy that theology and science are two different 
and opposite impulses, rivals for human allegiance. (36)
Of these three victims of orthodoxy, Bruno most clearly emblematizes the 
variety of free thought which seeks to synthesize science and theology. Of 
late, the Catholic Church has continued the tolerant, evolving gesture of 
Vatican II and tried to make ecumenical appeals and engage modern devel-
opments in science. The Church has also sought forgiveness for the past 
practices of the Inquisition. As part of this conciliation, the Vatican admitted 
in 1992 that Galileo had been right in defending a Copernican view of the 
universe. Bruno from all accounts will not receive such a formal rehabilita-
tion. However, during the late Victorian and modernist periods, Swinburne, 
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Pater, Shaw, Joyce, and Annie Besant, among others, found Bruno a heroic 
figure, championed his philosophy, and used it as a bulwark in their litera-
ture.6 For an illustration of this literary recuperation, the end of this chapter 
analyzes how Bruno’s pantheistic heresy underwrites the canonical transfor-
mations in and synthetic form of the short story “Clay” in Joyce’s Dubliners 
(1914).
 Bruno lived during the late Italian Renaissance and the Inquisition, and 
the branding of Bruno as a heretic and his subsequent burning at the stake 
can be seen as the inevitable fate of one who demonstrated a flowering of 
thought in an atmosphere that viciously suppressed independent minds. 
Born in the shadow of Mount Vesuvius near the town of Nola, Bruno entered 
the Dominican order at age fifteen. For ten years, he practiced the faith 
and developed his views on transubstantiation and other doctrines within 
the framework of orthodoxy, before cries of impiety forced him into exile. 
He became an itinerant scholar who graced the courts of France, England, 
and various German cities throughout the 1580s. He apparently endeared 
himself to Sir Philip Sidney, and his idea of the divine unity of all things 
may have inspired Hamlet’s riddle on the circulation of essential matter: “A 
man may fish with the worm that hath eat of a king, and eat of the fish that 
hath fed of that worm” (IV.iii.27–28). Prior to his apprehension by The Holy 
Office in 1592, Bruno wrote over sixty books, of which the most influential 
are The Expulsion of the Triumphant Beast (1584) and Cause, Principle and 
Unity (1584). In the latter, Bruno expounds on his theories of the infinite 
universe, the coincidence of contraries, and the anima del mondo (It. “soul 
of the world”). Part and parcel of divinity, the “soul of the world” is imma-
nent in all things. In the dialogic form of Cause, Principle and Unity, Bruno 
professes a belief that the “universe is . . . infinite and indeterminable” (135). 
Such a belief is a heresy in the eyes of the Church, for the idea of an infinite 
universe precludes the possibility of God’s exteriority to his Creation. Rather 
than concluding that there then is an absence of God, Bruno finds an omni-
present immanence of divinity through his heretical, pantheistic belief in 
“the obscure soul of the world,” as Joyce phrases it in Ulysses (23).
 In Cause, Principle and Unity, Bruno uses Aristotelian terms to explicate 
his paradigmatic coincidence of contraries, and finds that the ubiquitous 
“soul of the world” is the substance present in both cause and principle 
and their respective associations of form and matter. Thus, Bruno’s theory 
becomes a paradox that attempts to show the ultimate unity of apparent 
oppositions. His heresy was synthesis, and therefore his appeal to protomod-
ernists and modernists was both as an avatar of their thought and as a martyr 
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for their cause. The logical conclusion of his synthetic theory effected both 
Bruno’s rejection of the fundamental Church doctrine of the Trinity and his 
burning as a heretic. Though he never openly denounced the doctrine of 
the Trinity, Bruno could not uphold the doctrinaire distinction of “persons” 
in the Trinity. During his interrogation, Bruno told the Holy Office that he 
believed there is “a God distinguished into the Father, the Word and Love, 
which is Divine Spirit, and that all three of these are one God in essence” 
(Imerti 55).
 The year 2000 marked both the 400th anniversary of Bruno’s martyrdom 
and a Jubilee Year for the Catholic Church. If the Vatican were to rehabilitate 
Bruno, it would have happened during the millennium. Pope John Paul II 
planned a “Day of Pardon” in which he asked God’s forgiveness for the past 
sins of the Church. On February 17, the day of Bruno’s execution, people held 
a celebration in the piazza where Bruno had been burnt, and the Pontifical 
Theological Faculty of Southern Italy held a conference on Bruno in order to 
recognize him formally. The hope for rehabilitation and a specific reference 
to Bruno in the Pope’s penitent liturgy did not last long. The Catholic Church 
could apologize for the Inquisition, but it continued to maintain that Bruno’s 
“intellectual choices” (read heresy) remained incompatible with orthodoxy.7 
The reception of Bruno by orthodoxy has not changed because now as in the 
past his thought threatens to subsume orthodoxy with synthesis.
 With the proliferation of discourses surrounding heresy in the late nine-
teenth century, however, Bruno became a heroic figure during the wave of 
anticlericalism which swept the Risorgimento. His Latin and Italian works 
had been collected in separate volumes in the 1830s. Domenico Berti’s 1867 
biography further enabled scholars to revisit his life and martyrdom, and 
brief expositions of Bruno’s life and thought populated journals on both 
sides of the Atlantic in the 1870s. Depending on the inclination of the author, 
Bruno became an exemplar of free thought, heroic virtue, religious belief, or 
scientific insight. In 1885, the English National Committee was established 
in order to cooperate with the international movement to rehabilitate Bruno 
and commemorate him in statue. Swinburne became a member of this orga-
nization, and on June 9, 1889, an imposing statue was unveiled in Rome at 
the site of Bruno’s burning (see figure 5).
 Swinburne’s poem, “The Monument of Giordano Bruno” (1889), responds 
to this occasion in the Campo de’ Fiori. The poem consists of two English 
sonnets which laud the Italian heretic who possessed the “light / [w]hereby 
the soul keeps ever truth in sight.” Though “the fate required / [a] sacrifice to 
hate and hell,” the poetic voice implies that martyrdom eventually triumphs 
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and “[a]cclaims the grave bright face that smiled of yore / [e]ven on the fire 
that caught it round.” In effect, the poem affirms Bruno’s philosophy in that 
this “light” comes “[n]ot from without us, only from within,” and makes 
him, as is every element of the universe, “godlike.” Bruno can smile at his 
pyre because the light which “[b]urns in the soul” and “quickens thought” is 
consubstantial with the fire (6: 176–77).
 Swinburne wrote several other poems in which he extols Bruno, but per-
haps the closest expression of Bruno’s thought in Swinburne’s verse occurs in 
“Hertha,” the poem he considered his most polished craftwork. Swinburne 
wrote “Hertha” in the fall of 1869 in full sympathy with both the anticleri-
calism reacting to Vatican I (1869–70) and the patriotism which was soon 
to unify Italy as a nation. He had fallen under the sway of the exiled Italian 
patriot Giuseppe Mazzini, who believed that humanity had the best access 
to God. These influences find their most direct expression in Swinburne’s 
Figure 5. The monument of Giordano Bruno, 
Rome.
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“Hymn of Man” (1871), but they are also present in “Hertha.” As the poem 
declares, the thinking, giving “soul” which is in “man” provides the “[g]reen 
leaves of thy labor, white flowers of thy thought, and red fruit of thy death” 
(a reference to the Italian flag), and “[e]ven love, the beloved Republic, that 
feeds upon freedom and lives.” Of more importance, however, the poem 
rhapsodizes a metaphysics of an evolving world-soul, represented by Hertha, 
whom Swinburne described as “the vital principle of matter” (Lafourcade 
176). She unifies contradictions and finds that “truth only is living, / [t]ruth 
only is whole.” For the poem, Swinburne lets Hertha, the Germanic goddess 
of the earth, speak about the origins of the world and the nature of beings. 
Hertha declares her divine primacy: “before God was, I am.” In this subver-
sion of God’s words to Moses, Swinburne implies, as he often did, that the 
“twilight” of the Christian god has passed, and that through the world-soul a 
spirituality centered on the earth and beings can be renewed. Hertha explains 
that “God changes, and man, and the form of them bodily; I am the soul.” 
The “soul of the world” is an evolving, self-contained “Being,” in which the 
following contraries coincide and unite: “soul” and “body”; “the seeker” and 
“the sought”; “I” and “thou”; “deed” and “doer”; “seed” and “sower”; “reigns” 
and “ruins”; and “life” and “death.” Throughout Swinburne uses rhetorical 
questions, like Blake and the author of Job, to tell humanity not to look for 
God other than in itself. Hertha bids us “but be” and ends on the note that 
“man” is “equal and one” with her (2: 137–45). In this egalitarian relation-
ship, no homage is needed.
 Joyce’s interest in the Italian philosopher can be traced to as early as 1901, 
when Joyce alludes to him in “The Day of the Rabblement.” In this attack 
on parochialism in the Irish Literary Theatre, Joyce refers to Bruno of Nola 
as “the Nolan” and commends him for his steadfast love of the true and the 
good (69). Later, in his review of J. Lewis McIntyre’s Giordano Bruno (1903), 
Joyce declared: “More than Bacon or Descartes must he [Bruno] be consid-
ered the father of what is called modern philosophy. His system by turns 
rationalistic and mystic, theistic and pantheistic is everywhere impressed 
with his noble mind and critical intellect, and is full of that ardent sympathy 
with nature as it is” (“Bruno” 133). For the entry on Bruno, the Eleventh Edi-
tion of the Encyclopedia Britannica captures the spirit of synthesis and the 
heretic in the air: “To Bruno, as to all great thinkers, philosophy is the search 
for unity. Amid all the varying and contradictory phenomena of the universe 
there is something which gives coherence and intelligibility to them. Nor 
can this unity be something apart from things; it must contain in itself the 
universe, which develops from it; it must be at once all and one” (Adamson 
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and Mitchell 687a). Finding divine unity in every “cause” and “principle” of 
the universe is indeed the grandest of syntheses.
 As a result of Joyce’s attraction to the Italian philosopher, Bruno occupies 
a bedrock position in criticism on the Irish author. The presence of his per-
sonage and philosophy in Finnegans Wake has been well documented, and 
Bruno’s heresies may in fact underwrite the recurrent discourses surround-
ing consubstantiality and the Trinity in Ulysses. Primarily the criticism illus-
trates Joyce’s use of Bruno’s theory of the coincidence of contraries to place 
traditional antitheses in proximity to each other. Bruno is also the subject 
matter for two of the more memorable Joycean sound bites. In A Portrait of 
the Artist as a Young Man, Stephen Dedalus recalls a discussion with Father 
Ghezzi and enters in his diary: “He said Bruno was a terrible heretic. I said 
he was terribly burned” (249). Earlier in the novel when Heron called Lord 
Byron a heretic, Stephen’s reply, “I don’t care what he was” (81), shows his 
lack of regard for religious orthodoxy if aesthetic integrity is threatened with 
compromise. Moreover, the nineteen-year-old Joyce had already displayed 
his unflinching individuality and particular fidelity to Bruno; as he wrote, 
“No man, said the Nolan, can be a lover of the true or the good unless 
he abhors the multitude; and the artist, though he may employ the crowd, 
is very careful to isolate himself ” (“Rabblement” 69). Robert D. Newman 
points out that “Joyce’s attraction to Bruno began as admiration for the 
Nolan’s uncompromising defense of his beliefs and increasingly developed 
into an employment of those beliefs in his own writing” (215). One of those 
manifestations is in “Clay,” the short story written little over a year after his 
review of Bruno’s philosophy.
 If Bruno implores the readers of Cause, Principle and Unity to under-
stand one idea, it is a call for the shared perception of the cyclical dynamics 
of nature: “Don’t you see that what was seed becomes stalk, and what was 
stalk becomes corn, and what was corn becomes bread—that out of bread 
comes chyle, out of chyle blood, out of blood the seed, out of the seed the 
embryo, and then man, corpse, earth, stone, or something else in succes-
sion—on and on, involving all natural forms?” (102). In finding this dynamic 
process analogous to “stoking an engine,” Joyce had Bruno’s idea and diction 
in mind for Bloom’s rumination in Ulysses: “food, chyle, blood, dung, earth, 
food” (144–45). The laws at work for Bloom and Bruno are the transfer-
ence and conservation of energy as outlined by Newton’s Third Law, and in 
The Principles of Literary Criticism, I. A. Richards argues that such scientific 
principles should be accepted as truth in literature. In light of his sense of 
thermodynamics, Bruno states that there “must then exist an unchanging 
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thing which in itself is not stone nor earth nor corpse nor man nor embryo 
nor blood nor anything else in particular, but which after it was blood, 
became embryo, receiving the embryonic being; and after it was embryo, 
received the human being and became man” (103). The “unchanging thing” 
for Bruno is the “soul of the world,” a substance-principle that can take ani-
mate or inanimate forms. Bruno’s philosophy offers what most metaphysics 
do, an appeasement of the fear of death; through Bruno’s rationale, the fear 
is quelled by the idea that humans have an essence that, after the death of the 
individual self, will eventually become human again.
 The traditions that serve as the focus for Joyce’s short story “Clay” pro-
mote belief systems mitigating the fear of death with a similar theory of 
recursion. “Clay” takes place on both the Catholic feast of All Saints’ Day 
and the celebration of Samhain, the Celtic New Year. In name, the vigil of 
All Saint’s Day (All Hallow’s Eve) and, in ritual, Samhain spawned what we 
know as Halloween. Joyce originally entitled the story “Hallow Eve.”8 “Clay,” 
the short story, and clay, the substance, both act as agents that unite the 
contrary pagan and Catholic holidays. The short story illuminates the holi-
days’ simultaneity, and the substance indicates the state toward which all the 
participants on this and all other days tend. The traditions of both the Celts 
and the Catholics attempt to ease the angst accompanying existence with a 
system of regeneration based on rebirth or resurrection. Though Joyce uses 
elements of each tradition in “Clay,” their divergence is circumscribed by 
Bruno’s philosophy and the universal fate of decomposition into clay. In this 
process of synthesis, Joyce undermines both the conception of heaven and 
the canon for becoming a saint in Catholicism. In its repetition of elements 
of both Christian and pagan feasts, the story does not simply reproduce their 
cultural codes. The synthetic textual construction of “Clay” destabilizes the 
doctrine of canonization by subverting the divisions between the two com-
peting traditions. At work in the story is the heresy of syncretism, which the 
next chapter discusses in detail. In his review of McIntyre’s book on Bruno, 
Joyce claimed that his system “endeavors to simplify the complex” of meta-
physics and has “a distinct value for the historian of religious ecstasies” (134). 
“Clay” is Joyce’s syncretic simplification of the historical relation between 
two relevant religious feasts.
 Oppositions abound in “Clay,” but the effect of the story illustrates Bruno’s 
idea of the coincidence of contraries through both setting and character. The 
central character, Maria, an aging, working-class Catholic woman, helps in 
the kitchen of “the Dublin by Lamplight laundry,” run by Protestants to sup-
ply an institution to aid reformed prostitutes (83). Maria’s piety and spinster-
Franke_final.indb   136 1/28/2008   4:40:10 PM
C HA P T E R  4 :  C A NON IC A L  T R A N SF OR M AT ION S
hood create the assumption that she, however, is a virgin. On another level of 
importance to the setting, she has the stereotypical characteristics of a witch: 
“Maria was a very, very small person indeed but she had a very long nose 
and a very long chin” (82). Though Maria is said to have at one time believed 
the Catholic stereotypical “bad opinion of protestants,” she has reconciled 
herself to think that they are “very nice people, a little quiet and serious, but 
still very nice people to live with.” Surrounded by reform-minded Protestants 
in an environment with proselytizing “tracts on the walls,” Maria remains 
steadfast in her beliefs and plans to attend Mass on All Saints’ Day, a holy day 
of obligation. The temporal parameters of the story, from the women having 
“their tea at six o’clock” to the following morning Mass, may be equated with 
the vigil before All Saints’ Day (83–84). Prior to her communion with the 
saints, Maria however will indulge in the offerings of a purely pagan feast.
 The setting of the story illustrates the temporal coincidence when the 
Celtic old year meets the new, the tenth month meets the eleventh, and all 
the evil souls are rampant, as the pious and canonized mutually pray for each 
other. The tension between Christian and pagan festivals lies at the heart of 
the story. In honor of this unique day in the Celtic and liturgical calendar, 
Joyce characterizes Maria in suggestive, nebulous terms that have elicited 
several allegorical readings of her significance.9 Critics have tended to pick 
one of the festivals to explore and subsequently proceed to make the case for 
Maria as either the Blessed Virgin or a witch. Consequently, they neglect the 
significance of the fact that Maria personifies the simultaneity of the Catho-
lic and pagan rituals. She is at once witchlike in appearance and saintly in 
demeanor. Maria’s characteristics and the parallel in the story between the 
coincident traditions both allow for a coexistence of oppositions, in a date, 
in a person. Cóilín Owens has already delineated the Irish folklore and Mass 
of All the Saints that underlie “Clay.” However, Owens fails to pursue the full 
implications of Joyce’s “detailed and accurate” use of “popular folk customs 
and their roots in archaic tradition” (338). The story does not simply negate, 
as Owens supposes, the willingness to forsake earthly happiness by darkly 
invoking the Celtic and Catholic themes of self-sacrifice. Through the use 
of the overlapping Catholic and pagan celebrations, Joyce creates a paradox 
concerning the doctrine of canonization, not unlike that presented by Shaw 
and Donne, in which body and soul are equated.
 When in 1904 Joyce began to write the story that would become “Clay,” he 
had already published his first few stories in the Irish Homestead. Ashamed 
at publishing in this newspaper directed toward rural communities, what he 
referred to as the “pig’s paper” in Ulysses (158), Joyce first published under 
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the pseudonym Stephen Daedalus. Though the editor of the Homestead, H. F. 
Norman, had accepted the first three stories (“The Sisters,” “Eveline,” and 
“After the Race”), he asked Joyce to refrain from further submissions since 
readers had written letters of protest. An agrarian Irish audience that was 
perhaps already aware of the historical entanglement of the feasts might real-
ize that Samhain had “a decisive influence in the establishment of the feast 
of All Saints on November 1st” (Hennig 152). Vestiges of myth and folklore 
endure more readily in the country, and in fact the word “pagan” originally 
meant “country dweller,” in that Christianity grew first in cities. “Clay” had 
handled a subject that the Catholic populace would rather have left alone, the 
foundations of their beliefs. The rejection of “Hallow Eve” troubled Joyce, and 
for the next ten years the genteel sensibility of the printing world effectively 
censored Dubliners. Nevertheless, Joyce felt proud of his story (he exclaimed 
at one point, “ask the good gentlemen can they beat ‘Hallow Eve’”) (Letters 2: 
77), and in a last ditch effort to have the story published on its own he told his 
brother to “[s]ell it to Mighty AUM.” This reference to George Russell (A.E.) 
and his mysticism is a variant of Om, a word which Ellmann suggestively 
states signifies “creation, being, dissolution, and ultimate reality” (Joyce, Let-
ters 2: 85).
 In Bruno’s mind, the first step toward a conception of the unity of being 
entails a breaking down of boundaries, and Samhain is the appropriate 
beginning of such an occurrence. Samhain, pronounced “sow’-in,” mean-
ing “end of summer,” is the primary Celtic festival that ushers in winter and 
marks the start of the new year. James Frazer reports in The Golden Bough 
that “[w]itches then speed on their errands of mischief, some sweeping 
through the air on besoms, others galloping along the roads on tabby-cats, 
which for that evening are turned into coal-black steeds” (GBA 735). Indeed, 
Maria might be read as a witch given her freedom to roam about Dublin for 
the night. Of more importance, however, are the two relevant Celtic tradi-
tions performed in “Clay.” On Samhain, bonfires and modes of divination 
celebrated the oncoming year. Divination games ascertained their players’ 
destiny, and in “ancient Ireland, a new fire used to be kindled every year on 
Hallowe’en or the Eve of Samhain, and from this sacred flame all the fires in 
Ireland were kindled” (GBA 734). In modern times, the fires are hospitable 
gestures that welcome wandering souls to warm themselves at their old resi-
dences. Maria will return to Joe, whom she reared, warm herself by his fire 
and divine her own future to be clay.
 The competing Catholic tradition for the evening is the Vigil of Our Lady 
and All the Saints, which begins at sundown on the night prior to November 
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1. The collectivity of the feast is appropriate in that Mary is the most exalted 
of saints. In explicating Maria’s nature as a “veritable peace-maker,” the story 
clearly alludes to the Sermon on the Mount, which is the Mass for All Saints’ 
Day (Matt. 5:9).10 When Maria assumes her “blessed” role as “peacemaker” 
in a sibling rivalry and puts “in a good word for Alphy,” “Joe cried that 
God might strike him stone dead if ever he spoke a word to his brother 
again.” However, Joe calms himself because “he would not lose his temper on 
account of the night it was” (87). The reference to restraint is part of Joyce’s 
satire of superficial Catholic piety, calling attention to the arbitrary date of 
commemorating All the Saints.
 As with many Christian holidays, the history of All Saints’ Day reveals 
the Catholic Church’s anxiety about the popularity of pagan rituals, in this 
case the ritual for the dead on Samhain. As part of its missionary work, the 
Church sought to subsume pagan rituals by superimposing an appropriate 
thematic and Christian observance, in this case a ceremony for departed 
holy souls. However, the persistence of Samhain traditions showed the mere 
simultaneity of All Saints’ Day to be ineffectual in fully quelling the pagan 
observance, so the Church changed the perception of Samhain to one of pure 
evil and established All Souls’ Day as an homage to the dead. The Church 
liked to think of the movement from the evening vigil to the morning Mass 
as a telic progression from chaos to control. The power of the pagan tradition 
kept resurging, and eventually the Church abandoned direct competition 
and suppressed the vigil portion of the celebration in 1955. Some critics of 
Joyce’s story have misconstrued the genealogy of the feasts. For instance, 
Marvin Magalaner and Richard Kain claim: “the history of the church holi-
day actually establishes all the parallel background [Joyce] needs: The day set 
aside in honor of saints (like Mary) by Boniface IV has had its eve perverted 
by celebrants to the calling forth of witches” (129). To be sure, the usurpa-
tion of November 1 to serve as All Saints’ Day shows the Church’s common 
practice of molding, like clay, days of pagan rituals in order to serve its own 
purposes.
 Central to “Clay” is Maria’s homecoming and participation in Celtic tra-
ditions. Indeed, the plot outline of the story almost seems to have been for-
mulated by Frazer’s summary of the essence of Halloween. The Golden Bough 
could be a source text for the story. Throughout Europe, not just in Celtic 
lands, Halloween marked “the time of year when the souls of the departed 
were supposed to revisit their old homes in order to warm themselves by the 
fire and to comfort themselves with the good cheer provided for them in the 
kitchen or the parlour by their affectionate kinsfolk” (GBA 735). Part of the 
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good cheer the hosts intend for Maria is the hope of a benevolent prophecy 
from the blindfold-and-saucer divination game. After the “two nextdoor girls 
had arranged some Hallow Eve games,” they “insisted then on blindfolding 
Maria and leading her up to the table to see what she would get” (87–88). 
Traditionally, the game that they play consists of either four or five saucers 
distributed with water, a ring, salt or a coin, occasionally a prayer book, and 
in the less “genteel” versions, clay. The blindly chosen saucer divines a future 
of, respectively, migration or continued life, marriage, prosperity, entrance 
into a nunnery or seminary, and death. Though Joe Donnelly and his wife 
had intended a “genteel” version, someone, probably one of the next-door 
girls, had surreptitiously included clay for Maria’s turn. As Maria “moved 
her hand about here and there in the air and descended on one of the sau-
cers,” she “felt a soft wet substance with her fingers and was surprised that 
nobody spoke or took off her bandage.” By leaving the association to be made 
between the title-word, absent from the story, and the “soft wet substance,” 
Joyce highlights the malleability of “clay” and hints at a unifying matter that 
synthesizes the metaphysics of the contrary Christian and Celtic heritages 
of Ireland.11 Divination has revealed Maria’s fate, a universal one, to her fel-
low revelers, yet she wants to believe “that it was wrong that time and so she 
had to do it over again.” She ultimately picks “the prayer book.” In agreeing 
that the first time “was no play” (88), the characters collectively repress the 
inevitability of death.
 Through the amendatory act, the characters refuse to acknowledge the 
darker side of the game and, by extension, of life. François Laroque remarks 
that the characters’ act of repression shows “that they deceive themselves and 
each other into forgetting” “the true meaning of the ancient rites.” There-
fore, “because of the collective amnesia of the Dubliners,” “the reader has 
to reconstitute part of the missing data” (54). Replacing clay with the prayer 
book enacts the lacuna in the text, the strategic transformation of this holiday 
observance. Maria with her blindfold and her fellow revelers with their gen-
tility cannot see this historical imposition. Through this subtle performance, 
Joyce hints at the arbitrary nature of the holiday and the Church’s machina-
tions. By emphasizing the syncretism of the pagan and Catholic rites, Joyce’s 
return to origins invites a reexamination of the varying conceptions of death 
in the two traditions. In effect, “Clay” is a treatise on the presence of death in 
life and the inevitability of decay. In his review of Bruno’s philosophy, Joyce 
found that it enabled a person not to “fear to die” since the “death of the body 
is for him the cessation of a mode of being” (134). The short story makes the 
sanctity of All Saint’s Day seem strange, and disputes Catholic orthodoxy’s 
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sense of the ending. Instead, “Clay” offers the accessibility of “canonization” 
in the continuative process of life.
 Joyce’s later works also show a preoccupation with the biblical and deathly 
associations of clay. One of Joyce’s later images of clay in Ulysses, “Born all 
in the dark wormy earth, cold specks of fire, evil, lights shining in the dark-
ness” (198), inversely echoes a direct reference in the novel to Bruno’s “soul 
of the world”: “the obscure soul of the world, a darkness shining in bright-
ness which brightness could not comprehend” (23). In associating clay with 
the “soul of the world,” Joyce conflates two metaphysical systems of a cyclical 
nature, Bruno’s and the Judeo-Christian one reflected by Genesis 2:7 and The 
Dead Sea Scriptures: “What is man, mere earth kneaded out of clay, destined 
to return unto the dust” (174). The association counters the fourth defini-
tion of “clay” in the Oxford English Dictionary: “the earthly or material part 
of man.” Through Bruno’s philosophy, Joyce could see the possibilities of not 
separating the clay of the body from its capacity to hold a vestige of the “soul 
of the world.”
 By repeatedly emphasizing a return to clay, Joyce undercuts the orthodox 
idea of heaven in that not only is clay the genesis and fate of the human body, 
but it is also connected to the soul. Moreover, Joyce points to the agrar-
ian basis of Celtic culture and underscores the heretical idea that the body 
and the soul only return to clay. Substituting the prayer book for clay offers 
the condolence of a Christian afterlife; however, like most condolences, the 
replacement is a hollow contrivance. Through the replacement, Joyce subtly 
satirizes the arbitrary placement of All Saints’ Day on the liturgical calendar. 
Maria’s satisfaction in living a saintly life must be delayed, for death is requi-
site for canonization. On the other hand, complementing Bruno’s philosophy 
with the qualities of clay suggests that all people are holy, molded from clay, 
and to clay they shall return. Therefore, the earthly, the “clay,” should be can-
onized. The idea of universal synthesis is in some way a consoling projection 
itself, but perhaps not as superficial, for Joyce, as the one represented by the 
prayer book. Canonical transformations produce and are produced by the 
changing horizons of readers, and during the period from 1883 to 1924, a 
prominent agent of such a transformation was the heresy of syncretism. As 
the next chapter further illustrates, this form of synthesis found an intel-
lectual frame in the philosophy of Bruno and other amenable schools of 
thought, while the array of pagan literature and myth supplied much of the 
material.
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In his last, unfinished, book, Gaston de Latour (1896), Walter Pater also 
illustrates the late Victorian recuperation of Giordano Bruno, and finds that 
his deification of the material world makes him a “true son of the Renais-
sance, in the light of those large, antique, pagan ideas” (82). As Gaston 
becomes influenced by the Renaissance scholar’s philosophy in the chapter 
entitled “The Lower Pantheism,” the narrative describes the germination of 
Bruno’s heresies while he was in the Dominican order: the “young monk” 
puzzled “the good, sleepy heads of the average sons of Dominic with his 
neology, putting new wine in old bottles, teaching them their business.” As 
we know, Bruno’s new wine burst the bottle of his “brethren’s sympathy,” so 
he looked to “pagan writers” as “having a kind of natural, preparatory kin-
ship with Scripture itself ” (72).
 The rediscovery of classical paganism characterizes much of Renaissance 
art, and Pater’s own landmark Studies in the History of the Renaissance (1873) 
led, in part, to a similar return of paganism during the late Victorian and 
modernist periods. A profound fascination with new and buried products 
of science and art dominate each historical period, and Pater’s aesthetic 
treatise became a staple of the “art for art’s sake” movement and its desire 
to harmonize form and content. A common derivative of this approach saw 
a proliferation of literary works which collocated correspondent pagan and 
Christian rituals, images, and ideologies. This syncretic form of heresy often 
drew on the conclusions of cultural anthropology, and preoccupies the work 
of such artists as Pater, Hardy, Gauguin, Hudson, Lawrence, and Joyce. As 
this chapter illustrates, Pater’s The Renaissance championed a reconciliation 
of pagan and Christian aesthetics, while fiction with critical cultural implica-
tions such as Tess of the d’Urbervilles often used such a heretical synthesis to 
Chapter 5
•
Literary Paganism and the 
Heresy of Syncretism
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trouble the repressive complacency of orthodoxy.
 The philosophical pantheism behind the canonization of clay in Joyce’s 
story about All Hallows’ Eve reflects a turn toward the spirituality of “this 
world.” In Gaston, Pater states that “‘Nature’ becomes for [Bruno] a sacred 
term” (74), and, though he helped “himself indifferently to all religions for 
rhetoric illustration, his preference was still for that of the soil, the old pagan 
religion” (80). One result of this mystical trend, perhaps best exemplified by 
Theosophy and the Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn, saw a theoretical 
interest in pagan religions and an anthropomorphism which found spiritual-
ity in the vagaries of human endeavor. As literary experiments with pagan-
ism became more daring, the sexuality of various primitivisms that affirm 
“this world” came to the foreground, and their implicit critique of Christian 
asceticism led to charges of indecency in the work of Hardy, Joyce, and Law-
rence. Paganism does not blaspheme, being outside the pale of Christianity, 
but it could be “obscene.”
 Take, for example, the scandalous beach scene in the “Nausicaa” episode 
of Ulysses, the serialization of which initiated the obscenity charges against 
Joyce’s novel. Margaret Anderson had been publishing Joyce’s work in her 
journal the Little Review since 1918, and she described the obscenity trial of 
1921 as “a burning at the stake as far as I was concerned” (Crispi). In “Nau-
sicaa,” Joyce doubly frames the voyeuristic masturbation of Leopold Bloom 
and Gerty MacDowell with the tolling of steeple bells as Canon O’Hanlon 
confers the Blessed Sacrament in honor of the Virgin Mary, and with a 
bat frightened from the belfry “at the same time” flying “through the dusk, 
hither, thither, with a tiny lost cry” (298). A bat traditionally emblematizes 
both pagan and sexual agency, and these associations appear throughout the 
novel, notably in “Proteus” the parallel episode to “Nausicaa.” In the earlier 
beach scene, Stephen Dedalus thinks: “He comes, pale vampire, through 
storm his eyes, his bat sails bloodying the sea, mouth to her mouth’s kiss” 
(40). As the bat flies around in “Nausicaa,” the passage, key to the censorship 
trial of the novel, begins when Gerty leans back to reveal her undergarments 
and Bloom masturbates, as literal fireworks dapple the sky overhead. The 
narrative voice later states that their orgasmic encounter “was their secret, 
only theirs, alone in the hiding twilight and there was none to know or tell 
save the little bat that flew so softly through the evening to and fro and little 
bats don’t tell” (300–301). In his study of modernist obscenity and censorship, 
Adam Parkes notes many “blasphemous” elements in this episode including 
the unflattering simultaneity of the Mass, the associations of Gerty with the 
Virgin Mary, and the secret and “pornographic” elements structuring the 
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scene like a confession. Acknowledging Foucault’s idea that the confessional 
“turns desire into discourse and so regulates sex,” Parkes argues that in the 
confessional the “priest’s privileged access to women’s sexual secrets repli-
cates the structures of power exhibited in pornography.” Parkes also points 
out that Bloom and Gerty’s secrecy is violated by readers who are “implicated 
in the process of creating obscenity,” and that “Joyce challenges us to reflect 
critically on the implications of our spectatorship, and to recognize its sub-
versive possibilities” (83–86). One of these possibilities is pagan; the narra-
tive heretically inserts the “little bat” in the confessional position reserved for 
priests who also “don’t tell.” Readers do tell, though, and the telling use of the 
pagan image reveals one of Joyce’s many heresies. The bat’s “lost cry” echoes 
beyond the chime of church bells as it sanctions Bloom and Gerty’s sexual 
delight.
 Joyce’s novel, though, does not refrain from mocking the pagan revival 
common at the turn of the century, and this is a crucial qualification to 
Pater’s and Hardy’s use of paganism analyzed in the following sections. The 
pagan elements of The Renaissance and Tess of the d’Urbervilles subvert 
orthodox Christianity without any necessary intention to reinstall paganism 
as the privileged religion. In Ulysses, for instance, Stephen Dedalus thinks 
“To ourselves . . . new paganism . . . omphalos” (7), and dismissively lumps 
together these fin-de-siècle cultural movements. The “new paganism” is a 
reference to another use of pagan sexuality in the short-lived Pagan Review 
launched by William Sharp in 1891.1 The solitary edition had seven “frankly 
pagan” titles that advanced “the new paganism,” a movement which aimed at 
“thorough-going unpopularity” while appealing to the “younger generation.” 
Sharp found that the “religion of our forefathers . . . is no longer in any vital 
and general sense a sovereign power in the realm.” To revitalize the world, 
Sharp declared that the “duel between Man and Woman is to cease,” and that 
literature should reflect the “various forces of the sexual emotion” (1–3).
 During the 1890s, writers of “decadence” in particular wallowed in vari-
ous forms of sexualized paganism, and welcomed the comparison to the late 
stages of ancient Greece and Rome. Oscar Wilde’s ribald and erotic poem, 
“The Sphinx” (1894), epitomizes the themes and values of the Decadent 
decade. By addressing a hairless cat, perhaps of the sphinx breed, as the 
actual Sphinx of Greek and Egyptian legend, the poetic voice desires to 
revive the ancient myth and its accompanying sexual passion through a style 
that catalogs and gathers the god “scattered here and there.” In blazoning 
the “sphinx,” the resultant grotesque imagery conflates a panoply of deviant 
sexual acts and offers no discretion among the so-called wrongs. The poem 
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reconstructs the sphinx’s sundered body parts and implies that Egyptian 
myth is only fallow because “Only one god has ever died.” However, with this 
introduction of Christian imagery, the poet turns away in guilt and self-loath-
ing from the sphinx who wakes in him “each bestial sense” and makes him 
what he “would not be” (820–24).2
 Pater also stresses the aesthetic value of a pagan sensuousness in his 
study of the Renaissance. Though he does not discuss Bruno until Gaston, 
the “thick stratum of pagan sentiment beneath” (76) Bruno’s thought clearly 
makes the chapter an addendum of sorts to The Renaissance. As in his treat-
ment of other Renaissance figures, Pater links Bruno’s “flights of intellectual 
enthusiasm” with “those of physical love.” Pater states that Bruno’s “nature 
so opulently endowed can hardly have been lacking in purely physical or 
sensuous ardours,” and he believes that the “theorem that God was in all 
things whatever, annihilating their differences” awoke in Bruno “a constant, 
inextinguishable appetite for every form of experience” (75–77). The “soul 
of the world” grows through acts of creation such as the products of love 
and the imagination. Jane Spirit believes that within “the context of Gaston it 
would seem then that the protagonist discovers in Bruno’s system not only a 
theoretical justification for the integration of mind and matter, soul and body, 
but also an example of the fulfilment to be found in attaining such harmony.” 
Here was a new way to bottle wine and make a celebratory toast. However, 
Spirit points out that Pater found Bruno’s doctrine of the coincidence, or 
“indifference,” of contraries troublesome to the “distinctions” between “art 
and life,” “good and evil,” and “pain and pleasure” (225). In a way, Pater iden-
tifies with Bruno in that each of their theories could be dangerously appro-
priated by a decadent approach to life even though each “was cautious not to 
suggest the ethic or practical equivalent to his theoretic positions.” Therefore, 
Pater stresses the need to make the “distinction,” as later modernists would 
do, “between what was right and wrong in the matter of art” (82–83). In The 
Renaissance, though, he emphasizes the initial need to reject any a priori 
authority regarding aesthetic taste.
The “Curious” Pagan Spirit of
Pater’s The Renaissance
Of the many famous dicta born with Pater’s “Conclusion” to The Renaissance, 
perhaps the most subversive of his mandates for aesthetic criticism overtly 
calls for a consistent questioning of authority: “What we have to do is to be 
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for ever curiously testing new opinions and courting new impressions, never 
acquiescing in a facile orthodoxy, of Comte, or of Hegel, or of our own” 
(189).3 Pater’s plea yokes together two terms to privilege the paganism that 
he finds subtly apparent in Christian iconography. To be “curious” in the face 
of “orthodoxy” is both what Pater values in his chosen Renaissance artists and 
what he strove for in his own life. Indeed, Pater’s projection of autobiographi-
cal concerns onto his subjects emphasizes his desire for harmony between an 
artist’s life and work. In his treatment of Pico della Mirandola, Leonardo da 
Vinci and Johann Winckelmann, Pater admires most in them the principle 
that the artist’s work relates to his life, and asserts that the form of his artwork 
should also convey the array of sentiments associated with its historical and 
philosophical content. For Pater, this principle of Andersstreben explains both 
how the particular historical quality of the Renaissance, a pagan sensibility, 
appears in art and how correspondent aesthetic qualities become sublimated 
in the person. In his discussion of Giorgione, Pater explains his usage of 
Andersstreben in describing the relation between painting and music: “each 
art may be observed to pass into the condition of some other art, by what 
German critics term an Anders-streben—a partial alienation from its own 
limitations, through which the arts are able, not indeed to supply the place 
of each other, but reciprocally to lend each other new forces” (105). Pater’s 
argument throughout The Renaissance implies that a similar productive dia-
lectic undergirds the historical relation between Christianity and paganism, 
and his defense of “curiosity” and a “pagan spirit” distinguishes the work as 
a cohesive, unified treatise delineating in component parts the historical, 
aesthetic, and political relations between paganism and Christianity.
 As a correlative of Andersstreben, the prominent metaphor and preemi-
nent form of art in The Renaissance is music, an art form in which it is impos-
sible “to distinguish matter from the form.” Pater declares therefore: “All art 
aspires towards the condition of music” (106). Analogously for the religious 
concerns of The Renaissance, Pater tries to bring to the foreground the pagan 
“matter” repressed historically in the “forms” of Christian symbols and tradi-
tion. Pater finds that the unique dialogue between paganism and Christian-
ity in Renaissance art is its masterstroke, in that they too “lend each other 
new forces.” Curiosity is the driving force behind this genius. While criticism 
has generally seen The Renaissance as a disjointed collection of essays, the 
reciprocal function of curiosity and a pagan sensibility constitutes a domi-
nant, consistent argument throughout Pater’s work. In the third (1888) and 
fourth (1893) editions, Pater’s inclusion of “The School of Giorgione” and 
the discussion of Amis and Amile within “Two Early French Stories,” and the 
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restoration of the “Conclusion,” cultivate the coherence of a curious, pagan 
spirit. As part of this thesis, Pater argues that a curious, pagan spirit achieves 
a “serenity” and potentially harmonizes form and content through a desire 
for beauty and a search for historical and aesthetic continuities between 
paganism and Christianity.
 The emphatic rhetoric of the first sentence of the essay on Pico della 
Mirandola equally applies to a predominant theme subtending Pater’s work: 
“No account of the Renaissance can be complete without some notice of the 
attempt made by certain Italian scholars of the fifteenth century to reconcile 
Christianity with the religion of ancient Greece” (23). Pater later implies that 
history can synthesize Christianity and paganism, albeit at the expense of 
orthodoxy. As a result, Pater’s “Conclusion” elicited a stern rebuke from the 
Bishop of Oxford, and “scandalous” and “notorious” came to be mentioned 
in the same breath as the “Conclusion.” Pater’s paganism informs both the 
late Victorian debates between established religion, comparative anthro-
pology, and evolutionary thought, and T. S. Eliot’s later attempt to debunk 
Pater’s view of form and content. In defending the Christian tradition as 
the “true” content of art, T. S. Eliot continued the charges against Pater, who 
“knew almost nothing” about “the essence of the Christian faith” and only 
offers a “degradation of philosophy and religion” (“Pater” 388–91). To be 
sure, Pater champions “curiosity” as the relentless, unsettling characteris-
tic of artists who challenge the thoughtless acceptance of “tradition.” Pater 
suggests that the unmitigated love of beauty accompanying any “proper” 
aesthetics far outweighs the threat to orthodoxy concomitant with the resur-
facing of potentially oppositional internal elements. A curious look at Pater’s 
“Poems by William Morris,” an October 1868 review of Morris’s The Earthly 
Paradise, helps to clarify the fact that the orthodoxy “of our own” that Pater 
is questioning in his “Conclusion” is indeed Christianity.
 In its previously published form, the “Conclusion” occupied a similar 
structural position in also concluding the unsigned Morris review. Of inter-
est, then, are the tone and subject matter that led Pater initially to such con-
troversial remarks that promote “the love of art for its own sake” and declaim 
the “conventional” as having “no real claim upon us” (189–90). What fol-
lows is the paragraph in the review that immediately precedes what would 
become the “Conclusion”: 
One characteristic of the pagan spirit these new poems have which is on their 
surface—the continual suggestion, pensive or passionate, of the shortness of 
life; this is contrasted with the bloom of the world and gives new seduction to 
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it; the sense of death and the desire of beauty; the desire of beauty quickened 
by the sense of death. “Arriéré!” you say, “here in a tangible form we have the 
defect of all poetry like this. The modern world is in possession of truths; what 
but a passing smile can it have for a kind of poetry which, assuming artistic 
beauty of form to be an end in itself, passes by those truths and the living 
interests which are connected with them, to spend a thousand cares in telling 
once more these pagan fables as if it had but to choose between a more and a 
less beautiful shadow?” It is a strange transition from the earthly paradise to 
the sad-coloured world of abstract philosophy. But let us accept the challenge; 
let us see what modern philosophy, when it is sincere, really does say about 
human life and the truth we can attain in it, and the relation of this to the 
desire of beauty. (309)
Denis Donoghue believes that, when Pater transposed the review into the 
“Conclusion,” “he excised the passage about the pagan spirit, presumably 
because it was too closely attached to his broodings on Morris’s poems” 
(53). Donoghue could not be more wrong here. The “pagan spirit” also best 
describes Pater’s heretical stance that subtends The Renaissance. At once, the 
“shortness of life” and “sense of death” emphasized in the passage elucidates 
the inspired carpe diem motif of the “Conclusion” and suggests that a “pagan 
spirit” can provide insight into the relation between beauty and truth. One 
senses that Pater is not satisfied with the Keatsian proposition of the Grecian 
Urn. For Pater’s curiosity is especially aroused by those artists who do “spend 
a thousand cares in telling . . . pagan fables.” Here Pater hints at a nuanced 
reasoning behind his recurrent use of the word “curiosity.” Etymologically, 
“curiosity” derives from the Latin curiosus, “full of cares” or “careful.” Among 
the many theories of development blossoming in the 1860s, the discipline of 
etymology (<Gk. etumos, “truth, what is”) began to promote an intersection 
of history and language as the “study of truth.” One of Pater’s colleagues at 
Oxford, Max Müller, reinserted the importance of etymology in philological 
studies and put forth “the notion that the meaning of a word was equivalent 
to its whole etymological history” (Burrow 200). In its multi-tiered linguistic 
history, the word “curiosity” plays several roles in The Renaissance, often 
denoting alternately “inquisitiveness” or “an interesting object,” but never 
excluding any of its associated meanings.
 By the time Pater wrote the bulk of the essays that comprise The Renais-
sance, Matthew Arnold’s Culture and Anarchy (1869) had exerted consider-
able influence in critical studies of culture. The first words of the famous first 
chapter on “Sweetness and Light” claim that the “disparagers of culture make 
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its motive curiosity” (204). Arnold believes that this has happened because, 
in English usage, the word “curiosity” solely conveys pejorative connota-
tions. However, as he had noted in “The Function of Criticism at the Present 
Time” (1865), other languages use the term “to mean, as a high and fine qual-
ity of man’s nature, just the disinterested love of a free play of the mind on all 
subjects.” In this positive sense, curiosity is the controlling motive of cultural 
criticism (141). By combining this view of culture with the belief that soci-
eties try to improve culture and perform “the will of God,” Arnold believes 
that “culture” then is “a study of perfection” (“Sweetness” 205). Though Pater 
would refrain from thinking of “the will of God,” the word “curiosity” for 
Pater continues to carry all of its varied historical significances. Thinking 
of the “truth” linguistically buried in “etymology” sheds light on the passage 
from the Morris review: “The modern world is in possession of truths; what 
but a passing smile can it have for a kind of poetry which, assuming artistic 
beauty of form to be an end in itself, passes by those truths and the living 
interests which are connected with them” (309). Again Pater evokes the idea 
that language carries history residually and keeps the past alive. In miniature, 
hearing all the voices of a word exemplifies his humanist belief that “nothing 
which has ever interested living men and women can wholly lose its vitality,” 
including any “language they have spoken” (38). Pater uses “curiosity” as a 
keyword to reveal and underscore a similar historical development from 
paganism to Christianity, and he struggles to show the need for the recogni-
tion and persistence of the pagan spirit.
 In “Dallying nicely with words,” John Hollander argues that, in a cross 
section of writers from Shakespeare to Hopkins, “words are often like some 
agents in a larger fiction, not so much an epic or drama, but more a complex 
romance, of language” (123). In this light, Pater’s use of the word “curiosity” 
becomes an example of what Hollander calls “an allegorising of the etymo-
logical process” (130). Hollander suggests that literature can play “on English 
word and Latin etymon” and become a “valorisation of the relation between 
past and present usage” (130). Uncovering the etymological layers of the 
word “curious” would take us from “an object arousing interest” to “a desire 
to know or learn” to a process “full of cares” or of “healing.”4 When Petronius 
alludes to Horace’s curiosa felicitas, he is referring to this linguistic dimen-
sion of “curiosity” by implying an “elaborate and painstaking care in compo-
sition” (Arrowsmith 185). The last sense, “healing,” shows the word’s cognate 
relationship with “cure.” (On another level, the connotations of “curiosity” 
associated with “pornography” or “strangeness” speak to the erotic subtexts 
Pater often cultivates vis-à-vis his subjects, especially Leonardo.) By exten-
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sion, the thought processes involved in such a search for roots represent to 
Pater a convalescence that tries to syncretize Christian icons with analogous 
pagan symbols. Implicit in this approach is a sentiment that finds a malaise 
or loss of integration in the present. Hoping to revive the healing serenity of 
“Heiterkeit, that pagan blitheness” (180), Pater promotes, throughout The 
Renaissance, a willful and independent inquisitiveness as a means to restore 
this “cheerful” contentment in humanity.
 In his repetitive, incantatory use of the word “curiosity,” Pater draws 
attention to the word itself as an object of interest and as an illustration of 
how dormant and archaic meanings of any word or practice can be recovered. 
The word informs The Renaissance from the “curious strength” and “curious 
interest” of “Two Early French Stories” (7–11) to the “curiosity, the initia-
tory idea,” of “Pico della Mirandola” (25) to the call in the “Conclusion” “to 
be for ever curiously testing new opinions” (189). Clearly, though, the most 
playful repetition of the word occurs in “Leonardo da Vinci.” Pater describes 
the genius of Leonardo as “composed, in almost equal parts, of curiosity and 
the desire of beauty, to take things as they came” (86). Pater then unfolds the 
dynamic between these traits by repeating the terms with slight variation for 
the rest of the essay. Once, the terms fuse into “curious beauty” (90), and, 
in the following sentence, Pater nearly begs the question in explicating the 
synthesis of the terms: “Curiosity and the desire of beauty—these are the two 
elementary forces in Leonardo’s genius; curiosity often in conflict with the 
desire of beauty, but generating, in union with it, a type of subtle and curious 
grace” (86). Here we have the three central meanings of “curiosity” playing 
off each other, and, in the process, creating a dialectical system. Pater sug-
gests that the general desire to know engages a particular object arousing 
interest, and consequently generates a “curious grace” or healing power. If 
there were any doubt as to the importance of curiosity to Pater, the conclu-
sion of the Leonardo essay, the purple patch for curiosity, speculates how 
Leonardo dies looking “forward now into the vague land, and experienced 
the last curiosity” (101).
 Reading the layered meanings of curiosity in The Renaissance becomes 
a key that demonstrates the parallel endeavor of the work to use a historical 
process to reconcile the Christian present with its pagan past. To be con-
stantly curious presents a direct threat to authority: not only does curiosity 
challenge authority, but the progressive, continuative nature of inquisitive 
searching precludes the establishment of any fixed forms or orthodox doc-
trine. In this vein, curiosity for Pater is akin to the role of heresy in Shaw’s 
“Religion of the Future.” As Richard Dellamora argues, for Pater, a “curious” 
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“cultivation of self implies religious unbelief ” (137). From the “Preface” to 
the “Conclusion,” Pater emphasizes the durative process of searching far 
above the need for any final answers. One of the few qualities that Pater 
does want to achieve—the healing serenity of Heiterkeit—would not curtail 
curiosity in its attainment. Conversely, a serenity would be incorporated into 
curiosity and replace the angst-ridden concern for origins burgeoning in 
Pater’s time.
 While the role of curiosity plays a subtle role in linking the essays in The 
Renaissance, the prevalence of pagan issues more overtly harmonizes the col-
lection. The echo of pagan practices and images in the essays builds on the 
call to reconcile past and present and gradually culminates in the challenge 
to Christian orthodoxy in the “Conclusion.” Pater particularly takes interest 
in the appropriation of pagan gods and symbols by Christianity. In the two 
chapters highly concerned with cultivating a methodology for linking past 
and present, content and form, Pater stresses Pico’s listing of correspondences 
between the Greek and Christian religions and Giorgione’s “‘imaginative 
reason,’ that complex faculty for which every thought and feeling is twin-
born with its sensible analogue or symbol” (109). In the Doni Madonna, for 
another example, “Michelangelo actually brings the pagan religion . . . into 
the presence of the Madonna” and gives her “much of the uncouth energy 
of the older and more primitive ‘Mighty Mother’” (37). And, in Leonardo’s 
La Gioconda, Pater sees in Mona Lisa all “the thoughts and experience of 
the world” including “the return of the Pagan world” (98). In these works 
and in the “strange likeness” between Leonardo’s paintings of Saint John and 
Bacchus, Pater invokes “Heine’s notion of decayed gods, who, to maintain 
themselves, after the fall of paganism, took employment in the new religion” 
(93). Pater, as a Platonist, is drawn to those art forms that slightly reveal this 
transmogrification by foregrounding a residue of an earlier connotation of 
the subject. Furthermore, the idea of former pagan gods lying fallow in Chris-
tianity leads Pater to make the bold claim in “Winckelmann” that “the broad 
foundation . . . of all religions as they exist for the greatest number, is a uni-
versal pagan sentiment, a paganism which existed before the Greek religion, 
and has lingered far onward into the Christian world, ineradicable” (160).
 Consequently, criticism that speaks of paganism in The Renaissance gen-
erally focuses on “Winckelmann.” Paul Jordan-Smith calls the essay Pat-
er’s “remarkable confession of faith,” which “would bring back the spirit of 
paganism with its earthliness, its naturalness, and unite it to the gentleness 
and sympathy of Christian thought” (242). In his exhaustive study of the 
persistence of ancient Greek influence in Victorian Britain, Frank Turner 
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interprets Pater’s discernment of a “universal pagan sentiment” to indicate 
“humankind’s acute awareness of its vulnerability in the natural world”; con-
sequently, through “the myths, human beings sought to make themselves 
less estranged from nature and by religious ritual to exercise some vague 
control over it” (98). In discussing the Leonardo essay specifically, Dellamora 
contrasts John Ruskin’s love of medieval Christian art with Pater’s work, 
which “prefers ‘pagan’ to ‘Christian’ art precisely because it is ‘pagan.’” Del-
lamora also argues that Pater’s method “discloses processes basing and shap-
ing Leonardo’s art which afford guidance to contemporary artists in creating 
new forms.” Therefore, he believes that “Pater’s work does not merely mark 
the advent of modernism; it is itself modernist” (136). These modernist 
processes involve a non–a priori curiosity and a drive toward dialectical syn-
thesis, both of which are central functions of the discourse of heresy in the 
transitional period from 1883 to 1924.
 Early on in the preface, Pater argues that the actual value of trying to 
develop a universal formula for art arises concomitantly “in the sugges-
tive and penetrating things said by the way” (xix). By valorizing the very 
process of aesthetic criticism, Pater seeks no other goal than the constancy 
of reinvestigation and the questioning of accepted norms. In his egalitarian 
and unrigid approach, Pater underscores the naive attempts of Pico della 
Mirandola to come to terms with historical process. Though Pater believes 
that Pico exemplifies the idea that “the Renaissance of the fifteenth century 
was, in many things, great rather by what it designed or aspired to do, than 
by what it actually achieved,” Pater claims that it “remained for a later age to 
conceive the true method of effecting a scientific reconciliation of Christian 
sentiment with the imagery, the legends, the theories about the world, of 
pagan poetry and philosophy.” During the Renaissance, Pater finds that the 
“only possible reconciliation was an imaginative one” (36), but suggests the 
modern possibility of synthesizing science and religion through a “proper” 
Hegelian historical sense. A proper historical summary or philosophy of the 
world also synthesizes “all modes of thought and life” (99). With an applica-
tion of the “true” historical sense, built on the idea of process, Pater feels that 
he can fulfill this task.
 In a striking passage from the first essay in The Renaissance, “Two Early 
French Stories,” Pater sets forth the internal dynamics of his hermeneutics 
for thinking about the period. For any interpretation of the amalgam of 
Christian and pagan sentiments seen in Renaissance art, Pater suggests that 
the three methodological desiderata are an affinity for the sensuous, a will-
ingness to be unorthodox, and an application of the historical sense. In this 
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light, “Two Early French Stories” serves as an overture for the central themes 
of The Renaissance. By establishing a “continuity” between twelfth-century 
France and fifteenth-century Italy, Pater believes his approach will effect a 
“healing [of] that rupture between the middle age and the Renaissance which 
has so often been exaggerated” (2, emphasis added). Here, in the opening 
pages of the book, Pater foreshadows his use of the word “curiosity” and 
responds to Ruskin’s recent praise of a sparse, sublime Gothic art antithetical 
to the decadent effusions of the Renaissance.
 The Oxford Movement had helped to revive medievalism at Pater’s insti-
tution, so his valorization of the successive period in history and its particu-
lar paganism confronted both established religion and aesthetics. However, 
in adopting a view of history as a constantly unfolding process, Pater clearly 
identifies with the developmental theories prevalent in his time. By support-
ing a methodology that casts suspicion on the immutability of the word of 
God, The Renaissance executes a critique of the idea of any lex eterna. In 
the following passage from “Two Early French Stories,” Pater supports the 
particular challenge to the law of the church by lauding the heresy of anti-
nomianism:
One of the strongest characteristics of that outbreak of the reason and the 
imagination, of that assertion of the liberty of the heart, in the middle age, 
which I have termed a medieval Renaissance, was its antinomianism, its spirit 
of rebellion and revolt against the moral and religious ideas of the time. In 
their search after the pleasures of the senses and the imagination, in their 
care for beauty, in their worship of the body, people were impelled beyond 
the bounds of the Christian ideal; and their love became sometimes a strange 
idolatry, a strange rival religion. It was the return of that ancient Venus, not 
dead, but only hidden for a time in the caves of the Venusberg, of those old 
pagan gods still going to and fro on the earth, under all sorts of disguises. 
(18–19, emphases added)
As this passage reveals, Pater’s preoccupations in The Renaissance are fore-
shadowed again by “Poems by William Morris.” In addition to stressing the 
terminology, “a medieval Renaissance,” he champions once more a “spirit 
of rebellion” in confronting the hegemonic religion of the time. Curiosity, 
though unsaid directly in the passage, remains the central heretical element. 
In the “search” that has a “care for beauty” (two senses of “curiosity”) “people 
were impelled beyond the bounds of the Christian ideal.” The opposition of 
Christianity and curiosity clearly echoes the call in the “Conclusion” to be 
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“curiously testing” “orthodoxy.” The French stories become an example for 
Pater of how to revive dormant pagan gods. While a desire to see historical 
elements in present appearances will discover the gods in their “disguises,” 
Pater underscores the primary need for a vigorous antinomian ethics. Anti-
nomians preach a doctrine that frees Christians, saved by grace, from the 
observance of any law. Etymologically, they are “against” the “law.”
 Prior to the call to “burn” with a “hard, gem-like flame,” Pater’s “Con-
clusion” highlights “the tendency of modern thought” to regard both the 
physical world and the human psyche as fundamentally mutable and fleet-
ing. In each case, the “Conclusion” responds to the germination in the 1850s 
and 1860s of Higher Criticism and evolutionary thought, the seeds for what 
became the modernist crisis in Catholicism. Various scholars began applying 
notions of process and development to language, historical texts, and even, in 
bold moves, the Old Testament and the Gospels. Pater similarly opposes the 
static tenets needed by orthodoxy with the contemporary view of “physical 
life” as “a perpetual motion” of “elements, phosphorus and lime and delicate 
fibres,” which “are present not in the human body alone.” The interconnect-
edness of the material world humbles humanity, and viewing human beings 
as part of an evolving, internecine web of nature focuses attention on “this” 
world. In terms of the psyche, Pater notes that “the inward world of thought” 
illustrates that the “whirlpool is still more rapid.” The experience of “this” 
world becomes a linguistic and impressionistic function that isolates the 
individual and leads to Pater’s carpe diem conclusion to observe as many of 
these “unstable, flickering, inconsistent” impressions as possible. Pater’s defi-
nition of “success in life” then directly opposes orthodox views of morality 
and destiny which require “the sacrifice of any part of this experience.” For 
the Oxford don, asceticism and living with a goal of achieving heaven “have 
no real claim upon us” (186–89). While the implications of this perspective 
led to Pater’s apotheosis during the “art for art’s sake” movement, the influ-
ences informing his school of thought should not be separated from those 
that elicited the modernist crisis.
 While the Catholic modernist threat to orthodoxy did not weigh as heav-
ily on Protestantism, all Christian sects still were brought into the imbro-
glio perpetuated by a heretical interpretation of the Bible. For instance, the 
Bishop of Oxford, John Fielder Mackarness, followed the strategic response 
of Catholicism by defaming Pater as an internal dissenter whose philoso-
phies should be quelled. On April 25, 1875, the bishop addressed the reli-
gious skepticism being promoted at Oxford: “To speak the simple truth, 
a considerable number of Graduates who hold office in the University, or 
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Fellowships in the Colleges, have ceased to be Christians in anything but 
name;—in some cases, even the name is repudiated, when arguments based 
upon its retention are pressed.” Though he did not cite Pater by name, the 
bishop quoted three passages from the “Conclusion” to The Renaissance as 
examples of the emphasis that skeptics place on the ephemerality of life and 
the consequent need for reaping a manifold set of experiences.5 Additionally, 
the bishop critiqued the rise of a scientific historical method: “The historical 
facts of Christianity fare no better than its precepts: deference to scientific 
criticism (whatever that may mean), forbids them to be taken for true.” As 
a result of this form of education, the bishop believed that wayward youths 
would develop a “selfishness of character” and lose “all motive for serious 
action” (Seiler 95–96). In contrast, for Pater, Pico della Mirandola presents 
a serious attempt to synthesize all forms of thought out of a magnanimous, 
humanist gesture.
 In the essay on Pico, Pater uses his compelling but failed attempt to syn-
cretize paganism and Christianity as an illustration of the need for a proper 
historical criticism. Still, Pico’s endeavor to list 900 theses arguing that all 
Western philosophy and religions share the same underlying truths lead 
Pater to consider the Renaissance humanist scholar his spiritual precursor, 
who also personified “curiosity” and believed “that nothing which has ever 
interested living men and women can wholly lose its vitality” (38). Like the 
Quaker librarian in Joyce’s Ulysses, Pico had a “desire to hear all voices” (27). 
Above all, Pater finds Pico to be an attractive figure because he is a “pictur-
esque union of contrasts” himself and a person who “wins one on, in spite of 
one’s self, to turn again to the pages of his forgotten books” (37). A figure like 
Pico who was so desirous of all forms of knowledge inspires others to be so 
curious. Indeed, Pater certainly thinks of himself as continuing the approach 
of Pico, who was “one of the last who seriously and sincerely entertained the 
claim on men’s faith of the pagan religions” (33).
 In 1486, Pico planned on debating his 900 interdisciplinary theses at a 
conference to which he invited scholars from across Europe; however, Pope 
Innocent VIII declared thirteen of his theological theses to be heretical. 
When Pico avoided being burned at the stake by withdrawing the plans 
for his conference and acquiescing to work in a Dominican order, his life, 
according to Pater and his view of Andersstreben, became “so perfect a par-
allel to the attempt made in his writings to reconcile Christianity with the 
ideas of paganism.” Still holding a “tenderness” for his earlier life, Pico wrote 
Heptaplus, or Discourse on the Seven Days of Creation (1490), a series of son-
nets which strives to syncretize the works of Plato and Moses through an 
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“unbroken system of correspondences” and, of particular interest to Pater, a 
rigorous and inspired analysis of the “double meanings of words” (34–35).
 Despite admiring Pico’s intentions, Pater hints that a “modern scholar” 
occupied by a similar problem would not treat religious traditions as her-
metically sealed texts and divorce them from their cultural contexts. By 
placing the varied contexts at hand in light of the “gradual education of the 
human mind,” Pater declares that the “basis of the reconciliation of the reli-
gions of the world would thus be the inexhaustible activity and creativeness 
of the human mind itself, in which all religions alike have their root, and in 
which all alike are reconciled.” However, the historical sense required for 
this type of methodology would not develop until at least Hegel. During the 
Renaissance, Pater finds that scholars, despite exemplifying “a curiosity of 
the human mind” to compare religions, had to rely on the “quicksand of alle-
gorical interpretation.” Lacking historical tools and stuck within a geocentric 
view of the universe, fifteenth-century scholars tried to reconcile religions, 
“not as successive stages in a regular development of the religious sense, but 
as subsisting side by side.” As a result of such a spatial methodology, the 
interpretations tended to “misrepresent” the material because, set “side by 
side, the mere surfaces could never unite in any harmony of design” (25–27). 
Pater, thus, pokes at Pico’s overly nuanced attempt to force a harmonization 
where there was none.
 On the other hand, Pater feels that the results of such an endeavor, suc-
cessful or not, chiefly hold import in the loss of the “religious significance” 
and the rise of treating “the subject” as “purely artistic or poetical.” Foreshad-
owing his call in the “Conclusion” for the love of art for its own sake, Pater 
claims that “the natural charm of pagan story” caused Renaissance artists, 
unlike their scholarly counterparts, to value the beauty of the Greek gods 
solely out of aesthetic appreciation (23). In contrast to the wrongheaded 
attempts of scholars of the period to collocate the pagan and Christian as 
distinct complements, the art of the Renaissance cultivates a “practical truce 
and reconciliation of the gods of Greece with the Christian religion” (27). 
Here Pater foregrounds the capacity of the Renaissance artists to capture 
what their contemporary scholars could not—the method by which the past 
subtly persists in the present.
 Owing much unacknowledged debt to Pater, T. S. Eliot refines the idea 
of a living past in his landmark essay “Tradition and the Individual Talent” 
with the famous line that “the historical sense invokes a perception, not only 
of the pastness of the past, but of its presence.” 6 In his perspective on the 
Victorians, Eliot stridently heeds his own advice that a poet should distance 
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himself “from his predecessors, especially his immediate predecessors” (4). 
For, in his 1930 essay on Arnold and Pater, Eliot attacks them for replacing 
“Religion” with “Culture” and, in Pater’s case, for emphasizing a subjective 
impressionism in aesthetic interpretation. Eliot shuns their mutual “curios-
ity” that might dig up historical material unflattering or antithetical to Chris-
tianity. Then, Eliot quickly devolves into a personal attack on Pater’s mental 
faculties and ultimately tries to decanonize him. Since Pater was “incapable 
of sustained reasoning,” Eliot believes that his work will not influence “a 
single first-rate mind of a later generation” (390–92). The attempt to disem-
power Pater’s influence by and large succeeded, for, as Nathan Scott points 
out, Eliot’s ad hominem attack on Pater’s aestheticization of religion, though 
“utter nonsense,” “proved over the span of a generation to be something like 
a benchmark for contemporary criticism” (64). “Arnold and Pater” appeared 
after Eliot had been baptized into the Church of England in 1927. Thereafter, 
Eliot’s writings overtly promote Christianity, yet he steadfastly maintains his 
critical position on the dynamic between the past and present—content and 
form. As a result, Eliot endeavors to promulgate Christianity as the Western 
tradition, the old wine to be funneled into new bottles.
 The very distinctions made in the process of defining “tradition” mark 
the difference between Pater and Eliot. In each of their forms of rhetoric, 
the diverging pasts that they privilege illustrate the recurrently contested 
realm of canon-formation. For Eliot, the new work of art must “conform” 
to the “existing monuments” that “form an ideal order among themselves.” 
While he states that the individual artist must make the canon alter “ever 
so slightly,” the inclusion of pagan discourses through syncretism, for Eliot, 
would not entail “conformity between the old and new” (“Tradition” 5). In 
contrast to Eliot’s privileging of a self-consciously Christian presence, Pater, 
as we have seen, stresses the pagan sentiment, which is “a part of the eternal 
basis of all religions, modified indeed by changes of time and place, but inde-
structible, because its root is so deep in the earth of man’s nature” (160). In 
a wonderfully evocative description, DeLaura proclaims that Pater’s writings 
strive to move beyond the “inevitably inhibiting Victorian timidity and fear 
of paganism” in order “to provide a new spiritual basis for modern life which 
incorporates nothing less than a ‘comprehensive’ view of the totality of man’s 
past” (Hebrew 181). Indeed, Eliot responds so vehemently to Pater because 
he needs to counter a previous aesthetic critic who first put forth similar 
ideas of form and content, but with an oppositional viewpoint on what com-
posed the tradition. In Pater’s vision, the canon needs to be expanded in a 
more inclusive gesture.
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 The gesture would heal what Pater sees as the rupture between the medi-
eval period and the Renaissance and concomitantly reveal the shared origins 
of paganism and Christianity. In his discussion of “Winckelmann,” which 
propels his thesis beyond the Renaissance, Pater points at the fluid inclusivity 
of history: “Pagan and Christian art are sometimes harshly opposed, and the 
Renaissance is represented as a fashion which set in at a definite period. That 
is the superficial view: the deeper view is that which preserves the identity 
of European culture. The two are really continuous; and there is a sense in 
which it may be said that the Renaissance was an uninterrupted effort of 
the middle age.” For Pater, the temperament of the modern age would ben-
efit from knowing this continuity and the example of Winckelmann whose 
“Heiterkeit, that pagan blitheness,” reflects “a kind of ineffectual wholeness 
of nature, yet with a beauty and significance of its own.” In the rhapsodic 
denouement of “Winckelmann,” Pater calls for a rebirth of the Hellenic heal-
ing ideals of serenity, balance, and unity. As opposed to the art of Christian 
asceticism, the serenity of “art in the pagan manner” kindles sensuousness 
while treating the subject “with no sense of shame or loss” (176–77). Accord-
ing to Pater, the revival of pagan subjects in art awakens the world “with eyes 
refreshed, to those ancient, ideal forms” (181). For the heretical modernist, 
conformity of tradition had little claim as a mandate for art since tradi-
tional content itself is mutable. The historically documented appropriation 
of pagan myths and rituals testifies to that. In a countermove, Thomas Hardy 
deployed an archaic pagan ritual in Tess of the d’Urbervilles in an attempt to 
change everyday life.
Hardy’s Ur-Priestess 
and the Phases of a Novel
In the preface to the Fifth Edition of Tess of the d’Urbervilles, Hardy responds 
to the critics of the novel by calling some of them “modern ‘Hammers of 
Heretics’” who discourage free thought because they “may have causes to 
advance, privileges to guard, traditions to keep going” (6). In reviving an 
epithet applied to, among others, Tomás de Torquemada (1420–98), the first 
grand inquisitor of Spain, Hardy scornfully dismisses the intransigent and 
stifling nature of orthodoxy that secures its continuity. The many scathing 
reviews of Tess had objected to several of its ideological heresies, including 
the lack of providence in the novel, the claim for Tess’s “purity,” and the pres-
ence of pagan inclinations in England. For example, R. H. Hutton, writing 
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for The Spectator, argued against the intention he suspected Hardy had in 
writing the novel, namely, “to illustrate his conviction that not only is there 
no Providence guiding men and women in the right way, but that, in many 
cases at least, there is something like a malign fate.” In contrast to the review 
in The Bookman which stated that the novel’s “first aim is neither to upset nor 
to establish a system either of theology or ethics” (Lerner and Holmstrom 69; 
74), the general tenor of the reviews reveals that the novel did in fact upset 
religious sensibilities and the “keeping” of traditions by imposing heretical 
views.
 The reviews of Tess reveal religious conflict, the fundamental character-
istic of heresy. Two competing ways of thinking converge, and a thorough 
orthodoxy must decide either to crush the upstart ideas or to adopt the new 
tenets. Through the convergence of Christian and pagan cultural values, Tess 
slyly turns this conflict onto itself in order to challenge tradition and gener-
ate a new mode of thought in its readers. In the same preface noted above, 
Hardy describes what we might call the “heresies” of the novel as the “shift-
ing of positions,” and he states that such “shiftings often begin in sentiment, 
and such sentiment sometimes begins in a novel” (6). While Hardy’s state-
ment not only implies a narrative intention to change the way people think, 
of more interest is its description of a “ritual of succession” performed by the 
novel and designed to influence the reception of its readerly horizons. The 
textual history or “phases” of Hardy’s novel and new modes of interpreta-
tions such as New Historicism further illustrate the explicit use of ritual in 
Tess to produce the “shifting of positions.” The myths and rituals of succes-
sion surrounding the Golden Bough structure several plot elements in Tess, 
and the novel invokes this contemporaneous anthropological material not 
only to show how things change, but also to perform and elicit change. Tess of 
the d’Urbervilles—sometimes the character, sometimes the novel—functions 
as the Golden Bough in the eponymous ritual that James Frazer delineates in 
his tome.
 In his general conclusion (added to subsequent editions) to The Golden 
Bough (1890–1915), Frazer, with equanimity, puts his “search after truth” into 
a historical perspective that forecasts an inauspicious future for humanity 
while remaining enthusiastic about the process of “life” (GBA 824). Though 
he feels the progress of knowledge is inextricably bound to advances in sci-
ence, Frazer acknowledges a doomed humanity that will not “have strength 
to speed afresh our slackening planet in its orbit or rekindle the dying fire 
of the sun.” With dripping sagacity, he then develops a metaphor for see-
ing the history of thought as a “web woven of three different threads—the 
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black thread of magic, the red thread of religion, and the white thread of 
science.” Transitional moments between epochs show overlapping threads, 
and the fabric changes color over time as systems of thought supplant each 
other gradually. Frazer suggests that even science can be superseded and 
the “dreams of magic may one day be the waking realities of science” (GBA 
826).
 The idea of the succession of systems of thought is more important to 
understanding the relation between Tess and The Golden Bough than the 
recognition of cyclical or reproductive processes. As Frazer states in the 
preface to the first edition of The Golden Bough (1890), “[t]wo or three 
generations of literature may do more to change thought than two or three 
thousand years of traditional life” (GB viii). With Tess, Hardy wanted to be 
part of the process of changing thought. After he had received three succes-
sive rejections of the half-finished novel in the fall of 1889, and within a few 
months of the appearance of Frazer’s work, he wrote “Candour in English 
Fiction” (January 1890) out of frustration with the tyrannical morality con-
trolling serial publication.7 Mary Jacobus reports that when Hardy returned 
to Tess “in the post-1889 phase of composition,” the “first scenes to be writ-
ten” follow the episode of Tess’s and Angel’s wedding night confessions, and 
that forced and inauthentic narrative intrusions symptomatize Hardy writ-
ing “under precisely the adverse conditions described by ‘Candour in Eng-
lish Fiction’” (87–88). Hardy found that the late Victorian cultural context 
of serial publication made writers conform to prudery or face ruin, so an 
author often “can scarcely help . . . arranging a denouement which he [or she] 
knows to be indescribably unreal and meretricious, but dear to the Grun-
dyist and subscriber” (“Candour” 130). In an attempt to make Tess more 
“pure,” Hardy’s emendations, Jacobus argues, “produced anomalies [such 
as the forced denouement] which the conventional moralists were quick to 
seize on when the novel finally appeared” (79). For instance, the review in 
The Nation stated that the novel “was well adapted to confuse judgment” 
(Lerner and Holmstrom 134).
 The institutional forces at work in the publishing industry had forced 
Hardy once again to acknowledge the need to be subtle in promulgating his 
heresies. On January 1, 1892, he explained his compromise and the trivial 
textual inconsistencies in a letter to Frederick Harrison by revealing that 
the first draft of Tess “said much more on religion as apart from theology,” 
but he “thought it might do more harm than good, and omitted the argu-
ments, merely retaining the conclusions” (Letters 251). While Hardy may 
have repressed some of his religious arguments, the aftermath of Tess and 
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Angel’s disastrous wedding and the manuscript changes in the novel reveal 
that he chose instead to convey his point through a figuration analogous to 
the myth of the Golden Bough, and that he went back and textured the pre-
viously composed narrative with corresponding elements. J. T. Laird reports 
that Hardy revised Tess between November 25, 1889, and the autumn of 
1890, when he submitted an edited version for serial publication in Graphic 
(3–20).8 Graphic published the edited version of Tess in twenty-four weekly 
installments from July to December of 1891. With the serialization of the 
novel finally secure, Hardy, as The Early Life reports, “spent a good deal of 
time in August and the autumn correcting Tess of the d’Urbervilles for its vol-
ume form” (F. Hardy 313). Within days of the first serialized installment of 
the novel, Hardy had finished reading The Golden Bough. The entry for July 
7, 1891 in Hardy’s Literary Notebooks documents his pointed reading notes 
on Frazer’s work (45).
 The intricate degree to which Hardy engages with the subject matter 
of The Golden Bough mandates that we remember Frazer’s original aims in 
tackling his magisterial comparative survey of “Aryan” fertility rites. Frazer 
wanted to explain the custom of worshipping a slain god in terms of both 
the bloody ritual of succession to the priesthood of Diana and the associ-
ated legend of the Golden Bough that Aeneas plucked before his descent 
into the underworld. To paraphrase the legend, Frazer states that the sacred 
grove of Diana grew on the north shore of the lake of Nemi in Aricia, near 
Rome, and a priest who had achieved the title “King of the Wood” guarded a 
certain tree of which only a fugitive slave was allowed to hew a branch. If the 
slave broke off a bough, the Golden Bough according to antiquity, he could 
engage the reigning priest in battle and, if victorious, succeed to the throne 
of the King of the Wood. Though he does not discuss the role of the Golden 
Bough in Tess, Bruce Johnson compares Hardy’s retrieval of the past with 
Frazer’s analytical method. For example, Johnson states that “[w]e have lost 
the meaning” of the “murder of the priest in the grove,” but “it can be recov-
ered though penetration of the strata that comprise its particular formation 
and by a comparative mythology that aids that penetration” (259). Tess puts 
those findings to use as Hardy deploys the ritual for choosing a successor 
as a tool to capture and influence historical change. The ritual has appeal 
due to its pragmatic, diffuse, and varied nature. Indeed, Frazer explains the 
importance of beginning with an investigation of the rites of Diana’s priest-
hood by stating that its rule of succession is not exceptional to Roman lore 
and actually appears dispersed throughout European culture. The centrality 
of vegetation to his study arises not for its own sake, but from the fact that 
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trees, in particular, play a significant role in the various succession rites.
 Unique in its presentation of a divinity suspended between heaven and 
earth, the myth of the Norse god Balder directly leads to Frazer’s conclusion 
that the Golden Bough is mistletoe growing on a venerated oak. Balder, the 
son of Odin, prophetically dreamt of his own death, so all elements of nature 
were compelled to swear an oath against harming him. As Baler was too 
young to take a vow, mistletoe became his Achilles’ heel. A trickster figure, 
Loki, subsequently taunted Balder’s blind brother, Hother, into hurling some 
mistletoe at Balder, immediately killing him. To interpret the myth further, 
Frazer explains the mystical power attached to both mistletoe and oak trees 
in Druid lore. Thought to have fallen from the sky as a gift from the gods, 
mistletoe could function both as a panacea and as protection against fire and 
evil spirits as long as it never touched the humbling ground. Since mistletoe 
is evergreen, it was thought to give life to its host, the oak, traditionally seen 
as having divine blessing and power due to its proclivity to being struck by 
lightning. Mistletoe, in Frazer’s reconstruction of the myth-makers’ mindset, 
then became seen as a product of lightning. Through speculative substitu-
tion, Frazer concludes that the dying Balder personifies an oak whose life-
giving mistletoe has been severed. Similarly, Frazer argues that the King of 
the Wood represented the oak and could be slain only by one of its own 
boughs. (In the novel, the once-revered d’Urbervilles were “made Knights 
o’ the Royal Oak” [30]). Seeing mistletoe as interchangeable with the oak, 
Frazer accounts for the name of Aeneas’s talisman by noting that primitive 
peoples believed mistletoe was the “tree of pure gold” and “shone with a 
golden splendour” because it gave life to the oak and emanated the “sun’s 
fire” (GB 2: 365–68). Frazer later added the more natural explanation that 
mistletoe eventually changes from green to a “golden” color after being cut.
 Embedded deeply in the heathen landscape of the novel, as I will explain, 
the ritual of succession concerning the King of the Wood and his talismanic 
weapon is at once a theme and a performance within the novel. Perhaps the 
“phases” of the novel most overtly illustrate this dual role of the pagan ritual 
cast as a motif of succession. In the Explanatory Note to the First Edition, 
Hardy hints at a profound temporal order in describing the novel as “an 
attempt to give artistic form to a true sequence of things” (3). Each section, 
or “phase,” of the novel conveys the sense of primordial order at work, and 
the narrative develops a corresponding set of scenes, crucial to the plot, that 
suggest the problematic continuity of an ineffable “essence” beneath changing 
outward appearances. After Tess’s violation by Alec, the narrative describes 
her as “the same, but not the same” (125). The narrative complication of this 
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issue during Tess’s and Angel’s mutual confessions on their wedding night 
actually repeats the same question. In Angel’s mind, Tess’s confession makes 
her “another” person than the “woman” he had “been loving” (325). In her 
defense, Tess exclaims that their sordid stories are “just the same” (318), that 
she is still her “very self,” and that what Angel is angry at is in his “own mind,” 
“not in” her (325–29).
 During these significant, suggestive philosophical moments, the narra-
tive points to a buried cliché that history repeats itself with a difference. In 
the midst of transitional, historical moments, the values of the novel appear 
obscurely as, for example, the allusion to the “vague ethical being” which 
Tess “could not classify definitely as the God of her childhood, and could not 
comprehend as any other” (121). Hardy overtly structures the plot of Tess in 
terms of succession, but he is not candid about how he uses a pagan ritual to 
effect change, or with what values he exactly invests paganism. Sometimes 
patriarchy in general bears the brunt of the narrative attack as it points to the 
“wise” idea from Hamlet to “exclaim against [patriarchy’s] own succession” 
(238–39), or as in the statement that the d’Urbervilles are “extinct in the 
male line” (16). But a matriarchal worldview is at best an indirect value of the 
novel. Often of more importance is the narrative concern with the possibility 
that the “old order changeth” (493). As a result, the reviews of the novel often 
capture the threat to orthodoxy posed by the novel without fully discerning 
what constitutes its heresies. W. P. Trent, of The Sewanee Review, described 
Tess as a “novel with a purpose,” and Mrs. Oliphant in Blackwood’s Magazine 
“objected to being instructed by the novel.” However, the reviews remain 
unclear about the nature of the instruction other than, as Clementina Black 
noted in The Illustrated London News, the novel “disturbs” the “conventional 
reader” by presenting an “open challenge” to the “traditional pattern of right 
and wrong” (R. G. Cox 232; 203; 186). In contrast to the prominent heresies 
surrounding the sacraments of baptism, confirmation, and marriage, the 
deeper, subtler structuring device used to “shift positions” bypasses the cen-
sorious eyes of orthodoxy. The humbling, geocentric associations implied by 
the narrative function of the pagan ritual appear simply as results.
 As the novel comments explicitly on the attempt to syncretize paganism 
and Christianity, Tess anticipates a clerical debate over the modernist heresy. 
The modernists, in their most fundamental characteristic, tried to reclaim 
the apparent aspects of “becoming” that the world unfolds, and assimilate 
these ephemera with the static tenets of orthodoxy. In Tess, the parson, “a 
new-comer” to the parish, embodies the synthesis characteristic of modern-
ism in his “ten years of endeavor to graft historical belief on actual skepti-
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cism.” Struggling with this inner turmoil, the clergyman yields to his “nobler 
impulses” and tells Tess that, yes, both the baptism and burial she performs 
for her child “will be just the same” as if he had conducted them. Hardy 
satirically points out how a modernist sensibility in a clergyman can be seen 
as untenable by lay as well as clerical eyes: “How the Vicar reconciled his 
answer with the strict notions he supposed himself to hold on these subjects 
it is beyond a layman’s power to tell, though not to excuse” (135–37). As Jesus 
had bestowed priestly powers on his disciples, the vicar ordains Tess, and on 
both linguistic and ideological levels, the novel constructs Tess as a priest-
ess of her own sect. As the central heresy of the novel, a pagan sensibility 
arises from a narrative that intrinsically links Tess, language, the land, and 
“essence” through rituals associated with the Golden Bough.
 During the scene early in the novel when Angel Clare encounters Tess for 
the first time, the failure to harmonize pagan and Christian belief systems 
becomes a controlling theme of the novel. While Tess performs in a May Day 
Cerealia, her demure charm rises to claim Angel from his clerical-minded 
brothers who want to continue reading A Counterblast to Agnosticism.9 Nev-
ertheless, Angel is drawn to the jubilant atmosphere of the dancing nubile 
women. Angel does dance with a few of the women but overlooks Tess 
until the moment he has to leave. From this opening moment of frustration 
between the future lovers, the novel constructs Angel as a nonbeliever who 
initially retains Christian morals despite his loss of faith. The pagan and 
“natural” elements of Tess draw Angel near, but he does not recognize an 
alternative set of values regarding egalitarian love and premarital sex until 
they have grown estranged.
 Angel does eventually change his values, though, and his “enlighten-
ment” on hearing the “sublimed” remarks of “the large-minded stranger” in 
Brazil testifies to the power the novel invests in words (464). In another strik-
ing example, Alec d’Urberville recants his recent evangelism after hearing 
(decorously unnarrated for the genteel reader) Tess’s “negations” of Christi-
anity drawn from Angel’s “merciless,” objective “species of thinking” (439). 
The narrative states: “Tess’s words, as echoed from Angel Clare, had made 
a deep impression upon him, and continued to do so after he had left her” 
(443). By extension of this power in words to change thought, the novel uses 
a ritual involving choosing a successor—a lingering layer of the past—with 
the idea in mind that repetition with a difference may disturb and change 
minds. Although the ritual of the Golden Bough may be a vacuous supersti-
tion, it may also have efficacy. From the large-scale “phases” of the novel to 
specific instances of revision, the novel cultivates a theme of supplantation 
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woven into its structure and style. By understanding the metaphorical lan-
guage attached to the ritual of the Golden Bough, readers can see how the 
novel includes an example of Mark Schorer’s “analogical matrix,” which sug-
gests “experiences of meaning and of feeling that may be involved in novels, 
and responsibilities for their style which novelists themselves may forget” 
(24). In large part, a rite analogous to the Golden Bough develops the theme 
and defines the style of Tess and its conceptual understanding of a “true 
sequence of things.” As Schorer states, “style is conception,” and metaphori-
cal language can show “us what conceptions the imagination behind that 
work is able to entertain” (45). One central analogy in the novel substitutes 
discourse for ritual, and through the power of words, the narrative voice sug-
gests that education is possible beyond but through the landscape of a pagan 
world: “It was probable that, in the lapse of ages, improved systems of moral 
and intellectual training would appreciably, perhaps considerably, elevate the 
involuntary, and even the unconscious, instincts of human nature” (236).
 With the ambiguously auspicious beginning when John Durbeyfield 
learns of his “descent from Sir Pagan d’Urberville” (14), Hardy had first put 
forth the theme of a latent pagan past that surfaces now and then to struc-
ture the course of the novel. In these moments, Tess picks up the thread of 
The Mayor of Casterbridge and The Woodlanders in that Hardy continues to 
use primitive rituals to portray an atavistic combat that increasingly fails to 
regenerate agricultural fecundity. The existence of paganism in Tess has been 
established by many earlier critics.10 For instance, Charlotte Bonica points 
out the common desire of Hardy’s later characters to search for “a system of 
value capable of replacing the traditional orthodoxies that no longer satisfy 
them” (849). Such a view can still elicit condemnation, for she claims that 
paganism “is nevertheless based on the impossible premise that the natural 
world can function as a source of human value” (852). Though using natural 
selection as a basis for political economy has implications antithetical to the 
basis of civilization, social Darwinism has in fact become a crucial defense 
for capitalism and the anti-welfare state. For less politically charged issues, 
nature has functioned as the basis for seasonal feasts, codes of environmental 
ethics, and physical laws influencing customs, science, and legislation. On 
the other hand, Bruce Johnson argues that the novel valorizes Tess’s view of 
paganism while critiquing Angel’s view of her associations with nature. John-
son states: “Hardy seems to associate the ability to be in touch with primeval, 
pagan meanings with the ability to be in touch with the emotional, primitive 
sources of one’s own being” (261). Angel’s view of Tess is disturbing because 
it enshrines and essentializes her, but this perspective does not necessarily 
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divest the novel of placing a high value on nature or of having other variant 
portrayals of nature. To argue her point, Bonica distorts Johnson’s numerous 
illustrations of how Hardy, Tess, and the novel do derive value from nature. 
Her critique confuses the idea of nature having an inherent morality with 
the possibility of nature being a source of value. Though nature is relatively 
powerless in conflict with civilization, this certainly does not mean its mech-
anisms, laws, and role in life are wrong or can be dismissed. The novel uses a 
pagan ritual as a means to draw attention to “this world” while avoiding any 
mythical elements associated with pagan spirituality.
 More recently, Catherine Gallagher argues, in an explicit demonstra-
tion of New Historicism, that the novel needs to be read in the context of a 
late nineteenth-century fascination with comparative mythology and fertil-
ity rites. Also noting the influence of Pater and Robertson Smith, Gallagher 
addresses Hardy’s implicit dialogue with Frazer’s The Golden Bough and its 
persistent argument that the origin of civilization is inseparable from ritu-
als promoting fecundity. She illustrates how the “lost rituals” surrounding 
Artemis and Diana “stand aloof from the plot” because “formal disconnec-
tions” imply that “archaic sacrificial urges survive” in “the acts of reading 
and writing novels” (429–30).11 Gallagher’s detailed attention both to Angel’s 
allusion to Tess as Artemis and to the sacrificial undertones of the rape scene 
occupies the body of her argument; consequently, she neglects discussing 
Artemis’ Roman counterpart, Diana, and the ritual perpetuating her priest-
hood. Though Gallagher finds that allusions to sacrificial rituals cue “the 
reader to look beneath [the plot] for a level of explanation that is not in the 
story we are reading,” she misses the function of the Golden Bough, one of 
the “ritual possibilities” conjured “without naming them” (430–31). The pos-
sibilities raised by the dialogic exchange between the novel and The Golden 
Bough go unnamed, but the important point is that there are possibilities for 
alternative modes of thought and for change. Still, Gallagher skillfully shows 
how a ritual of sacrificing a supposed virgin is performed by discourse in 
the novel. She is less thorough in explaining why it does so. Wanting to see 
the novel “at cross-purposes with itself,” she sees the ritual in the novel “as 
nothing more than a particularly intense instant in a rather dismal reproduc-
tive cycle” (439). She points to Tess’s somberness in thinking about history: 
“what’s the use of learning that I am one of a long row only—finding out 
that there is set down in some old book somebody just like me, and to know 
that I shall only act her part” (180). Tess’s “dismal” view, what Angel calls 
the “ache of modernism” (177), is related for Gallagher to “the mere ‘sad-
ness’—or pessimism—produced by the historically minded paganizers of the 
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late nineteenth century” (438–39). Still, “dismal,” “mere,” and “pessimism” 
are evaluative judgments that at least some modernist “paganizers” might 
not have held. Additionally, someone historically minded would be less con-
cerned with the emotional effect of discussing a pagan past or the cycles of 
nature than his or her “truth” claim.
 As Laird and Gallagher have shown, Tess and The Golden Bough share a 
dialogic exchange in many intricate and structural ways. This exchange must 
have begun in the post-1889 composition history of the novel after Hardy 
became familiar with Frazer’s work, and at the time when he was pondering 
Tess and Angel’s postnuptial future. The immediate repercussions of Angel’s 
rejection of Tess most dramatically reflect the influence of The Golden Bough 
in the episode concerning the mistletoe. From this moment on, the novel 
activates rites analogous to those of the King of the Wood delineated in 
Frazer’s book in an attempt to effect a change in cultural and intellectual 
thought. Tess performs a pagan ritual not necessarily to retrieve a pagan sen-
sibility but to weave all of the alternative threads into its contextual scientific 
and religious fabric. As the narrative voice states, “Such supplanting was to 
be” (206). The double grammar of this fatalistic statement connotes both a 
comment on destiny and a metaphysical principle.
 If the Golden Bough is mistletoe, the discourse surrounding the para-
sitic evergreen in the novel not only performs analogous elements of the 
pertinent myths and rituals, but it also uses the performance to supplant the 
old ideological associations. The narrative employs the ritual of succession 
against itself in order to elicit a new way of thinking by shifting the values of 
its component parts, and Hardy’s change in calling the sections of the novel 
“phase[s],” instead of the original “book[s]” (Laird 6), connotes growth and 
supplantment as if the narrative were a form of metamorphosis. The compo-
sition history of the novel accentuates this affinity. As J. Hillis Miller states in 
Fiction and Repetition, the novel “is a story about repetition” without “some 
single accounting cause”; and the “relation among the links in a chain of 
meanings in Tess of the d’Urbervilles is always repetition with a difference, 
and the difference is as important as the repetition” (115; 141; 128). The 
phases of a metamorphic narrative such as the ritual of the Golden Bough 
repeat themselves with a difference.
 On the other hand, the discursive exchange between the novel and the 
Balder myth (along with the manuscript changes and Hardy’s narrative com-
promises) suggests that Tess suffers an agonistic performance of the ritual 
designed to reflect back on the function of discourse in the novel and effect 
change in readerly horizons. In effect, Hardy inscribes Tess in a religious dis-
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course like the sign-painter whose scriptural graffiti on the stile inculpates 
her; he then leaves, like the sign-painter once again, the inscription’s “appli-
cation to the hearts of the people who read ’em” (113). However, Hardy also 
leaves outlines in the narrative that accentuate the idea that religion consis-
tently evolves, and that part of this effect is due to forward-minded thinkers 
unfit for their generation. To participate in this evolution, the novel uses the 
Balder myth for reasons similar to those behind Alec d’Urberville’s hiring of 
the sign-painter: “to paint these reminders [so] that no means might be left 
untried which might move the hearts of a wicked generation” (426). Hardy 
had The Golden Bough ready at hand and would not leave a stone unturned 
that might “shift positions.” Words in the novel “are meant to be,” like the 
sign-painter’s, “[c]rushing, killing” (113). Repeatedly, the narrative under-
scores the susceptibility of religion to historical change, “creeds being tran-
sient” (331). For example, Tess can discern the incongruity of Alec’s conver-
sion since “animalism” could “become fanaticism; Paganism Paulism” (420). 
Old Lady Day can become Lady Day, or the Annunciation, and expose the 
arbitrariness of certain holy feasts (392). The narrative voice also states that 
some readers may respond to the sign-painter’s accusatory scrawl by crying 
out “‘Alas, poor Theology!’ at the hideous defacement—the last grotesque 
phase of a creed which had served mankind well in its time” (113, emphasis 
added). Readers relate to ritual discourse in the novel in a manner similar 
to Balder’s symbiosis with the mistletoe, through a mutually constitutive 
element that undergoes successive changes over the course of history. For 
Balder, divinity and the oak are interchangeable—for Tess and her readers, 
being and language. This narratological heresy draws from Frazer’s confla-
tion of Balder, the mistletoe, and the oak to offer its own parallel associations 
between Tess, language, and being.
 First, though, the old ritual must be enacted. For his honeymoon with 
Tess in a farmhouse formerly of the d’Urberville estate, Angel had painstak-
ingly secured some mistletoe in secret. When “they shopped as partners in 
one concern” on “Christmas Eve, with its loads of holly and mistletoe” (294), 
the one concern for Angel is the procurement of the mistletoe. While the 
narrative does not explicitly state the reasons for his actions, the mistletoe 
represents for Angel his consummation with and possession of Tess, a woman 
he considers a pagan and a “daughter of the soil” (180). The phrase, “with 
its holly and mistletoe,” is a late addition to the text, one that explains when 
and where Angel bought his surprise gift and its understated presence prior 
to the wedding (Hardy, Archive 278). More importantly, the insertion point-
edly reveals Hardy’s late engagement with The Golden Bough and his desire 
to employ its central myth. After the purchase of the talisman, Angel dreams 
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of fighting the man who had insulted Tess at market, and he wrestles in his 
sleep with the portmanteau carrying the plant (294–96). He presumably had 
just packed the mistletoe in the portmanteau. In a displacement of his role in 
the myth, Angel dreams of struggling to become King of the Wood and the 
high priest of his Diana. After the wedding, he is “glad” to see the arrival of 
this luggage at the farmhouse, and the added inference is that his satisfaction 
derives from now being able to hang the mistletoe above their bed (313–15). 
In sliding “the massive oak bar” (another recursive addition to the manu-
script) across the door to the farmhouse (315), Angel proceeds with his ritual 
performance that he probably feels would (if he were a believer) sanctify and 
ensure fertility on the night of his wedding to a perceived virgin.
 After Tess’s disastrous confession and Angel’s inability to see beyond his 
double standard, Tess, with the reader, can piece together “the explanation 
of that mysterious parcel” in the luggage when she finally sees the “bough 
of mistletoe” above their bed. Angel had not explained the contents of the 
package to her, “saying that time would soon show her the purpose thereof ” 
(331). Like Balder, she feels intimations of her own mortality in the para-
site—“forgot existence”—and thinks of suicide (332). However, as the nar-
rative voice remarks how “foolish and inopportune that mistletoe looked 
now” (331), the time is not ripe for the ritual sacrifice. The mistletoe has not 
yet faded and become golden. At work here is Gallagher’s notion of ritual 
“standing aloof from plot” and creating “formal disconnections.” Schorer 
adds further illumination in stating that in straining “toward symbolism” 
metaphorical language “can even be counterposed to dramatic structure” 
(44). The mistletoe appears “foolish” and “inopportune” because of the break 
in plot created by the performance of the ritual. Hardy’s additions to the text 
accentuate the narrative discontinuity. The irony multiplies in realizing that 
the emendations added concerning a “changing of the guard” are designed 
to create a new storyline about stories. When Tess later confesses to Angel 
her thoughts of self-destruction under the mistletoe, she states her belief that 
by her own hand she cannot set Angel “free” and tells him that he is the one 
“who ought to strike the blow” (338). Tidying up business at the farmhouse 
later, Angel synecdochically kills his former image of Tess: “The mistletoe 
hung under the tester just as he had placed it. Having been there three or four 
weeks it was turning colour, and the leaves and berries were wrinkled. Angel 
took it down, and crushed it into the grate. Standing there he for the first 
time doubted whether his course in this conjecture had been a wise, much 
less a generous one. But had he not been cruelly blinded?” (372, emphasis 
added). Here the mistletoe has become the Golden Bough in its dying splen-
dor, and Angel the blind murdering brother of Balder.
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 Angel has tried to become a priest of his Diana, and, in placing her in “the 
empty stone coffin of an abbot” during the sleepwalking episode (350), he 
has tried to make her an abbess, a gesture that feminizes a patriarchal religion 
(abbot <Aram. abba, “father”). To persuade Angel to return to the farmhouse, 
Tess whispers the suggestion in his ear, and he “unresistingly acquiesced,” 
after which his dream “seemed to enter on a new phase, wherein he fancied 
she had risen as a spirit, and was leading him to heaven” (351, emphasis 
added). However, each of these supplanting options ignores what Tess con-
siders herself to be. While she retains much of both her Christian and pagan 
heritages, Tess does not “believe in anything supernatural” (438). Rather, in 
beginning her first sojourn in the “uplands and lowlands of Egdon,” Tess “felt 
akin to the landscape” (146–47). Anticipatory of Heidegger’s notion of Das-
ein, the novel emphasizes the relative consciousness of Tess, whose concern 
is the present, for “through her existence all her fellow-creatures existed, to 
her” (221). Tess’s religion is tied to the land—in Hardy’s world, the Heath. As 
a dairymaid or “field-woman,” she is “a portion of the field” (124). After Tess’s 
loss of innocence when “she could come to church no more,” she would ven-
ture into “the woods” where “she seemed least solitary” (120). In these mysti-
cal moments, the narrative stresses the idea that the world is what we make it. 
Though Tess’s “whimsical fancy would intensify natural processes around her 
till they seemed a part of her own story,” the didactic narrative voice declares 
that “they became a part of it” since “the world is only a psychological phe-
nomenon, and what they seemed they were” (121). This phenomenological 
view rubs against the ontological bulk of the novel, but it is used here to sug-
gest that the world, in part, is vulnerable to linguistic manipulation.
 While Hardy certainly does essentialize Tess, the novel also implies a 
common synthesis for all of humanity. To this end, the narrative uses trees to 
mark the outline and import of Egdon Heath, the locale of the “rally” phase 
of the novel, where Tess is most happy and the idyllic “world was drawn to a 
larger pattern” (148). The larger narrative pattern of the novel draws connec-
tions between humanity and natural cycles through its use of myth, etymol-
ogy, and an arboreal allegory. For instance, during their blissful idyll, Tess 
and Angel “passed the leafy time, when arborescence seems to be the one 
thing aimed at out-of-doors,” and the narrative voice then compares Tess to a 
tree: “She was, for one thing, physically and mentally suited among these new 
surroundings. The sapling which had rooted down to a poisonous stratum 
on the spot of its sowing had been transplanted to a deeper soil” (183–84). 
At the end of “Phase the Second,” Tess wonders if “any strange good thing” 
might come with her arrival in Egdon Heath, “her ancestral land.” She feels 
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the irrepressible hope of youth, and “some spirit within her rose automati-
cally as the sap in the twigs” (141). However, throughout the novel, trees 
signify the life of the land, rather than the divinity of a heavenly spirit. The 
novel changes the valence of the divine role of trees in Frazer’s study of veg-
etation rites.
 Rooted in the ground, trees and Tess both reflect Hardy’s call to pay 
more attention to the concerns of this world. The narrative foregrounds this 
ethos most literally when the abandoned Tess walks toward her seasonal 
appointment on a tenant farm and encounters the man who had insulted 
her at market. To escape him and her past, Tess plunges behind “the foli-
age of some holly bushes” and buries “her hunted soul” beneath “the dead 
leaves.” Enacting the traditional role of some fallen mistletoe beside its holly, 
Tess acutely feels her humbled position and contrasts this with “a most inad-
equate thought for modern days”: “All is vanity.” As a form of hewn mistletoe 
analogous to that in the myth of the Golden Bough, she can recognize the 
successive advance of thought: “Solomon had thought as far as that more 
than two thousand years ago: she herself, though not in the van of think-
ers, had got much further” (384). Since she feels that “[a]ll was, alas, worse 
than vanity—injustice, punishment, exaction, death,” Tess identifies with 
her “kindred sufferers,” the shot pheasants, and considers herself “outside 
humanity” (384–86). In this light, her “pantheistic” “essence” (247) is simi-
lar to Balder’s relation to the mistletoe. In 1890, Frazer had found that the 
mistletoe made Balder “a being whose life is thus, in a sense, outside himself,” 
and which “must be strange to many readers, and has, indeed, not yet been 
recognised in its full” (GB 2: 296).
 Tess similarly estranged its readers through its new conception of natural 
relations. In euthanizing the dying pheasants falling from “thick boughs” to 
the ground, Tess, whose career at the d’Urberville estate entailed caring for 
fowls, first confronts those who “destroy life,” singularly characterized as 
“tenant-farmers, the natural enemies of tree, bush, and brake” (385–89). The 
pheasants had tried to escape the dreary, hunted landscape where there “was 
not a tree within sight” (392). In these moments, Tess not only participates 
in a pagan form of renewal but actually functions as the Golden Bough itself. 
Tess’s self-burial most dramatically symbolizes and transforms the Golden 
Bough’s position between heaven and earth when she yearns to lose the 
ideological inheritance of her avatars by bringing them down to earth.
 Tess’s linguistic associations, however, have been rooted in the novel 
since the dance scene when she is first introduced. The May Day “Cerealia” 
dance, a revision of a “traditional rite,” is an example of how “some old 
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customs of their [the forests’] shades remain” “only in a metamorphosed or 
disguised form” such as this “guise of the club-revel, or ‘club-walking’” (20). 
Like the reader, Angel first encounters Tess dressed in pagan garb, though 
his brothers are afraid to be seen with “a troop of country hoydens” (24). 
From this initial description of Tess, Hardy linguistically identifies her with 
forests and the land, for “hoyden” derives from the same Indo-European 
root, *kaito-, “forest, uncultivated land,” that lies fallow in “heathen” and 
“heath.” “Hoyden” is also an emendation (of “girls”) to the manuscript, sug-
gesting that Hardy further cultivated Tess’s ties to the forest in the process 
of revision. In the same opening scene, Hardy also describes the dialect of 
Tess’s people: “the characteristic intonation of that dialect, for this district, 
being the voicing approximately rendered by the syllable UR, probably as 
rich an utterance as any to be found in human speech” (23). In addition to 
being embedded in the title of the novel, the utterance is particularly rich for 
purposes here because, in the Druidic tree alphabet, the equivalent to our 
“u,” “Ur,” is represented by the low-growing evergreen shrub, heather.12
 An arboreal allegory continues when Tess goes to “claim kin” (37) from 
the new d’Urbervilles who have bought her ancestral name. The newness 
is brought home to her by the disparity between the d’Urberville estate of 
“recent erection” and “The Chase—a truly venerable tract of forest land; 
one of the few remaining woodlands in England of undoubted primæval 
date, wherein Druidical mistletoe was still found on aged oaks.” The “sylvan 
antiquity,” however, “was outside the immediate boundaries of the estate.” 
Though Simon Stoke-d’Urberville constructed “his family tree on the new 
basis,” the narrative points out that “a family name came by nature” and that 
these d’Urbervilles were not any more “of the true tree” than anyone else 
(50–52). The last instance of the word “tree” is a change from “stock” in the 
manuscript. In November 1891 when Hardy turned to publish Tess in novel 
form, he further accentuated the arboreal allegory in the book by referring 
to the book itself as a tree. In the Explanatory Note to the First Edition, he 
thanks the editors for enabling him “to piece the trunk and limbs of the 
novel together, and print it complete” (3). The limbs now sprout mistletoe. 
As a whole, the novel develops several fundamental conceptions around the 
image and associations of trees. Even the “ache of modernism” that Angel 
attributes to Tess originates in her response to the sylvan surroundings. 
She states that the “trees have inquisitive eyes,” and their foreboding nature 
causes her to feel the seriousness of life and a deep angst. The trees represent 
the encroaching, successive “numbers of to-morrows just all in a line” (177). 
In its description of the ache of modernism, the novel links trees with suc-
cession, and though the ritual of the Golden Bough drives the changing of 
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values in the novel, the trees themselves persist. In Hardy’s dendrological 
world, such variants as “evergreen oaks” dominate the landscape and the 
final image as they partially “disguised” Tess’s gallows’ pole (542).
 “Druid,” “tree,” “true,” and “endure” all come from the I.E. root *deru, but, 
while Tess points to a truth in trees that endures, the novel does so to establish 
a link between language and being, not to posit any absolute truths beyond 
this fundamental connection. As John Paul Riquelme has shown, the echoes 
of “ur” and “murmur” throughout the novel equally serve to deconstruct 
“conventional structures of adult understanding, including grammar and 
logic” (513). Though Riquelme does not address how the novel describes the 
environmental import of “the syllable UR,” he shows how “Tess d’Urberville 
murmurs” (512) to create an indeterminacy in the novel that is exemplified 
by the opposing centripetal and centrifugal vectors of the last two chapters. 
The centripetal force leads Angel and Tess to Stonehenge where as a “hea-
then” she feels “at home” (536); the centrifugal drive is exemplified by Angel 
and Liza-Lu leaving Tess’s hanging and, in my mind, by the reader recoiling 
from the modern world that condemns her and the sanctity of the natural 
world.
 Tess is a dismal story, and the reader wrenches in despair as Tess suffers 
rape, the imposition of Angel’s double standard, and the refusal of her author 
to destine her to anything except hanging. While the understanding that the 
novel performs a pagan ritual may let Hardy partially off the hook (“self-
sacrificing” Tess must be sacrificed), her fate also suggests the idea that the 
modern world cannot yet abide her. In the following passage, the narrative 
ascribes fundamental change to bodily sacrifice: “the break of continuity 
between her earlier and present existence, which she had hoped for, had not 
after all taken place. Bygones would never be complete bygones till she was 
a bygone herself ” (421). In this logic of ritual sacrifice, we might understand 
the disturbing appearance of Liza-Lu at the end of the novel as a “spiritual-
ized image of Tess” as she becomes Tess’s successor (541). In moments such 
as these, the narrative functions like the Golden Bough. Tess must die with 
the novel, by the novel, so new, more tolerant narratives can be born. Tess 
continues the legacy of heretics such as Bruno who suffered martyrdom for 
the cause of a grand inclusive synthesis. Through an evolving discursive pro-
cess, Hardy’s novel constructs language and being as mutually constitutive 
and suggests that being persists through natural cycles and the horizons of 
readers. To answer Tess’s question, the use of learning about rituals and the 
past is not to recognize oneself as mindlessly homogenized by history, but to 
understand and participate in the process of how things change.
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The fascination with etymology evinced by the work of Pater and Hardy 
exploded during the span from late Victoriana to High Modernism. While 
there was certainly a “curiosity” about the “truths” that “endure,” philology 
also presented language as the vessel carrying the record of historical change. 
Monumental studies quickly followed on the heels of each other from Walter 
Skeat’s Etymological Dictionary (1879–82) to Ernest Weekley’s The Romance 
of Words (1912) to Otto Jesperson’s Language: Its Nature, Development and 
Origin (1922) to the OED in its many fascicles from 1884 to 1928. With such 
rich glosses ready at hand, the modernist literary experiments with myth 
and religion often drew attention to the linguistic root or history of a word 
in order to compel close analysis and exploit the dependence of knowledge 
and being on language. Etymology explores the ruptures in signification that 
a word can display diachronically, though the discipline also evokes a cen-
tripetal drive for original wholeness and primordial synthesis. However, the 
search for integral words always ends, at best, in a speculative, reconstructed 
root. Such studies reveal the multiple and vexed origins that certain words 
have and, more importantly, how words themselves become the site at which 
issues of power are decided. For many of the literary modernists, the Word, 
by inference, became no longer either implicitly divine or immune from 
the processes of history. At the end of this chapter, a brief analysis investi-
gates how two major modernist texts responded to these developments. T. S. 
Eliot’s The Waste Land (1922) and E. M. Forster’s A Passage to India (1924) 
both play comparative religion and the shared origins of Indo-European lan-
guages off each other for very different ends. While Forster’s work continues 
the Edwardian legacy of synthesis, Eliot’s work demonstrates the turn toward 
authoritarian traditional choices.
Chapter 6
•
Fictions, Figurative Heresy, 
and the Roots of English
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 The early twentieth century also saw the birth of modern structural 
linguistics with Saussure’s Course on General Linguistics (1916). While Saus-
sure was teaching this course in Geneva, C. K. Ogden began his forays 
into semantics while establishing the notoriety of the Heretics Society. He 
ventured into a correspondence with Lady Welby and used her theory of 
“Significs” as a starting point for his own thoughts on language. Welby also 
sent off her famous letters regarding signification to Charles Peirce. Hans 
Vaihinger published his Philosophy of “As If ” (1911) in which he argues 
with the buttress of Kant’s Critiques that most forms of knowledge arise 
from the willing acceptance of “fictions” by humanity. Later in this chapter, 
the construction of an “aesthetic fiction” of the sublime (to use Vaihinger’s 
phrase) can be seen at work in D. H. Lawrence’s The Rainbow (1915). The 
early 1920s saw further semiotic developments in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 
(1921) and Ogden and I. A. Richards’s collaboration on The Meaning of 
Meaning (1923). By 1924, Ogden had translated both Wittgenstein’s and 
Vaihinger’s work as he began to use Jeremy Bentham’s “Theory of Fictions” 
as an apparatus for devising Basic English. These issues are discussed in 
greater detail in the afterword where Finnegans Wake and Nineteen Eighty-
Four represent two opposing trajectories of the development of this flurry 
of linguistic thought.
 Amid the postwar fervor for all things English, Richards became one of 
the first professors in Cambridge’s newly launched School of English. The 
Great War also had dealt a death blow to faith in nonbelievers’ minds, and, 
while also an active Cambridge Heretic, Richards began promoting the study 
of literature as “capable of saving us” since it is “a perfectly possible means of 
overcoming chaos” (Science 82–83). In Richards’s mind, poetry provides the 
grandest example of the organization of complex and competing impulses, 
and it could therefore serve as a bulwark against the fragmentation ram-
pant in modern society. The refinement of analytical skills in organization 
would then transfer into everyday life. F. R. Leavis became one of the first 
students in the School of English, and his textual mode of criticism evalu-
ated literature for its moral character and promotion of humanity. His wife, 
Q. D. Leavis, would note later that reading literature can be described as the 
“desire to obtain assistance in the business of living, formerly the function 
of religion” (69). Such was the turn of the study of literature in the 1920s, 
and the Cambridge Clark Lectures and Heretics Society both participated 
in this amalgamation of humanitarian and textual approaches. For example, 
Charles Percy Sanger addressed the Society with his seminal piece of criti-
cism, “The Structure of Wuthering Heights” (1926).
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 As the discipline of English literature germinated in the 1920s, the critical 
focus on the formal elements of a literary work eventually complied with the 
religious orthodoxies behind much of New Criticism, the praxis of which 
sought to harness the sway toward religious disavowal potentially elicited 
by reading. At the forefront, Cleanth Brooks declared that “poems never 
contain abstract statements” since their meaning “cannot be divorced from 
the [dramatic] context in which they are embedded.” The aim of the poet, 
in his mind, is to dramatize intricately “the total situation” so that “it is no 
longer a question of our beliefs, but of our participation in the poetic experi-
ence” (“Irony” 801; 806). The effect of this view of criticism can be to derail 
the capacity of literature to change the way people think, since, as Brooks 
claimed in “The Problem of Belief and The Problem of Cognition” (1947), 
even in understanding the poetic experience the reader “is not asked to give 
up his own meanings or beliefs or to adopt permanently those of the poet” 
(Urn 226). As in his critique of the “heresy of paraphrase,” Brooks believes 
that the poetic experience should not be translated into everyday words or 
situations.
 Though Brooks made these statements in the 1940s, they owe much to 
Richards’s work on what he interchangeably terms the “equilibrium” or “syn-
thesis” within literature in his forays into literary criticism during the 1920s. 
For Richards, “poetry of inclusion” synthesizes a manifold variety of opposi-
tions (e.g., self and society, subject and object), and tragedy best exemplifies 
the perfect culmination of this wholeness. Oscillating between the creation 
of pity and terror, classical tragedy effects a catharsis that confronts the 
spectator with the dissonances of “life.” In Richards’s view, the best tragedies 
are firmly rooted in secular affairs, and he claimed that the “least touch of 
theology which has a compensating Heaven to offer the tragic hero is fatal” 
(Principles 246).
 While an Honorary Member of the Heretics Society, Richards established 
a methodology for analyzing poetry of “inclusion” and “synthesis” in the 
landmark Principles of Literary Criticism (1925). Brooks builds on Richards’s 
argument that poetry generally is not conducive to verifying statements of 
belief, and he aligns Richards’s work with T. S. Eliot’s test for the validity of a 
poetic statement, one which makes all statements the result of dramatic situ-
ations, and therefore irrelevant to evaluation by independent belief systems 
(“Irony” 801). However, Brooks had appropriated Richards’s methodology 
for his own purposes, to argue that a principle of poetic unity precludes all 
discussion of belief. In fact, in his Principles, Richards hopes “we can devise 
a more adaptable morality” (57), and the last chapter, “Poetry and Beliefs,” 
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constitutes a veiled deconstruction of religious beliefs. His heretical leanings 
are so subtle, though, that they are easily appropriated by an orthodox view.
 In “Poetry and Beliefs,” Richards distinguishes between scientific and 
emotive belief, and, since poetry generally consists of emotive statements, 
“only the very foolish would think of attempting to verify [them]” (272). 
The foolish are those who believe literature can create an absolute foun-
dation for religious belief. On the other hand, Richards does believe that 
poetic statements, such as those of Leopold Bloom noted earlier, can be veri-
fied by scientific truths “such as the laws of thermodynamics” and therefore 
can be “brought into connection with what else we know” (285). He argues 
that “certain highly complex and very special combinations” of references in 
verse “can be either true or false” if they “correspond to the ways in which 
things actually hang together” (272). Scientific beliefs hold true in all con-
texts, whereas “revelation doctrines,” to mention his chief example, are emo-
tive, depend on dramatic situations, and “will readily attach themselves [as 
Ellmann notes] to almost any reference, distorting it to suit their purpose.” 
Richards wants to distinguish between “beliefs which are grounded in fact” 
and those “which are due to other causes, and merely attach themselves 
to such references as will support them.” Dramatic situations often create 
a series of relations which are conducive to religious beliefs, but a sincere 
modern intellectual cannot make religion cohere because of the “break-down 
of traditional accounts of the universe” (279–81). Brooks turns the fruits of 
Richards’s methodology into the unilateral conclusion that poetry does not 
state independent propositions because they are part of a dramatic situation. 
In fact, Richards does imply that religious belief cannot attach itself to scien-
tific truths expressed in verse, but those same truths can conversely debunk a 
religious view. This critique is buried in the last few subtle pages of Principles 
of Literary Criticism. Heresy underwrites the origins of New Criticism, the 
haven of orthodoxy.
 In noting the traditional view that the arts convey a mystical sense of 
beauty, Richards explains how emotive relations in art create beliefs in such 
“Eternal Absolute Values” (286). These values remain solely emotive, though, 
and he cites two examples of analysis which beg the question in reviving 
them. In The Necessity of Art (1924), Percy Dearmer argues: “[h]uman speech 
bears constant witness to the universal conviction that Goodness is beautiful, 
that Beauty is good, that Truth is Beauty. We can hardly avoid the use of the 
word ‘trinity,’ and if we are theists at all we cannot but say that they are one 
because they are the manifestation of one God. If we are not theists, there is 
no explanation” (180). Richards then cites another example of a critic insert-
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ing “God,” “the greatest of all emotive words,” into the trinity of truth, beauty, 
and goodness. Though Richards refrains from the “easy,” “wrong approach” 
which finds “such utterances ‘meaningless,’” he equally cautions against mis-
taking “the incitement of an attitude for a statement of fact.” He does believe 
in positing some interpretive propositions, though, and he closes his study 
with a jibe at Dearmer’s claim that “[i]f we are not theists, there is no expla-
nation”; Richards states, “after all there is another explanation, which would 
long ago have been quietly established to the world’s great good had men 
been less ready to sacrifice the integrity of their thought and feeling for the 
sake of a local and limited advantage” (286–87). If we are not theists, Rich-
ards implies, the world would become a better place since the belief in God 
may result in political advantage at the expense of intellectual integrity.
 Richards’s critique of “belief ” in literature not only reveals a decided het-
erodoxy below a seminal account of literary criticism, but also establishes a 
methodology for understanding the synthetic heresies embedded in its con-
temporaneous literary structures and forms. As a modernist critic, Richards 
exemplifies the common desire to come to terms with the incommensura-
bility of orthodox Christianity and developments in scientific and historical 
analysis. As several critics have noted, his analysis of the combination of 
references in a literary work also parallels that of the Russian Formalists, 
and anticipates the reading strategies posited by Wolfgang Iser. Each critical 
school allows for the reader to become estranged by the unique combination 
of traditional discourses in a text. In Principles and even more so in Practical 
Criticism (1929), Richards empowers the reader with the authority to deter-
mine the authenticity and sincerity of events and ideas presented in a text. 
The equipose in a reader’s mind generated by poetry of synthesis becomes a 
substitute religion. For Iser, the “repertoire” of the reader enables the recog-
nition of gaps in a text which then defamiliarize conventional codes of refer-
ence and transform the reader’s belief system. It is a small step to link these 
close reading strategies with the discourse history and ideology of a literary 
text’s structural elements. The repertoire of a reader can include historical 
and political analysis, and, as etymology shows, even each word has a history 
too.
 The informed reader is one who will not ignore the political implications 
of a text, and, as Jonathan Culler argues, criticism has been remiss in discuss-
ing one specific political dimension of literature, its presentation of religion. 
Culler argues that “an uncriticized religious discourse helps to legitimate a 
variety of repressive and reactionary movements,” and that “the teaching 
and criticism of literature may work to legitimize religious discourse and 
strengthen its political power rather than to foster a critique of religion and 
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religious authoritarianism” (71). The advent of New Criticism, veiling its 
orthodoxy, and the previous neglect of the innumerable modernist heresies 
discussed herein testify to Culler’s point. In short, if we are honest and thor-
ough in literary criticism, religiosity in literature must be debated. Modern-
ism is a boon to such a study, for intellectuals from all schools hotly contested 
religious issues, and literary writers often composed synthetic heresies in a 
constructive manner through the complex formal combination of Christian 
and pagan elements. Texts such as Pater’s The Renaissance, Joyce’s “Clay,” and 
Lawrence’s The Rainbow put together synthetic heresies in a manner beyond 
the limitations of Richards’s and Iser’s response theories. Richards internal-
izes the readerly conflict within the literary form, and Iser’s approach is built 
on the negativity of gaps. D. H. Lawrence’s The Rainbow (1915), for instance, 
instead constructs a fiction of the sublime in its endeavor to transport the 
reader beyond the text by acting as if its heretical transfigurations would 
become manifest in reality.
Synthesis and the Sublime in The Rainbow
After the outrage that Jude the Obscure evoked, the inheritance of Hardy’s 
heretical voice fell primarily to Lawrence, who, in a sense, rewrote the battle 
in Hardy’s last novel between the flesh and the spirit in his own first novel 
Sons and Lovers (1913). However, a closer parallel to Jude’s education appears 
in the coming of age of Ursula Brangwen in The Rainbow. This novel also fol-
lows Tess of the d’Urbervilles in its use of a structural pattern designed to elicit 
change in its readers. Soon after the outbreak of the First World War, Law-
rence wrote “A Study of Thomas Hardy” (1914) “[o]ut of sheer rage” against 
the “colossal idiocy” of the war, and this philosophical piece of criticism 
informs the concurrent composition and publication history of The Rain-
bow (Letters 2:212). In particular, Lawrence’s treatise points to the synthetic 
temperament he finds in Hardy’s novels and deploys in the structure of his 
own contemporaneous novel. In the “Study,” Lawrence argues that humanity 
must “reconcile the two” “Absolutes” of “Law” and “Nature” and of “Love” 
and “Knowledge” (123). History has witnessed the great expression of “Law” 
or “Love” but never in equal measure, and Lawrence believes “the supreme 
art” will be the “perfect utterance” which conveys the two elements justly as 
“Two-in-One” (125–28). His own simultaneous attempt at “the supreme art” 
met with a stern backlash of propriety.
 Despite Lawrence’s elision of certain objectionable phrases in the novel, 
The Rainbow was suppressed in November 1915 under the 1857 Obscene 
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Publications Act. Specific passages in the novel, in the words of the Hicklin 
standard of 1868, tended to “deprave and corrupt.” As the prosecutor in the 
case argued, “[a]lthough there may not be an obscene word to be found in 
the book, it was a mass of obscenity of thought, idea, and action, wrapped 
up in language which in some quarters might be considered artistic and 
intellectual” (qtd. in Parkes 21). The affront to conventional taste lay in the 
frank depictions of sexuality of the novel, not its linguistic form. The Rain-
bow is a stellar example of Ellmann’s point that Edwardian writers felt free 
to use the Christian lexicon heretically, for the formal pattern is indebted to 
the symbol of the covenant, the sacrament of marriage, and the doctrine of 
transfiguration. Lawrence’s use of these religious metaphors, however, seeks 
to transcend conventional morality.
 Though the putative obscenity of The Rainbow functioned like heresy in 
obeying the laws of decorous language, the open portrayal of sexuality drew 
the attention of the censors because, like Jude, it was too open. Furthermore, 
Lawrence believed that the lack of subtlety in his impiety principally caused 
the legal action; as he wrote to the publisher, Martin Secker: “The scene to 
which exception was particularly taken was the one where Anna dances 
naked, when she is with child” (Letters 3:459). While Adam Parkes speaks 
of the “blasphemous implications” of the ritualized allusion to David danc-
ing before the Ark (23), Anna’s performance of the sacred rite in a highly 
sexualized manner also entails an earnestness that suggests the scene is bet-
ter understood as heresy. Lawrence’s sincere efforts to liberate the body ran 
counter to wartime morality rallying around orthodox Christianity, but his 
literary sorties were first and foremost serious, and a credible new bedrock 
of scripture to him. A “becoming” view of the world and a revitalization of 
gender relations form part of what might be called the Lawrentian “school of 
thought.”
 The significance of heresy in fulfilling the hope associated with the imag-
ery of pregnancy and the rainbow pointedly structures Lawrence’s “allo-
tropic” novel in which Tom, Anna, and Ursula Brangwen embody a primal, 
atavistic force evolving across generations. At two key moments in the novel, 
Anna and Ursula each have a mystical experience after becoming naked in 
their search for both solitude and consummation. Anna is pregnant with 
Ursula during the ritual dance of “lifting her hands and her body to the 
Unseen, to the unseen Creator who had chosen her.” In a reversal of the gen-
der roles in the biblical scene, Will is Michal to Anna’s David, and witnessing 
his wife’s dance makes him feel “he was being burned alive” “as if he were at 
the stake” (170–71).1 Will needs to be “born at last unto himself,” to “let go” 
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of his control of Anna, and to create a stronger sense of his own self (176). 
When his “absolute self ” becomes manifest and Ursula is born, Anna feels 
the tension between the “here” and the “beyond,” recognizes that “[d]awn 
and sunset were the feet of the rainbow that spanned the day,” and sees “the 
hope, the promise” in the biblical symbol of the covenant (181). Similarly, 
Ursula needs liberation from Skrebensky during the sublime beach scene of 
the denouement, in which “she gave her breast to the moon, her belly to the 
flashing, heaving water” (444). She has faced the might of nature, overcome 
her fear, and then wants a destination apart from her mechanical lover. After 
Ursula breaks from him, the narrative states: “She was as if tied to the stake. 
The flames were licking her and devouring her. But the flames were also 
good” (448). Ursula has performed the rites she learned in utero and links 
them with pregnancy. Again The Rainbow associates the imagery of burning 
a heretic with promise and hope for the future when Ursula first mistakenly 
thinks she is with Skrebensky’s child before she finally sees “a band of faint 
iridescence colouring in faint colours a portion of the hill” and “the rainbow 
of the earth’s new architecture” (458–59).
 In these structural repetitions, The Rainbow suggests that the promise of 
a new covenant depends on sacrifice in the spirit of heretics burned at the 
stake. Similarly, at the end of Jude the Obscure, Jude identifies with Nicholas 
Ridley (c. 1500–55), who was declared a heretic and burnt at the stake in 
Oxford. Jude, too, feels that he is giving his “body to be burned” (296). While 
he had believed that he might serve “as a frightful example of what not to do” 
(256), Sue reminds him that his “worldly failure” is to his “credit” not “blame” 
since the “greatest among mankind are those who do themselves no worldly 
good” (284). In Lawrence’s novel, the rainbow, pregnant with the symbolism 
of a new covenant and the symbolism of pregnancy, implies that in order to 
be born, a new architecture of life must perform and sexualize sacred rites 
and then endure the consequences of heresy. Lawrence rewrote the sacred 
script in order to account for and reveal, as he stated in “Morality and the 
Novel” (1925), the “changing rainbow of our living relationships” (532). The 
novel illustrates that chasing rainbows puts a literary career at stake, but 
Lawrence, Hardy, and the other various heretics in the period from 1883 to 
1924 considered such an endeavor to be a morally obligatory and realizable 
pursuit.
 Chasing rainbows for Lawrence entails a desire for a unified sense of being 
emblematized most pointedly in the novel through marriage. In the world of 
The Rainbow, an ideal marriage synthesizes two beings in a consummate and 
complementary set of gender and sexual relations. Mark Kinkead-Weekes 
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argues that the novel asks readers “to think in terms of forces impelling men 
and women to seek the marriage of opposites,” which for Lawrence “involves 
a kind of death of the self, and a kind of rebirth” (25–26). For example, Tom 
and Lydia achieve “entry into another circle of existence” and discover “com-
plete confirmation” and a “new world” after he let himself “mingle with her, 
losing himself to find her, to find himself in her” (90). This “confirmation” 
is their transfiguration, a recurrent trope often followed by the vision of the 
rainbow and its promise. Tom and Lydia “now met to the span of the heav-
ens,” and Anna “was free to play in the space beneath, between” (91). This 
new covenant born of transfiguration recurs across the three generations of 
Brangwens as Anna later forges a household with Will “under the arch of 
the rainbow” (182) that creates a “door” through which Ursula can eventu-
ally see the “earth’s new architecture.” While this arch of the novel illustrates 
Lawrence’s idea of an allotropic ego at work, the genealogy also extends 
and encapsulates the struggles of Jude who found that it “takes two or three 
generations to do what [he] tried to do in one” (256). Hardy and Lawrence 
represent the two successive generations in the span from 1883 to 1924 who 
likened the conflicts of their heroes and heroines to being burnt at the stake 
for challenging tradition and orthodoxy. Jude and Ursula are heretics, to bor-
row Shaw’s definition, because they were ahead of their time.
 In The Rainbow, the narrative derives its power from the sublime. The 
novel feels obliged to pursue its humanist vision, elevate its readers, and 
confront being in all its infinity and awe, and it hinges the possible achieve-
ment of its ideals on philosophical underpinnings delineating the fictional 
nature of the sublime itself. The narrative reflects a composite of theories 
on the sublime in its portrayal of the terror of uncertainty and self-obliv-
ion drawn by Burke and Schopenhauer, in its creation of the psychological 
dynamic of the experience posed by Kant, and in its elaboration of figures 
of speech to create the aesthetic quality as noted by Longinus. Bruce Clarke 
finds that from “Women in Love onwards” Lawrence “commits himself to a 
sublime style,” which Clarke defines as “attempts to render in prose aspects 
of individual being that the cogito cannot possess” (450). The Rainbow, in 
fact, initiated this style with a signature trope to convey the development 
and synthesis of a sort of ideal ego that Lawrence described in a famous let-
ter of 1914: “There is another ego, according to whose action the individual 
is unrecognisable, and passes through, as it were, allotropic states . . . of the 
same single radically-unchanged element” (Letters 2:183). In this descrip-
tion of a continuity of being passing through metamorphoses in the three 
generations of Brangwens, Lawrence had discovered his sublime subject 
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matter, which for the novel carries much of the Romantic sense of the term. 
In a dramatization of sublime experience, the Brangwens recurrently face 
the dissolution of their sense of self, but Lawrence invests his narrative voice 
with an imaginative drive that restores their being and wills a new order of 
things.
 As a formal innovation corresponding to its subject matter, the trope 
of “as if ” is used by the narrative in The Rainbow to make the mundane 
sublime. In these iterations which pepper the novel and introduce its grand 
rhetoric, The Rainbow dramatizes the ideas of Hans Vaihinger’s The Phi-
losophy of “As If.” In this work, Vaihinger shows his discipleship of Kant and 
argues that humanity willingly constructs fictions and then accepts these 
falsehoods as true in order to survive and thrive. The linguistic form “as if ” 
characterizes the latent, conditional acceptance of fictions, and Vaihinger 
demonstrates this wish fulfillment at work in math, physics, philosophy, and 
religion. Once knowledge of the world is seen as a fictitious construction, 
novelistic discourse such as the transfiguration of the covenant in The Rain-
bow finds legitimacy for its potential realization.
 Vaihinger’s rather accessible major work pointedly informs The Rainbow 
in its explanation of the linguistic form of fictions and “the law of ideational 
shifts.” In much of the treatise, Vaihinger illustrates how scientific concep-
tions such as infinity are fictitious at the core and simply instruments for 
furthering other conceptions of the world. Though the concept of infinity is 
“not a picture of true reality,” it serves as a “logical expedient” for secondary 
constructions or hypotheses that depend on predicating its existence. In con-
trast, religious and mythological fictions are purely inventive in giving shape 
to the world, and aesthetic fictions adapt these constructs for new poetic 
ends. While Vaihinger readily acknowledges his debt to Kant in arguing that 
“the conceptual world is only a creation of the imagination,” he wants to 
stress the fact that scientific and aesthetic concepts “are useful and necessary, 
though theoretically they are false” (63). On this note, he distinguishes his 
work from pragmatism, which, for him, allows utility to prove truth. Instead, 
Vaihinger embraces fictitious concepts and particularly poetic fictions which 
are “not merely legitimate but necessary fictions” for the construction of 
“refined types of social intercourse” (83). For example, the Kantian dynamic 
of the sublime parallels “fictive judgments” which Vaihinger finds to be char-
acterized by the linguistic form “as if.” For Kant, the sublime is to be found 
not “in the things of nature, but only in our ideas,” and it “shows a faculty 
of the mind surpassing every standard of sense” (88–89). While the sublime 
is experienced subjectively when reason fails or is defied as in facing the 
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boundless magnitude of nature, the mind can have this experience precisely 
because it is aware of both its cognitive limitations and ability nevertheless 
to rationalize an account of the infinite. When Kant “speaks of an Idea,” Vai-
hinger claims, “an ‘as if ’ is somewhere hidden” (94–95). People experience 
the sublime as if infinity or boundlessness can be understood as a whole. In 
“as if ” formulations, Vaihinger argues that the expressions first deny “objec-
tive validity” or insist upon “the impossibility of what is stated in the con-
ditional clause,” but then assert that “this judgment, although subjective, is 
permissible or even necessary” (95). In both the Kantian sublime and “as if ” 
fictive judgments, a process of elevation occurs despite the lack of rational 
certainty.
 In the law of ideational shifts, Vaihinger illustrates how ideas develop in 
stages of being fictions, hypotheses, and dogmas, and how these ideas can 
also degenerate across this spectrum. Fictions become hypotheses because of 
their similar instable core construction, but while fictions remain subjective 
formulations, hypotheses endeavor to receive verification in objective real-
ity. Yet hypotheses do not have the rigidity of a dogma and therefore create 
a “tension which must be exceedingly disagreeable to the mind.” The pure 
subjectivity of fictions makes this tension greater and furthers their tendency 
toward becoming hypotheses. The transition from hypothesis to dogma Vai-
hinger explains along the same lines; the psyche strives to avoid the disquiet-
ing feeling of instability implicit in a hypothesis, and makes it “more stable 
through repeated confirmation” (125). This also explains how a fiction can 
immediately become a dogma. He states that “the psyche” is “impatient to 
rid itself ” of the tension concomitant with the inability to make ideas cohere 
(127). Doubt turns a dogma into a hypothesis and eventually a fiction, and 
Vaihinger believes this process of decay is apparent in religions from those 
of ancient Greece to Christianity. He believes all dogmas are illegitimately 
founded, and he even cautions against transforming fictions into hypotheses. 
Instead, he declares that we must not “substitute for reality what has been 
deduced from the fiction”; instead we should “recognize them as fictions and 
be content with this knowledge” (90). In the law of ideational shifts, there is 
a parallel for the process by which a heresy often will become accepted as 
orthodoxy. Previous orthodoxies will become crusty and doubt-ridden, and 
heresies take their place as the new doctrinal dogma. Lawrence’s syntax of “as 
if ” creates a figurative heresy that defamiliarizes the doctrine of transfigura-
tion; the “as” draws in the comparison with familiar biblical references, but 
the conditional “if ” sends them away as an impossible fiction. For instance, 
when Tom discovers “another centre of consciousness” through Lydia, he felt 
“as if a strong light were burning there, and he was blind within it, unable 
Franke_final.indb   184 1/28/2008   4:40:18 PM
C HA P T E R  6 :  T H E  RO O T S  OF  E NG L I SH
to know anything, except that this transfiguration burned between him and 
her, connecting them, like a secret power” (38).
 Through the lens of Vaihinger’s treatise, Lawrence could envision the 
world as an elaborate set of fictions whose successful actualization depends 
on rhetoric. In this vein, the argument of The Rainbow parallels Bloomsbury’s 
use of Moore’s Principia Ethica to convince others of what is “good.” One of 
the major strengths of the rhetoric in The Rainbow lies in the insistency with 
which the narrative invokes its signature simile. “As if ” appears on nearly 
every page, and the trope clusters around figurative moments when the nar-
rative leaves off simple description and reaches for the sublime. The second 
paragraph of the novel sets forth this technique in its general description of 
the family: “There was a look in the eyes of the Brangwens as if they were 
expecting something unknown, about which they were eager” (9). Tom feels 
his surrogate lineage in Anna since it “was as if his hope had been in the 
girl” (120), and when Will discovers his “absolute being,” he feels “as if now 
he existed in Eternity” (179). As in the Kantian movement of the sublime, 
Will’s contentment follows much strife. Perhaps the most painful degree of 
his loss of self occurs just before he gave up “the master-of-the-house idea” 
when Anna makes him feel a fool regarding the miracle at Cana and his 
hold on the religious doctrine dissolves. The following narrative description 
of his psychological conflict epitomizes Vaihinger’s philosophy: “The water 
had not turned into wine. But for all that he would live in his soul as if the 
water had turned into wine. For truth of fact, it had not. But for his soul, it 
had” (160). Here the “as if ” trope blurs with the modernist doctrine of “vital 
immanence” in that it too compels a “special sentiment” striving to manifest 
“the reality of the divine.” The make-believe games of Ursula’s childhood 
intuit what she can express later in describing her beliefs as solely based 
on humanity and love. The prepubescent games were “a sort of fiction to 
them” (244), but she keeps a sense of this childlikeness in the philosophy of 
her coming of age: “Truth does not lie beyond humanity, but is one of the 
products of the human mind and feeling” (317). Truth is a construction for 
Ursula, and the sense of “fictions” underwriting the novel adumbrate post-
structuralism.
 Much of the criticism on Lawrence’s novel has focused on issues relevant 
to other concerns of this study, for the Lawrentian legacy understandably 
carries forth his retrieval of primitivism, concomitant liberation of the sexual 
body, and battle against the resultant charges of obscenity. The early works, 
Sons and Lovers and The Rainbow, strove to make necessary breaks from 
tradition and orthodoxy in order to catalyze Lawrence’s vision. As a result 
of this critical emphasis, Lawrence, as Garrett Stewart notes, “has had scant 
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attention paid . . . to the words he used to gain his leverage on the literary 
imagination.” Instead, Stewart asserts that Lawrence’s style is “characteris-
tically good, complex, and uniquely resonant,” and intricately shows this 
craft at work in Lawrence’s “transcendental vocabulary and grammar of ‘to 
be’” (219; 218). Stewart’s essay surveys most of Lawrence’s major works and 
nuances their allotropic style of representing being, so it is not surprising 
that analysis of specific scenes escape its purview. The marriage of Will and 
Anna, in particular, demonstrates at once Lawrence’s formal innovations 
regarding the grammar of being, the axiom of synthesis, the imagery of her-
esy, and the trope of transfiguration.
 In the opening scene of “Wedding at the Marsh,” the narrative anoma-
lously breaks into the present tense to describe the temporality from the 
arrival of the carriages to the conveyance of the wedding party to the altar 
where Tom gives Anna away. The present tense is capturing the passing on 
of her hand as if it were the passing on of an allotrope. The verbal tense is 
quite conspicuous in documenting this wedding presence from how there “is 
a great bustle,” to how there “begins to be more room,” to how Anna “puts 
her hand very lightly on [Tom’s] arm,” to how “she is in ecstasies with herself 
for making such a lovely spectacle” (124–25). Anna, who “was in the present” 
(125), and Will become transfigured in this marriage of beings, and the nar-
rative present tense strives to act as an apotheosis of this synthetic moment 
of being. Will is a changed man and feels “as if the surface of the world had 
been broken away entire” since “a man wasn’t born before he was married.” 
The preceding “as if ” clause introduces a catalog of the everyday which then 
“peeled away into unreality” in the face of “one’s own being . . . suddenly 
become present” (139). Amid this all, Tom must suffer the pains of the here-
tic. As they “stood before the altar,” he sacrifices his claim to Anna in order to 
enable the transfiguration as if his stare “at the burning blue window” could 
see through his “pain” to the future when he “was finished.” In the window 
which “burned alive in radiance,” Tom feels “the clue” that one may “never 
get old, never die” (125–26), and this experience leads to his epithalamium 
which concludes with the synthesis that “an angel is the soul of man and 
woman in one” (129). In his “Study of Thomas Hardy,” Lawrence states that, 
though no one has yet found “perfect consummation of marriage,” “every 
generation can get a little nearer” (127). For Lawrence, “the supreme art” 
eyed this angelic synthesis in human terms as its goal that could be achieved 
by acting as if the reconciliation were a fait accompli. As the enactment of 
“Two-in-One,” a “Consummate Marriage” for Lawrence enables the continu-
ity of being, and the allotropic quality of being allows for subsequent genera-
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tions to adapt to and transform the fictions of their time.
 The wine of one generation might be vinegar to the next. Lawrence’s use 
of the allotropic metaphor closely parallels Hardy’s play with “phases” in 
Tess. While the ritual of succession to the King of the Wood points to “creeds 
being transient” in Hardy’s novel, the trope of “as if ” propels the creation of 
new religious fictions in The Rainbow. In each novel, these telic discourses 
orient toward the sublime. Since “religion” had been “another world” for 
Ursula and “she held that that which one cannot experience in daily life is 
not true for oneself,” the novel constructs a sublime fiction out of her quotid-
ian existence. After the first of two chapters entitled “The Widening Circle,” 
Ursula has reached a stage in her life akin to one of Vaihinger’s ideational 
shifts in which religion is no longer a dogma but a fiction. Religion “now fell 
away from reality, and became a tale, a myth, an illusion, which . . . one knew 
was not true—at least for this present-day life” (263). Once orthodox religion 
is just a fiction she becomes free to create her own.
 Hence Ursula begins to experiment with both heterosexual and homo-
sexual love to satisfy her curiosity for knowledge, and she wants to make 
her mark in what the novel calls “the man’s world” and associates with 
education. In a striking passage describing her scholarly preferences, Ursula 
experiences intimations of the sublime. Since she found “the close study of 
English literature” to be the “[m]ost tedious” subject, she asks “[w]hy should 
one remember the things one read?” The answer to her seemingly disillu-
sioned question immediately follows since “in odd streaks” she received “a 
poignant sense of acquisition and enrichment and enlarging” (310). Such 
elevation to the sublime moves within her in moments when she actually 
reads literature. The first case mentioned simply notes her reading of As 
You Like It, the Shakespeare play probably chosen for the resonance of the 
title with the wish fulfillment nature of the “as if ” iterations. Ursula also 
“heard a passage of Latin” “with her blood” and “knew how the blood beat 
in a Roman’s body,” and she then forever “knew the Romans by contact.” 
Ursula even “enjoyed the vagaries of English Grammar, because it gave her 
pleasure to detect the live movements of words and sentences” (310–11). In 
The Rainbow, the “as if ” clause produces the “live movements” of the narra-
tive as the trope which turns the transfiguration theme and transfigures the 
covenant. For instance, Ursula went with Skrebensky “out of the church, as 
if her feet were beams of light that walked on flowers for footsteps” (282). 
Ursula becomes self-luminous like Christ in his Transfiguration. The novel 
too seems to “enjoy” the vagaries of the conditional and subjunctive clauses, 
and the emphasis on the “live movements” and “the present-day” in the 
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preceding passages self-referentially points back to the present tense of Will 
and Anna’s wedding scene.
 In the malleable world of the novel in which orthodox dogmas have 
become fictions, the “as if ” clauses strive to elevate the present to the sub-
lime. As Vaihinger states, “[a]esthetic fictions serve the purpose of awaken-
ing within us certain uplifting or otherwise important feelings,” and are “a 
means for the attainment of higher ends” (82). The struggles of the Bran-
gwen family across generations between the “here” and the “beyond” remain 
rather unresolved at the end of the novel, but the narrative, in all its transfig-
uring tropes, lays the foundation for Lawrence’s new architecture of consum-
mation that Ursula will find in the companion novel Women in Love (1920). 
To achieve this end The Rainbow narrates a series of generational phases in 
which each of the allotropic characters experiences the sublime by oscil-
lating between the terror of the dissolution of self and the surge of forging 
a grander union of being. Desire is the cause of this tension, and romantic 
relationships become Lawrence’s touchstone for the dialectic between the 
pain of denial and the pleasure of intimacy. In his violent sensuality with 
Anna, Will experiences “ultimate beauty, to know which was almost death 
in itself ” (219). When Skrebensky kisses Ursula, “she quivered as if she were 
being destroyed, shattered” (414), even though she had earlier thought he 
would lead her to “a consummation, a being infinite” (409).
 The Brangwens experience an inner turmoil, likened to the martyrdom 
of heretics, because of a narrative desire to subsume the doctrine of trans-
figuration in an apotheosis of human relations. There could be nothing more 
sublime. The narrative strives to transcend Christian asceticism by using 
the inherent process of sublimation in asceticism to achieve its vision of the 
sublime. Ursula, in fact, ventures out ever further into the “widening circles” 
after recurrent renunciations of pleasure. The psychology of desire which 
constitutes so much of the novel incorporates a sense of the processes of 
sublimation, and another contemporaneous text, Freud’s “On Narcissism” 
(1914), may have informed Lawrence on the topic. Without sublimation 
there would be no sublime. The allotropic changes across generations and the 
narrative delay of Ursula’s fulfillment across novels ultimately stellify Ursula 
with Birkin in Women in Love. Just before their consummation and subse-
quent flight to the Continent, Ursula sees Birkin “as if she were enchanted, 
and everything were metamorphosed” (304). The fictions of transfiguration 
and the sublime have achieved full synthesis, and “philosophy and fiction” 
for Lawrence have “come together again.” Ursula and Birkin’s “perfect rela-
tion” in which they are “free together” (308) becomes a new creation-myth 
Franke_final.indb   188 1/28/2008   4:40:19 PM
C HA P T E R  6 :  T H E  RO O T S  OF  E NG L I SH
of a constellation that raises them to the heavens as “two single equal stars 
balanced in conjunction” (143). Lawrence’s sublime style elevates his charac-
ters to celestial bodies as “Two-in-One,” and the mutual gravitational pull of 
their orbit emblematizes the tension of centrifugal and centripetal forces at 
work in Bakhtin’s notion of heteroglossia. While this may make the Lawren-
tian sublime postmodern and founded on the abyss in Lyotard’s sense of the 
aesthetic term, it nevertheless illustrates the subtle development of heretical 
syntheses so characteristic of modernist literary history.
The Choice of Tradition and the
Synthesis of Being
In successive years, T. S. Eliot and E. M. Forster each went up to Cambridge 
to deliver the esteemed Clark Lectures. Eliot’s “Varieties of Metaphysical 
Poetry” (1926) and Forster’s “Aspects of the Novel” (1927) both demonstrate 
the turn of English studies toward analysis of formal structures while decid-
edly retaining a humanist sense of the arts as the staple of civilization. Both 
lectures enable us better to understand the major works that preceded them, 
The Waste Land (1922) and A Passage to India (1924). In each literary piece, 
linguistic roots linking Indo-European languages and culture demonstrate 
the tension between centripetal and centrifugal forces that function in a text. 
The analysis of these two texts sketches the legacy of heresy at the tail end of 
this literary history; the afterword examines the fate of heresy in later like-
minded texts. In the last section of Eliot’s poem “What the Thunder Said,” the 
poetic voice endeavors to control the divisions of a pluralistic, fragmented 
modern society with a ritualistic display of authorized subject and object 
relations. The heresy of the poem is etymological in its root sense of “choice,” 
a function at work in dogmatically determining what traditions constitute 
the world. As Chesterton had advised, however, Eliot thinks his choices 
are “right” and considers them orthodox. In Forster’s novel, what had been 
a fearful thunderclap ushering primordial peoples into caves becomes the 
echo of a linguistic past uniting being, language, and the religious discourses 
associated with mosque, cave, temple, and church. Here Forster continues 
the Edwardian mode of synthesis in a variation of his desire to “only con-
nect.”
 A hotly contested issue in the study of Eliot’s work has been the question 
of the “two Eliots” and whether his literature prior to his 1927 entry into 
the Church of England can be reconciled with the overtly Christian nature 
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of his later work. F. R. Leavis sought to establish a consistency in Eliot’s 
oeuvre through the value of classicism Eliot always espoused, and on this 
note Kenneth Asher analyzes Eliot’s posthumously published Clark Lectures 
from 1926 to argue for “a strongly continuous Eliot, with no major rupture” 
(18). Asher believes that in these last statements before Eliot’s conversion, 
the lectures build on his previous essay, “The Metaphysical Poets” (1921), 
but reduce the stature of Donne’s “sensibility” and indirectly elevate Dante’s. 
For Asher, this moves “Eliot closer to the religious center of a tradition he 
had always embraced on political grounds” (22). In the early essay, Eliot puts 
forth his famous notion of the “dissociation of sensibility” that set in after the 
metaphysical poets and sundered the “recreation of thought into feeling.” At 
the same time, he lauded “the poet’s mind” as a synthetic site “amalgamating 
disparate experience” and distanced it from the “ordinary man’s experience” 
which is “chaotic, irregular, fragmentary” (246–47). All this is familiar and 
so too perhaps is the notion that the relationship between form and content 
in The Waste Land embodies the literary values of this and Eliot’s other early 
essays on the use of tradition, emotion, and mythical order. In its synthesis 
of fragments, the form of The Waste Land acts as a performance of the rituals 
it discusses, and the performance orders the anxiety of modern experience 
and strives to overcome chaos, to paraphrase Richards. Eliot appreciated 
Richards’s theory of equilibrium in a synthetic reader’s mind and wanted to 
insert morals into the equation, but what I want to stress here is that Eliot’s 
choice of fragments, rituals, glosses, and linguistic roots for the poem is sec-
tarian and orthodox and further establishes the continuity of Eliot’s career.
 In Eliot’s “Notes on ‘The Waste Land,’” he famously directs readers seeking 
elucidation of the poem to Jessie L. Weston’s From Ritual to Romance (1920) 
and “The Perilous Chapel” chapter in particular. He does also acknowledge 
the general influence of Frazer’s The Golden Bough, but Weston’s slim and 
highly speculative work takes precedence for its application of Frazer’s volu-
minous documentation of rituals restoring fertility and social order to the 
legend of the Holy Grail. Though Frazer had subdued references to Christ 
as another in the line of mythical slain gods like Balder for his abridged edi-
tion (1922), Weston’s book championed the Grail as “a living force” founded 
“upon the ruins of an august and ancient ritual” that can disappear only to 
“rise to the surface again, and become once more a theme of vital inspira-
tion” (187–88). She even suggests that the Templars were condemned as 
heretics for keeping the ritual alive in secret, and this reflects the proclivity in 
modernist literary history for seeing heresy become the orthodoxy of future 
generations.
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 When the amalgamating voice in Eliot’s poem asks about “the roots that 
clutch,” it inserts “Son of man” at the end of the questioning lines before 
telling its “chaotic” readers “You cannot say” since they know only “broken 
images” (19–22). Though Eliot points to Ezekiel for his use of the phrase 
“Son of man,” where it means “member of the human race,” the line-break 
and its lingering pause establish the common association with Christ as at 
least an initial answer to what clutches. The genius and wonder of the poem 
rests on such ambiguity and duplicity with its surface tension of diverse, frag-
mented languages and apparent syncretism of diffuse myths and religions, 
while at a structural and theoretical level, it spins Indo-European roots, Bud-
dhism, and The Upanishads for orthodox Christian ends. As the original title 
of the poem suggests, Eliot “do the police in different voices.” The “Jug Jug” 
(103) of the poem may connote brutal sex and the sound of a nightingale on 
one level, but below that repetition is “The Jug” of Bentham, his euphemism 
for the juggernaut power of organized religion.
 In “What the Thunder Said,” the Christian tradition comes to the fore in 
the first stanza with allusions to Christ’s trial and crucifixion and continues 
in a benediction of the Indo-European root *da- enacting Eliot’s idealized 
relationship between subject and object, order and myth, and the individ-
ual and tradition. In the fable from The Upanishads about the meaning of 
thunder, Eliot had found an antecedent for his literary values in the Hindu 
mantra “datta, dayadhvam, damyata” (give, sympathize, control). Embedded 
in such words of ours as “democracy,” “demagogue,” “Zeitgeist,” and “time,” 
the reconstructed root *da- (“to divide”) underwrites the variant interpreta-
tions of God’s will in the fable, but the interaction of these divisions creates a 
sense of control. For the poem offers its own interpretation of the mantra by 
inserting, after a colon, an English version of the meaning of its divided parts 
defined by references to Christianity and the Fisher King. As Bakhtin argues, 
“Indo-European linguistics” directs attention “away from language plurality 
to a single proto-language” and helps to determine the “content and power 
of the category of ‘unitary language’” and “its creative, style-shaping role in 
the majority of poetic genres” (271). The centripetal drive in the Ursprache 
of The Waste Land parallels its choice of tradition, and those included in the 
canon must serve the restoration of the social order.
 Eliot considered “What the Thunder Said” not only the best section of the 
poem, but also a justification of the whole work, and this fifth part occupies 
both the position of catharsis in classical tragedian structure and the role in 
ritual order of replenishing the postwar European wasteland. The *da- root 
also runs below the word “daimon,” the lesser deity which originally signified 
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“divider and provider,” as the thunder brings fear but also the nourishment of 
rain. In the first two interpretations of God’s imperative in the thunder, “give” 
entails an individual subject putting feeling into form, but to create order out 
of myth and establish control, the subject must “sympathize” with traditional 
thought and narrative. The Waste Land betrays its sympathies in its choice of 
traditions, for they are strategically chosen to prop up orthodox thought. To 
paraphrase the lines of verse following the datta and dayadhvam, the poem 
suggests that to break out of the prison of our egos we should be receptive 
to Christ since nothing can compare with his self-sacrifice. Despite the reso-
nance of the Hindu fable, the allusions to Eastern traditions in the poem are 
rather scant. Buddha’s fire sermon is reduced to “burning” (311), and the 
ascetic plea misses the balance of The Middle Way. The fruitless love of Ant-
ony for Cleopatra and Aeneas for Dido segues into modern analogs for failed 
gender and sexual relations, and with further illustration of debased sex and 
the turn to spiritual concerns the ascetic tenor of the poem becomes clear. 
In this vein, The Waste Land exemplifies the claim of Jane Harrison’s 1921 
address to the Heretics, as discussed earlier, that modern religion improves 
life through “the function of choice and the practice of asceticism,” which “is 
necessary for eminence in art.” In contrast to the “complete nonconformism” 
of Surrealism, the modernist experimentation with form in Eliot’s poem 
demonstrates how heretical discourses can be appropriated by orthodoxy. 
While heresies may become orthodoxy as Shaw, Harrison, and Weston sug-
gested, such a process enables orthodoxy to react, learn to don the clothes of 
the heretic, and write such books as “A Primer of Modern Heresy.”
 The landmark nature of The Waste Land makes it not surprising that two 
years later Forster might have rewritten the import of “What the Thunder 
Said” in the etymologically inflected chant “Esmiss Esmoor,” which creates 
a new legend in A Passage to India. In fact, Forster’s novel alludes to both 
the beginning and end of Eliot’s modernist epic. The famous first line of 
the poem informs the phrasing of time, “April, herald of horrors, is at hand” 
(124), when the travelers are about to venture into the caves, and the transla-
tion of the poem’s concluding “shantih,” “the Peace that passeth Understand-
ing,” frames the disastrous trek with this restful “gesture” that manifests when 
“the whirring of action ceases” (280). In the middle of this circumscription 
lie the dark caves whose echoic effects epitomize the “muddle” theme of the 
novel. The chant echoes through the remaining narrative and into Forster’s 
discussion of two “Aspects of the Novel,” prophecy and rhythm, that he 
presented as part of his Clark Lectures. Trying to be in tune with English 
studies at Cambridge, the lectures on textual analysis are primarily human-
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ist in concern. Forster argues that prophecy is “an accent in the novelist’s 
voice,” the theme of prophetic fiction is “something universal,” and, since it 
“proposes to sing,” the “strangeness of song” in prose is “bound to give us a 
shock” (181). In his textual discussion of rhythm, Forster simply defines it as 
“repetition plus variation” (240) which makes the novel cohere “because it is 
stitched internally” (236). Forster’s stature as a novelist by and large grants 
the lectures the critical import they retain, and the debt is further evident in 
the resonance of the lectures with A Passage to India. The continuities sug-
gest that he could not help basing his analyses on his own creative practice, 
for the chant of “Esmiss Esmoor” is stitched with the Indo-European root 
*es-, meaning “to be” or “be,” and the rhythm of this “song” reverberates 
through the denouement of the novel. The narrative voice declares that the 
“song of the future must transcend creed” (298), and the syncretic drive of 
the novel strives to subsume any traditional orthodoxy.
 On several levels, A Passage to India dramatizes the susceptibility to 
misinterpretation that rises in the clash between cultures and languages. In 
addition to the trumped-up allegations that put Aziz on trial, Mrs. Moore’s 
belief that her encounter with Aziz in the mosque could be misunderstood 
and Ronny’s disparaging perception of Aziz’ missing collar-stud point to the 
workings of heteroglossia and the idea that sectarian and colonial relations 
create a “muddle.” The novel suggests that the origin of calumny and failed 
communication lies in the insularity of linguistic cultures and in language 
itself. Despite the differences between India and British cultural expecta-
tions, Aziz, Mrs. Moore, and Fielding all try “to bridge the gulf between East 
and West” (26). In particular, Mrs. Moore grants divinity to India and desires 
to see the land and its people on an equal standing in the world community. 
She states, “India is part of the earth” (53), and “God is here” too (18), yet she 
struggles to verbalize her feeling that “God . . . is . . . Love” (53). The ellipses 
will be filled in later at Godbole’s religious ceremony, but “by an unfortunate 
slip of the draughtsman” the words become “God si Love” (320).
 Amid a place “full of misstatements” that confuse English and Indian 
relations (117), Aziz wants “to symbolize the whole into some truth of reli-
gion or love” (16), and one of his verses went “straight to international-
ity” (329). The English and the Indian peoples are “Aryan Brother[s]” (26), 
anthropologically linked, but Aziz has the larger vision that “[a]ll men are 
my brothers” (125). He dreams of “universal brotherhood” that “became 
untrue” “when put into prose,” and Mrs. Moore believes India needs “some-
thing universal” to have “barriers” “broken down” (160). Godbole’s choir 
sings of loving the “whole universe,” and “tiny splinters of detail” in the song 
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momentarily create “universal warmth” (321). Forster claimed in his lecture 
that the “face” of prophetic fiction “is toward unity” and elicits “the sensa-
tion of a song” (197). He was not concerned with the “particular view of the 
universe” in the work of prose, but rather “its implication that signifies and 
will filter into the turns of the novelist’s phrase” and “minutia of style” (182). 
The *es- root definitively emblematizes this “minutia of style” as one of the 
“splinters of detail” that imply a universal theme in the rhythmic repetition 
of the root linking language and being.
 Despite prophesying a binding humanity, the novel illustrates the forces 
that work against this synthetic vision by repeatedly playing with the nature 
of writing and the origins of language. The reconstructed *es- root is part of 
a motif in the novel that centers on the linguistic change concomitant with 
the diaspora of the primordial Aryan people, the proto-Indo-Europeans. 
However, Godbole offers supplications for “[c]ompleteness, not reconstruc-
tion,” and he wants to impel beings “to that place where completeness can be 
found” (321). The novel suggests that a reconception of being is necessary to 
attain such synthesis, and it begins by revisiting the origins of being and lan-
guage in the Marabar Caves, which are “older than all spirit” and “unsealed 
since the arrival of the gods” (136–38). Pilgrims, however, “find too much 
of it” (136), as Adela Quested and Mrs. Moore discover. After they hear the 
“terrifying echo,” it “began in some indescribable way to undermine” Mrs. 
Moore’s “hold on life” (162–65). The dissolution of self into a larger concep-
tion of being is unbearable, and she experiences the sublime. Filled with 
despair, she cannot continue her journey into the caves, and pointedly she 
cannot finish her letter. She loses possession of her “sincere words,” becomes 
terrified with the vastness of the universe, and “knew that” Christianity’s 
“divine words from ‘Let there be Light’ to ‘It is finished’ only amounted to 
‘boum’” (166). She not only critiques the “fictions” of language here, but 
“boum,” French for “boom,” evokes a theory of language positing that cave 
dwellers began speaking in echoic imitation of natural sounds—in this case, 
thunder.
 When the crowd at Aziz’ trial begins chanting “Esmiss Esmoor,” a similar 
interplay of language, being, and divinity comes forth (250).2 As the crowd 
“Indianizes” Mrs. Moore’s name, the sibilant invocation tries to bring her 
into being. After the chant inflects her name with the call of the I.E. root 
for “to be,” there grew “signs of the beginning of a cult” devoted to this new-
found divinity (285). Still, the narrative voice acknowledges that meditations 
on divine being such as “He is, was not, is not, was” may just be “games 
with words,” for being depends upon language (317; 307). In The Order of 
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Things, Foucault illustrates how the copulative function of the verb “to be” 
“is the indispensable condition for all discourse.” The verb enables the “rep-
resentation of being in language; but it is equally the representative being of 
language” (93–94). Forster’s characters feel that in India “everything hangs 
together” and trouble to find the “connecting thread” (345). The chant of 
“Esmiss Esmoor” with its woven “eses” connects the thread of being and lan-
guage, and Godbole finds that the significance of the choir’s song to Krishna 
can become “audible through much repetition” (348). When Aziz later notes 
the rhythmic change in the chant, “in the interstice,” he “heard, almost cer-
tainly, the syllables of salvation that had sounded during his trial” (352). In 
his lecture on rhythm, Forster described it as a “living being” that takes “vari-
ous forms” like the “little phrase” of music in Proust. The nature of rhythm 
is “not to be there all the time,” but in “its lovely waxing and waning” it can 
mean “everything to the reader” and “fill us with surprise and freshness and 
hope” (237–39). For instance, Godbole finds hope in Aziz’ internationalist 
verse which “might be rendered into Sanskrit, it is so enlightened” (329), and 
this cue to the ancient language is helpful in looking at its verbal forms of “to 
be.” The stem of the present forms is an “s” or “as,” and “s-mas” means “we 
are.” The “s-mas” in “Esmiss” not only suggests a reason for the change in her 
form of address, but these “syllables of salvation” in the chant also imply that 
the recognition of collectivity is necessary for existence. Indeed, the image of 
the Marabar and the catastrophe of the trek make Fielding feel that “we exist 
not in ourselves, but in terms of each others’ minds” (277–78).
 When a word from a master discourse becomes appropriated by a sub-
jugated counterpart, the word itself at this transitional moment informs 
the mechanisms of power potentially revealed by etymology. In the case of 
“Esmiss Esmoor,” etymology points toward Bakhtin’s notion of re-accentua-
tion, which he states is “enormously significant in the history of literature” 
since every “age re-accentuates in its own way the works of its most immedi-
ate past” (420–21). The assibilation of Mrs. Moore’s name is “an accent in 
the novelist’s voice” that re-accentuates the antithetical divisiveness of the 
*da- root. Bakhtin explains that re-accentuation in the novel occurs with 
“a change in the background animating dialogue,” and these new dialogic 
conditions not only resist parodic intentions, but also “may emit bright new 
rays” of meaning since the “living word” is “true to itself” (419–20). In all 
its heteroglossia, the hissing chant of the crowd at the trial challenges the 
legal system and invokes a new conception of being which subsumes India 
and England, undermines the eminence of any religion, and subverts any 
missionary justification for colonization. Amid this prophetic universalism 
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that demands, as Forster claimed in his lecture, “the absence of the sense 
of humour” (197), the narrative points to one last synthesis, “the inclusion 
of merriment” to complete the spiritual “circle” of “salvation” (324). The 
disruptive nature of laughter makes it a fundamental centrifugal force in 
discourse, and Forster’s nod to its importance not only lightens the spirit of 
the prophetic fiction, but also points to the centrifugal imagery ending the 
novel when Aziz and Fielding cannot be “friends” and “swerved apart” (362). 
Forster knew of limits to the desire to connect. The awareness of the novel 
of the instability of logos in the face of the syncretic drive of the narrative 
adumbrates postmodernism and the desire both to control and to liberate 
language discussed in the afterword, which follows.
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In Umberto Eco’s medieval murder mystery, The Name of the Rose (1981), 
the cleric who destroys the last surviving copy of Book II of Aristotle’s Poet-
ics justifies his criminal acts by stating that in the treatise on comedy, “the 
function of laughter is revered, it is elevated to art, the doors of the world 
of the learned are opened to it, it becomes the object of philosophy, and of 
perfidious theology.” While the Catholic Church could control “the heresy 
of the simple” by granting “the moment of feast, carnival, fair,” intellectual-
izing and defending such Dionysian and centrifugal elements is the most 
dangerous heresy in the cleric’s mind (474). Indeed, he sets fire to the laby-
rinthine library because he found that “behind the veil of mirth it concealed 
secret moral lessons” (437). The subversive effects of a “pagan laughter” and 
the references in the novel to the “great Lyotard,” along with Eco’s previous 
work on Joyce and semiotics, clearly make one of the effects of the novel 
the blurred distinction between orthodoxy and heresy when seen with a 
poststructuralist lens. In a pointed turn of phrase, William, the rationalist 
English Franciscan, explains that he had forsaken his post as an inquisitor 
because of “the problem of difference itself ” (196). He could discern “little 
difference between his mystic (and orthodox) faith and the distorted faith of 
the heretics” (123). The principle of difference causes questions of heresy to 
become relative and arbitrary.
 The seeds of poststructuralism were sown during the modernist period, 
and often High Modernist authors such as Joyce and Woolf have become 
the darlings of deconstructionists, with Derrida’s work on the Irish writer 
leading the way. As we know, deconstruction grew out of a critique of the 
claims of structuralism, and at the same time as the radical modernist liter-
ary experiments with language, Saussure’s work on semiotics, the Prague 
After Words
•
The “Empires of the Mind” and the 
Control of Heresy
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school of linguistics, and others sought to decode fundamental structures 
below language and literature. C. K. Ogden’s development of Basic English 
during the 1920s shares this fascination with the centripetal desire to impose 
order on language. In a sense, Basic English is a cross between such struc-
turalist endeavors, and the dogmatic manifestoes, proliferating at the time, 
which variously sought correctives to perceived social, aesthetic, and politi-
cal problems. To examine briefly the currency and control of heresy in the 
period immediately beyond the scope of this study, two literary encounters 
with Ogden’s work on Basic emblematize oppositional historical trajecto-
ries of the discourse of heresy. Joyce’s continued cultivation of heresies in 
Finnegans Wake dissolve in Ogden’s translation into Basic of an excerpt from 
Joyce’s last work. In Nineteen Eighty-Four, George Orwell drew on his knowl-
edge of Ogden’s universal language to forecast the dangers to unorthodox 
thought posed by language control.
 The translation of the excerpt from Finnegans Wake, in Ogden’s words, put 
“the simplest and most complex languages of man” “side by side” (“Anna” 93), 
and this emblematic moment speaks to the stereotypical antithesis between 
the Edwardians and the modernists which Joyce so quintessentially troubles. 
He is neither the dogmatic modernist nor the apolitical aesthete, and not 
quite the politically committed Edwardian harmonizer of history. Ogden, 
too, was of that generation who matured before the First World War, but 
who were still young enough to try to adjust to advances in modern thought 
and the changing global political landscape. Before the war, he had helped 
to found the open-minded Heretics Society; afterward he turned toward 
what he called “Orthology” and began to profess what he claimed were the 
proper corrective measures for social interaction. In miniature, his career 
embodies the rise and fall of heresy during the modernist period. Ogden 
the Heretic became Ogden the Orthologist. In this light, the outcome of his 
lucubrations, Basic English, can be seen as another in the series of modern-
ist manifestoes. Ogden repeatedly overemphasized the importance of Basic 
by claiming it was the last chance for world peace and global understanding 
since he thought, as we might think of another connotation of “translation,” 
that his “universal language” could “put” the world, like the Wake, “into sim-
pler terms.” Translating the passage from the Wake into Basic English erodes 
its heresies, and Ogden’s “orthology” emblematizes Chesterton’s point that 
thinking a school of thought “right” changes the face of heterodoxy. It shines 
with self-righteous authority.
 Ogden’s purpose in developing Basic was akin to the humanist ideal of 
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“synthesis” in that the modern world would be a less fragmented place if 
everyone could understand an auxiliary language. This fact is important 
to remember because the most common misconception of Basic is that it 
sought to replace English and other languages. While concerns about cul-
tural imperialism arise nevertheless, in name, Basic only courted traffic in 
the human affairs its acronym suggests: British American Scientific Inter-
national Commercial. For the international business traveler, Basic touted 
itself as being able to fit all of its 850 words on one page and thus capable 
of being learned in one day. Eventually, Basic received the financial support 
of the Irving Trust and the Rockefeller Foundation. It is no wonder that 
Churchill and Roosevelt found Basic attractive during the Second World 
War. Churchill in particular saw it as a new way to colonize and exert influ-
ence in those countries where Basic had already achieved footholds in the 
1930s—India, China, Egypt, Russia, Mexico, and nearly thirty others. By the 
early thirties, H. G. Wells, I. A. Richards, Bernard Shaw, John Dewey, and 
Paul Robeson had already officially declared the urgent need for Basic.
 For Ogden, the key to developing his language system lay in the ideas of 
Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticism and Theory of Fictions. Ogden found Ben-
tham’s thoughts on linguistics to be a forerunner of Vaihinger’s philosophy 
of “as if,” which he translated from the German as he began to use Bentham’s 
views on substantives and paraphrase to subtend the agenda and methodol-
ogy of Basic. W. Terrence Gordon finds that in Bentham’s work, Ogden “saw 
an appealing progression from the analysis of language to the laying of a 
foundation for a specific program of language reform” (45). What Ogden 
called the “Panoptic Eliminator” reduced words through the use of nega-
tion and opposition, and he designed his patented Panoptic Word Wheel 
in order to teach correct word order and enable envisaging the entire Basic 
vocabulary in one glance (see figures 6 and 7). He explained that the Word 
Wheel was “named the ‘Panopticon’ because all the necessary units are seen 
together” (System 305). Through substitution at the syntactic level, one could 
imagine where to insert the rest of the 850 words. By 1932 when he delivered 
the Bentham centenary lecture at University College London, Ogden had 
become the leading Bentham scholar of his time, and he attributed “the final 
synthesis” of panoptic elimination and the birth of Basic to his close reading 
of Bentham’s works (“Universal” 5). Initially, in fact, Ogden called his auxil-
iary language “Panoptic English.” Synthesis, for Ogden, had become a set of 
limiting choices, in the spirit of the modernist manifestoes, designed to make 
the world coherent.
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Figure 6. The Panoptic Eliminator. C. K. Ogden designed this diagram as 
an aid for developing the word list for Basic English, or Panoptic English 
as he initially called it. By putting an essential word in the center, one 
could eliminate words on the periphery from the Basic vocabulary, since 
their meanings could be conveyed through a combination of operators 
and the essential word. The annotations for the illustration are in Ogden’s 
hand. (Source: C. K. Ogden fonds, McMaster University Library, MCMA 
132.16)
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The ABCs of ALP: Basic English and Finnegans Wake
A year after Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World appeared in 1932, H. G. Wells 
responded with a positive vision of a totalitarian future as told through a 
“dream book” that narrates the short history of the world from 1929 to 2106. 
This utilitarian utopia, The Shape of Things to Come (1933), imagines an 
international “Modern State” founded on scientific principles and run with a 
“Puritan Tyranny.” Wells envisions a new world order made possible after a 
period of apocalyptic war, plague, and barbarism. When the world becomes a 
tabula rasa again, unity and peace eventually blossom after people let global 
concerns override personal interest. Behavior modification, technology, and 
a socialized economy make life a model of efficiency and, in the vein of one 
of G. E. Moore’s addresses to the Heretics Society, what Wells calls “com-
mon sense” determines political decisions. Since an objective “intellectual 
organization” of “scientific men” may be able to “prove that this, that, or the 
other course is the right one,” Wells entertains the idea that a “dictatorship 
Figure 7. The Panopticon, or Basic Word Wheel. Ogden 
patented the Panopticon, which is seven cardboard circles 
whose rotation is designed to teach English syntax. (Source: 
C. K. Ogden fonds, McMaster University Library, MCMA 
128.7)
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of “common-sense” should “some day rule the earth” (Democracy 202–3). In 
the novel, one example of the supposed refinements enabled by logic is the 
use of Basic English as the lingua franca of the world.
 Wells’ historical narrative looks back on the year 1929, and to illustrate 
the development of language it compares two ongoing linguistic experiments 
of that year, Joyce’s work on the Wake and C. K. Ogden’s creation of Basic. 
Wells supported Ogden’s endeavor and dismissed Joyce’s, and the narrative 
likewise reveals these biases in stating that “while Ogden sought scientific 
simplification, Joyce worked aesthetically for elaboration and rich sugges-
tion, and vanished at last from the pursuit of his dwindling pack of readers 
in a tangled prose almost indistinguishable from the gibbering of a lunatic” 
(416). In his personal dealings with Joyce, Wells was more pleasant. In 1928, 
he wrote to Joyce explaining that he could not support openly the linguistic 
experiments of Finnegans Wake: “The frame of my mind is a world wherein 
a big unifying and concentrating process is possible. . . . For it, I want lan-
guage (and statement) as simple and clear as possible. . . . Perhaps you are 
right. . . . But the world is wide and there is room for both of us to be wrong” 
(Joyce, Letters 1: 274–75). In contrast to Joyce’s explosion of language, the 
polar extreme of Basic English functioned with only 850 words and led to 
Wells’ imagined world in which “all understand another” through this “syn-
thetic language,” and everyone lives “in one undivided cultural field” (417).
 In her discussion of the Basic English translation of “Anna Livia Plu-
rabelle,” Susan Shaw Sailer explains that, since Basic does not capture the 
vernacular or mythic functions of language, it can only “communicate infor-
mation on a national [or international] scale” (865). Therefore, she concludes 
that “Ogden’s translation errs in activating cultural values that Joyce prob-
ably did not intend to be operative,” and is “a completely inadequate tool for 
translating Finnegans Wake” (865–66). Certainly this is true, but by look-
ing more closely at the respective values operating in the texts, two prime 
examples of what synthesis meant in 1929 come to the fore. Sailer describes 
a “conceptual similarity” between Basic English and the Wake as a “notion of 
the universality of human nature that characterizes much modernist art and 
thought” (853). However, their attempts at creating a synthetic universal lan-
guage to convey a common human experience drastically diverge in terms of 
the method by which all things putatively can be said. One is amalgamating, 
subversive, and liberating, the other isolating, directive, and colonizing. The 
late Victorian heresy of syncretism culminates in the substance and style of 
the Wake, while Ogden’s word “choice” imposes artificial limitations in his 
synthesis of natural English. It would take Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four 
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to forecast the dangers of reducing and controlling language as a means 
towards controlling thought. For that is what Basic English sought to do. 
Although fundamentally beneficent in his goal, Ogden believed he could 
improve thought processes by ridding language of what he called “word-
magic” and “fictions,” after Bentham and Vaihinger.
 Unlike Wells, however, Ogden approached Joyce’s work judiciously and 
saw the latter’s linguistic experimentation as an illustrative contrast to his 
own language system. The feeling was mutual. By 1929, when Joyce solicited 
Ogden to write the introduction to Tales Told of Shem and Shaun, both men 
had begun struggling to garner support for their radical projects. In return 
for the introduction that Joyce found “useful” (Letters 1: 279), he brought 
recognition to Basic English by recording onto gramophone the last four 
pages of “Anna Livia Plurabelle” at Ogden’s Orthological Institute in London. 
This encounter and the subsequent translation of these same pages into Basic 
English are the meetings of the heterodox synthetic mind and its standard-
izing corrective counterpart.
 To questions about the style of the Wake, Joyce would explain that he had 
to invent neologisms and use other languages because English had enough 
words, “but they aren’t the right ones.” In his novel, which extends the impli-
cations of etymology, he wanted “a language which is above all languages, a 
language to which all will do service” (Ellmann, Joyce 397). For his synthesis 
of English, Ogden emphasized the Greek roots in his use of the term “Orthol-
ogy” (orthos, “correct,” and logos, “word”), and he described Basic English 
as “the International Language of 850 words in which everything may be 
said.”1 Each man would search for the mot juste to achieve his ends, and 
Ogden reports that during the recording session Joyce “expressed a desire 
to see how far the effects at which he was aiming with a vocabulary of say 
850,000,000 words could be conveyed with the 850 words of Basic English” 
(“Anna” 92–93). Though the Wake has been translated into other languages, 
the linguistic explosion of Joyce’s narrative suggests that it is against control, 
is its own peculiar, self-referential linguistic community, and is therefore 
theoretically untranslatable.
 In his brief preface to the Basic English “Anna Livia,” Ogden states that 
“the reader will see that it has generally been possible to keep almost the same 
rhythms.” He further champions his translation by stating that though “the 
sense of the story has been changed a little,” Joyce had stressed the impor-
tance of achieving “these effects of rhythm [rather] than to give the nearest 
Basic Word every time” (“Anna” 93). Ogden would have it that Basic English 
is so extensive and supple that it was compromised by the translation, and 
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the international language, if it wanted, could better capture the sense of the 
Wake. In privileging rhythm, however, a difficulty arises for Ogden’s trans-
lation, for as John Bishop has shown in his tour de force explication of the 
chapter, the sense, the meaning, at least partly lies in the nongraphic sound 
and rhythm of blood circulating through HCE’s ears. The most commonly 
recognized device of the Wake, the inundation of names of rivers, works to 
create the echoic effects of rushing waters or pulsating blood. Bishop then 
shows how this conception underwrites both the form and content of “Anna 
Livia,” so the question arises whether the sense can change without disrupt-
ing the rhythm. The issue becomes further complicated when one notes that 
Joyce, according to Ogden, had a hand in the translation while sojourning in 
London during the summer of 1931.2
 One salient aspect of the Basic translation is its arbitrariness. Sometimes 
it adheres to the syllabic pattern, sometimes it takes liberties with its own 
lexicon, and sometimes it retains the names of people and the names of 
rivers. For example, “Godavari, vert the showers” (Wake 213.20) becomes 
“Godavari keep off the rains,” and the river in India is now clearly asked to 
hold back water. However, translating “vert,” another river, into “keep off ” 
as if it were “avert” works against the fluidity principle of the chapter. Ety-
mologically, “vert” (Lat. vertere, “to turn”) would actually suggest turning 
on the showers. Reproducing “Godavari” is an interesting choice because, 
for the rest of the chapter, Ogden tends to suppress the mention of divine 
concepts. Indeed, the translation here has even asked the “avaricious God,” 
“varied gods,” or “God of ours” embedded in the river name to stay out of the 
business of this world.
 Rational thought does not want to account for the vagaries of the irra-
tional, and Basic English either categorizes deities and blessedness as “the 
good” or lumps spiritual questions under the term “religion.” Consequently, 
the same “Godavari” is asked only to provide “support,” not bestow “grace,” 
and the translation simply elides words evocative of divinity such as “Holy” 
(214.30), “Lord” (214.18), “gloria” (213.31), and “Seints of light” (214.31). 
Rather than “Ho, Lord” (215.28), Ogden’s version exclaims “O, Laws,” and 
Sailer notes that this instance “reveals as much about Ogden’s secular vision 
as about Basic English” (866). Taking the pun “the load is with me” (214.19) 
as a cue, the load of lordly language becomes in the translation a “weight” 
(“the weight is with me”), which humbly brings the travails of human 
endeavor down to earth. The “kingdome gone” (213.31) is just “the land of 
the dead,” and in Basic the washerwomen beseech the “Earth” to “give peace 
to their hearts and minds” rather than “Orara por Orbe and poor Las Ani-
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mas” (214.6), a phrase closely akin to the Spanish for “to pray for the Earth 
& the Souls” (McHugh 214). There is no need to pray when in Basic “All have 
livings” and “All is well,” and in this new expression the echoes of alleluia 
fade from “Allalivial, allalluvial” (213.32).3 Certainly, the Basic translation is 
partly right in orienting “Anna Livia” around life and “this world.” Much of 
what ALP and her “mamafesta” (104.4) stand for is life-affirming and anti-
patriarchal. However, the loss of ambiguity created by clearly withdrawing 
the divine from the course of events erodes the tension and significance of 
the Wake.
 William Empson, that heretical classifier of ambiguities in the late 1920s, 
could support Basic while still critiquing its representation of literature. He 
explained his position by explicating the conflict between authority and free-
dom in the moment when Wordsworth devotes himself to poetry in The 
Prelude. Empson’s reasoning also particularly applies in the case of the Basic 
ALP; he states: “the effect is that this beautiful morning is like a sign of some 
good secret at the back of all experience. As so frequently in Wordsworth, 
in fact, there is an idea of religion not clearly in view. It seems to me that 
putting the lines into Basic makes this turn of thought much clearer, for the 
very reason that Basic is so short of words like ‘magnificent.’ The effect is 
like taking the cover off a machine” (“Basic” 170).4 Similarly, the Basic “Anna 
Livia” removes much of the wondrous hydraulic apparatus from the chapter, 
and Joyce would possibly expect this in collaborating with Ogden, whom he 
considered “a mathematician,” on the Wake, “which he insisted was math-
ematical” (Ellmann, Joyce 614).
 One technique of the Wake that could be considered mathematical, 
Bruno’s heretical coincidence of contraries, suffers from Basic’s inability to 
replicate amalgamations. For rhythm, “Anna Livia,” as Bishop notes, is “par-
titioned into intricate binary patterns” (350). While the Basic version often 
equivalently repeats words for sonorous effect, it fails in particular to account 
for the inclusive gesture of rivers running past and bringing forth historical 
and religious contradictions. The synthetic coincidence of contraries owes 
much to the effect of rivers, and, as Bishop pointedly explains, “rivalry” 
is “a formal principle of ‘Anna Livia’” partly “because it derives from the 
Latin rivalis (‘one using the same stream’)” (350). Those rival city-builders 
of Latium, Romulus and Remus, sent adrift on the stream Tiber, would be 
nursed by Dea Tacita, “the silent goddess” also known as Acca Larentia. 
Before the fratricide happened and the murderer founded his eponymous 
Rome, Dea Tacita, or “Deataceas” (213.30), had reconciled their rivalry with 
a surrogate mother’s love.
Franke_final.indb   205 1/28/2008   4:40:25 PM
0 A F T E R  WOR D S
 The Basic translation’s omission of the allusion to Dea Tacita causes the 
loss of this emblematic coincidence of contraries important to the dream 
works of the Wake. As Bishop states, “all things manifest on the surface of the 
text act only as vectors pointing to far more turbulent rivalries and conflicts 
everywhere ‘lying below’ the evident surface of things” (351). The surface 
tension of “Deataceas” develops further when HCE, the archetypal male fig-
ure and another city-builder, appears syncretically as an “Etrurian Catholic 
Heathen” (215.20). Changing this cipher of HCE to “Etrurian Catholics of 
hated religion” dramatically exposes the biases of the translation. Whereas 
the Wake amalgamates the various types of religion that have lived along 
the Tiber, the Basic “Anna Livia” not only changes the rhythm and elides 
the tension embedded in the cipher, but it also imposes a value judgment on 
the religious relationships. In the Wake, the mysterious Etruscan religion, 
Roman Catholicism, and a general heathenism all survive simultaneously, 
and, as Ogden himself described Joyce’s style, “this synthetic proliferate 
agglomeration” produces “the timeless condensation of the dream” (Preface 
x–xi).
 For several years after the Basic English translation, Joyce continued 
with his Work in Progress, and reversed the direction of Ogden’s reductive 
and clarifying project. According to his friends, Joyce would go “over a pas-
sage that was ‘still not obscure enough’” or solicit “a word that would be 
more obscure than the word already there” (Bishop 3). He relished adding 
more names of rivers. Like so many of his personal dealings, the experience 
with Ogden found its way into the pages of “The Letter,” according to Danis 
Rose, “probably in the mid-1930s” (441). In preparing this chapter of the 
Wake, Joyce inserted several qualifications about universal languages into 
a passage describing the primordial “letter” and the nature of being human 
and being in love: “if the lingo gasped between kicksheets, however basically 
English, were to be preached from the mouths of wickerchurchwardens and 
metaphysicians . . . where would their practice be or where the human race 
itself ” (116.25–30, emphasis added). The passage suggests that no language 
can justly convey the fundamental aspects of being and love. The more com-
plicated discourses, such as philosophy or theology, only distort the human 
emotions, perhaps best saved for pillow talk “gasped between kicksheets.” 
And if the church warden or the metaphysician spoke in Basic English about 
caritas or Plato’s Symposium, they would possibly lose their erudite mystique, 
but also do a disservice to love. Limiting vocabulary might be good for clar-
ity, but the varieties of human experience often depend upon the change and 
wealth of language.
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 When the passage later refers to “hapaxle, legomenon” (116.33), hapax 
legomenon, the context suggests that though a word may only have been said 
once in history, this should not diminish its significance, for, among other 
things, it could represent love for someone. Furthermore, there may be no 
other word for it; it is untranslatable. In a sense, then, Joyce’s response to 
Basic English supports the idea that he had in mind Bishop’s observation that 
the rhythmic effect of the rivers conveys love. Through an analysis of HCE’s 
feeling of being in the womb, which bonds and blurs genders, Bishop argues 
that “the ‘interior’ of his body is suffused by the ‘intimite’ ‘lisp’ of a sound 
unconsciously signifying ‘love’” (368). The love becomes lost in translation 
once productive rivalries turn to hate, once people exclude rather than syn-
thesize worldviews.
The Betrayal of Heresy in Nineteen Eighty-Four
In the godless world of Oceania in Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, “heresy” 
still functions as the term used repeatedly to describe all subversive and 
antiestablishmentarian thought. Shorn of its religious connotations, heresy is 
Winston Smith’s last hope and the elusive discourse in his desire to resist the 
extreme authoritarian state. The narrative teases him with the opportunity 
to read “the book,” Goldstein’s “compendium of all the heresies” (15), only to 
have him trapped just as he understood what he already knew, the mecha-
nisms by which the state, or war machine, controls heresy. The telescreens 
and the official language of Oceania, Newspeak, are perhaps the two most 
salient inventions of Orwell’s dystopia, and they represent, respectively, the 
common practices of surveillance and propaganda. When “Newspeak had 
been adopted once and for all and Oldspeak forgotten,” the appendix to the 
novel, “The Principles of Newspeak,” states that it “was intended” that “a 
heretical thought . . . should be literally unthinkable, at least so far as thought 
is dependent on words” (246). The Inner Party chases after words as the 
Inquisition pursued heretics; only it has learned from historical mechanisms 
of discursive control and tries to “convert” the heretic rather than “destroy 
him.” Since in “the old days the heretic walked to the stake still a heretic, pro-
claiming his heresy, exulting in it” (210), the Party uses all forms of torture 
and mind control to rehabilitate dissidents outside of the public spectacle.5
 In Orwell’s novel, the telescreens enable “Big Brother” to keep watch 
on the entire population of Oceania at nearly every moment. As the nar-
rative states, “[t]here was of course no way of knowing whether you were 
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being watched at any given moment” (6). Oceania is a version of Bentham’s 
Panopticon on the grandest scale. In this light, both predominant methods 
of control in Nineteen Eighty-Four, Newspeak and the telescreens, owe their 
creation, in part, to Bentham’s reformist mind. While delivering his cente-
nary lecture on Bentham, Ogden declared that “Bentham is the true father 
of Basic English,” and he pointed to the page of 850 words on which, he said, 
“Bentham’s ideas for an international language have at last been worked 
out” (42–44). While Foucault’s famous account in Discipline and Punish has 
illuminated the Panopticon’s peculiar role in the historical turn from torture 
to rehabilitation, John Bender’s Imagining the Penitentiary (1987) is one of 
the few studies to link Bentham’s work on incarceration with his theory 
of fictions. Bender argues that Bentham’s “ideas help us to understand the 
novel and the penitentiary as fundamentally similar social texts” because he 
“wished to master reality by reshaping, and by rendering visible, the modes 
of its fictional construction” (36). The proponents of Newspeak in Nineteen 
Eighty-Four view reality, like Vaihinger, as a linguistic construction, and they 
simultaneously exploit and dissemble that proposition. As a skewed variant 
of “Panoptic English,” Newspeak imprisons people within language while 
simultaneously letting them think they are free.
 The parallels between Basic English and Newspeak are manifold and 
obvious. Both are “founded on the English language as we now know it,” and 
each sought to cut “the language down to the bone” by overhauling the “great 
wastage” which lies “in the verbs and adjectives” (Nineteen Eighty-Four 247; 
45). While Ogden did think Basic could make, as Syme explains in the novel, 
the “meaning” of a word more “rigidly defined” as in Newspeak, Orwell’s 
hyperbolic critique extrapolates the implication that “the whole aim of New-
speak is to narrow the range of thought” (46).6 In both language systems, the 
process of elimination depends heavily on the interchangeability of parts of 
speech and the regularity of inflections. Not only are synonyms redundant, 
but the negative prefix “un-” makes antonyms also superfluous since “[a]ll 
that was necessary, in any case where two words formed a natural pair of 
opposites, was to decide which of them to suppress” (248). As a result, a “few 
blanket words covered” “heretical meaning words,” as in the Basic transla-
tion of ALP, “and, in covering them, abolished them” (Nineteen Eighty-Four 
251).
 As Newspeak included the C Vocabulary for specialized work in sci-
ence and technology, Basic English hurt its claim that only 850 words were 
required for an international language by developing word lists for use in, 
among other disciplines, science, economics, and literature. In “The Prin-
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ciples of Newspeak,” Orwell may even be poking at the acronym behind 
Basic English: “Even in the early decades of the twentieth century, telescoped 
words and phrases [such as Nazi and Comintern] had been one of the char-
acteristic features of political language” (252). The description of Newspeak 
claims that “in thus abbreviating a name one narrowed and subtly altered 
its meaning, by cutting out most of the associations that would otherwise 
cling to it” (252–53). The Anglo-American industrial and corporate interests 
disappear behind a language system simply touting itself as fundamental. 
Finally, both Basic and Newspeak grew in large part out of the desire to 
control heretical discourse. Newspeak sought the “repression of heretical 
words” (247), and, as I noted before, Ogden reflected that one of the great 
advantages in running the Heretics Society was the repeated forum in which 
“to study the defects of verbal exposition, and argument, under the most 
favourable conditions.” His study of Bentham drew his attention to control-
ling the instability putatively more inherent in the verb, which was “a sort of 
linguistic eel—a slippery rhetorical luxury” (“Lecture” 42).
 While defenders of Basic English shun the unflattering associations of a 
comparison with Newspeak,7 it is clear that Ogden’s invention was a source 
text for the planned language of Oceania. Too many similarities exist for crit-
ics to claim that, though Orwell had worked with Ogden on Basic English, 
the universal language does not inform Newspeak since Orwell never con-
demned it or openly attributed aspects of Basic to the creation of Newspeak. 
Indeed, Orwell appreciated the ability of Basic to deflate vague and highfa-
lutin rhetoric, and he defended it against false beliefs that “advocates of an 
international language aim at suppressing the natural languages, a thing no 
one has ever seriously suggested” (Works 16: 82).8 Orwell even facilitated the 
broadcast of Basic English ideas on the BBC in India. Nevertheless, Howard 
Fink documents Orwell’s familiarity with Basic, outlines several dimensions 
in which Newspeak parodies it, and claims that “the public notoriety of 
Basic during the 1940s made it a natural vehicle for Orwell’s satire” (156). 
Jean Jacques Courtine affirms that the “satire of Basic English is transparent 
in Newspeak” (72). Arguing that in the 1940s “contemporary educated read-
ers with linguistic interests” would have discerned the parallels between the 
invented languages, Roger Fowler offers the following judicious perspective: 
“Orwell is not attacking Basic through Newspeak; Basic is used rather as an 
analogy, an aid to readers to imagine what kind of linguistic system Newspeak 
might be” (220–21). If Newspeak is founded in part on actual experiences, 
the dangers of language control become more real. In fact, Orwell explained 
that the future of Nineteen Eighty-Four “could happen” because “the direction 
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in which the world is going at the present time” exposed it to the dangers 
of continuously preparing for a war driven by the fear of terror, and of “the 
acceptance of a totalitarian outlook by intellectuals of all colours” (Works 
20:134). Perhaps Orwell grew wary of Basic English during the mid-1940s 
when Ogden handed over the copyright for his language to the Crown and 
eventually settled for £23,000, the same compensation Bentham had received 
from the Crown for the rights to the Panopticon. The state had appropri-
ated the work of Ogden, whose multifarious heresies had been brought into 
the fold and then lost in bureaucracy. Orwell’s dystopic novel illustrates the 
results of the appropriation of altruistic syncretic discourse by the state appa-
ratus.
 The control of heretical discourses in Nineteen Eighty-Four represents 
the culmination of the prevalent betrayal theme underwriting the novel. 
From little children informing on their parents to Winston’s broken loyalty 
to Julia, people betray each other in the face of institutional control. The state 
conducts false flag operations, and O’Brien pretends to introduce Winston 
to the underworld supposedly gathering around Goldstein’s “compendium of 
all the heresies,” only to assert his absolute power during the process of “reha-
bilitation.” Eventually, the torture, starvation, isolation, observation, “merci-
less questioning” (199), and fear of the unknown lead to Winston’s ultimate 
betrayal, the insertion of another body, Julia his love, between himself and 
his greatest fear, the rat mask.9 After Julia’s and Winston’s mutual betrayal, 
she explains that “after that, you don’t feel the same toward the other person 
any longer” (240). Once Winston Churchill, whose name it has been noted 
lends itself to Orwell’s protagonist, called for an Anglo-American coalition 
promoting Ogden’s language, a similar taint of betrayal infected Basic Eng-
lish.
 In July of 1943, Churchill dictated his interest in Basic English to the Sec-
retary of the War Cabinet, Sir Edward Bridges: “I am very much interested 
in the question of Basic English. The widespread use of this would be a gain 
to us far more durable and fruitful than the annexation of great provinces. 
It would also fit in with my ideas of closer union with the United States by 
making it even more worth while to belong to the English-speaking club.” 
As part of this “special relationship,” Churchill further suggested that “the 
B.B.C. should teach Basic English every day as part of their propaganda, 
and generally make a big push to propagate this method of interchange of 
thought” (War 571). During 1944, Churchill drew six ministries into the pro-
motion of Basic, and this governmental support not only brought Basic into 
the quagmire of bureaucracy, but also elicited the withdrawal of American 
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funding. When Churchill lost the election of 1946, the new Labour govern-
ment pigeonholed Basic and effectively sealed its official fate. However, in 
accepting an honorary degree at Harvard in September 1943, Churchill had 
forecast the global hegemony of English: “Let us go forward as with other 
matters and other measures in aim and effect [as Basic English] . . . Such 
plans offer far better prizes than taking away other people’s provinces or 
lands or grinding them down in exploitation. The empires of the future are 
the empires of the mind” (Victory 238).10
 Nineteen Eighty-Four is the demonstration of the colonization of a mind. 
Newspeak facilitates the “doublethink” that can cause a “lunatic dislocation 
in the mind” (204), and Winston’s rehabilitative “cure” destroys his belief that 
“[n]othing was your own except the few cubic centimeters inside your skull” 
(26). Ogden, who once had been the “Arch-Heretic” at Cambridge (MCMA 
114.3), and whose Heretics Society had taught him about the verbal “fictions” 
in the mind, welcomed the official totalization of his language system. He 
wanted a “strong ‘Anglo-American Directorate’ formed by the two govern-
ments to take control of its future expansion” (“World” 25). Diffusing English 
language handbooks in the name of globalization could be a boon to a British 
and American coalition exporting military and industrial technology.
 A month after Churchill’s speech at Harvard, Ogden introduced his 
invention to a now captive national audience in a strange article in The 
Picture Post, “Can Basic English Be a World Language?” Ogden’s promotion 
of the language system, interlaid with bizarre photographs of him in various 
masks, must have been disturbing to any dissident thinker. As he often did 
to promote his language, Ogden wrote the article in Basic English, with one 
mistake designed to turn the article into a deciphering contest. Several of 
the photographs underscore a sense of duplicity in that they include shots 
of Ogden in “different masks” worn “to suit different requirements” (23). 
In one photograph, he wears a Fu Manchu mask which somehow demon-
strates “certain Eastern language effects” (24), and the caption below the 
opening photo asks if the “strange figure in the Orthological Institute” is 
“Mr. Churchill discovering Basic English” (see figure 8). No, it is Ogden 
in an affectless, white mask which he described as “that which has doubts 
about the chances of one’s death taking place in one’s bed” (23). The masks 
flavor Ogden’s introduction of Basic to the national stage with an unsettling 
eccentricity akin to the effects of Charrington’s disguise and the rat mask in 
Orwell’s novel. Indeed, Mary Adam’s recollection of Ogden’s fascination with 
masks has an eerie resonance with the novel: “He would often don a mask. 
He had many masks. A wonderful collection. And he would wear a mask 
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when he talked to you—and often put a mask on you” (qtd. in Gordon 3). 
Another photograph in the article shows Ogden holding a Panoptic Word 
Wheel nearby a “Janus,” a tool used for teaching tenses (see figure 9). The 
associations of the two-faced god, the masks, and the eclectic artifacts in 
Ogden’s study evoke the images associated with Charrington, the masked 
member of the Thought Police who entraps Winston in his curiosity shop.
 While these images can only be speculatively associated with the novel, 
Ogden’s discussion of the potential effects of mass media on the populace 
bears remarkable similarities to the “Two Minutes Hate” in Oceania. In the 
article, Ogden states: “One great step forward [toward international peace] 
would be news every hour of the day and night, in a simple common language, 
from one or other of 24 stations working with a common purpose through 
Basic. Five minutes would be enough . . . to give everyone the feeling that he 
was part of a Great Society which was slowly pulling itself together” (24). In 
Oceania, everyone gathers before a telescreen on the “eleven hundred” hour 
in preparation for the propaganda of the “Two Minutes Hate” (12). Whereas 
Figure 8. “Mr. Churchill Discovering Basic English.” C. K. Ogden wears a mask in the 
offices of the Orthological Institute. (Source: C. K. Ogden fonds, McMaster University 
Library, MCMA 138.13).
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the “horrible thing about the Two Minutes Hate” was “that it was impossible 
to avoid joining in,” almost immediately a “hideous ecstasy of fear and vin-
dictiveness, a desire to kill, to torture, to smash faces with a sledge hammer, 
seemed to flow through the whole group of people like an electric current, 
turning one even against one’s will into a grimacing, screaming lunatic” (16). 
In an exact parallel to Winston’s job in the Ministry of Truth, Ogden sup-
poses the fruits of his imagined news broadcast: “We have been comforting 
ourselves for five minutes with current notes from the International History 
Bank whose managers are the experts of the Limited Language Company 
responsible for the news . . .—a Basic account of those events which in their 
opinion were, at that time of day, of greatest general interest” (25).
 Such opinions certainly can be influenced by advertising and political 
leanings, and Orwell’s novel shows how a similar form of propaganda could 
be used to cultivate “hate.” The novel, in effect, challenges Ogden’s claim that 
the diffusion of Basic English “would at least do no damage” (25). At a mini-
mum, Nineteen Eighty-Four underscores the dangerous potential of language 
manipulation, and the disturbing, exploited historical truism that war makes 
both television and public approval ratings soar. About three weeks after 
Churchill’s “empires of the mind” speech, Orwell tendered his resignation at 
Figure 9. C. K. Ogden holding the Panopticon, or Basic Word Wheel. (Source: C. K. 
Ogden fonds, McMaster University Library, MCMA 138.13)
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the BBC, where he had been commissioning radio talks on Basic during the 
Second World War. He explained that “by going back to my normal work 
of writing and journalism [he] could be more useful.” During this time, he 
drafted the first outline of Nineteen Eighty-Four, which ends with the entry 
“The Two Minutes Hate” (Works 15:368).
 Unlike the hedonism of Brave New World, the promise of The Shape 
of Things to Come, or the comic elements of Eugene Zamiatin’s We (1924), 
the absolute power wielded by Big Brother and the bleak general despair in 
Oceania clearly construct Orwell’s vision of the future as a didactic dystopia. 
Aside from coteries of individuals nestled into the upper echelons of the 
military industrial complex, no one, however, reads the novel as a positive-
minded teaching text. War makes people flock to the security of oversimpli-
fied, rigid policies. Only by opposition does the novel pose a series of lessons 
on how to keep heresy alive amid an authoritative state bent on its control. 
By exposing the mechanisms by which state apparati quash and regulate 
heresy, the novel points to sites of contestation within the modus operandi 
of surveillance, propaganda, and the appropriation of subversive discourse. 
Each intrinsically depends on language, and Orwell’s work invests the power 
of words not only with the state, but also individuals. The omnipotence of 
the state may make Winston love Big Brother, but Julia’s note of “I love you” 
causes Winston to “desire to stay alive” (90–91). The state may package 
all subversive thought within Goldstein’s “compendium of all the heresies,” 
and thereby limit its independence, but its presence nevertheless delivers a 
pointed critique, however tedious, of the politics of the Party.
 The control of discourse by the totalitarian state is unmitigated, but most 
readings of the novel tend to expose various unrealistic elements of its por-
trayal. Readers resist, and perhaps the greatest misrepresentation lies in 85 
percent of the population, the “proles.” Orwell’s own distrust of the pro-
letariat certainly informs the narrative portrayal of the mass of people as 
readily appeased with gambling, sport, drink, and the “Two Minutes Hate.” 
They are the sleeping giant forever snoring, but the narrative also repeatedly 
states, “If there is hope . . . it lies in the proles.” Winston’s hope, though, imme-
diately becomes flagged by the italicized, intrusive reflection which “might 
almost have been a transcription from one of the Party textbooks”: “Until 
they become conscious they will never rebel, and until after they have rebelled 
they cannot become conscious” (60–61). He has begun to “doublethink.”
 In The Act of Reading, Wolfgang Iser explains that the repertoire of a text 
“contains familiar materials, but that this material undergoes a change,” and 
that when the norms “are depragmatized, they become a theme in them-
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selves.” As a repertoire of the novel, Basic English points to both the themes 
of betrayal and the use of language to colonize the mind. Through the expo-
sure of social norms, a text, Iser argues, enables the reader “to perceive 
consciously a system in which he had hitherto been unconsciously caught 
up, and his awareness will be all the greater if the validity of these norms 
is negated.” In this process of defamiliarization, “the reader is constrained 
to develop a specific attitude that will enable him to discover that which 
the negation has indicated but not formulated” (212–13). While Newspeak 
negates Basic English in part, the version of Newspeak in the novel is only 
“a provisional one” since it “was expected” to “have finally superseded Old-
speak . . . by about the year 2050” (246). Similarly, in 1928, Ogden believed 
that Basic English would “initiate a programme of scientific Debabelization 
which it may take a hundred years to carry through” (“Universal” 6). The 
futuristic and dystopic nature of Orwell’s novel accentuates Iser’s point that 
the “process of negation . . . situates the reader halfway between a ‘no longer’ 
and a ‘not yet’” (213). Winston can still struggle to have heretical thoughts 
during the gradual inculcation of Newspeak. The process of negation in 
Nineteen Eighty-Four indicates that the education of the “proles” is key to 
staving off the world of Big Brother. The “proles” remain outside the agenda 
of the colonization of the mind, and the characterization of such a large 
percentage of the populace running rampant with relative impunity and 
ignorance draws attention to itself as an absurdity and a site of contestation. 
Or, in Iser’s words, the lack of an educated proletariat “prestructures” the 
reader’s “mental image” of Oceania as a “defined deficiency” and a “hollow 
form” (213). The “proles” are the large blank slate to be taught the skills of 
interpretation, for rebellion may feed consciousness, but education is its 
staple.
 In the framework of the novel, heretical discourse is an impossibility 
for the “proles” because they do not have the language skills or historical 
sense necessary for interpretation. Even members of the Inner Party will 
supposedly not have these skills since the final absorption of Newspeak 
would preclude the use of other words. Interpretation disappears in such a 
linguistic community because Newspeak cannot be paraphrased by its own 
lexicon. It is the rendering plant of paraphrase. “The Principles of Newspeak” 
states that it was “possible to utter heresies of a very crude sort, a species of 
blasphemy,” but such statements “could not have been sustained by reasoned 
argument, because the necessary words were not available” (254–55). New-
speak and Basic English both turn paraphrase cannibalistically onto itself. 
John Bender argues that Bentham’s “signal contribution to narrative theory” 
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was “the expository device of ‘paraphrasis’” which he “invented to dispel ‘the 
pestilential breath of fiction’” (214). For Basic English, Ogden directly applies 
this “paraphrasis of exposition” in one of the key reductive principles of its 
vocabulary—the “[e]limination of all words which can be defined in 10 other 
words” (“Universal” 5). For both Ogden and Bentham, the use of paraphrase 
can expose the “illusion of significance that attaches to fictional entities,” 
and which inheres in “human language” (Bender 214). Bentham insisted, in 
Bender’s analysis, that “substantives used in apparently significant sentences 
gain their meaning, even when they have no real reference, by the context 
of the whole sentence in which they appear and, critically, that the transla-
tion of such sentences into other sentences determines their significance” 
(214). For Basic English, Ogden directed this sentence-level analysis onto 
individual words.
 In his later years, William Empson referred to the “doublethink” of 
Nineteen Eighty-Four as an example of how doctrinal statements often mask 
untenable propositions, disturbing premises, and irreconcilable contradic-
tions. As his methodology shows, paraphrase is a valuable interpretive tool 
to illuminate the ambiguities often underlying authoritarian answers. Dur-
ing the Second World War, Empson also worked on Basic at the BBC, and 
he shared his concerns with Ogden that Basic lost its efficacy in necessarily 
including official quotations: “The problem about news, especially for the 
BBC, which has a policy of being cautious about news, is that half the time 
you are quoting a communiqué or some text which is the only authority for 
the story, and that source is itself couched in vague or puzzling terms” (Let-
ters 140). Paraphrase can deconstruct such statements, and that is the reason 
Basic attracted Orwell and Empson. Its importance for heretical thought 
continues, for it can expose the workings of propaganda and the “double-
think” of an ideology that sees a “continuous war” become the given state of 
affairs and engender the definition “WAR IS PEACE” (7).11
 Cleanth Brooks’ denunciation of Empson’s mode of critical analysis as 
the heresy of paraphrase exemplifies Foucault’s point that “the importance 
that has been given for so long to the small techniques of discipline, to 
those apparently insignificant tricks that it has invented, and even to those 
‘sciences’ that give it a respectable face” arises from the development of the 
“minute disciplines, the panopticisms of every day” as “the political coun-
terpart of the juridical norms according to which power was redistributed” 
(Discipline 223). In Foucault’s view, the panoptic principle is central to the 
origins of the disciplinary society. New Criticism is an example of a panoptic 
“minute discipline” which affirmed Bentham’s and I. A. Richards’ emphases 
Franke_final.indb   216 1/28/2008   4:40:30 PM
T H E  “E M P I R E S  OF  T H E  M I N D”
on the whole literary context to determine meaning, while refuting the abil-
ity to speak of its significance in other words. As a result, New Criticism 
can reinforce the power of orthodoxy. Denying the validity of paraphrase 
deprives literature not only of the capacity for social critique, but also its 
ideal function of making better citizens.
 As various elements of Orwell’s world become more “real,” the import 
of the novel increases concomitantly with the responsibility to teach and 
practice dissent, diversity, and other forms of heretical thought. To wage a 
continuous war, increased surveillance invades personal privacy in the name 
of homeland security, and national media control the dissemination of for-
eign press and the reports of political protests, always inflecting the end of 
the news blurb with dismissive trivialities or minor counter-demonstrations. 
Foreign policy creates a pariah out of a former ally, and constructs pure “evil” 
which then shifts its axis depending on the global climate. On the other hand, 
the rejuvenation of religious fundamentalism is a development Orwell did 
not foresee; “even religious worship would have been permitted if the proles 
had shown any sign of needing or wanting it” (62). Noting “how far educa-
tion has abandoned its historic tasks, of combating superstition, encouraging 
skeptical debate about competing religions and their claims of their myths, 
and fighting religious dogmatism and its political consequences,” Jonathan 
Culler suggests that teachers of literature might compare “Christianity with 
other mythologies when we teach works imbued with religion, [make] the 
sadism and sexism of religious discourse an explicit object of discussion,” 
and “work to keep alive the critical, demythologizing force of contemporary 
theory” (78–81). In 1945, an aging Bernard Shaw additionally warned that 
“heretical teaching must be made irresistibly attractive by fine art,” or nations 
will fall “at the feet of Pavlov and Hitler” (Postscript 292). This pedagogy 
could include modes of interpretation from the linguistic to the political and 
share the mechanisms of heretical discourse which veil critique, subvert the 
censor, expose ideology, and spawn difference. To cultivate the hope that lies 
in the “proles,” literary scholars are ethically bound to discuss the education 
Jude Fawley sought and found, the education culminating in Stephen Deda-
lus’ non-serviam, the education the Heretics Society fostered. While “new 
wine in old bottles” now may be a “dead metaphor” as Orwell jotted down 
in his notes for Nineteen Eighty-Four, heresy will survive (Works 15:367). 
Perhaps it will go under a different name such as progressive politics, radical 
theology, or deep ecology, but none has yet equaled the weight wielded by 
“heresy” in the era of Hardy, Harrison, Shaw, and Joyce.
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a.)  published addresses
b.)  public lectures
c.)  lecture added to original schedule
d.)  strictly confined to full members of the Heretics Society
e.)  published in revised form
f.)  uncertain date
g.) uncertain title of address
Titles and forms of address are in original cases and spellings.
Michaelmas 1909
 
 Nov. 21  C. N. S. Woolf, “Blake the Mystic”
 Nov. 28  A. E. Löwy, “Evolution of Religion”
a. b.) Dec. 8  Miss Jane Harrison, “Heresy and Humanity” (inaugural lecture)
a. b.) Dec. 8  Dr. John McTaggart, “Dare to be wise” (inaugural lecture)
Lent 1910
 Jan. 30 G. W. Paget, “William Godwin”
b.) Feb. 4 Prof. E. G. Browne, “The Adaptation of Heresy to its   
  Environment”
 Feb. 6 S. H. Batty-Smith, “The Plays of Oscar Wilde”
b.) Feb. 12  Dr. F. C. S. Schiller, “Pragmatism, Humanism, and the   
  Religious Problem”
 Feb. 13 Mr. E. I. James, “The True Mysticism” (earlier titled “The Place of  
  Mysticism in philosophy”)
 Feb. 27 N. B. Michell, “Love”
b.) Mar. 10 Mr. R. R. Rusk, “What is Religion?”
  Mr. L. H. G. Greenwood, “Agnosticism and Conduct” (joint 
  meeting  with the Emmanuel Religious Discussion Society)
Appendix
•
Meetings of the Heretics Society, 
Cambridge, 1909–24
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Easter 1910
b.) May 12 Miss F. M. Stawell, “Hebrew Scepticism”
 June 12 N. B. Michell, “The Secular Education Movement”
Michaelmas 1910
a.) Oct. 23 C. M. Picciotto, “Via Mystica”
b.) Oct. 26 Dr. A. C. Haddon, “The Moral Ideas of Savages”
 Oct. 30 Mr. E. B. V. Burns, “von Hartmann’s Critique of Religion”
 Nov. 6 F. F. L. Birrell, “On Idiotism”
b.) Nov. 7 Mr. Aylmer Maude, “The Future of Religion”
b.) Nov. 13 C. Bradlaugh Bonner, “Mithraism and Christianity”
 Nov. 20 G. E. Jackson, “Social Aspects of Disillusion”
a. b.) Nov. 23 Mr. Harrold Johnson, “The Problem of an effective Lay Moral  
  Education, with special reference to France and Japan”
d.) Nov. 30 Miss E. M. Smith, “Self-Delusion and its Value”
 Dec. 4 Mr. Arthur Machen, “Symbolism” (previously scheduled for 
  Nov. 27)
Lent 1911
 Jan. 22 A. Watkins, “Individuality and Convention”
a. b.) Jan. 23 Mr. Edward Clodd, “Obscurantism in Modern Science” (joint  
  meeting with the Emmanuel R.D.S.)
 Jan. 29 W. B. Copeland, “E. A. Poe”
 Feb. 5 P. Sargant Florence, “The value of Historical Method in Aesthetics”
b.) Feb. 8 Mr. A. C. Benson, “Walter Pater”
 Feb. 12 Miss K. C. Costelloe, “The Relation of Pragmatism to Truth and  
  Ethics”
 Feb. 19 C. K. Ogden, “The Progress of Significs”
b.) Feb. 20 Rev. R. J. Campbell, “The Possibility of a Liberal Interpretation of
  Christianity” (earlier titled “Is a Liberal Interpretation of 
  Christianity possible?”)
b.) Feb. 25  J. A. Hobson, “Sentiments regarding Heresy”
 Feb. 26 D. S. Fraser, “Hinduism”
 Mar. 5 A. J. Dorward, “Aristotle’s Poetics” (replaces Mom Chow Skon  
  “Orientalia” which had been originally scheduled for Feb. 5 under  
  the title “Siamese Superstitions” and then apparently canceled)
 Mar. 12 A. L. Bacharach, “Thomas Hardy, the Poet of Heresy”
Easter 1911
 Apr. 23 C. B. Bonner, “Servetus and Calvin”
 Apr. 30 C. K. Ogden, “The Inexplicable Indescribability of Post-mortem  
  Psychoses”
b.) May 1 Earl Russell, “Religion and Science”
 May 7 R. A. Fisher, “Whilom Eugenics”
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 May 14 D. H. Pinsent, “Solipsism”
a. b.) May 21 Dr. W. H. R. Rivers, “The Primitive Conception of Death”
a. b.) May 29 Mr. G. Bernard Shaw, “The Religion of the Future”
Michaelmas 1911
 Oct. 15 A. Watkins, “Functions of Modern Drama”
 Oct. 22 Mr. S. H. Swinny, “Positivism”
a. b.) Oct. 25 Mr. F. M. Cornford, “Religion and the University”
 Oct. 29 R. D. Macrae (canceled)
 Nov. 5 R. Smith, “The Philosophy of Bergson” (replaces lecture by C. B.  
  Bonner)
a.) Nov. 12 Mr. H. G. Wood, “The Christ-Myth (a criticism)” (originally  
  scheduled for Nov. 19)
a. b.) Nov. 17 Mr. G. K. Chesterton, “The Future of Religion” also called “Some  
  Dogmas of Mr. Bernard Shaw” (reply to Shaw’s address)
 Nov. 19 Mr. W. R. M. Lamb, “Principles of Plastic Art” (originally 
  scheduled for Nov. 12)
 Nov. 26 A. E. Heath, “Hypothesis in Science” (earlier titled “Science and  
  Hypothesis”)
a. b.) Dec. 3 Mr. J. M. Robertson, M.P., “The Historicity of Jesus” (originally  
  scheduled for Nov. 25)
Lent 1912
 Jan. 21 H. F. Heard, “G. K. Chesterton”
 Jan. 28 G. F. Shove, “The Conception of the General Will in Modern  
  Political  Theory”
b.) Jan. 29 Mr. Joseph McCabe, “Materialism”
 Feb. 4 Miss E. M. Smith, “Animism”
 Feb. 11 C. F. Angus, “Christian Discipleship”
b.) Feb. 12  Mrs. A. W. Verrall, “Telepathy”
 Feb. 18 E. J. F. Alford, “Liberty”
 Feb. 25 T. E. Hulme, “Anti-Romanticism and Original Sin”
b.) Feb. 26 Dr. C. S. Myers, “The New Realism”
a. b.) Mar. 11 Bertrand Russell, “The Philosophy of Bergson”
Easter 1912
 Apr. 21 T. Renton, “Egyptian Religion”
 Apr. 28 J. E. Wilks, “Conversion”
b.) Apr. 29 Mr. E. Bullough, “Religion and Art”
 May 5 L. C. Robertson, “The Vedantic Philosophy”
 May 12 H. F. Jolowicz, “The Paradox of Ancient Religion”
 May 19 Dr. J. W. Oman, “Religion and Reality” 
 May 26 Miss M. Gabain, “Pascal: The Consistent Christian”
 June 2 Mr. H. Wildon Carr, “Life and Logic” (a defence of Bergson)
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b.) June 5 Mr. Frank Harris, “Shakespeare as Friend and Lover”
Michaelmas 1912
 Oct. 20 P. Sargant Florence, “The Possibility of an Inductive Political 
  Science”
b.) Oct. 21 Prof. Patrick Geddes, “Mythology and Life—an Interpretation of  
  Olympus as Rediscoverable”
 Oct. 27 Harold Munro, “Contemporary English Poetry”
 Nov. 3 V. Bugeja, “Scientific Intellectualism and Religious Belief ”
 Nov. 10 Rev. P. N. Waggett, “Scientific Method in Religion”
b.) Nov. 11 Dr. G. T. Wrench, “Nietzsche”
 Nov. 17 Dr. Ivor Ll. Tuckett, “The Evidence of the Supernatural”
 Nov. 24 E. B. Shanks, “The Technique of English Verse”
a. b.) Nov. 25 Jane Harrison, “Unanimism: A Study of Conversion and Some  
  Contemporary French Poets”
 Dec. 1 L. Macrae, “The Nature of Religious Knowledge”
 Dec. 8 W. L. Scott, “Against Mr. Moore”
Lent 1913
 Jan. 19 P. Sargant Florence, “Political Science”
 Jan. 26 H. F. Jolowicz, “The Greek Attitude towards Art”
b.) Jan. 27 By a Member of the Facts Society, “The Truth about Telepathy”
 Jan. 28 Gathering to celebrate the 100th meeting of the Heretics
 Feb. 2 A. J. Dorward, “Evidence and Belief ”
 Feb. 9 F. Bekassy, “Medieval Heretics”
b.) Feb. 11 Dr. W. H. D. Rouse, “Some Principles of Education”
 Feb. 16 M. Georges Roth, “Unanimist Poetry”
e.) Feb. 23 Rupert Brooke, “The Drama: Present and Future” (originally 
  scheduled for Mar. 2)
b.) Feb. 24 Mr. Haldane MacFall, “The Splendid Wayfaring: An Attack on Art- 
  Criticism” (titled “Against the Art Critics” in contemporaneous  
  issue of Cambridge Magazine)
 Mar. 2 Miss O. H. Persitz, “Anarchism: Past & Present” (originally 
  scheduled for Feb. 23)
Easter 1913
 Apr. 13 J. F. Harris, “Samuel Butler, the author of ‘Erewhon’”
 Apr. 20 A. D. Richie, “Vitalism”
 Apr. 27 Mr. Kamaluddin, “Some Principles of Islam”
b.) May 4 Dr. G. F. Rogers, “Hypnotism”
 May 11 Miss S. Fairhurst, “The Sorrows of a Psychologist”
 May 18 R. A. Fisher, “Nietzsche or Huxley?”
 May 25 V. Bugeja, “The Social Psychology of the Jesuits”
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 June 1 Mr. H. Golding, “Kierkegaard, a forerunner of Ibsen and Nietzsche”
b.) June 2 Mr. F. C. Conybeare, “Dreams”
 June 8 Mr. S. A. Cook, “Psychology and future Theology”
Michaelmas 1913
 Oct. 19 Mr. H. G. Wood, “Religion and the Unknown”
 Oct. 26 W. L. Scott, (1) “Bertrand Russell as a Neo-Platonist”; (2) 
  “Dramatic Criticism Condemned”
a. b.) Oct. 27 Mr. G. M. Trevelyan, “De Haeretico Comburendo”
b.) Nov. 2 Mr. C. Reddie, “Sex in Education and Education in Sex”
a. b.) Nov. 10 Mr. Holbrook Jackson, “The Artist as Heretic”
 Nov. 16 Mr. Halliday Sparling, “The Logic of the Bandar Log”
 Nov. 23 F. W. Stokoe, “Jules Laforgue”
b.) Nov. 24 Mr. G. Sturge Moore, “Taste”
 Nov. 30 Mr. Hugh Elliott, “Scientific Materialism”
c. e. f. g.) Dec. 1 Georg Brandes, “Nietzsche”
Lent 1914
 Jan. 18 F. Bekassy, “Hungarian Poetry since 1906”
 Feb. 1 Mr. R. D. Prowse, “Some Aspects of Modern Drama”
b.) Feb. 6 Mr. G. Lowes Dickinson, “The Religion of Time and the Religion  
  of Eternity”
 Feb. 8 Dr. R. Piccoli, “Croce’s Aesthetic”
d.) Feb. 15 Dr. G. E. Moore, “The Philosophy of Commonsense”
b.) Feb. 16 Debate with the “X” Club, Oxford, “That in the opinion of this  
  House the Churches are doing more harm than good”
b.) Feb. 22 Mr. J. H. Badley, “Co-Education”
 Mar. 1 Mr. John Alford, “Walt Whitman” (canceled)
a. c. d.) Mar. 1 Bertrand Russell, “Mysticism and Logic”
d.) Mar. 8 Mr. A. Thorold, “The Philosophy of Anatole France”
Easter 1914
 
 Apr. 26 G. Von Kaufmann, “The Monism of Wilhelm Ostwald” (originally  
  scheduled for Jan. 25)
 May 3 W. J. Gould, “History of Individualism”
b.) May 10 Miss Cicely Hamilton, “The Conventions of the Theatre”
 May 17 H. D. Henderson, “Morality and its Motives”
 May 24 A. J. Dorward, “Conventionality and Boredom”
 May 31 P. Vos, “The Reasonableness of the Jewish Religion”
c.) June 3 Signore F. T. Marinetti, “Futurism”
b.) June 5 Professor Gilbert Murray, “The Conception of Another World”
 June 7 Mrs. Graham, “Can we see God?”
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Michaelmas 1914
 Oct. 18 Mr. E. J. Dent, “The Meaning of Music”
 Oct. 25 Mr. E. Bullough, “Nietzsche and the War”
 Nov. 1 Dr. N. Wiener, “Scepticism”
 Nov. 8 P. Sargant Florence, “The Key to Sociology”
c.) Nov. 15 Prof. G. Santayana, “An Interpretation of Transcendentalism”
 Nov. 22 B. W. Downs, “Brieux” (originally scheduled for Nov. 15)
 Nov. 29 Dr. R. Piccoli, “The Philosophy of Michelstaedter” (originally  
  scheduled for Nov. 22)
a.) Dec. 5 or 6 Miss C. (Constance) Stoney, “Early Double Monasteries”
Lent 1915
 Jan. 17 Private Business
 Jan. 24 L. H. G. Greenwood, “Can the Promotion of Heresy be defended?”
 Jan. 31 Miss F. M. Stawell, “The Religion of Goethe”
 Feb. 7 Rev. E. W. Lummis, “In Praise of Faith”
 Feb. 14 M. Van Iseghem, “Romain Rolland”
c.) Feb. 21 Mr. E. E. Kellett, “Mediaevalism in Milton”
c.) Feb. 28 W. H. Bruford, “Friedrich Hebbel”
 Mar. 7 Mr. Harold Monro, “The God-Myth in Modern Poetry”
 Mar. 14 Mr. S. Thayer, “Aesthetica”
Easter 1915
 
 Apr. 25 Private Business
 May 2 Mr. C. Delisle Burns, “The Debt of Modern Philosophy to Literature”
 May 9 Mr. E. Bullough, “The Talking Horses of Elberfeld”
 May 16 Miss I. R. Turner, “On Certain Theosophical Fallacies”
 May 23 Mr. Shinji Ishii, “Freedom of Thought in Japan”
 May 30 Mr. A. S. McDowall, “Are we Realists?”
 June 6 Vernon Lee, “War, Group-Emotion and Art”
Michaelmas 1915
a. d.)  Oct. 17 Jane Harrison, “Russia and the Russian Verb: A Contribution to  
  the Psychology of the Russian People” (members’ meeting)
 Oct. 24  Miss E. Power, “Cult of the Virgin in the Middle Ages”
 Oct. 31 Charles Sayle, “Sir Thomas Browne”
 Nov. 7 Miss D. Jordan-Lloyd, “Facts and Fancies”
 Nov. 14 Desmond Macarthy, “Heroic Poetry”
 Nov. 21 S. K. Ratcliffe, “Billy Sunday and the Business of Conversion”
 Nov. 28 James Woods, “Cubism”
 Dec. 4 J. C. Squire, “Utopias”
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Lent 1916
c.) Jan. 16 Mr. W. S. Scott, “A Problem of Ethics”
 Jan. 23 G. E. Moore, “Intrinsic Value and its relations to Beauty and 
  Patches of Yellow surrounded by Red Rings”
b.) Jan. 30 G. H. Hardy, “The Value of Knowledge”
 Feb. 6 G. G. Coulton, “Toleration”
 Feb. 13 L. Alston, “Marcus Aurelius”
 Feb. 20 P. G. Howlett, “Carlyle’s Debt to Goethe”
 Feb. 27 W. E. Armstrong, “Happiness”
 Mar. 5 Miss L. A. Lomas, “Psycho-analysis and Poetry”
 Mar. 12 E. J. Dent, “The Musical interpretation of Shakespeare on the 
  Modern  Stage”
Easter 1916
 Apr. 30 F. S. Marvin, “The Reality of Progress”
 May 14 G. de Swietochowski, “Poland and her Religious Problems”
 May 21 Mrs. Bradlaugh Bonner, “Belief, Make-belief, and Unbelief ”
 May 28 V. Peniakoff, “The Aesthetics of Mr. Clive Bell” (originally 
  scheduled for May 7)
 June 4 Julius West, “The Russian Intelligentsia”
 June 11 Dr. Raffaello Piccoli, “The Religion of Mazzini”
Michaelmas 1916
 Oct. 22 Dr. Raffaello Piccoli, “The Ethics of Intellect”
 Oct. 29 W. H. Bruford, “Anatole France”
 Nov. 5 Mrs. Constance Graham, “Soul-doctoring, a Profession for the Laity”
 Nov. 12 Mrs. Rebecca West (postponed)
 Nov. 19 Miss D. W. Black, “Some Conceptions of Comedy”
 Nov. 26 Sunday meeting transferred to open meeting q.v.
b.) Nov. 28 Professor W. Bateson, “Evolutionary Theory and Modern Doubts”  
  (with Lantern Illustrations)
 Dec. 3 Mrs. M. A. Hamilton, “Henry James”
Lent 1917
 Jan. 21 Ernest J. Chaloner, “Art and Anarchy”
 Jan. 28 Miss Rebecca West, “Emotion and Education” (originally   
  scheduled for Nov. 12, 1916)
 Feb. 11 A. D. Waley, “Chinese Poetry”
 Feb. 18 Mr. Thomas, “Buddhism and Western Heterodoxy”
 Feb. 25 M. Jean Nicod, “Love of Life and the Instinct of Sacrifice” 
  (originally scheduled for Feb. 4)
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 Mar. 4 Mr. E. E. Turner, “The Futility of Utility”
 Mar. 11 E. R. Brown, “Still Life”
Easter 1917
 Apr. 22 Mr. E. Vulliamy, “Is Reality an Object of Art?”
 Apr. 29 Mr. Adrian Stephen, “In Defence of Understanding”
 May 6 Mr. W. W. Rouse Ball, “Cagliostro”
 May 13 Miss D. D. Ivers, “Origen and his Age”
 May 20 B. W. Downs, “Four Novelists of the Grand Siècle”
 May 27 Miss Gabain, “Eurhythmics”
 June 3 Mr. John Copley, “Revolutionary Fetters on Art”
Michaelmas 1917
 Oct. 21 Mr. A. E. Heath, “The New Realism”
 Oct. 28 Dr. G. F. Rogers, “Hypnotism”
 Nov. 4 Mr. E. E. Kellett, “The Nicene Creed”
 Nov. 11 C. C. Chatterji, “Individual and Society”
 Nov. 18 Mrs. A. E. Meyer, “Eugenics and Education”
 Nov. 25 L. S. Stebbing, “The Utility of Metaphysics”
 Dec. 2 S. K. Ratcliffe, “The Lower Middle Classes. A Problem”
Lent 1918
 Jan. 20 Sworry1
 Jan. 27 Miss E. A. Drew, “What was Shakespeare’s idea of Comedy?”
 Feb. 3 Mr. R. Demos, “The Nature of Organisation”
 Feb. 10 Miss D. Wrinch, “The Inter-Relation of Science and Philosophy”
 Feb. 17 Dr. G. E. Moore, “The Value of Religion”
 Feb. 24 Mr. P. Tudor-Hart, “Unity in Art”
 Mar. 3 Miss D. W. Black, “The Abbé Pluche and other Christian 
  Apologists”
 Mar. 10 Mr. Roper, “Education”
Easter 1918
 Apr. 28 Sworry
a.) May 5 Dr. Santayana, “Philosophic Opinion in America”
 May 12 Mr. John Drinkwater, “The Poet and Tradition”
 May 19 Mr. Shinji Ishii, “The Influence of Buddhism in Japan and the  
  Psychology of Harakiri”
 May 26 Mr. Graham Wallas, “Rational Purpose”
 June 2 Miss E. B. C. Jones, “Walter de la Mare”
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Michaelmas 1918
 
 Oct. 20 Mr. R. Demos, “Intolerance”
 Oct. 27 Captain Osbert Sitwell, “Intimidation in Art and Literature”
 Nov. 3 M. Mitrinevitch, “The realisation of reality”
 Nov. 17 F. C. Bartlett, “In Praise of Intolerance”
 Nov. 24 Meeting as announced
a.) Dec. 1 Miss D. W. Black, “How to be Happy—Some 18th Century Recipes”
Lent 1919
 Jan. 19 Mr. L. B. Walton, “The Imitative Faculty in Art”
 Jan. 26 J. B. Conliffe, “Aspects of New Zealand University Life”
 Feb. 2 Mr. E. Bullough, “My Experiences at Wilhelmshaven”
 Feb. 9 Sava Popovitch, “Synthetic Art”
 Feb. 16  W. A. Orton, “Artzibashef and the Russian Pessimism”
 Feb. 23 J. Reineke van Stuwe, “Recent Currents in Dutch and Flemish  
  Literature”
 Mar. 2 Miss Strachey, “The Case against Modern Poetry”
 Mar. 9 Mr. A. G. Pape, “A Plea for a New Motive in Education”
Easter 1919
 May 4 Mr. B. W. Downs, “Is Drama a dead form of Art?”
 May 11 Mr. J. C. Squire, “The Limitations of Heresy”
 May 18 L. Smodlaka, “Scandinavian and Jugo-Slav ideals compared and  
  contrasted”
 May 25 Mr. E. Bullough, “The Film as a New Art”
Michaelmas 1919
Sabbatical Term
Lent 1920
 Jan. 18 Mr. Robert Young, “State Religion in Japan”
 Jan. 25 Mr. Ivor Richards, “Emotion and Art”
 Feb. 1 Miss E. B. C. Jones, “The Art of Walter de la Mare”
 Feb. 8 E. A. Walker, “Marcel Proust”
 Feb. 15 Mrs. Vulliamy, “Dress”
 Feb. 22 Dr. H. Crichton Miller, “The Making of a Heretic”
 Feb. 29 Miss E. E. Power, “The Nun in Literature”
 Mar. 7 Walter de la Mare, “Life in Fiction”
 Mar. 14 Mrs. M. A. Hamilton, “Henry James”
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Summer 1920
e.) Apr. 25 I. A. Richards and C. K. Ogden, “The New Symbolist Movement”
 May 2 Miss E. E. Power, “A plea for the Middle Ages” (earlier titled “In  
  Defence of Mediaevalism”)
 May 9 B. Dobree, “Laughter in its relation to Comedy”
 May 16 Miss E. Pedley, “The Sublime”
From June 1920 to January 1921, the records are incomplete.
a.)  Lytton Strachey, “Art and Indecency”
Lent 1921
 Jan. 23 Dr. G. E. Moore, “Some Problems of Ethics”
 Jan. 30 W. Whateley Smith, “Psychical Research”
e.) Feb. 27 Jane Harrison, “The Religion of To-Day”
Summer 1921
 Apr. 24 Dr. W. H. R. Rivers, “The Origin of Caste”
 May 1 A. V. Burbury, “A Study in Reserve”
 May 15 Capt. L. De G. Sieveking, “The Unforeseen Effects of Flying on the  
  Mind”
 June 5 Mr. Harold Monro, “Can any Religion meet the Conditions of  
  Modern  European Civilization?”
Michaelmas 1921
 Oct. 16 Dr. Marriette Soman, “Modern French Literature”
 Oct. 23 Prof. B. Muscio, “Behaviourism”
 Oct. 30 Mr. C. H. Hsu, “Readings in Chinese Poetry”
 Nov. 6 Miss Edith Sitwell, “Modern Criticism”
d. e.) Nov. 13 Mr. Arthur Waley, “Zen Buddhism”
 Nov. 17 Mr. G. G. Coulton, “Super Heresy” (by invitation)
 Nov. 20 Mr. H. Morris, “The Tragedy of Education”
d. e.) Nov. 27 Mr. Clive Bell, “Jazz Art”
Lent 1922
 Jan. 22 Mr. B. K. (Kingsley) Martin, “The Psychology of the Press”
 Jan. 29 Dr. H. Hartridge, “Sleep”
 Feb. 5 Mr. L. L. Whyte, “Adventures of Atoms”
 Feb. 12 Mr. A. Clutton Brock, “Some Difficulties of Literary Expression”
 Feb. 19 Mr. W. J. Turner, “Musical Heresies”
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 Feb. 26 Mr. A. E. Heath, “Why are Mathematicians obsessed by the Mind?”
d. e.) Mar. 5 Mr. and Mrs. Bertrand Russell, “Industrialism and Religion”: (1)  
  Bertrand Russell, “Traditional Religion”; (2) Dora Russell, “The  
  Industrial Creed”
 Mar. 12 Prof. J. T. Wilson, “A Rational Universe”
Summer 1922
 Apr. 30 L. S. Penrose, “The Chess Problem; a neglected form of Art”
 May 7 A. B. Mathews, “Anthropology; its practical and theoretical   
  applications”
 May 14 Miss E. E. Power, “India, China and Europe; a traveller’s 
  impressions”
 May 21 Mr. S. K. Ratcliffe, “The Intellectual Reaction in America”
 May 28 Mr. Julian Huxley
 June 4 M. H. A. Newman, “Can Physics be saved from the 
  Mathematicians?”
 June 11 Mr. Eugene Goossens, “Contemporary Music”
  Economic Section
 May 18 M. H. Dobb, “The Decline of Capitalism”
Lent 1923
e.) Feb. 4 J. B. S. Haldane, “Daedalus”
 Feb. 18 Walter de la Mare, “Islands and Robinson Crusoe”
 Feb. 25 Percy Turner, “Modern Art”
 March 6 Roger Fry, “Composition”
C. K. Ogden withdraws from managing the Society, and the records become scattered.
Summer 1924
e.) May 18 Virginia Woolf, “Character in Fiction”
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Introduction
 1. In The Longest Journey (1907), E. M. Forster clearly continues Arnold’s and Hardy’s 
critique of the modern “want of correspondence” between form and content. Survey-
ing the cataracts near the road from Salisbury to Cadover, the narrative voice declares: 
“instead of looking towards the cathedral, as all the city should, they look outwards at 
a pagan entrenchment, as the city should not. They neglect the poise of the earth, and 
the sentiments she has decreed. They are the modern spirit” (288). For Forster, the form 
of modern dwellings here does not cohere with their intended purpose. Etymologically 
pagans are “country-dwellers.” Forster plays on words to foreground the straying of “civil-
ians” from the “civis” and the cathedral which had distinguished them from heathens.
 2. In After Strange Gods, Eliot defines “tradition” as a set of “habitual actions” “of 
the same people living in the same place” (11), associates tradition with orthodoxy, and 
declares that “the right tradition for us must also be a Christian tradition” (22).
 3. Kranidis argues that a prominent method used to achieve these ends was to syn-
thesize “the conventional tradition-bound figure of womanhood with the enlightened 
New Woman” (xiv). Through this subversive technique, writers such as Mona Caird 
and Olive Schreiner could “successfully insert [their alternatives and criticisms] into 
mainstream discourses and maintain [their] political purpose . . . without compromising 
[their] message” (ix).
 4. Perhaps the most evocative literary example of the literary and historical amnesia 
that accompanied the onset and aftermath of the First World War is Chris Baldry’s mental 
erasure of the twentieth century in Rebecca West’s The Return of the Soldier (1918). By 
suppressing the fifteen years from 1901 to 1916, Chris returns to a time in his life filled 
with poetics, romanticism, and a Victorian sensibility.
 5. The aesthetic attempt at “completion,” for instance, appears at the end of Woolf ’s 
To the Lighthouse (1927) as Mr. Ramsay finally arrives at the lighthouse. Lily Briscoe has 
her “vision” simultaneously and can complete her “blurred” painting, “an attempt at some-
thing,” by drawing “a line there, in the centre” (208–9).
Chapter 1
 1. In his discussion of the reception of Nietzsche’s attacks on Christianity, René 
Girard wonders whether in academic circles there is “something inopportune or embar-
Notes
•
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rassing about the theme” and whether it is “strategically advisable” to discuss critiques of 
religion (816). In his study of church attendance in England from 1870–1930, Jeffrey Cox 
notes the “religious indifference of the twentieth century” which finds that “the subject of 
religion often provokes boredom” and “is not supposed to be important” (3).
 2. For example, Jacques Derrida, Gianni Vattimo, and Slavoj Žižek have brought 
religion back to the foreground of criticism. See Derrida, Acts of Religion (New York: 
Routledge, 2002); Derrida and Vattimo, eds., Religion (Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University 
Press 1998); and Žižek, On Belief (New York: Routledge, 2001). Several other studies have 
applied the work of Levinas and Bakhtin to extended treatments of religion, society, and 
literature. See Jeffrey Kosky, Levinas and the Philosophy of Religion (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2001); and Susan M. Felch and Paul J. Contino, eds., Bakhtin and Religion 
(Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 2001).
 3. References to Keynes’ collected writings are cited parenthetically within the text by 
volume and page number.
 4. Paul Levy describes the Apostles and Bloomsbury as giving “the impression that 
they could not be harmed, that they were not vulnerable,” and he attributes this demeanor 
to the fact that “they were sure of their rightness” (245).
 5. For example, the Bishop of Durham, Joseph Barber Lightfoot (1828–89), wrote 
several influential studies of St. Paul’s Epistles, and his Ignatius (1885) decided the authen-
ticity of St. Ignatius’ epistles. Additionally, Lightfoot participated with Brooke Westcott 
(1825–1901) and Fenton Hort (1828–92) in the celebrated revision of the Greek New 
Testament (1881). The culmination of Westcott’s thought appears in The Gospel of Life 
(1892).
 6. For a more full discussion of college chapel and compulsory attendance at 
Cambridge, see Christopher Brooke, A History of the University of Cambridge, vol. 4 
(Cambridge University Press, 1993), 106–21; and V. H. H. Green, Religion at Oxford and 
Cambridge (London: SCM Press, 1964), 297–333.
 7. In 1913, J. E. M. McTaggart, a Heretic, put forth the successful motion at Trinity 
not to enforce compulsory chapel.
 8. In 1929, the Master of Magdalene succeeded in reinstituting two attendances per 
week for all members of the Church of England. This statute lasted until the Second World 
War.
 9. In the May 14 1909 edition of The Church Times, the Church of England newspa-
per with the largest circulation reported the state of affairs at Cambridge. The anonymous 
columnist tried to dismiss Chawner as an eccentric to be neither tolerated nor worried 
about: “Much distress has been caused at a large and important College by the publication 
of a pamphlet by the Master, in which he details his views on religion. Their somewhat 
elementary nature shows that he cannot have devoted much time—or at any rate much 
study—to the question, and his action has caused needless pain to both teachers and 
learners in the College, who are not prepared to see the whole supernatural element of 
Christianity thrown overboard without a protest. These inconsiderable utterances are 
much to be deplored” (The Church Times 14 May 1909: 651). Ogden clipped the review 
and pasted it in his copy of “Prove All Things.”
 10. Apparently Francis Cornford is one of the three who did not want their correspon-
dence to be published. In his brief account of the Chawner affair, Don Cupitt includes an 
excerpt from a letter Cornford sent to Chawner on May 17, 1909, in response to “Prove 
All Things.” He probably did not want his militant agnosticism to be exposed, for he called 
for “solidarity among the non-clericals here, and some organised protest” against denying 
the use of Swinburne’s name for a University prize. He also stated that the “Theological 
School is a disgrace” (TCA 9).
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 11. At the October 3 informal meeting of the Heretics, Mr. Hodge of Trinity joined 
after forsaking the F. T. A. Lavington was there and did not.
 12. The full list is: The Master of Emmanuel, Prof. E. G. Browne, F. M. Cornford, Dr. 
F. Darwin, G. Lowes Dickinson, G. H. Hardy, Miss J. E. Harrison, W. E. Johnson, J. M. 
Keynes, Dr. J. E. McTaggart, V. H. Mottram, D. S. Robertson, Prof. A. C. Seward, J. T. 
Sheppard, H. W. V. Temperley, G. M. Trevelyan, V. S. Vernon Jones, Dr. A. W. Verrall, and 
H. J. Wolstenholme.
 13. A. E. Ward of Newnham was the first female committee member in 1910.
 14. In one passage, McTaggart almost seems to parody William James’ work in his 
overuse of the words “variety,” “religious,” and “experience” (5). The influence of James’ 
book on English philosophy at the turn of the century cannot be overstated.
Chapter 2
 1. The membership book is titled, in Ogden’s hand, “Ye Worshipful Society of ye 
Heretics” (MCMA 114 Env.3).
 2. Remembering the Christian presence in the Heretics, G. F. Fox reports: one of the 
“most vociferous members was a Roman Catholic from Montenegro. C. F. Angus was a 
Christian and gave us what was practically a sermon. He was listened to with profound 
attention, and there was no heckling in the discussion. Whereas another Christian speaker 
who addressed us in a patronising tone was given a nasty heckling later” (88).
 3. For instance, W. J. Turner addressed the group on “Musical Heresies” in 1922, and 
Dr. H. Crichton-Miller wrote to Ogden in 1920 explaining that his contribution, “The 
Making of a Heretic,” could also be called “Psycho-analysis and heretical tendencies” or 
“Heresy and the Subconscious” (MCMA 113.36).
 4. Ogden’s friend Mary Adams reports that he would ask people to wear masks 
because, he said, “[t]his enables me to talk in terms of ideas and not in terms of personali-
ties. I blot you out. I only listen to what you say and the ideas you have” (CA 44).
 5. The controversy created a deep bitterness in Chawner toward Raven since the 
Master had been responsible for Raven’s appointment in the face of opposition from the 
Christian members of the governing body. Later, Raven would find he was too young and 
out of line in challenging Chawner (Raven 178–80).
 6. The correspondence between Ogden and Welby is mostly housed at York Univer-
sity, Toronto. On May 16, 1911, she wrote to Ogden: “I agree that orthodoxy is just as bad 
as heresy,—and vice versa!”; “I don’t wonder that you feel as you do about the ‘divine.’ I 
should welcome a term for the starry and the sunny and the rush of Spring beauty, which 
was free from outgrown references”; “As for Faith you must be consistent and socially 
canonise the deserter, the betrayer, the traitor”; and “I feel a little as if Heresy was becom-
ing the opposite of a faith, that is becoming a dogma” (MCMA 112).
 7. References to Russell’s collected papers are cited parenthetically within the text by 
volume and page number.
 8. Writing for The Gownsman, a reviewer of Benson’s address questioned the “sur-
prising omission” of “Pater’s curious attitude toward the Church” (Gownsman Vol. 2 {Feb-
ruary 11, 1911}: 363).
 9. Virginia Woolf, To the Lighthouse (New York: Harcourt, 1989), 34.
 10. Several of the budget sheets of the Heretics are housed in McMaster’s collection 
(MCMA 113.38).
 11. The Great Heresies (1938), Belloc’s contribution to reactionary Catholic apologet-
ics, takes pride in polarizing orthodox Catholic doctrine and tradition with a handful of 
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heresies. Above all, he wants to mark the differences by defining what exactly makes a her-
esy a heresy so that he can line up the “ranks” “as for a battle” (161). The war to be waged 
will decide “the whole future of our race” (161).
 12. Forster’s diary is housed in the Kings’ College Archives at Cambridge University. 
Portions have not yet been opened to the public.
Chapter 3
 1. During the 1909–10 academic year, 3,699 male undergraduates were enrolled at 
Cambridge. At the height of the First World War, only 575 enrolled for the Easter Term, 
1916 (Brooke 331).
 2. Dora Black would return to Cambridge in March 1922, after marrying Bertrand 
Russell. Together they addressed the Heretics on “Industrialism and Religion.”
 3. Each of the volumes in the Today and Tomorrow Series has a Latin or Greek title 
followed by an alternative title usually involving the word “future.” Among personages for-
merly involved in the Heretics, the series includes Bertrand Russell’s Icarus, or the Future 
of Science, Dora Russell’s Hypatia, of Woman and Knowledge, J. B. S. Haldane’s Daedalus, 
or Science and the Future, and Vernon Lee’s Proteus, or the Future of Intelligence.
 4. In Jacob’s Room, Virginia Woolf must certainly have had in mind the address of her 
fellow member of Bloomsbury when an outraged Jacob Flanders reacts against bowdler-
ization and prudery and cites Shakespeare and Aristophanes for the argument in his essay 
“Ethics of Indecency” (69–78).
 5. For instance, in H. D.’s Notes on Thought and Vision (1919), she claims: “Two or 
three people, with healthy bodies and the right sort of receiving brains, could turn the 
whole tide of human thought, could direct lightning flashes of electric power to slash 
across and destroy the world of dead, murky thought” (27).
 6. In the December 1, 1923, edition of Nation and Athenaeum, Woolf first introduced 
Mrs. Brown in the short response, “Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown,” to Arnold Bennett’s 
critique of Jacob’s Room. The address to the Heretics was the first substantial development 
of Woolf ’s illustrative contrast between Edwardians and Georgians, which T. S. Eliot would 
publish after major revisions as “Character in Fiction” in the July 1924 edition of Criterion. 
In October of that year, the Hogarth Press published this same essay as Mr Bennett and Mrs 
Brown in pamphlet form.
 7. Virginia Woolf, “Character in Fiction,” The Essays of Virginia Woolf, ed. Andrew 
McNeillie, vol. 3 (London: Hogarth, 1988), 503. This appendix to the collection of Woolf ’s 
essays is a transcript of her revised typescript address to the Heretics. Since “Character in 
Fiction” is also the title of the published version McNeillie collects in his volume, I will 
hereafter cite the address to the Heretics as CF1 and the published version as CF2 paren-
thetically within the text.
 8. Samuel Hynes perhaps initiated the inaccuracy in reporting that Woolf delivered 
the lecture “to the girls of Girton College in May 1924” (“Contention” 31). Woolf ’s own 
version of the gender of her audience appears in a letter to Ethel Sands: “I’ve been lecturing 
at Cambridge on your beloved Arnold Bennett, and not a single young man or woman in 
the place has a good word to say for him!” (Letters 3: 112).
 9. For example, Hirst declares that “Love” is the concept that “seems to explain it all” 
(315). Later, in order to repress the fact that Rachel was near death, Terence experiences a 
mystical view of the natural world: “Surely the world of strife and fret and anxiety was not 
the real world, but this was the real world, the world that lay beneath the superficial world, 
so that, whatever happened, one was secure” (343).
 10. In the published version of “Character in Fiction,” Woolf changed the example of 
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Jude to The Mayor of Casterbridge. This is a symptomatic shift. In the 1920s, criticism led 
by Eliot tended to bestow praise on Hardy’s earlier novel (if he received praise at all) for 
its character development. Criticism could thus steer away from the scandal of Jude.
 11. For example, in her discussion of Harrison’s influence on Woolf ’s Between the Acts, 
Sandra Shattuck highlights the brilliant estrangement elicited by Miss La Trobe’s dramatic 
use of broken mirrors as an instance of Harrison’s ideas surrounding collective ritual per-
formance.
 12. R. M. O’Donnell underscores the importance of heresy to Keynes since “his earli-
est years,” and considers this appreciation “a by-product of his interest in truth and reason 
and his attitude to preordained rules and duties.” O’Donnell also clusters a set of allusions 
to heresy in Keynes’ writings (367n5). Heresy defines the Bloomsbury economist’s thought 
to such a degree that Robert L. Heilbroner entitles the relevant chapter “The Heresies of 
John Maynard Keynes” in his famous history of economic thinkers, The Worldly Philoso-
phers (1953).
 13. John Maynard Keynes, “The Economic Consequences of Mr Churchill,” The Col-
lected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, vol. 19 (Cambridge University Press, 1981), 441.
 14. Keynes’ endeavor illustrates the importance of both persuasion and synthesis to 
his approach to economics. The General Theory is one grand synthesis that inverts ortho-
dox claims to generality and makes it the special case (O’Donnell 176). As Keynes himself 
argued, the limitations of orthodox economics make it “a particular theory applicable 
only to certain conditions; and this is my justification for calling my own theory a general 
theory, of which the orthodox theory is a limiting case” (14: 106).
 15. The Rockefeller Foundation appears to have had a long-standing interest in lan-
guage reform. In Shaw’s Pygmalion (1913), Alfred Doolittle returns at the end of the play 
fearing that he will be caught in “middle class morality” now that he has been awarded a 
lifetime stipend by one “Ezra D. Wannafeller” (73–74). Doolittle had been part of Henry 
Higgins’ offhand application for funding for the foundation of “Moral Reform Societies” 
and the invention of a “universal language” (74).
 16. In an anonymous lampoon, “Those in Authority,” published in Granta in May 
1929, the author roasts Empson’s untidy lifestyle and has particular fun with his recruit-
ment of speakers for the Heretics. While attempting to interview “Bill,” the author shuffles 
across the beer-stained carpet only to hear him say “Look here, it’s lucky someone turned 
up. What can you read a paper on for next Sunday?” The author concludes by noting 
that “the interesting creature is on view every Sunday evening . . . where he may be seen 
preening himself beside his catch, and glowering at the assembled Heretics” (15–16). In 
this view, the President of the Heretics was always on the lookout for prey. On the hunted 
rather than hunting hand, we have Empson idealizing the conviction of heretics in Milton’s 
God: “when I was a little boy I was very afraid I might not have the courage which I knew 
life to demand of me . . . if some bully said he would burn me alive unless I pretended to 
believe he had created me, I hope I would have enough honour to tell him that the evi-
dence did not seem to me decisive” (89).
 17. In Milton’s God, Empson argues against the traditional view that Milton had inad-
vertently characterized God as a tyrant through the inconsistencies in the epic. Instead, 
Empson finds that the richness of the poem derives from Milton’s honest investigation of 
the nature of God’s ways. Sometimes God is wicked and sadistic, and punishment unfair, 
and this interpretation troubled the critical waters that mandated that Milton made mis-
takes since God’s ways are necessarily good. Empson’s book met a strong critical backlash, 
perhaps best summarized by Hugh Kenner as “surely the maddest critical book of the 
century” (213n).
 18. In part, Empson developed his idea of equilibrium from I. A. Richards who uses 
the term interchangeably with “synthesis” and “wholeness.”
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 19. Paul Fry notes the similar use of the seventh type of ambiguity in Empson’s analy-
sis of the function of the doctrine of the Trinity in Paradise Lost and that of Atonement 
in “The Sacrifice” (156–69). They both are dependent on divisions within the writer’s 
mind. In a similar vein, Christopher Norris summarizes Empson’s analogous approach: 
“in Milton’s case this means trying to understand both how a doctrine like the Christian 
Atonement could implant itself so firmly in the Western cultural tradition, and how vari-
ous thinkers within that tradition struggled to avoid its worst, most sadistic implications 
by telling the story over again while refusing—at whatever ‘unconscious’ level—to endorse 
the official creed” (“Introduction” 13–14).
 20. The twentieth century witnessed an explosion of various schools of thought flying 
under the banner of “humanism.” From Irving Babbitt’s New Humanism to the Human-
ist Manifesto to the liberal humanism of E. M. Forster and the Cambridge Humanists, 
various groups of people appropriated the term. The resultant vagueness of the label often 
hid the ideology of the affiliations, and gives credence to G. E. Moore’s complaint that, in 
comparison to “heresy,” the name “humanism” was not “strong enough” (WCL 406).
 21. Jonathan Culler explains that Empson became ostracized and labeled an “eccen-
tric” because he wished “not only to open skeptical debate about Christian principles that 
are articulated in literature but to challenge the complicity with religion which neglects 
authors’ oppositions to theological orthodoxies” (75). Stressing the importance of a politi-
cal critique of religious discourse in literature, Culler adds that Empson was simply “trying 
to combat the unreflective acceptance of Christianity that makes attacks on it seem odd 
and tedious behavior” (76).
 22. As Cleanth Brooks himself acknowledges, his previous discussion of Robert 
Herrick’s “Corinna’s Going-a-Maying” “is perhaps susceptible of this interpretation—or 
misinterpretation” (181). Though a “pagan appeal” persists throughout the presentation 
of the ritual in the poem, this is qualified by “the Christian view” and, “if we read it care-
fully,” the “primacy of the Christian mores” (182). The qualification by the Christian view 
precludes the need to make statements about the poem, but Brooks believes that the critic 
can still use interpretive paraphrase to confirm that the poem states “that the May-day 
rites are not a real religion but a ‘harmless follie’” (181–82). If it promotes Christian values 
and thwarts the appeal of pagan “follie,” Brooks tolerates the heresy of paraphrase.
 23. Many years after the dissolution of the Heretics Society, Kathleen Raine wrote to 
Julian Trevelyan after having heard one of Alistair Cooke’s weekly broadcasts in which 
“he had talked to the new generation of rabble students.” She remembered him describing 
“to them ‘our’ Cambridge: the talk, the hard work, the Heretics, the fullness of our days, 
innocence; and overheard one of the new guys saying to another—‘do you know—that 
square—I really believed he liked it!’ I almost wept” (TCL JOT 13/16).
Chapter 4
 1. Noteworthy among their public spectacles was a mock trial of 1914 “solving” The 
Mystery of Edwin Drood in which Chesterton as the judge and Shaw as the foreman of the 
jury found John Jasper guilty of the murder.
 2. The pamphlets of both Shaw’s and Chesterton’s addresses are reports transcribed 
by the Heretics for private publication. They include notes of applause, laughter, and ges-
ture, and at the end they attach several excerpts from reviews of the events as reported by 
various national newspapers and journals.
 3.  Shaw’s view of “The Heretic” is akin to the Italian miller whose cosmology Carlo 
Ginzburg describes in The Cheese and the Worms (1976).
 4. For personal recollections of actresses who have played Joan, see Holly Hill’s fas-
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cinating collection, Playing Joan (New York: Theatre Communications Group, 1987). The 
revisionist, feminist narrative of Mark Rappaport’s film From the Journals of Jean Seberg 
(1995) traces the career of the actress who debuted nationally as Joan in Otto Preminger’s 
film adaptation of Shaw’s play, Saint Joan (1957). Rappaport’s film implies that there is a 
curse in playing Joan, and Seberg suggests that Preminger actually allowed her to be burnt 
during filming. An accident on the set while she is “burnt” at the stake did let the flames 
reach her.
 5. On several occasions, Shaw’s play points to the arbitrariness and failure of Joan’s 
voices. The voices chose dubiously to speak to Joan “in French” (126). Joan states that she 
hears the voices “in the bells” (110). More importantly, she admits that “the voices come 
first,” and she finds “the reasons after” (111). Finally, she even declares that her “voices 
have deceived” her because they “promised” that she “should not be burnt” (139–40).
 6. Bruno’s influence has also been noted in Spenser, Sydney, Bacon, Donne, and 
Coleridge.
 7. In 1930, the Catholic Church canonized Cardinal Robert Bellarmino, the cleric in 
charge of Bruno’s trial and punishment.
 8. Joyce sequentially changed the title of the story from “Hallow Eve” to “The Clay” 
to “Clay,” and these changes suggest a turn away from specificity, a movement that accords 
with Joyce’s search for a larger order beyond Catholic orthodoxy.
 9. Some critics point out that she bakes “barmbracks,” the traditional Celtic food for 
Samhain, and that she returns to her old haunts, Joe’s house. Other critics note how Maria 
is beyond reproach. The matron of the laundry finds her “a veritable peace-maker,” and 
Joe frequently used to say, “Mamma is mamma but Maria is my proper mother” (110–11). 
From such comments and her apparent virginity, some criticism has cast her as the moth-
er of God. Donald Torchiara summarizes the genesis of such variant readings: “Maria by 
name and appearance seems to be the expected confluence of Christian and pagan that 
makes up the modern Halloween” (151).
 10. In an interesting further gloss of “Clay,” Roman Catholic catechism polarizes the 
Standard of Christ, “blessed are the peacemakers,” with the Standard of the World, “Am I 
my brother’s keeper?” (Kelley 67). Maria regrets that the brothers she raised have become 
estranged: “Alphy and Joe were not speaking” (113).
 11. Joyce may have entitled the story “Clay” to echo a moment in “A Little Cloud.” 
Apart from the title of “Clay,” the only mention of the word in Dubliners occurs in “A Little 
Cloud.” While rocking his child, Little Chandler tries to read the second stanza of Byron’s 
“On the Death of a Young Lady”: “Within this narrow cell reclines her clay, / That clay 
where once . . .” (92). The fragment anticipates Maria’s story, whose title knowingly follows 
another set of ellipses, the last line of “Counterparts”: “I’ll say a Hail Mary . . .” (109). Both 
of these fragments find completion in “Clay” and testify to the interwoven, molded nature 
of the stories in Dubliners.
Chapter 5
 1. Edited by Sharp under the pseudonym W. H. Brooks, The Pagan Review was 
designed to be a quarterly journal. However, its serial nature never materialized after 
Sharp could not continue the tour de force of writing the entire contents (dramatic, nar-
rative, and poetic) under varying pen names.
 2. It is important to remember that, in the end, the poet cries “False Sphinx!” and 
asks to be left with his “crucifix.” Here in miniature is Ellis Hanson’s notion of the decadent 
turn to Catholicism. In Decadence and Catholicism (1997), Hanson synthesizes Christian, 
aesthetic, and erotic discourses in the work of Huysmans, Pater, and Wilde to show the 
NO T E S  TO  C HA P T E R  5 
Franke_final.indb   237 1/28/2008   4:40:33 PM
ways in which nineteenth-century Catholicism is “decadent,” and the decadent movement 
Catholic.
 3. Quotations are drawn from the fourth edition of The Renaissance (1893), the last, 
revised edition published in Pater’s lifetime.
 4. In the OED, the first definition of “curious” used as a subjective quality of persons 
is: “Bestowing care or pains.” Demonstrating the relation of “curious” to “cure,” John 
Ayto states that the “Latin adjective curiosus originally meant ‘careful,’ a sense preserved 
through Old French curios into English curious but defunct since the 18th century. The 
secondary sense ‘inquisitive’ developed in Latin, but it was not until the word reached Old 
French that the meaning ‘interesting’ emerged” (150).
 5. Wolfgang Iser finds that the “skepticism of Pater’s first essay [on Coleridge] 
remained fundamental to all his writings,” and describes it, in the vein of “curiosity,” as a 
“skepticism in the old classical sense of ‘spying out, investigating, searching, examining’” 
(Pater 16–17).
 6. In his essay on the subtextual Paterian echoes in Eliot’s criticism, David DeLaura 
finds that, in “Sandro Botticelli,” Pater “had given several hints which suggest a source for 
the criterion of the ‘objective correlative’” (“Pater” 428).
 7. Hardy published “Candour in English Fiction” in the January 1890 edition of The 
New Review, and Frazer dates the preface of the first edition of The Golden Bough March 
8, 1890.
 8. For a rich discussion of the composition history of Tess, see Juliet Grindle and 
Simon Gatrell’s introduction and notes to the Clarendon edition of the novel, along with 
Gatrell’s Hardy the Creator (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988).
 9. Hardy’s choice of both Tess’s involvement in a “Cerealia” and the Clare brothers’ 
reading of A Counterblast to Agnosticism occurs during the process of revision and points 
to his accretion of details furthering the opposition between paganism and Christianity in 
the novel.
 10. Rosemary Eakins discusses several of the pagan and Christian allusions in the 
novel and concludes that this “traditional material becomes the very fabric of the book, 
woven into almost every aspect of the tragic story” (107). For the source of some of this 
material, she suggests, which others have confirmed, that Hardy possibly read Frazer’s The 
Golden Bough.
 11. In a brief survey, Gallagher draws parallels between the sexual and sacrificial rites 
performed by Artemis and the King of the Wood and “the main events of Tess Durbey-
field’s destiny—sex in the primeval forest, murder by stabbing of the priest-husband, and 
the execution of the goddess herself ” (429).
 12. For further discussion of the Celtic tree alphabet, see Roderick O’Flaherty, Ogygia, 
1685, trans. James Hely (Dublin: M’Kenzie, 1793); Robert Graves, The White Goddess 
(New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1966); and Fergus Kelly, “The Old Irish Tree List,” 
Celtica 11 (1976): 107–24.
Chapter 6
 1. In the early drafts of The Rainbow, Lawrence compares Will’s feelings to being 
“racked” rather than “burnt at the stake.” The change further testifies to Lawrence’s iden-
tification of the novel with heresy.
 2. In the first draft of A Passage to India, the novel simply chants “Mrs. Moore.” 
Forster’s decision to inflect her name with the Indo-European root for “to be” reflects not 
only the stitched nature of the novel, but also the interwoven nature of language and being 
that is the most fundament universal synthesis.
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After Words
 1. In November 1927, transition continued its serial publication of Joyce’s Work in 
Progress (Finnegans Wake) with an early version of “Anna Livia Plurabelle,” Book I, chapter 
8 of the Wake. During 1928, Joyce revised “Anna Livia,” and Crosby Gaige published it in 
booklet form. Two years later, Faber and Faber became the first English publisher to print 
“Anna Livia,” also as a booklet. Ogden’s translation into Basic English works from this edi-
tion.
 2. In assisting with the Italian and French translations of the chapter, Joyce also 
stressed his concern with reproducing a similar rhythm, harmony, and consonance. Bish-
op dismisses any perception in these cases of Joyce’s “apparent recklessness” in ignoring 
literal meaning, and emphasizes that he “knew quite well what he was doing” (457n23).
 3. Additionally, in this instance, the translation loses the repetitive rhythm of Joyce’s 
phrasing.
 4. In the Wake, Joyce similarly critiques the inability of a limited lexicon to convey 
the richness of words such as “majesty”: “I am told by our interpreter . . . that there are 
fully six hundred and six ragwords in your malherbal Magis landeguage . . . but yav hace 
not one pronouncable teerm that blows in all vallums of tartallaght to signify majestate” 
(478.8–13).
 5. In 1931, Bernard Shaw pointedly suggested that the “Inquisition is not dead” since 
modern dictatorships will create a “secret tribunal dealing with sedition, with political 
heresy, exactly like the Inquisition” (qtd. in Holroyd 75).
 6. Syme may be named after the counterinsurgent heresy hunter in Chesterton’s The 
Man Who Was Thursday.
 7. For instance, W. Terrence Gordon has often denied the connection between Basic 
English and Newspeak. Also see W. F. Bolton, The Language of Nineteen Eighty-Four 
(Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1984).
 8. In fact, Ogden had suggested that Basic could make English a study for antiquar-
ians.
 9. Orwell’s own creation of a scandalous “blacklist” while he was writing the novel 
may have accentuated the theme of betrayal.
 10. It is no wonder that the Axis accused England of using the promotion of Basic 
English “as a propaganda stunt designed to secure domination of the world” (Gordon 
52).
 11. In its final form, the Basic English word list includes both “war” and “peace,” 
but in 1929 Ogden had defended his initial reasoning to exclude “peace.” In an editorial 
for Psyche, he responded to the criticism of Basic by a writer for the Baltimore Sun. The 
unnamed critic had lambasted the omission of important words in the Basic lexicon, and 
highlighted the choice of “war” over “peace.” Ogden retorted: “The significance of choos-
ing ‘war’ as the more fundamental word is that when ‘not at war’ we have ‘peace’; while 
peace is more naturally described in terms of war ‘coming to an end’ than vice versa” 
(Editorial 4). As in the given state of affairs in Nineteen Eighty-Four, war, in this mindset, 
is the fundamental and natural character of global politics.
Appendix
 1. The term “sworry” is Ogden’s humor. The Society held a soirée instead of a regular 
meeting.
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